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Light in the Cave  
A Philosophical Enquiry into the Nature of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Philosophy 
Tianyi Zhang 
Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191), founder of the Islamic Illuminationist tradition, is 
one of the most controversial and misunderstood Arabic philosophers. Corbin cultivates 
Suhrawardī as a mystic who revived ancient Persian wisdom; Gutas reads him as a follower of 
Avicenna (d. 1037); scholars like Ziai and Walbridge argue that he is an original and serious 
philosopher. But it seems that no reconstructions of Illuminationist philosophy are satisfactory. 
I propose a Cave Story approach, which relates Suhrawardī’s ambitious Illuminationist 
project to Plato’s cave allegory. By following this approach, I present a historical reconstruction 
of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy, focusing on three areas: presential knowledge 
(epistemology), mental considerations (ontology and the problem of universals), and light 
metaphysics. 
Chapter I proves, by solid textual evidence, that Suhrawardī’s four Peripatetic works and 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (The Philosophy of Illumination, his masterpiece and the only Illuminationist 
work) constitute one and the same Illuminationist project. Chapter II reconstructs Illuminationist 
presential knowledge, an original epistemology of particulars (without any universals involved) 
and the epistemological foundation of Illuminationism. Chapters III and IV prove 
philosophically that universals must all be mental considerations (i.e. things created by the 
mind), and real things must be particulars; this is Suhrawardī’s fundamental criticism of 
Peripatetic metaphysics. Chapter V reconstructs light metaphysics, a serious metaphysics of 
particulars (not universals). 
I conclude that Suhrawardī is an original and serious philosopher, who resorts to mysticism 
only for sound philosophical reasons, and who should not be taken as a follower of Avicenna; his 
Illuminationism is a philosophy of particulars rather than universals. 
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The following abbreviations are used in the dissertation. 
• Suhrawardī’s works 
Ḥ.Sh  = Suhrawardī. Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. In: Corbin (ed.) 2001. 
LMḤ  = Al-Suhrawardī. Kitāb al-Lamaḥāt. 1969. 
LWḤ = Sohrawardī. Al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyyah Va al-Aršiyyah. 2009. 
LWḤ3  = Suhrawardī. Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya (al-ʿIlm al-  
   Thālith). In: Corbin (ed.) 1952. 
QWM3  = Suhrawardī. Kitāb al-Muqāwamāt (al-ʿIlm al-Thālith). In: Corbin (ed.) 1952. 
ṬRḤ3  = Suhrawardī. Kitāb al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-Muṭāraḥāt (al-ʿIlm al-Thālith).  
   In: Corbin (ed.) 1952. 
• Others’ works 
I.K1 = Ibn Kammūnah. Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyyah wa-l-ʿArshiyyah (Vol. 1  
   Logic). 2012. 
I.K3  = Ibn Kammūnah. Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyyah wa-l-ʿArshiyyah (Vol. 3  
   Metaphysics). 2012. 
Sha  = Shahrazūrī. Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. 1993. 
Shī = Shīrāzī. Sharh-i Hikmat al-Ishrāq of Suhrawardī: Commentary on  
   Illuminating Wisdom. 2005. 
NJ = Avicenna. Kitāb al-Najāt. 1945. 
Sh.I  = Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ: al-Ilāhiyyāh. 1960. 
Sh.N.D = Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: al-Madkhal. 1952. 
ShWR  = Avicenna. Le livre des Théorèmes et des Avertissements. 1892.  
RZ2 = Rāzī. Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt. Vol. 2. 2005.  
• Marks 
§  = section 
¶  = paragraph  
Examples: 
[Ḥ.Sh 107.9–16, ¶109] = Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, page 107, line 9 to line 16, in paragraph 109 (if 
“¶” comes after page and line numbers, the citation is part of a paragraph). 
[Ḥ.Sh ¶107, 106.12–13] = Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, the whole paragraph 107, page 106, line 12 to 
line 13 (if “¶” comes before page and line numbers, the citation is a whole paragraph). 
All translations in the text are mine unless otherwise indicated.  
When significant philosophical terms or expressions appear in the text, the Arabic terms and 
their transliterations (in italic) are given in brackets, e.g. “immaterial light (الــــنـور الـمـجــــّرد, al-nūr al-
mujarrad)”, according to EI3 system (http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/pages/help/transliteration-
islam). 
Chapters (e.g. Chapter V) and section numbers (e.g. 5.1.1 = Section 5.1.1 in Chapter V) are 
underlined for clarity. 
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A Story 
—Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Project 
To begin with, I would like to introduce briefly my hypothesis of Suhrawardī’s 
Illuminationist project. I relate Suhrawardī’s project to Plato’s famous cave allegory. Different 
parts of this story will be mentioned in appropriate places of the thesis to make things clearer; I 
find it particularly helpful in understanding some Illuminationist terms, principles and 
discussions, and in always keeping in mind a whole picture of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist 
philosophy. However, it must be noted that Suhrawardī, as far as I know, does not indicates that 
he is deliberately following Plato’s cave allegory (although he considers himself as a follower of 
Plato). 
Let us review the cave allegory (with certain modifications), as presented by Plato in the 
Republic (514a–520a):  1
 The picture is downloaded from the following website: https://aplogosblog.wordpress.com/2017/01/21/the-allegory-of-the-1
cave-by-plato/.
 1
Outside the cave, there are the Sun, living things under the sunlight and many other 
beautiful things. Inside the cave, from the entrance to the cave wall, there is fire; there are idols/
statues/artefacts of living things of all kinds, carried by people walking along a low wall, so the 
shadows of the idols are cast on the cave wall; there are prisoners behind the low wall, whose 
necks and legs are fettered since childhood, so they have never seen anything else except the 
shadows in front of them on the cave wall. These prisoners are deeply convinced that the 
shadows are the real things and they even give them different names. One day, a prisoner freed 
himself from the bonds, stood up, turned around his head, and saw the idols which are the causes 
of the shadows. He realised that these idols are, in fact, the real things rather than the shadows, 
so he established a philosophy inside the cave based on the investigation into the idols.  
Then, another day, a second prisoner, who once had much confidence in the cave 
philosophy, found something fundamentally wrong with it and decided to escape from the cave. 
Finally, he saw the Sun, living things under the sunlight and other beautiful things, and realised 
that they are, in fact, the real things rather than the lifeless idols or their shadows inside the cave; 
moreover, they are the archetypes and causes of the idols and shadows. After witnessing these 
real things with his own eyes and constructing a fundamentally superior wisdom outside the 
cave, the second prisoner decided to return to the cave and help as many his fellow prisoners as 
possible get out of the cave into the real world, and replace their cave philosophy with a 
fundamentally superior wisdom.  
However, he was fully aware that not many prisoners would believe him and some may 
even kill him if he told them directly what he had seen outside the cave. So here is his brilliant 
plan. First, he would help all prisoners study the cave philosophy of the best version, as 
reconstructed by him; the cave philosophy has various versions, many of which are 
fundamentally wrong. While reconstructing the best cave philosophy, he would deliberately 
leave in it some hints which lead to a higher wisdom. But he would do so very carefully so that 
only those of sufficient intelligence understand those hints and follow his instructions. Although 
others may not understand them, they can nevertheless learn the best cave philosophy. At last, 
those who understand the hints and believe him would follow him out of the cave and pursue the 
true wisdom. 
This, I believe, is Suhrawardī’s brilliant Illuminationist project.  
 2
Introduction 
At the end of al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-Muṭāraḥāt, the longest Peripatetic work of Shahāb al-Dīn 
al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191),  he complains: 1
I am almost 30 years old.  Most of my life was [spent] in trips, and inquiring 2
and searching for an insightful companion. But I have not yet found anyone 
who knows anything about the noble sciences (الـعلوم الشـریـفة, al-ʿulūm al-sharīfa) 
or even anyone who believes in them. [ṬRḤ3 505.9–11] 
If Suhrawardī were alive, his complaint would continue. It seems that he also has not yet found 
an insightful interpreter of his Illuminationist philosophy. There is no doubt that Suhrawardī, the 
“Master of Illumination” (شـــیخ اإلشـــراق, shaykh al-ishrāq), is one of the most misunderstood (and 
also the most fascinating and important) philosophers in Medieval Arabic philosophy.  
The Cave Story approach 
H. Corbin, who first brought Suhrawardī and his philosophy to the attention of Western 
scholarship, reconstructs Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy as “Oriental Theosophy”, “a 
deliberate resurrection of the wisdom of ancient Persia”.  To be specific, by “Oriental 3
Theosophy”, Corbin means “a philosophy which postulates inner vision and mystical 
experience” or “inner revelation and mystical vision”, which has its origin from the Sages of 
ancient Persia, especially Zoroaster (Zarathustra).  This approach is adopted by scholars like S. 4
H. Nasr and M. Aminrazavi.  Then, Corbin further develops this approach into an Illuminationist 5
approach to reconstruct Arabic philosophy as a whole. 
Corbin’s approach, however, is severely criticised by D. Gutas in “Historiography of 
Arabic philosophy” (2002).  Gutas argues that “Corbin thus took the older orientalist position 6
that Arabic philosophy is mystical to its logical conclusion and elevated it to the sole 
 I dispense myself from repeating Suhrawardī’s biography; an English translation of Shahrazūrī’s account of Suhrawardī’s life 1
from Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ wa-Rawḍat al-Afrāḥ is found in Thackston Jr. 1999: ix–xiii. The accounts of modern scholars are largely 
based on Shahrazūrī’s: to name but a few, Nasr 1997: 55–59; Walbridge 2005: 201–203, 2017: 255–256; Marcotte 2012: “1. Life 
and Works”.
 Suhrawardī died at the age of 38.2
 Corbin 1993: 206.3
 Corbin 1993: 209.4
 Nasr 1997: 66–77; Aminrazavi 1997.5
 Gutas 2002: 16–19.6
 3
hermeneutical principle of his approach”;  he blames Corbin for making of “Arabic philosophy 1
nothing more than Islamic mysticism and theology”.  When criticising Corbin’s approach, Gutas, 2
however, commits a mistake himself. He reads Illuminationist philosophy as a “Platonic version 
of Avicennism” or “Illuminationist Avicennism”, and takes Suhrawardī as a follower of Avicenna 
(d. 1037). Although Gutas does not offer any systematic reconstruction of Suhrawardī,  his idea 3
is nevertheless so tempting that many scholars, I believe, are more or less influenced by it and 
following the Illuminationist Avicennism approach consciously or unconsciously.  4
H. Ziai and J. Walbridge are among the first modern scholars who aim to present 
Suhrawardī as a truly creative philosopher.  Ziai writes:  5
My position concerning the Philosophy of Illumination … is that it is a distinct, 
systematic philosophical construction designed to avoid the logical, 
epistemological and metaphysical inconsistencies which Suhrawardī 
perceived in the Peripatetic philosophy of his day.   6
Likewise, Walbridge writes: 
However, in my view it is a grave error to examine his philosophy, 
Illuminationism, through romantic spectacles, for Suhrawardī, despite his own 
attempts to mystify his project, was a hardheaded philosophical critic and 
creative thinker who set the agenda for later Islamic philosophy. … 
Suhrawardī’s critique of Avicenna’s ontology and of Aristotelian epistemology 
and his solutions to these problems were his successors’ starting points. The 
modern description of his philosophy as “theosophy” does not do justice to 
the rigor and philosophical influence of his thought.  7
I agree with the general position of Ziai and Walbridge: Suhrawardī is neither a mystic nor a 
follower of Avicenna. However, I do not think Ziai, Walbridge or any other modern scholar has 
 Gutas 2002: 17.1
 Gutas 2002: 18.2
 Even Gutas’s (2002: 17) short account of Suhrawardī’s philosophy is not devoid of obvious errors. For example, “ʿālam al-3
mithāl” (الــــمـثـال  the imaginal world which lies between this world and the light world—is misunderstood (and thus—(عــــالــــم 
mistranslated) by Gutas as “the world of the archetypes”; this leads to several other mistakes. For a discussion of Suhrawardī’s 
imaginal world, see Sinai 2015.
 Traces of Gutas’s approach can be found even in historically rigorous studies like H. Eichner 2011 and J. Kaukua 2013. See 4
Chapter II (2.1) for detail.
 See, for instance, Ziai 1990, 2007; Walbridge 2005, 2014, 2017, 2018a (on Ziai’s approach).5
 Ziai 2007: 40.6
 Walbridge 2005: 201.7
 4
done a satisfactory job in proving that Suhrawardī is a truly creative philosopher or revealing the 
true nature of his Illuminationist philosophy. This is what I aim to achieve with my thesis entitled 
“Light in the Cave”. 
The story—“Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Project”—at the very beginning of the thesis is 
certainly not simply a story but the Cave Story approach I propose to reconstructing 
Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy. I believe that Suhrawardī must have in mind a rather 
ambitious Illuminationist project, which can be related to Plato’s famous cave allegory. Only 
when one is fully aware of this project, can one rightly grasp Suhrawardī’s philosophy: it is 
neither Corbin’s Oriental Theosophy nor Gutas’s Illuminationist Avicennism; it is much more 
complicated and profound than what Ziai, Walbridge or others have discovered. 
Suhrawardī’s project has three parts. One part is to prove that Avicenna’s Peripatetic 
philosophy is the “cave philosophy”, which is based on baḥth (بــــحـث, investigation, or discursive 
reasoning) or knowledge by forms (عـلم صـوري, ʿilm ṣūrī). The Peripatetics are like the “prisoners” 
who have never been outside the cave; their philosophy is, in fact, based on the investigation into 
“the idols of the shadows”, rather than “the real living things outside the cave”.  Another part is 1
to construct another fundamentally superior “philosophy outside the cave”, which is based on 
taʾalluh (تــــألّــــھ, deification, or to become God-like) or Illuminationist presential knowledge (عــــلم 
.(ʿilm ḥuḍūrī ishrāqī ,حـضوري إشـراقـي  Suhrawardī is the “prisoner” who has been outside the cave, 2
and his Illuminationist philosophy is based on immediate knowledge and direct experience of 
“the Sun, living things under the sunlight and other beautiful things outside the cave”. However, 
Suhrawardī is fully aware that perhaps eventually, only very few blessed prisoners have the 
ability and luck to escape from the cave. So the third part of Suhrawardī’s project is to 
reconstruct a cave philosophy of the best version in his four Peripatetic works which differ in 
both length and depth for prisoners of all intellectual levels to study.  In the meantime, by 3
leaving Illuminationist hints in the Peripatetic works, Suhrawardī will guide only those of 
 “Idols” (أصــــنـام, aṣnām) is, in fact, an Illuminationist term, which refers to particular sensible species forms—not universal 1
intelligible forms—of natural things, such as sensible horse forms. Platonic Forms in Illuminationist metaphysics are called the 
“lords/maters of idols/species” (أربــاب/أصــحاب األصــنام/األنــواع, arbāb/aṣḥāb al-aṣnām/al-anwāʿ), which are living self-apprehending 
immaterial lights (sing. مـجــــّرد  nūr mujarrad)—not lifeless separate intelligible forms—in the light world; they are the ,نــــور 
complete causes of their “idols”. “The Sun” in the story refers to the highest immaterial light, “the Light of lights” (نـور األنـوار, nūr 
al-anwār), namely, God; “living things outside the cave” refer to other separate immaterial lights in the light world. For a 
thorough discussion on Suhrawardī’s immaterial lights, see Chapter V.
 See Chapter II for a detailed analysis of Suhrawardī’s theory of presential knowledge. The real meaning of deification is 2
revealed in 2.6.
 I believe Suhrawardī is, in fact, reconstructing Peripatetic philosophy in his Peripatetic works, rather than merely expounding 3
Avicennan philosophy, so we can expect a modified Peripatetic philosophy by Suhrawardī (1.3.2).
 5
sufficient intelligence to study Illuminationist philosophy, which is elaborated in his masterpiece, 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (The Philosophy of Illumination). 
This is Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist project. With this project in mind, we can avoid falling 
back into Corbin’s Oriental Theosophy approach (for Peripatetic philosophy constitutes an 
essential part of Suhrawardī’s project), or Gutas’s Illuminationist Avicennism approach (for 
Illuminationist philosophy is fundamentally superior to Avicennism). By following the Cave 
Story approach, I hope to reveal the true nature of Illuminationist philosophy. It should be clear 
by now that Suhrawardī and his Illuminationist philosophy are the “Light in the Cave”. 
Scope and methodology 
In this thesis, I focus on three areas of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy: the theory 
of presential knowledge (Chapter II), the significant discussion of mental considerations (اعــتبارات 
 iʿtibārāt dhihniyya) (Chapters III & IV) and light metaphysics (Chapter V). An ,ذھــــنــیــة
investigation into these three areas can lead to an in-depth understanding of the nature of 
Illuminationist philosophy.  
In terms of methodology, to borrow R. Rorty’s (1984) four genres of the historiography of 
philosophy, this thesis presents a historical reconstruction—which obeys Q. Skinner’s maxim —1
but with some Geistesgeschichte features: I aim to describe Suhrawardī “in terms of his entire 
work rather than in terms of his most celebrated arguments”,  to justify that he deserves to be 2
treated as a great dead philosopher, and to explain why he has certain philosophical concerns and 
reveal the historical and philosophical significance of them. 
A large part of my thesis is devoted to textual analysis and reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s 
sophisticated philosophical arguments, to the extent that, in some cases, it appears like a 
Medieval commentary on Suhrawardī’s works. I try to base every claim of mine on textual 
evidence. In this way, my reconstruction has falsifiability and hence is “scientific”: if my 
interpretation of Suhrawardī on a certain point is false, one can prove it is false by arguing that 
my rendering or interpretation of Suhrawardī’s certain text is mistaken. Focusing on the 
reconstruction of arguments is first decided by Suhrawardī’s writing style. Just as Avicenna, 
Suhrawardī is a master of argumentation; philosophical arguments constitute the major part of 
 Skinner writes: “No agent can eventually be said to have meant or done something which he could never be brought to accept 1
as a correct description of what he had meant or done.” See Rorty 1984: 50.
 Rorty 1984: 57; for a discussion of Geistesgeschichte, see Rorty 1984: 56–61.2
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his every philosophical work. Moreover, this is the best way to reveal Suhrawardī’s position on a 
certain point: for instance, since Suhrawardī puts forward two arguments against the real genus—
differentia distinction, then we know for sure that he does not accept such a distinction as real 
(4.4.2). Furthermore, even if one rejects my interpretation of Illuminationist philosophy, the 
reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s arguments still has its academic value. 
I am aware that there are certain shortcomings of my current research. (1) I concentrate 
solely on Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; no attention is paid to 
Suhrawardī’s other works, especially the mystical allegories.  (2) I do not offer a thorough 1
contextual study, although I do make attempts to indicate the possible contexts (e.g. 2.1, and the 
introduction to Chapter III). For example, I do not investigate into the possible relation between 
Suhrawardī and Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 1165);  in Chapter II, I point out without treating 2
thoroughly the similarity between Suhrawardī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210). (3) I rarely 
evaluate the strengths of Suhrawardī’s arguments, although I do indicate my preference by 
choosing which arguments to introduce and which to treat thoroughly.  3
I do, however, have some excuses for not doing these things. (1) The main reason I 
concentrate on Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq without other works is 
straightforward: Suhrawardī’s own requirement. As will be shown in Chapter I (1.2), Suhrawardī 
explicitly requires his readers to read al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt and then Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; no 
other work is mentioned. Secondly, modern scholars all agree that the Peripatetic works and 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq should be taken as Suhrawardī’s major and mature philosophical works.  4
Lastly, even if I take the mystical allegories into account, this would hardly make any difference 
to my reconstruction or conclusion. I never deny the mystical side of Suhrawardī’s thought, 
which is presented in these mystical works. But I argue that there must be significant 
philosophical reasons underlying this mystical side, which lead Suhrawardī to mysticism in the 
first place. My focus is on revealing these philosophical reasons (see especially Chapter II), and 
this is what makes Light in the Cave a “philosophical enquiry”. 
 For an overview of Suhrawardī’s mystical treatises, see Thackston Jr. 1999: xiv–xxxii. For a latest survey of the manuscripts of 1
Suhrawardī’s Persian allegories and related works, see Walbridge 2018b: 34–36; Walbridge holds that these works (some, if not 
all) are, in fact, Suhrawardī’s juvenilia.
 Suhrawardī’s possible relation with Abū al-Barakāt, at the current stage, is nothing but an assumption, first put forward by Ziai 2
(1990: 19–20) based on S. Pines’s (2000) study on Abū al-Barakāt but not in any way proved by Ziai. Based on my preliminary 
reading of Abū al-Barakāt, I have not yet found any essential similarity between Suhrawardī and Abū al-Barakāt.
 For example, in Chapter III (3.4), I introduce three of Suhrawardī’s seven arguments against real univocal existence.3
 To name but a few, Nasr 1997: 58–59; Ziai 1990: 9–14; Thackston Jr. 1999: xiii–xiv; Marcotte 2012: “1.2 Works”; Walbridge 4
2017: 256–258, 2018b (based on a survey of manuscripts).
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(2) I hold that the historical reconstruction of a great dead philosopher consists of several 
stages, which should not be confused with each other. In the first-stage reconstruction, a 
historian’s purpose is to present a philosophy as it is by focusing mainly on the philosopher’s 
own works. Such a reconstruction is “first” and “first-stage” in the sense that it is absolutely 
fundamental and foundational (not in the sense that it is preliminary or rudimentary). Only based 
on such a solid foundation, should one further put a philosopher in context by relating him to his 
predecessors, contemporaries or later generations who either follow him or reject him. The first-
stage reconstruction is also necessary for one who intends to examine the philosophy analytically 
and do a rational reconstruction. My reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy in 
this thesis belongs to the first stage. I certainly agree that a thorough contextual study could 
provide some insights into how to understand Suhrawardī; one should, however, also be aware of 
the danger of paying very much attention to the context (especially the possible context which is 
not verified by Suhrawardī himself) in the first-stage reconstruction, that is, before forming an 
independent understanding of Suhrawardī’s philosophy: one might have preoccupation and read 
Suhrawardī through others’ eyes, and might even fail to capture the true nature of his 
philosophy.  But there would be no such danger if one does a contextual study after the first-1
stage reconstruction. However, I do hold that, at the first stage, we must consider the necessary 
context, which must be verified by the philosopher himself, in order to understand adequately 
what he is doing. In the case of Suhrawardī, Avicenna’s Peripatetic philosophy is sufficient. 
(3) Also based on the spirit of the first-stage reconstruction, that is, to present a philosophy 
as it is, my priority in this thesis is to reconstruct Suhrawardī’s arguments faithfully and as 
reasonable as possible: my focus is on showing the purpose of every argument and how they 
serve the system, presenting them in accurate forms, working out their logic, and revealing every 
hidden key premise. The evaluation of the strengths of Suhrawardī’s arguments, in my view, 
does not serve the purpose well, for “what is this argument?” and “is this a good argument?” are 
two different questions. Moreover, if one passes judgement on an argument too quickly, the 
danger involved is that one might give an inaccurate evaluation due to many reasons.  Such 2
evaluation should be the mission of the reconstruction of further stages rather than the first stage. 
 A popular but highly problematic approach is to read Suhrawardī with Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640), for example, Izutsu 1971; Rizvi 1
1999, 2000.
 A good example is the evaluation of the Third Man argument (TMA) from Plato’s Parmenides (132a–b). Scholars hold different 2
views about its strength until the crucial premises—Self-Predication and Non-Identity—are fully revealed by Vlastos (1954). At 
the current stage, I suggest we concentrate on working out the most reasonable reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s arguments rather 
than evaluating them too quickly.
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Light in the Cave is intended to be an example for how to reconstruct Suhrawardī’s 
Illuminationist philosophy by using the original Cave Story approach I propose above, and to be 
the first work of a trilogy, which offers a thorough historical reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s 
Illuminationist philosophy (especially metaphysics).  1
 The second work will be Philosophy inside the Cave, dealing with Suhrawardī’s modified Peripatetic metaphysics presented in 1
his Peripatetic works; my hypothesis is that it is the very existential metaphysics which Mullā Ṣadrā adopts (so Mullā Ṣadrā is 
not the founder) (see 3.3 for detail). The third work will be Wisdom outside the Cave, which goes on with the reconstruction of 
light metaphysics (following Chapter V), with an investigation into the possible impact of Arabic (Neo-) Platonic works, such as 




From the Peripatetic Works to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 
—The Relations Between al-Talwīḥāt, al-Lamaḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt, al-
Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 
According to Suhrawardī, his Illuminationist philosophy is fundamentally different from 
Peripatetic philosophy, since it is based on “another path” (ســـیاق آخـــر, siyāq ākhar) which differs 
essentially from “the method of the Peripatetics” (طـــریـــقة الـــمّشائـــین, ṭarīqat al-mashshāʾīn) [Ḥ.Sh 
10.5, ¶3] or “the approach of the Peripatetics” (مـــأخـــذ الـــمّشائـــین, maʾkhadh al-mashshāʾīn) [ṬRḤ3 
194.4]. One might then expect the majority of Suhrawardī’s philosophical works to be those 
expounding Illuminationist philosophy. However, this is not the case. The only mature 
Illuminationist work is his masterpiece: Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (The Philosophy of Illumination). 
Other than it, there are mystical allegories, other short works, and four Peripatetic works which 
“contain the vast bulk of his philosophical writing” : al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya, 1
al-Lamaḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt, and al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-Muṭāraḥāt.  At this point, the following 2
questions arise naturally. 
What are the contents of these Peripatetic works? Are they merely Suhrawardī’s juvenilia 
or works representing his immature ideas before his conversion to Illuminationism,  or are they 3
his mature philosophical works which constitute an indispensable part of the Illuminationist 
project? If they are indeed his mature works, then how do they relate to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq? Are 
they “Peripatetic” in the sense that Suhrawardī is merely expounding Avicennan philosophy in 
them, or are they “Peripatetic” in some other sense? Since Suhrawardī has made it perfectly clear 
 Walbridge 2017: 257. This is Walbridge’s latest research on the relation between Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic works and Ḥikmat al-1
Ishrāq. For a latest survey of Illuminationist manuscripts, see Walbridge 2018b.
 Al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya (al-Talwīḥāt for short) is rendered as “Intimations of the Tablet and the Throne” by 2
Walbridge (2017); “Intimations” by Nasr (1997) and Ziai (1990). This is an accurate rendering, according to Ibn Kammūna’s 
comment on the introduction to al-Talwīḥāt [I.K1 5.14–15] (see 1.1.1). 
Al-Lamaḥāt is rendered as “The Flashes of Light” by Ziai (1990), Marcotte (2012) and Walbridge (2017). But al-Lamaḥāt is 
more likely to mean “The Glances” or “The Quick Looks” at Peripatetic philosophy (see 1.1.1). Note that Walbridge (2018b: 24) 
uses “The Glimpses”. 
Al-Muqāwamāt is rendered as “The Apposites” by Ziai (1990) and “The Points at Issue” by Walbridge (2017). But al-
Muqāwamāt is more likely to mean “The Refutations”, since in this book Suhrawardī is correcting the views of preceding 
philosophers (see 1.1.1). Nasr (1997) and Bonmariage (2011) use “The Oppositions”. 
Al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-Muṭāraḥāt (Suhrawardī himself calls it al-Muṭāraḥāt for short) is rendered as “The Paths and Havens” by Ziai 
(1990) and Walbridge (2017). But a more appropriate rendering may be “The Sources and Debates”; there are indeed many 
debates between Suhrawardī and the Peripatetics there. Nasr (1997) uses “Conversations”. 
Due to these differences in renderings, I refer to these books by their Arabic names in this thesis to avoid confusion.
 Suhrawardī writes in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq that he once strongly defended the Peripatetic method in refuting the world of Platonic 3
Forms until he saw the proof of Lord [Ḥ.Sh 156.9–10, ¶166].
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that his Illuminationist philosophy is fundamentally different from Peripatetic philosophy, then 
why does he compose so many works based on the Peripatetic method or approach? What does 
he aim to achieve with these Peripatetic works? In what sense do they constitute an 
indispensable part of the Illuminationist project? 
Finding answers to these questions is crucial. If the Peripatetic works indeed form an 
essential part of the Illuminationist project, then ignoring them would lead to serious 
consequences. (1) First of all, the significance of the Peripatetic works themselves cannot be 
fairly evaluated. (2) Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq would be read and interpreted in an inadequate or even 
wrong way. For example, it may either be taken as an independent or free-standing philosophical 
work and hence regarded as more or less incomplete;  or be read with his mystical allegories and 1
consequently misunderstood as a mystical rather than a serious philosophical work.  (3) 2
Consequently, the nature of Illuminationist philosophy would either be interpreted inadequately 
or even be misinterpreted. Its mystical tendency may be overemphasised, with its profound 
philosophical significance neglected. (4) Suhrawardī himself would then be misjudged as a Ṣūfī 
or pure mystic, or a philosopher who has no creative or original idea except his peculiar 
terminology, which can even be translated back to Avicennan terminology.  
If it can be established that the Peripatetic works indeed serve as an essential part of the 
Illuminationist project, which is what I aim to do in this chapter, then first of all, a new way to 
read Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq naturally opens up. Moreover, a much deeper understanding of the true 
nature of Illuminationist philosophy based on the reflection of Peripatetic philosophy can be 
expected. 
In this chapter, by carefully analysing the introductions to the four Peripatetic works and 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, I first explain the contents of these works and their relation to each other (1.1). 
Based on solid textual evidence—the introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt—I will prove that these four 
Peripatetic works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq must be read together, and they must form one and the 
same Illuminationist project (1.2). I am aware that I am not the first one to pose such an 
 Sinai (2016: 287) writes: “Firstly, despite the loose ends and generally somewhat unfinished feel of the Philosophy of 1
Illumination …” I do not agree that Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is unfinished in any sense; it must be read together with his four Peripatetic 
works, as will be shown in this chapter (1.2). 
 In Chapter V, by reconstructing Suhrawardī’s light metaphysics based on Book I of the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, I shall 2
prove that Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq must be a serious philosophical work, and it is not Avicennan.
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argument,  but since this is not yet an established fact, I must justify and emphasise this point 1
again. In the following chapters, I shall draw heavily on these Peripatetic works to reconstruct 
Suhrawardī’s discussions of the following topics: presential knowledge (Chapter II), mental 
considerations (Chapters III & IV), and light metaphysics (Chapter V).  My challenge in this 2
chapter is to explain why Suhrawardī composes these four Peripatetic works; in what sense they 
constitute an indispensable part of the Illuminationist project. As we shall see, these questions 
can be answered reasonably by resorting to my Cave Story on Suhrawardī, reconstructed from 
Plato’s cave allegory (1.3).  
Therefore, basically, I aim to answer two significant questions in this chapter. What are 
these Peripatetic works? Why are these Peripatetic works? Let us start from the what-question.  
 Ziai, as far as I know, is the first scholar who establishes the relation of Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic works to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq by 1
resorting to the introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt (Ziai 1990: 9–11). Walbridge (2017) argues for this relationship as well, but it seems 
he is not aware of the introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt, which presents the most solid evidence. For my analysis of the introduction 
to al-Muṭāraḥāt, see 1.1.3 & 1.2.
 To be specific, Chapter II (on presential knowledge) draws heavily on al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt; Chapters III & IV (on 2
mental considerations) on al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt; Chapter V (on light metaphysics) takes Chapters II & 
III & IV as its basis, so in this sense, it also has much to do with these Peripatetic works.
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1.1 Contents of the four Peripatetic works 
In this section, by carefully analysing the introductions to the four Peripatetic works and 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, and by consulting the commentaries by Saʿd Ibn Mansūr Ibn Kammūna (d. 
1284), Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī (d. 1288?) and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 1311),  I explain the 1
contents and features of these Peripatetic works and their relation to each other. 
Let us start with the introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. 
1.1.1 Al-Talwīḥāt & al-Lamaḥāt 
In the introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 1] 
I have already composed for you, before this book [i.e. Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq] and 
during [composing] it, when interruptions hindered me from [composing] it, 
several books based on the method of the Peripatetics (طــریــقة الــمّشائــین, ṭarīqat 
al-mashshāʾīn). I have summarised in them their principles (قــــواعــــدھــــم, 
qawāʿiduhum). Among them, there is an abstract (مــــختَصر, mukhtaṣar) named 
al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya, which includes many principles. I 
summarised in it [many] principles despite its small volume. Other than it 
 ,dūnahu), there is al-Lamaḥāt. I have written other books than these two ,دونـھ)
and among them, there is what I composed in my youth. [Ḥ.Sh 10.4–7, ¶10] 
Based on the text above, the temporal order of composition of Suhrawardī’s works must be as 
follows. In his youth, Suhrawardī had written some books, which do not include the Peripatetic 
works. Then he began to write the Peripatetic works, including at least al-Talwīḥāt and al-
Lamaḥāt, as mentioned explicitly in the text. But before finishing these Peripatetic works, 
Suhrawardī had already begun to compose Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. When there was no interruption, he 
would focus on Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; when interruptions hindered him, he would continue with the 
Peripatetic works. As for when these works were finished, no answer can be found here. Another 
 For an overview of the commentaries on Suhrawardī works, see Walbridge 2017: 259–261. Ibn Kammūna’s commentary on al-1
Talwīḥāt is earlier than Shahrazūrī’s commentary on Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, which is earlier than Shīrāzī’s commentary on Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq. My impression is that Ibn Kammūna is the most faithful commentator among the three. Shahrazūrī and Shīrāzī both draw 
on Ibn Kammūna’s commentary; Shīrāzī draws heavily on Shahrazūrī’s commentary, to the extent that, in many cases, Shīrāzī 
simply reports what Shahrazūrī has said. For a survey of the works (especially the manuscripts) of these three philosophers, see 
Walbridge 2018b: 27–33.
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fact we know is that both al-Talwīḥāt and al-Lamaḥāt are abstracts of Peripatetic philosophy, and 
they contain many Peripatetic principles. 
 Shahrazūrī holds that Suhrawardī’s juvenilia include most of his short works (أكــثر رســائــلھ, 
akthar rasāʾilihi) [Sha 19.18]; the composition of al-Lamaḥāt, al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt all 
began before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, and they were all finished before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Sha 19.15–
18]. But nothing is mentioned about al-Muqāwamāt. However, based on my analysis of the 
introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt in what follows (1.1.3), I do not agree that Suhrawardī began to 
compose al-Muṭāraḥāt before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. 
Shīrāzī nearly repeats what Shahrazūrī has said except for two points. (1) He adds al-Alwāḥ 
and al-Hayākil to Suhrawardī’s juvenilia [Shī 14.13–14].  (2) It seems he does not agree with 1
Shahrazūrī that the composition of al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt began before Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq, but he is certain that the composition of al-Talwīḥāt and al-Lamaḥāt began before Ḥikmat 
al-Ishrāq [Shī 14.10–13]. I tend to agree with Shīrāzī. 
Since al-Talwīḥāt and al-Lamaḥāt are both abstracts of Peripatetic philosophy, then what is 
their difference? To answer this question, we must look at the introductions to them. Both 
introductions are brief. In the introduction to al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 2] 
These, my friends, are intimations/hints of sources of wisdom (تـلویـحات عـلى أصـول 
الــــحـكـمـة  [talwīḥāt ʿalā uṣūl min al-ḥikma). [These intimations shall be ,مــــن 
mentioned in the three sciences in their order,  and they are very concise 2
 [bālighatan fī al-ījāz). [I.K1 5.12–13 ,بالغًة في اإلیجاز)
Ibn Kammūna remarks: 
He names this book al-Talwīḥāt because it is very concise and brief (لشـّدة إیـجازه 
 li-shiddat ījāzihi wa-ikhtiṣārihi). For in this book, he refers to his ,واخــــتـصـاره
meaning by indication and intimation (بـــاإلیـــماء والـــتلویـــح, bi-l-iīmāʾ wa-l-talwīh), 
rather than clarification or explication (بــاإلفــصاح والــتصریــح, bi-l-ifṣāḥ wa-l-taṣrīḥ). 
[I.K1 5.14–15] 
 These two work are “al-Alwāḥ al-ʿImādiyya” (Tablets Dedicated to ʿImād al-Dīn) and “Hayākil al-Nūr” (The Temple of Light). 1
See Nasr 1997: 58.
 That is, logic, physics and metaphysics.2
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Based on the introduction to al-Talwīḥāt, Ibn Kammūna’s comment above, and my own 
impression, I suspect Suhrawardī is following Avicenna (al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt) in composing 
al-Talwīḥāt. Note that “talwīḥāt” and “ishārāt” are synonymous terms: hints, intimations, or 
pointers. But this possible connection certainly requires a serious study.  1
In the introduction to al-Lamaḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 3] 
These are glances at the truths (لــمحات فــي الــحقائــق, lamaḥāt fī al-ḥaqāʾiq)  in an 2
extremely concise way (عـلى غـایـة اإلیـجاز, ʿalā ghāyat al-ījāz). I do not mention in 
them what is not important in the three sciences. [LMḤ 57.3–4] 
By comparing these two introductions, we know that although they are both abstracts, al-Lamaḥāt 
is even more concise than al-Talwīḥāt, for Suhrawardī says that it is extremely concise. In fact, my 
impression is that al-Lamaḥāt seems to be a summary of al-Talwīḥāt, since there are a number of 
references in al-Lamaḥāt to al-Talwīḥāt.  But I do not notice any reference in al-Talwīḥāt to al-Lamaḥāt. 3
If al-Lamaḥāt is indeed a summary of al-Talwīḥāt, then it may follow that Suhrawardī began to 
compose al-Lamaḥāt after he had finished al-Talwīḥāt. 
Although al-Lamaḥāt is an extremely concise work, this does not mean that it is 
insignificant. In fact, we can still find Suhrawardī’s original ideas in al-Lamaḥāt. For example, 
Suhrawardī reduces ten Peripatetic categories to four: substance, relation, quantity and quality, 
with motion introduced as a fifth category. Place, time, position (وضـع, waḍʿ) and disposition (مـلكة, 
malaka) are reduced to relation; action and affection to motion, just as he does in al-Talwīḥāt.  4
Towards the end of this “glance”, Suhrawardī advises his readers to consult al-Talwīḥāt on this 
matter by saying that “we have already mentioned the examination of these things in al-Talwīḥāt 
al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya” [LMḤ 124.20–21]. For another example, when dealing with God’s 
knowledge, Suhrawardī mentions briefly his theory of presential knowledge in al-Lamaḥāt [LMḤ 
131.21–132.18]. At the end of this “glance”, Suhrawardī likewise writes that “the problem of 
knowledge should be studied from al-Talwīḥāt for clarity” [LMḤ 132.18]. 
Moreover, by reading al-Lamaḥāt, one can get a clear idea of what Suhrawardī is 
discussing in al-Talwīḥāt. I usually consult al-Lamaḥāt to make sure I do not miss Suhrawardī’s 
 Walbridge (2018b: 24, footnote 7) also mentions this possible connection.1
 This is why I do not agree to render al-Lamaḥāt as “The Flashes of Light”.2
 This is also mentioned by Marcotte (2012: “1.2”).3
 For a short discussion, see [LMḤ 123.13–124.21].4
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points in al-Talwīḥāt. The significance of al-Lamaḥāt and its relation to al-Talwīḥāt still require 
a serious study. But at least we are certain that al-Lamaḥāt is worth studying seriously and it is 
apparently not just a summary of Avicennan philosophy, but more like a summary of al-Talwīḥāt.  
Therefore, Ziai’s evaluation of al-Lamaḥāt should not be accepted. According to him, al-
Lamaḥāt is simply “an outline or a short syllabus of the major topics of Peripatetic philosophy, 
as presented, for instance, in Avicenna’s major philosophical work, the Healing”, and “a simple, 
non-argumentative presentation of the central Peripatetic philosophical principles and rules of 
logic, physics, and metaphysics”.  Following Ziai, Walbridge makes an equally problematic 1
remark: “The Flashes of Light (al-Lamaḥāt) is a rather elementary introduction to philosophy 
that is of much less importance here.”  2
1.1.2 Al-Muqāwamāt 
About the contents of al-Muqāwamāt and its relation to al-Talwīḥāt, there is a clear 
explanation in Suhrawardī’s introduction to al-Muqāwamāt:  
[Text 4] 
This [al-Muqāwamāt] is an abstract (مــــخــتــَصــر, mukhtaṣar), serving as the 
appendices (الــلواحــق, al-lawāḥiq) of my book named al-Talwīḥāt. In it, there are 
corrections (إصــــالح, iṣlāḥ) of what needs to be corrected: what the ancients 
 al-awwalūna) neglected. It is not easy to mention them [i.e. the ,األّولــــون)
corrections] in al-Talwīḥāt due to its conciseness. So what needs minimal 
expansion does not suit it [i.e. al-Talwīḥāt], and being concise in the places in 
order to make up for [the ancients’] negligence in the important matters would 
not benefit [al-Talwīḥāt].  So we mention them [i.e. the corrections] here, 3
adding to them some well-known points (نــــكـت مــــشـھـورة, nukat mashhūra) . I 4
name it al-Muqāwamāt. [QWM 124.2–5] 
From the text above, we know al-Muqāwamāt is similar to al-Talwīḥāt in being an abstract, and 
it serves as appendices for al-Talwīḥāt. It contains the necessary corrections of what the 
“ancients” have neglected in the important matters. However, Suhrawardī does not tell us to 
 Ziai 1990: 11–12.1
 Walbridge 2017: 257.2
 That is to say, it is inappropriate to mention these scattered corrections, summarised in the most concise form, in al-Talwīḥāt, 3
which is a systematic philosophical work.
 Presumably, these “well-known points” refer to Illuminationist points, mentioned as well in al-Muṭāraḥāt; see [Text 5] in 1.1.3.4
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whom the “ancients” refer. In addition, some “well-known points”—presumably, some 
Illuminationist points—are included in al-Muqāwamāt. Therefore, it can be expected that al-
Muqāwamāt is not a systematic Peripatetic work like al-Talwīḥāt; rather, it is the appendices to 
al-Talwīḥāt. 
My impression is that al-Muqāwamāt is somewhat like a summary of al-Muṭāraḥāt. When 
working on Chapters III & IV (on mental considerations), which draw heavily on al-Talwīḥāt, al-
Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, I notice that al-Talwīḥāt indeed only contains the necessary 
discussion; al-Muṭāraḥāt, by contrast, is much more elaborated and has many things not 
mentioned in al-Talwīḥāt; in al-Muqāwamāt, I can find almost everything that is missing in al-
Talwīḥāt, though in a summarised form. Sometimes, an argument in al-Muṭāraḥāt is summarised 
as merely one sentence in al-Muqāwamāt. There are many such examples in my reconstruction 
of Suhrawardī’s ten hybrid infinite chains (4.3). The whole discussion is missing in al-Talwīḥāt; 
nine out of the ten hybrid chains are mentioned rather briefly—each chain summarised as one 
sentence—in al-Muqāwamāt; in al-Muṭāraḥāt, all the ten chains are put forward, with seven 
analysed in detail. If al-Muqāwamāt is indeed a summary of al-Muṭāraḥāt, it may follow that 
Suhrawardī first finished al-Talwīḥāt, then al-Muṭāraḥāt and lastly al-Muqāwamāt.  
If my translation of the introduction to al-Muqāwamāt is accurate, then Walbridge’s 
following claim is untenable: 
There are also points of tension among the Peripatetic works, with the Points 
at Issue [i.e. al-Muqāwamāt], for example, correcting the Intimations [i.e. al-
Talwīḥāt]. … Suhrawardī explains that this book consists of corrections (iṣlāḥ) 
to The Intimations based on what had been passed down from the ancients.  1
According to my reading of the introduction to al-Muqāwamāt, al-Muqāwamāt is in no way 
correcting al-Talwīḥāt; rather, it is correcting the views of the ancients. 
1.1.3 Al-Muṭāraḥāt 
The introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt is extremely significant, since it provides sufficient 
information to solve many puzzles among modern scholars. Suhrawardī begins by writing: 
 Walbridge 2017: 259.1
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[Text 5] 
This is a book which includes the three sciences. I write it in accordance with 
your suggestions for me (بـــحكم اقـــتراحـــكم عـــلّي, bi-ḥukm iqtirāḥikum ʿalayya), my 
brothers. I mention in it studies (مــباحــث, mabāḥith) and rules (ضــوابــط, ḍawābiṭ) 
which do not exist in other books. They are very beneficial; they are taken out 
and extracted from my arrangements. Despite this, I do not deviate much 
from the approach of the Peripatetics (مـأخـذ الـمّشائـین, maʾkhadh al-mashshāʾīn). 
But I have set down in it points and subtle things (نـكت ولـطائـف, nukat wa-laṭāʾif) 
which hint at noble principles (قــواعــد شــریــفة, qawāʿid sharīfa) in addition to what 
they [i.e. the Peripatetics] mention. [ṬRḤ 194.1–5] 
The first thing we learn from the text above is what motivates Suhrawardī to compose al-
Muṭāraḥāt: the suggestions from his “brothers”. This calls to mind what he writes in the 
introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: 
[Text 6] 
Know, my brothers, it is your many suggestions [for me] (كــثرة اقــتراحــكم, kathrat 
iqtirāḥikum) to write Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq that weakened my determination to 
refuse and dispelled my inclination to refrain from assistance. [Ḥ.Sh 9.6–7, 
¶2]  
Although the motivation of composing al-Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is similar, namely, 
his brothers’ suggestions, Suhrawardī’s attitude is obviously different. In the introduction to 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, his attitude appears rather negative. It seems that at first, for some reason, he 
did not want to compose Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq at all, for his initial “determination” was to “refuse” 
and his “inclination” was to “refrain from assistance”. However, due to his brothers’ repeated 
suggestions, he reluctantly agreed to write it. By contrast, Suhrawardī’s attitude in the 
introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt appears much more positive. It seems that as soon as his brothers 
suggested to him, Suhrawardī gladly agreed to compose al-Muṭāraḥāt. Moreover, he even 
deliberately “took out and extracted from his arrangements” many beneficial “studies and rules 
which do not exist in other books” and “set down points and subtle things which hint at noble 
principles”; at the same time, he tried “not to deviate much from the approach of the 
Peripatetics”. He gladly did all these things in al-Muṭāraḥāt to help his brothers reach the height 
of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. The similarity of motivation and difference of attitude suggest that the 
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composition of al-Muṭāraḥāt began after Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, so that al-Muṭāraḥāt can serve as a 
bridge from the other Peripatetic works, especially al-Talwīḥāt, to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.  But 1
Suhrawardī seems to finish al-Muṭāraḥāt a little before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, by perhaps just one 
year or so: respectively, 1185 and September of 1186.  The fact that Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is 2
mentioned twice in the introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt—[ṬRḤ 194.7, 12]—also indicates 
Suhrawardī had completed at least part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq before he started writing al-Muṭāraḥāt. 
All of these assumptions are corroborated by the introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, as translated 
above:  
[Part of Text 1 in 1.1.1] 
I have already composed for you, before this book [i.e. Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq], and 
during [composing] it, when interruptions hindered me from [composing] it, 
several books based on the method of the Peripatetics. [Ḥ.Sh 10.4–5, ¶3] 
Presumably, al-Talwīḥāt and al-Lamaḥāt are the works finished before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, with al-
Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt being the works composed during Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. The analysis 
above also suggests that al-Muṭāraḥāt is more closely related to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq than the other 
three Peripatetic works. 
Al-Muṭāraḥāt contains “studies and rules which do not exist in other books”. By “the other 
books”, Suhrawardī refers to the other Peripatetic works: al-Talwīḥāt, al-Lamaḥāt and al-
Muqāwamāt. In addition, there are “points and subtle things” in al-Muṭāraḥāt, and they hint 
ultimately at “noble principles”, which refer undoubtedly to those Illuminationist principles in 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. Therefore, al-Muṭāraḥāt serves not only as a complement to the other 
Peripatetic works, but also as a bridge from Peripatetic philosophy to Illuminationist philosophy. 
In terms of writing style, al-Muṭāraḥāt is relatively free, as Suhrawardī goes on in the 
introduction: 
[Text 7] 
We do not care about the order (الـترتـیب, al-tartīb) here, and we do not follow, in 
 Note that it is possible that the supposed reluctance to write Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is probably just a trope, which is a familiar 1
feature of much Arabic literature. I would, however, still hold that the composition of al-Muṭāraḥāt began after Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, 
due to another two reasons listed in what follows, according to the introductions to al-Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.
 Fortunately enough, Suhrawardī mentions explicitly in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq the exact time when his masterpiece was finished: the 2
sixth month of 582 AH [Ḥ.Sh 258.4–5, ¶279] (15 September 1186, according to Walbridge & Ziai 1999: 185, note 35). He also 
mentions towards the end of al-Muṭāraḥāt that it was finished when he nearly reached thirty [ṬRḤ3 505.9, ¶225]: around 1185, if 
he was born in 1155. So al-Muṭāraḥāt seems to be finished around one year before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.
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some places, the subject matter of a science (مــــوضــــوع عــــلـم, mawḍūʿ ʿilm). 
Rather, our purpose in this book is [simply] investigation (الــــبـحـث, al-baḥth), 
though this may lead to [or touch upon] principles in separate sciences (عــــلـوم 
 [ʿulūm mutafarriqa). [ṬRḤ 194.8–10 ,متفّرقة
That is to say, when composing al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī would confine himself neither strictly to 
“the approach of the Peripatetics”, as mentioned in [Text 5], nor to the normal “order” of writing, 
that is, only discussing the subject matter of a certain science without touching upon principles in 
other sciences. Instead, he would not hesitate to cross these boundaries as long as it serves his 
purpose: “investigation” (الـبحث, al-baḥth). Therefore, it could be expected that the discussions in al-
Muṭāraḥāt are more thorough and exhaustive than those in the other Peripatetic works, whose 
writing style is labelled as “abstract” or “concise”, such as al-Talwīḥāt, al-Lamaḥāt and al-
Muqāwamāt. 
Towards the end of the introduction, the close relation between al-Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat 
al-Ishrāq is highlighted: 
[Text 8] 
If an investigator (الــباحــث, al-bāḥith) is confused by this mode (نــمط, namaṭ), let 
one start from the practice leading to the flashing light (الـــریـــاضـــات الـــمبرقـــة, al-
riyāḍāt al-mubriqa) under the order of those who exercise [the practice of] 
illumination, until one witnesses some of the principles of illumination (بــــعـض 
 مــبانــى) baʿḍ mabādiʾ al-ishrāq), and then the structures of things ,مــبادئ اإلشــراق
 [mabānī al-umūr) will become complete to one. [ṬRḤ 194.10–11 ,األمور
In the text above, the importance of mystical practice is emphasised. Only by conducting 
“the practice leading to the flashing light”,  can an “investigator” (بــــاحــــث, bāḥith)—one who is 1
engaged only in investigation (بــحث, baḥth) without deification (تــألّــھ, taʾalluh) —fully understand 2
the final direction of al-Muṭāraḥāt and “the structures of things” in Suhrawardī’s philosophical 
system. Without mystical practice, one might be confused by “the studies and rules which do not 
exist in other books” and particularly, those “points and subtle things which hint at noble 
 In §2.5.9 of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī explains in detail various levels of mystical experience; this is the first level: the 1
“flashing light” (نور بارق, nūr bāriq). See [Ḥ.Sh ¶272, 252.12–254.5].
 “Investigator” refers to a philosopher proficient in investigation but lacking deification. I will discuss Suhrawardī’s ranking of 2
philosophers in 1.3.1. The fundamental difference between investigation and deification shall be revealed in Chapter II 
(especially 2.6). 
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principles”. Consequently, one might get lost in Suhrawardī’s relatively free writing style and 
puzzled by the discussions in al-Muṭāraḥāt.  
However, mysticism is not our interest here. I, as an “investigator” or “seeker” myself, aim 
to show that even without mystical practice, Suhrawardī’s philosophical works can still make 
perfect philosophical sense. I shall take up this challenge from Chapter II onward. 
Before proceeding to the next section, let me illustrate the order in which Suhrawardī’s 
Peripatetic works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq are written, according to my analysis above:  
Starting time:  
al-Talwīḥāt => al-Lamaḥāt => Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq => al-Muṭāraḥāt => al-
Muqāwamāt 
Ending time:  
al-Talwīḥāt => al-Lamaḥāt => al-Muṭāraḥāt (1185) => al-Muqāwamāt => 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (1186)  1
 This is merely my preliminary assumption. 1
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1.2 Peripatetic works as an essential part of the Illuminationist project  
After introducing the contents and features of the four Peripatetic works, let us consider the 
next question: how do the Peripatetic works relate to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq? 
As one may notice, I deliberately left out a passage of the introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt—
[ṬRḤ 194.5–8]—in the previous analysis (1.1.3). This is because the passage is so significant 
that it deserves a new section. Although Ziai has already mentioned this passage in his 
monograph,  other scholars, nevertheless, seem to overlook it.  So I must translate this passage 1 2
again and elaborate on its significance. In the introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 9] 
If one loses one’s passion halfway after contemplating the books for general 
people (كــــتـب الــــقـوم, kutub al-qawm), satisfied with what others are not satisfied 
with, and if one is not skilful in the sciences of investigation (الـعلوم الـبحثیة, al-ʿulūm 
al-baḥthiyya), then there is no way for one to reach my book named Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq. This book [i.e. al-Muṭāraḥāt] ought to be read before it [i.e. Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq] and after examining (تــحقیق, taḥqīq) the abstract named al-Talwīḥāt. [ṬRḤ3 
194.5–8] 
In the text above, Suhrawardī has made it perfectly clear that Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq should be read 
after al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
al-Talwīḥāt => al-Muṭāraḥāt => Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 
This syllabus for readers is the key to many puzzles.  
(1) To begin with, this passage alone is sufficient to establish that al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt 
and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq together form one and the same Illuminationist project. To this project, we 
should add al-Lamaḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt, according to my analysis above (1.1.1 & 1.1.2): 
al-Talwīḥāt (+ al-Lamaḥāt & al-Muqāwamāt) => al-Muṭāraḥāt => Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 
(2) Since the Peripatetic works constitute an essential part of the Illuminationist project, it 
follows that they must all be Suhrawardī’s mature works rather than juvenilia or those 
representing his immature ideas before his conversion to Illuminationism. Therefore, such a 
 Ziai 1990: 9–11.1
 For example, Marcotte (2012) and Walbridge (2017). 2
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claim that there are two distinct periods in Suhrawardī’s works—Peripatetic, followed by 
Illuminationist—is untenable.  Rather, the four Peripatetic works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq must 1
form Suhrawardī’s one and the same Illuminationist project. 
(3) This passage explains perfectly why many discussions in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq are 
unusually brief to the point that one may argue Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq has loose ends or even seems 
unfinished.  Let me give just one example: as we shall see in Chapter III, some arguments about 2
univocal existence in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq are extremely brief to the point that they are almost 
impossible to reconstruct (e.g. 3.4.2 and 3.4.3), if one confines oneself to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. This 
is because the full versions of these arguments can all be found in either al-Talwīḥāt, or al-
Muqāwamāt, or al-Muṭāraḥāt. When composing Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī takes for granted 
that his readers are already rather familiar with the relevant discussions in his Peripatetic works 
(they must at least know where to find them), so there is no need to repeat them; instead, a 
simple indication in each case should be enough. In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, the last book and the 
summit of the Illuminationist project, Suhrawardī focuses simply on what matters the most, for 
example, constructing his original light metaphysics (Chapter V).  3
(4) This passage decidedly opens up a new and the only right way to read Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq. Although some modern scholars have already adopted this approach, I still do not think 
enough attention has been paid to the Peripatetic works. Excellent examples of using the 
Peripatetic works include Eichner (2011) and Kaukua (2013), both on presential knowledge. But 
out of the field of presential knowledge, it seems that most scholars still confine themselves to 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. In this thesis, from Chapter II onward, I hope to set an example for how to 
make full use of the Peripatetic works to reconstruct Suhrawardī’s full discussion of certain 
topics.  
(5) This passage justifies the way by which Ibn Kammūna interprets al-Talwīḥāt and how 
Shahrazūrī and Shīrāzī read Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. This allows us, as modern readers of Suhrawardī, 
to make use of these commentaries to understand Suhrawardī’s philosophical works, without 
doubting whether or not it is permissible to read Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq in light of the Peripatetic 
works. 
 Marcotte (2012: “1.2”) mentions this two-period-theory and rejects it for several reasons. But none of her arguments is as strong 1
and decisive as Suhrawardī’s own words in the introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt. 
 Sinai 2016: 287. 2
 As we shall see in Chapter V, especially 5.3 and 5.4, Suhrawardī’s arguments there are extremely elaborated.3
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(6) Moreover, this passage indicates the close relation not only between the Peripatetic 
works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, but also between Peripatetic philosophy and Illuminationist 
philosophy. It follows that the true nature of Illuminationist philosophy cannot be fully 
understood without an in-depth reflection on the nature of Peripatetic philosophy. As we shall 
see from Chapter II onward, Illuminationist presential knowledge cannot be fully understood 
without an in-depth reflection on Peripatetic knowledge by forms (Chapter II); Illuminationist 
light metaphysics (Chapter V) cannot be fully interpreted without an in-depth reflection on 
Peripatetic metaphysics which is concerned more with universal mental considerations rather 
than particular things in the real world (Chapters III & IV).  
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1.3 Significance of the Peripatetic works 
The what-question answered above leads naturally to the why-question: why are the 
Peripatetic works? To elaborate, as mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, since 
Suhrawardī has made it perfectly clear that his Illuminationist philosophy is fundamentally 
different from Peripatetic philosophy, then why does he compose so many works based on the 
Peripatetic method or approach? What does he aim to achieve with these Peripatetic works? In 
what sense do they constitute an indispensable part of the Illuminationist project? 
I can think of five answers to the why-question. The first answer is based on Suhrawardī’s 
introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; the other four are derived from my Cave Story on Suhrawardī. 
1.3.1 The first answer: a philosopher of the highest rank 
In the introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, a ranking of philosophers is put forward by 
Suhrawardī. Not only can it be used to answer the why-question, but it is important in its own 
right. A significant distinction between deification (تـألّـھ, taʾalluh) and investigation (بـحث, baḥth) is 
introduced by Suhrawardī; this distinction has much to do with our topic of Chapter II: 
Illuminationist presential knowledge. Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 10] 
The ranks (الـمراتـب, al-marātib) are many and they [i.e. philosophers] belong to 
various classes (عــــلـى طــــبـقـات, ʿalā ṭabaqāt),  which are as follows: [3]  divine 1 2
philosopher (حـــكیم إلھـــي, ḥakīm ilāhī) proficient in deification (مـــتوّغل فـــي الـــتألّـــھ, 
mutawaghghil fī al-taʾalluh) but lacking investigation (عــــدیــــم الــــبـحـث, ʿadīm al-
baḥth); [5] investigative philosopher (بــــّحـاث  ḥakīm baḥḥāth) lacking ,حــــكـیـم 
deification;  [1] divine philosopher proficient in [both] deification and 3
investigation; [2] divine philosopher proficient in deification but average in 
investigation or weak in it (مــتوّســط فــي الــبحث أو ضــعیفھ, mutawassiṭ fī al-baḥth aw 
ḍaʿīfuhu); [4] philosopher proficient in investigation but average in deification 
or weak in it; [6] seeker (طــالــب, ṭālib) for [both] deification and investigation; [7] 
seeker for deification only; [8] seeker for investigation only.  
If it happens in a time/period that there is a philosopher proficient in [both] 
 I think by “classes” (طــبقات, ṭabaqāt) Suhrawardī refers to the three broad categories: divine philosopher, philosopher and seeker. 1
These “classes” are sub-divided into eight “ranks” (مراتب, marātib). See my following discussion for detail.
 I add “[1], [2]…[8]” for clarity. The ranking is based on my following analysis.2
 I think the reason Suhrawardī mentions ranks [3] and [5] first is that they refer respectively to the Ṣūfīs and the Peripatetics.3
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deification and investigation, then he has the leadership (الرئـاسـة, al-riʾāsa) and 
he is the caliph of God. If it does not happen, then a philosopher proficient in 
deification but average in investigation [has the leadership and he is the 
caliph of God]. If it still does not happen, then a philosopher proficient in 
deification but lacking investigation [has the leadership] and he is the caliph 
of God. The earth (األرض, al-arḍ) shall never be without someone proficient in 
deification. The investigator (الـباحـث, al-bāḥith) who is proficient in investigation 
but not proficient in deification shall never have any leadership on the earth 
of God. [Ḥ.Sh 11.12–12.5, ¶5] 
First of all, what do “deification” (تـــألّـــھ, taʾalluh) and “investigation” (بـــحث, baḥth)  mean 1
respectively? This question shall be answered in great detail in Chapter II (especially 2.6). For 
the time being, let us just say “deification” refers to Illuminationist presential knowledge; 
“investigation” refers to Peripatetic knowledge by forms. The reason Suhrawardī calls presential 
knowledge “deification” or “to become God-like” is that God has presential knowledge of 
everything (2.4). So for one to become God-like is for one to have presential knowledge of as 
many things as possible like God.  2
Based on the proficiency in deification and investigation, philosophers (and would-be 
philosophers) are ranked as follows: 
(1) Divine philosopher proficient in deification, proficient in investigation 
(2) Divine philosopher proficient in deification, average or weak in investigation 
(3) Divine philosopher proficient in deification, lacking investigation (Ṣūfīs) 
(4) Philosopher proficient in investigation, average or weak in deification 
(5) Philosopher proficient in investigation, lacking deification (the Peripatetics) 
        —“investigative philosopher” 
(6) Seeker for both deification and investigation 
(7) Seeker for deification only 
(8) Seeker for investigation only   3
 Walbridge and Ziai (1990) render “تــــألّــــھ” (taʾalluh) as “intuitive philosophy” and “بــــحـث” (baḥth) as “discursive philosophy”. 1
“Discursive philosophy” may be acceptable, but “intuitive philosophy” is far from the literal meaning of “تــألّــھ” (taʾalluh). I think 
it is safer to render these two terms literally: deification and investigation.
 I believe this is my original argument. It seems no scholar, including Suhrawardī’s Medieval commentators, interprets the 2
deification—investigation distinction by resorting to the distinction between Illuminationist presential knowledge and Peripatetic 
knowledge by forms.
 Shahrazūrī holds that philosophers are of ten ranks, since “average” and “weak” should be further distinguished [Sha 28.1–19]. 3
However, it seems Suhrawardī himself does not intend to make a further distinction; eight ranks should be enough.
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Only philosophers of the first three ranks are given the honourable name of “divine philosopher” 
 al-ḥakīm al-ilāhī) by Suhrawardī, since they are all proficient in deification or ,الــــحـكـیـم اإللـھــــي)
Illuminationist presential knowledge. They are followed by (non-divine) philosophers proficient 
in investigation but not in deification. Those who belong to the last three ranks, strictly speaking, 
should be called “seekers” or “students” (sing. الــــطـالــــب, al-ṭālib) rather than “philosophers”. 
Obviously, the primary criterion of Suhrawardī’s ranking of philosophers is their proficiency in 
deification: whether they are proficient in deification, capable of it but not proficient (i.e. 
average or weak), or lacking it completely. The secondary criterion is their proficiency in 
investigation: whether they are proficient in it, capable of it but not proficient (i.e. average or 
weak), or lacking it completely. If one wishes to simplify this ranking, one could reduce the eight 
ranks to four:  
(a) divine philosopher proficient in both deification and investigation = (1) 
(b) divine philosopher proficient only in deification but not in investigation = (2+3) 
(c) philosopher proficient only in investigation but not in deification = (4+5) 
(d) seeker proficient in neither deification nor investigation = (6+7+8)  1
The highest of the eight ranks is divine philosopher proficient in both deification and 
investigation. When a philosopher of the highest rank emerges, “he has the leadership and he is 
the caliph of God”. This again proves the importance of proficiency in deification. If one is not 
proficient in deification, one shall never have such leadership, regardless of how proficient one is 
in investigation. However, proficiency in deification is still not enough if one aims to be a 
philosopher of the highest rank; proficiency in investigation matters as well.  
Suhrawardī’s idea of combining deification (تـألّـھ, taʾalluh) and investigation (بـحث, baḥth) is 
so powerful that T. Izutsu (1971) argues Suhrawardī has inaugurated a new era of Islamic 
philosophy, namely, the tradition of what Izutsu calls “Ḥikmat philosophy”, regarded by some 
scholars (e.g. Corbin, Nasr, Izutsu) as the Islamic philosophy in the true sense. By first 
formulating the “formal structure” of Ḥikmat-type of thinking—“a perfect fusion of mystical 
experience and analytical thinking”—Suhrawardī, in this respect, should taken as the founder of 
 Shīrāzī puts forward in his commentary a similar simplified ranking, consisting of three levels. Then he expands these three 1
levels into many ranks, even more than Shahrazūrī’s ten ranks [Shī 20.23–22.2]. This seems unnecessary.
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“Ḥikmat philosophy”, because Islamic existentialist philosophers, like Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640) and 
Hādī Sabzawārī (d. 1878), all follow Suhrawardī’s lead.  1
My first answer to the why-question, therefore, is plain to see. Suhrawardī’s ambition is to 
become a philosopher of the highest rank. This requires him to be proficient not only in 
deification but also in investigation. By composing the four Peripatetic works which differ in 
both length and depth, Suhrawardī has proved perfectly his proficiency in investigation; by 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, he has proved his proficiency in both deification and investigation.   2
However, this answer is still insufficient to solve the following puzzles. Why must the 
Peripatetic works (at least al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt) be read before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq? Why 
does Suhrawardī require readers to be “skilful at the sciences of investigation” [ṬRḤ3 194.5–7] 
before studying Illuminationist philosophy? Why does he leave deliberately those “points and 
subtle things which hint at noble principles” in al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 194.4–5]? How do the 
Peripatetic works constitute an essential part of the Illuminationist project? 
1.3.2 Four answers from the Cave Story 
My following answers to the why-question are derived from my Cave Story on 
Suhrawardī, reconstructed from Plato’s cave allegory. Or maybe I should say it was when 
considering these answers that I first related Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist project to Plato’s cave 
allegory.  
The second answer: philosophy for everyone. By composing the four Peripatetic works 
which differ in both length and depth, Suhrawardī aims to expound comprehensively “the 
philosophy for the majority” (الـحكمة الـعاّمـة, al-ḥikma al-ʿāmma)  [ṬRḤ3 195: footnote].  They are 3 4
“the books for the general people” (كــــتـب الــــقـوم, kutub al-qawm) [ṬRḤ3 194.5–6], since they are 
suitable for people of all intellectual levels. Suhrawardī’s ambition is to help every “prisoner” 
 See Izutsu 1971: 59–62. In Chapter III (3.3), I shall further argue that Suhrawardī is also the founder of Islamic existential 1
metaphysics.
 I shall argue in Chapter V (introduction) that in the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq Suhrawardī is, in fact, using the 2
investigation-method to construct what he apprehends by deification.
 “The philosophy for the majority” is intended for everyone; by contrast, “the philosophy for the minority” (الــــحكمة الــــخاّصــــة, al-3
ḥikma al-khāṣṣa)—Illuminationist philosophy—is intended only for people of higher intellectual levels, that is, philosophers 
proficient in investigation and seeking deification, at least.
 In this rather long footnote, Corbin introduces deliberately a passage from §2.1—“On definition”—of the Logic of al-4
Muṭāraḥāt. Corbin believes that this passage has much to do with “the meaning of ‘illumination’ (اإلشــراق, al-ishrāq) and ‘oriental 
wisdom/philosophy’ (الــــحـكـمـة الـمـشــــرقــــیـة, al-ḥikma al-mashriqiyya)” [ṬRḤ3 195: footnote]. This passage is indeed significant; 
however, it is merely a hint or indication to a lengthy discussion in the metaphysics of al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt and al-
Muṭāraḥāt: Suhrawardī’s criticism of both the real genus—differentia distinction and the real determinable—differentia-of-
determinate distinction. The whole discussion will be reconstructed in the second half of Chapter IV (4.4).
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study the best cave philosophy; at any rate, Peripatetic philosophy is the highest wisdom that one 
can learn inside the cave. So what Suhrawardī pursues through his entire life must be the revival 
and flourishing of philosophy in general. 
The third answer: invitation for potential Illuminationists. By deliberately putting down 
“points and subtle things which hint at noble principles” [ṬRḤ 194.4–5] and “some noble, 
investigative, scattered points” [ṬRḤ 195: footnote] in the Peripatetic works, Suhrawardī aims to 
help as many “seekers” and “investigators” as possible become fully aware of the deficiency and 
fundamental problems of the Peripatetic method—investigation or Peripatetic knowledge by 
forms—and guide them to pursue Illuminationist philosophy which is based on the superior 
Illuminationist method: deification or Illuminationist presential knowledge. 
The fourth answer: Illuminationist selection process. The four Peripatetic works can be 
regarded as Suhrawardī’s selection process, because only those who actually understand the 
“points and subtle things which hint at noble principles” in the Peripatetic works would follow 
Suhrawardī to study Illuminationist philosophy and escape from the cave. Therefore, the 
Peripatetic works can test not only the candidates’ willingness to follow Suhrawardī, but also 
their intellectual capability. Moreover, this process—from the Peripatetic works to Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq—ensures that Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is studied only by Suhrawardī’s intended readers, namely, 
philosophers proficient in investigation and seeking deification, so it would not be misread or 
misinterpreted as, for instance, pure mysticism. This is corroborated by what Suhrawardī states 
in the introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: it is intended not for everyone but only for those who 
indeed seek deification [Ḥ.Sh 12.15–13.3]. Moreover, towards the end of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, 
Suhrawardī as well advises his brothers to keep this book from those who should not read it; 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is intended merely for those who doubt the Peripatetic method and who love 
the light of God [Ḥ.Sh ¶279, 258.3–9].  
However, perhaps beyond even Suhrawardī’s expectation, Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq alone becomes 
so popular that more and more readers begin to read it on its own without even knowing the 
existence of the Peripatetic works. Consequently, misinterpretation of various kinds arises. In 
this sense, one cannot say Suhrawardī’s selection process is a very successful one. Perhaps he 
should make it much clearer in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq that it must be read after the Peripatetic works. 
The fifth answer: reconstruction of Peripatetic philosophy. In the Peripatetic works, 
Suhrawardī is not merely repeating or paraphrasing what Avicenna has said, but rather, he is 
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reconstructing Peripatetic philosophy of the best version, which, in certain aspects, differs 
fundamentally from Avicennan philosophy. That is to say, Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic works are not 
“Peripatetic” in the sense that he is merely expounding Avicennan philosophy in them; rather, 
they are “Peripatetic” in the sense that Suhrawardī’s is reconstructing the best Peripatetic 
philosophy by merely using the Peripatetic method (investigation or Peripatetic knowledge by 
forms) without resorting to the Illuminationist method (deification or Illuminationist presential 
knowledge).  
What are the exact aspects where Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic philosophy differs 
fundamentally from Avicennan philosophy? This certainly requires a much more thorough 
research than what I can offer in this thesis. But at least I can provide three examples to prove 
my assumption. First, in epistemology, Suhrawardī argues in great detail in both al-Talwīḥāt and 
al-Muṭāraḥāt that Illuminationist presential knowledge must be superior to Peripatetic 
knowledge by forms, and we can only make philosophical sense of our self-apprehension, sense-
perceptions, and moreover, God’s knowledge of particulars by resorting to presential knowledge 
(Chapter II). This is clearly not Avicennan. Secondly, in metaphysics, Suhrawardī puts forward 
in al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt a lengthy and profound discussion of mental 
considerations, by which he aims to prove that no universal mental consideration can exist as a 
metaphysical component of particular things in the real world. These considerations include 
univocal existence, oneness, contingency, necessity by another, genera, differentiae (and thus, 
common natures) and so on (Chapters III & IV). This is not Avicennan either. Thirdly, I argue 
that the metaphysics presented in al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt is, in fact, existential 
metaphysics, of which the subject matter is systematically ambiguous existence (3.3). Whether or 
not Avicennan metaphysics can be interpreted as existential metaphysics is open to question. 
Therefore, Suhrawardī is eliminating in his modified Peripatetic philosophy every element 
he deems as unreasonable or fundamentally wrong from a much higher perspective: 
Illuminationist philosophy. As someone who has been outside the cave, Suhrawardī knows 
perfectly well what is right and what is wrong in the cave philosophy and hence, how to 
reconstruct the best version of it.  
My contention is that the fundamental reason Suhrawardī has composed four Peripatetic 
works is that he is, in fact, reconstructing Peripatetic philosophy in them. If my assumption is 
sound, then we can expect a new Peripatetic philosophy as reconstructed by Suhrawardī. This 
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may be the true significance of the four Peripatetic works, which undoubtedly deserve a serious 
study. I shall devote Chapters II & III & IV to setting an example for such a study.  
To sum up, the five answers that I can think of to the why-question—why does Suhrawardī 
compose the four Peripatetic works?—are as follows.  
First, the Peripatetic works undoubtedly prove Suhrawardī’s proficiency in investigation, 
which makes him a philosopher of the highest rank. Secondly, they are intended for the general 
people; everyone can gain wisdom by studying them. Thirdly, by putting down Illuminationist 
hints in them, Suhrawardī can help as many seekers and investigators as possible recognise the 
deficiency of the Peripatetic method and guide them to pursue the superior Illuminationist 
philosophy. Fourthly, they are Suhrawardī’s selection process, which ensures that only the 
intended readers read Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and study Illuminationist philosophy. Fifthly and most 
importantly, Suhrawardī is reconstructing in them the best version of Peripatetic philosophy—
which differs fundamentally from Avicennan philosophy in certain aspects—for everyone. 
More answers will be added as the thesis goes on. (6) The weakness of human cognitive 
power (so general people need Peripatetic philosophy) (see Chapter II, especially 2.6), (7) the 
elimination of the confusion between universal mental considerations and particular real things 
(so the Peripatetic works are needed to reveal and correct this fundamental fallacy underlying 
Peripatetic metaphysics) (see Chapter III & IV, especially 4.5), and (8) Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq as a 
perfect fusion of deification and investigation (so readers are required to study the Peripatetic 
works to become proficient in investigation) (see the introduction to Chapter V) all explain the 
indispensability of the Peripatetic works from different respects. 
Now we are in a position to proceed to Chapter II on presential knowledge, where I aim to 




Presential Knowledge and the Nature of Illuminationist Philosophy   1
In the introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī tells us that unlike the Peripatetic 
works, his Illuminationist masterpiece follows another path or road which is fundamentally 
different from the method of the Peripatetics, as he writes: 
[Text 1] 
This is another path (ســیاق آخــر, siyāq ākhar) and a road which is shorter (أقــرب, 
aqrab), more ordered (أنــــظم, anẓam), more accurate (أضــــبط, aḍbaṭ) and much 
easier to obtain (أقـّل أتـعابـا فـي الـتحصیل, aqall atʿāban fī al-taḥṣīl) than the method of 
the Peripatetics (طـریـقة الـمّشائـین, ṭarīqat al-Mashshāʾīn). It did not occur to me at 
first by thinking (فــــكـر, fikr) , but rather, its occurrence is by something else. 2
[Ḥ.Sh 10.8–9, ¶3] 
The following questions arise naturally. What does Suhrawardī mean by “another path” or 
“road”? How does it fundamentally differ from the method of the Peripatetics? In what sense is 
Illuminationist philosophy superior to Peripatetic philosophy? If Illuminationist philosophy is 
indeed superior, why does Suhrawardī not abandon Peripatetic philosophy altogether? Above all, 
what is the nature of the philosophy of Illumination (اإلشــــراق  ,(ḥikmat al-ishrāq ,حــــكــمــة 
Illuminationist philosophy (الـــحكمة اإلشـــراقـــیة, al-ḥikma al-ishrāqiyya), or simply, Illuminationism 
 ?(al-ishrāqiyya ,اإلشراقیة)
Through a detailed analysis of the epistemological foundation of Suhrawardī’s 
philosophy, the well-known Illuminationist presential knowledge (عـلم إشـراقـي حـضوري, ʿilm ishrāqī 
ḥuḍūrī)  [ṬRḤ3 485.17–18, 487.5], I shall offer in this chapter answers to all the questions 3
above, and also to the puzzle left unsolved in Chapter I: what does Suhrawardī mean by 
“deification” (تـــألّـــھ, taʾalluh) and “investigation” (بـــحث, baḥth) (1.3.1)? More importantly, I 
 An abbreviated version of this chapter—“Suhrawardī and Presential Knowledge”—was presented on 26 May 2017 at the 2nd 1
Annual HoAPGoC Workshop—“Themes in Post-Classical Islamic Thought”—held by Dr. Tony Street in the Faculty of Divinity, 
Cambridge.
 In al-Lamaḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: “Thinking here is the transition from the known to the unknown.” [LMḤ 58.7–8]2
 I use “presential” to render “حــــضوري” (ḥuḍūrī), which is the adjective form of “حــــضور” (ḥuḍūr, meaning “presence”). Modern 3
scholars often render “عـلم حـضوري” (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) as “knowledge by presence”, but this, in my opinion, is inaccurate. According to 
Suhrawardī, knowledge is the very presence of a thing to an immaterial self which has illumination (2.3), so knowledge is not 
“by presence” but the “presence” itself. Perhaps due to the same consideration as mine, “عـلم حـضوري” (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) is rendered by 
Kaukua (2013) as “knowledge as presence”, and sometimes, “presential knowledge”.
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will present an original interpretation of the nature of Illuminationist philosophy from an 
epistemological perspective. 
In contrast to knowledge by forms (عــــلم صــــوري, ʿilm ṣūrī)  with which the Peripatetics are 1
mainly concerned, a new type of knowledge—Illuminationist presential knowledge—is 
introduced for the first time by Suhrawardī in a dialogue on the nature of knowledge/
apprehension between him and Aristotle in a dream-like vision, in §3.1—“On apprehension and 
immateriality”—of the Metaphysics of al-Talwīḥāt. After establishing presential knowledge, 
Suhrawardī further argues in al-Talwīḥāt that it must be the very kind of knowledge that God 
should have. Then, the discussion in al-Talwīḥāt is fleshed out in the same context, that is, an 
investigation into the nature of knowledge in general and God’s knowledge in particular, in §7.1—
“On apprehension and knowledge”—of the Metaphysics of al-Muṭāraḥāt. Some parts of the 
theory of presential knowledge are scattered in different places of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq as well.  2
When dealing with God’s knowledge in al-Lamaḥāt [LMḤ 131.21–132.18], Suhrawardī also 
mentions this theory very briefly. 
Presential knowledge has been widely discussed from various angles, but scholars hold 
different views about how to understand it. Corbin, Nasr and Aminrazavi are concerned 
primarily with the mystical side of presential knowledge,  considering it as “an intuition-based 3
theory, the main aim of which is to account for and culminate in a mystical type of knowledge 
that transcends the realm of what is commonly called philosophical” . In the past few decades, 4
scholars begin to pay more attention to the philosophical side of this theory of knowledge and to 
study it in its contemporary context: the reception of Avicennan philosophy in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. Excellent examples are the studies by H. Eichner and J. Kaukua.  Eichner 5
holds that presential knowledge is put forward by Suhrawardī to solve the problem of the mind-
ʿilm ṣūrī) is not rendered as “formal knowledge” (corresponding to “presential knowledge”), given that “formal” 1) ”عـــلم صـــوري“  
usually means “official”, “serious” and so on. Instead, “عــــلـم صــــوري” (ʿilm ṣūrī) is rendered as “knowledge by forms”, because 
knowledge of this kind is indeed by forms, but not forms themselves. By contrast, “عــلم حــضوري” (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) is not by presence, 
but the presence itself. In fact, “عـلم صـوري” (ʿilm ṣūrī) is not a phrase which corresponds directly to “عـلم حـضوري” (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) in 
the first place; “عــــلم حــــصولــــي” (ʿilm ḥuṣūlī, occurrential knowledge, or knowledge as occurrence) is (although, as far as I know, 
Suhrawardī himself does not use this phrase).
 For example, two arguments regarding self-apprehension can be found in §2.1.6 of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; in both §1.3.9 and §2.2.4, 2
there are discussions of visual perception; in §2.2.10, there is a treatment of God’s knowledge. See my reconstruction in this 
chapter (2.2–2.4) for detail.
 For instance, Aminrazavi (2003: 210) writes: “A direct result of knowledge by presence is that it paves the way for mysticism to 3
be taken seriously by both masters [i.e. Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī].”
 Kaukua 2013: 309.4
 Eichner 2011; Kaukua 2013.5
 34
body relation in Avicenna’s epistemology; Kaukua rejects Eichner’s view and rightly argues that 
the problem with which Suhrawardī aims to deal is God’s knowledge of particulars. 
With this chapter, I aim first to demystify Suhrawardī’s theory of presential knowledge. 
Fundamentally, it is not a mystical theory of knowledge, but rather, a philosophical one. 
Suhrawardī formulates it as an explanation of the nature of human knowledge alternative to 
Avicenna’s knowledge by forms. It should be taken as Suhrawardī’s attempt to solve the problem 
regarding the nature of human knowledge in general and how human beings know particulars in 
particular (2.1 & 2.3). Furthermore, presential knowledge is used by Suhrawardī to explain God’s 
knowledge, especially how God knows particulars (2.4). Although presential knowledge leads 
eventually to some kind of mystical knowledge, Suhrawardī resorts to mysticism only for a 
sound philosophical reason. He believes that the proper objects of human knowledge are, in fact, 
particulars rather than universals, so his ambition is to exhaust human beings’ cognitive ability 
to know all extramental particular things as they are, including not only material things in this 
world, but also immaterial things beyond this world (2.6).  
In this chapter, I make an attempt to treat the theory of presential knowledge as the 
epistemological foundation of Illuminationist philosophy, rather than merely as Suhrawardī’s 
solution to a particular theological problem: God’s knowledge of particulars, as held by Kaukua. 
By doing so, I hope to reveal what Suhrawardī aims to achieve ultimately with Illuminationist 
philosophy and the fundamental difference between it and Peripatetic philosophy (2.6). 
Moreover, my reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge in this chapter, if 
reasonable, should undermine such a position that Suhrawardī’s theory of knowledge is 
essentially Avicennan, like the one held by Aminrazavi: 
In what follows, I will argue that despite apparent differences and the 
association with two different schools of thought, the epistemology of 
Suhrawardī is essentially that of Ibn Sīnā (or Avicenna), and even 
Suhrawardī’s theory of “knowledge by presence” (al-ʿlm al-ḥuḍurī), which is 
considered to be uniquely his, is at least inspired by Ibn Sīnā. I will argue that 
Ibn Sīnā’s peripatetic orientation and Suhrawardī’s ishrāqī perspective have 
both maintained and adhered to the same epistemological framework while 
the philosophical language in which their respective epistemologies are 
discussed is different. Of particular interest in our investigation is to show that 
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both masters have adhered to a hierarchy of knowledge as follows: 
1. Knowledge by definition 
2. Knowledge by sense perception 
3. Knowledge through a priori concepts  1
4. Knowledge by presence 
5. Knowledge through direct experience: mysticism  2
First, I argue that Suhrawardī’s epistemology is essentially not that of Avicenna. An obvious 
reason is that they are based on two fundamentally incompatible epistemological assumptions: 
Avicenna believes that the proper objects of human knowledge are universals, whereas 
Suhrawardī holds that they are particulars. Secondly, Suhrawardī’s theory of presential 
knowledge is not inspired by Avicenna. I suspect Aminrazavi arrives at such a claim because his 
understanding of presential knowledge is limited to self-apprehension, that is, presential 
knowledge is equivalent to self-apprehension, which seems to be a somewhat traditional 
interpretation shared by many modern readers of Suhrawardī.  But according to my reading, self-3
apprehension is merely one type of presential knowledge; there are, in fact, at least another three 
kinds: the apprehension of the body and bodily faculties, the apprehension of the pain caused by 
amputation and visual perception, based on the relevant texts in al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt 
(2.2). Thirdly, the epistemologies of Avicenna and Suhrawardī do not maintain or adhere to the 
same epistemological framework. Regardless of whether or not Avicenna adheres to the 
“hierarchy of knowledge” suggested by Aminrazavi above, Suhrawardī must have an entirely 
different one in mind, which should be something like this (2.5): 
 Aminrazavi’s claim that Suhrawardī’s fiṭrī (فــــطـري) knowledge refers to pre-given or a priori knowledge has been undermined 1
already by Mousavian (2014a & 2014b) and Walbridge (2014).
 Aminrazavi 2003: 203.2
 This point is obvious, according to Aminrazavi’s (2003: 207–210) interpretation of presential knowledge: “Now that we have 3
established how knowledge of the external world is determined, let us go further and investigate how one attains knowledge of 
one’s self, a knowledge that is regarded by Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī to be the necessary condition for the attainment of any 
knowledge. The theory that addresses this epistemological concept is referred to as ‘knowledge by presence,’ a perspective on 
which both Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī elaborate.”  
The monograph of M. H. Yazdi (1992) is based largely on a reading similar to Aminrazavi’s that Suhrawardī’s presential 
knowledge is equivalent to self-knowledge or “self-objective knowledge” (Yazdi’s term). See, for example, Yazdi 1992: 1–3 
(Introduction), 43–56 (Chapter 3). But Yazdi seems to be aware that there might be a theory of presential knowledge in a broader 
sense, as he writes in Chapter 4 (Yazdi 1992: 66): “It must, however, be admitted that there is a sense of presence in which the 
acquaintance of the mind with the sense-data, with all their conceptual implications concerning the physical object, can be used. 
Yet this would require a further ramification of knowledge by presence to be worked out to apply to sense-data and not to be 
confused with the subject under consideration here.”  
In addition, as Eichner (2011: 117, footnote 1) rightly points out, Yazdi’s “monograph has established this notion (i.e. knowledge 
by presence) as a modern epistemological paradigm for Islamic Mysticism, rather than restricting itself to an investigation 
grounded in the historical sources”. A similar remark is made by Kaukua (2013: 310, footnote 5): “In spite of its undeniable 
merits, Ha’iri Yazdi’s book is not a historically rigorous study.”
 36
1. Presential knowledge (cannot be divided into conception and assent) 
  A. Presential knowledge by being principle and having total control  
      (e.g. God’s knowledge, self-apprehension) 
  B. Presential knowledge by control (e.g. human apprehension of the 
body) 
  C. Presential sense perception 
2. Knowledge by forms (divided into conception and assent) 
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2.1 The context of the theory of presential knowledge 
As pointed out by Kaukua, “plenty has been written about this passage [i.e. the passage on 
the dialogue between Suhrawardī and Aristotle on the nature of knowledge in al-Talwīḥāt], but 
few writers have paid sufficient attention to the context”. He suggests that “the notion of 
knowledge as presence is introduced in the context of explaining God’s knowledge of 
particulars”.  This is true so far as it goes but not the whole context. My contention is that 1
presential knowledge is put forward by Suhrawardī in the context of general dissatisfaction in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries with Avicenna’s explanation of the nature of apprehension (إدراك, 
idrāk)  and indeed, his whole epistemology. This dissatisfaction is not only found in 2
Suhrawardī’s texts, such as §3.1 of al-Talwīḥāt and §7.1 of al-Muṭāraḥāt, but also in the works 
of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), for example, his commentary on Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt wa-l-
Tanbīhāt, “which heavily influences and determines even the way that al-Razī’s critics and 
opponents read Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy” . 3
Avicenna writes in al-Najāt:  
It seems that every apprehension is taking the form of a thing apprehended 
  [akhdh ṣūrat al-mudrak). [NJ 344.3 ,أخذ صورة المدَرك)
Likewise, in the seventh paragraph of the third namaṭ of al-Ishārāt, “On the earthly and 
heavenly soul”, he says “the apprehension of a thing is that its reality (حـــقیقة, ḥaqīqa) becomes an 
image (مــــتـمـثّـلـة, mutamaththila) in the apprehender”, and “the image of the thing’s reality” is “not 
different from that thing” [ShWR 122.5–11]. Therefore, according to Avicenna, apprehension is 
taking the corresponding form or image of the thing apprehended, or in other words, the 
occurrence of a thing’s form (حـــصول الـــصورة, ḥuṣūl al-ṣūra), or the imprinting of its form (انـــطباع 
 .(inṭibāʿ al-ṣūra ,الصورة
When commenting on Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt, Rāzī finds this explanation so unsatisfactory 
that he spends more than ten pages—[RZ2 219.2–233.13]—arguing against Avicenna’s idea that 
apprehension is the imprinting or occurrence of a thing’s form. He writes: 
 Kaukua 2013: 310.1
 “Apprehension” (إدراك, idrāk) is frequently used by Avicenna in epistemology to refer to knowledge of any kind, including 2
external and internal sense perceptions, and intellectual understanding. Following Avicenna, post-Avicennan philosophers, like 
Suhrawardī and Rāzī, also use this term quite often in epistemology. See also, Eichner 2011: 122–123.
 Eichner 2011: 117.3
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Know that there are people who reject [the idea] that the occurrence of 
apprehension and sense perception depends on the occurrence of the quiddity 
of a thing apprehended in an apprehender (حــصول مــاھــیة الــمدَرك فــي الــمدِرك, ḥuṣūl 
māhiyyat al-mudrak fī al-mudrik). They prove this by an argument which 
applies generally to intellectual and sensory apprehensions, and several 
arguments which apply specifically to each one of those apprehensions. [RZ2 
219.2–4]  
I mention but do not propose to analyse Rāzī’s arguments here.  1
Apparently, there are philosophers other than Rāzī who likewise disapprove of Avicenna’s 
account of the nature of apprehension; Suhrawardī is one of them. In my view, Suhrawardī finds 
two problems with Avicenna’s idea.  
First, Suhrawardī does not think Avicenna’s explanation applies generally to every human 
apprehension. There are at least four kinds of human knowledge—self-apprehension, the 
apprehension of the body, the apprehension of the pain caused by amputation and visual 
perception—that cannot be explained by Avicenna’s theory (2.2). According to Suhrawardī, these 
apprehensions have one thing in common: none of them requires a form as an intermediary; 
rather, they all occur simply because of the presence (or non-absence, in the case of self-
apprehension; see 2.3.1) of the very thing apprehended. By following this line of reflection, 
Suhrawardī is prompted to come up with another more comprehensive explanation for what 
apprehension is. 
The second problem has to do with the question about how human beings know 
particulars.  According to Avicenna, the human soul is in principle intellect, so the proper objects 2
of human knowledge are universals. Human beings are not, however, merely intellects, but souls 
controlling bodies and bodily faculties and engaging with the material world.  So they can 3
apprehend particulars as well, though in a universal manner: the aggregate of universal forms 
with the “reference to an individualised intention” (اإلشــارة إلــى مــعنى مــتشّخص, al-ishāra ilā maʿnan 
mutashakhkhiṣ) [Sh.N.D 70.11–12], or, to borrow Kaukua’s phrase, “an ostensive reference to 
 A discussion can be found in Eichner 2011: 122–127.1
 For an excellent discussion of Avicenna’s epistemology, especially on knowledge of particulars, see Adamson 2005. Adamson 2
shows that, following Aristotle, Avicenna goes so far to argue that “knowledge” in the strict sense must be of universals; “there is 
in fact no such thing as ‘knowledge’ of particulars, at least not as such” (Adamson 2005: 257). Suhrawardī, by contrast, holds 
that the best knowledge—presential knowledge—is always of particulars and it has several degrees; knowledge of universals is 
much more inferior (see 2.3 onwards). Therefore, it is plain to see Suhrawardī’s epistemology is essentially not Avicenna’s.
 See Kaukua 2013: 311–312.3
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unique spatio-temporal co-ordinates, which are the foundation of the individuality of material 
entities” . Suhrawardī is fully aware of Avicenna’s idea, and even paraphrases it before 1
introducing presential knowledge in al-Talwīḥāt: 
[Text 2] 
Know that it is permissible that the soul  knows particulars in a universal 2
manner (عـــلى وجـــھ كـــلي, ʿalā wajh kullī). For example, it knows Zayd by the fact 
that he is the tall, the black, and the son of someone, in so far as these 
universals do not exist simultaneously (مـــجتمعة, mujtamiʿa) in anyone else. But 
despite that, the meaning of the aggregate of these universals itself does not 
make impossible the participation in itself (الـشــــركــــة فــــیـھ, al-sharika fī-hi) from 
happening; if the impossibility of the participation is presumed, then it is due 
to a hindrance (مــانــع, māniʿ) which is not the meaning [itself]. Let this be a rule 
for you. [LWḤ3 69.12–15]  3
Although Suhrawardī accepts Avicenna’s idea that human beings can know particulars in a 
universal manner, that is, by their corresponding forms, he does not think this knowledge 
accurately reflects the particulars themselves. This is because no form, be it a simple form or an 
aggregate of forms, in itself makes impossible “the participation in itself”, whereas the object of 
knowledge—Zayd, in this case—in itself makes impossible the participation in himself. 
Unlike Avicenna, Suhrawardī believes the proper objects of human knowledge are, in fact, 
particulars rather than universals. Human beings can know particular things as they are, rather 
than merely “in a universal manner” (عــــلـى وجــــھ كــــلـي, ʿalā wajh kullī) or by means of universal 
forms, as long as they are present (or not absent). Only when an object is absent, do we need its 
form as an intermediary to know it (2.3).  
To tackle these two problems, Suhrawardī starts from self-apprehension. Aristotle, who 
came to Suhrawardī in a dream-like vision, advises him at the very beginning of their dialogue 
on the nature of knowledge in al-Talwīḥāt: 
 Kaukua 2013: 312.1
 The term “soul” refers specifically to the human soul in this chapter.2
 For an alternative exposition of this passage, see Kaukua 2013: 311–312.3
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[Text 3] 
Go back to yourself (ارجــــع إلــــى نــــفسك, irjiʿ ilā nafsika) and it [i.e. the problem of 
knowledge (مسألة العلم, masʾalat al-ʿilm)] will be solved for you. [LWḤ3 70.7]  
Suhrawardī is aware that there is at least one particular thing that every human being can know 
as it is: one’s self. With the analysis of self-apprehension as the starting point, Suhrawardī further 
argues that there must be many more particular things that we can know as they are. In fact, 
particulars, rather than universals, are the proper objects of human knowledge. 
Therefore, it is in this context of general dissatisfaction with Avicenna’s epistemology that 
Suhrawardī introduces presential knowledge. At first glance, it is an explanation of human 
apprehension alternative to Avicenna’s. Essentially, it is another attempt to solve the problem 
regarding how human beings know particulars and, in general, how to make sense of the nature 
of human knowledge. Furthermore, presential knowledge is used to explain God’s knowledge, 
especially how God knows particulars. 
Eichner holds that with the theory of presential knowledge, Suhrawardī is dealing with the 
problem of the mind-body relationship in Avicenna’s epistemology:  
Ibn Sīnā held that perception and thought involve brain activity and material 
processes. Given his immaterialist doctrine of the rational soul, how then can 
perception be integrated with phenomena such as consciousness and 
apperception?  1
To tackle this problem, Eichner argues: 
… al-Suhrawardī extends the explanatory power of the term ḥuḍūr [i.e. 
presence] to the mind-body relationship. He thus provides a unified 
epistemological theory which includes apperception as well as perception 
and apprehension of external objects.  2
To elaborate, she goes on: 
As “Aristotle” points out in the dialogue, we have continuous apprehension of 
our bodies, and they are not absent from us. It is this relation between the 
 Eichner 2011: 119.1
 Eichner 2011: 119.2
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immaterial self and the body which is described as “presence” and “non-
absence”. The same analysis extends to all parts of the body, including bodily 
faculties involved in perception and apprehension of external objects. Thus, 
“presence” is a concept which is situated at the link between body and 
intellect, but also between universality and the particularity that is achieved 
by “pointing”.  1
This concept [i.e. presence] provides the link between intellection and brain 
activity. The soul’s relationship to the internal senses (and hence the brain) 
has to be explained in terms of the same concepts which describe our 
awareness of our bodies.   2
Therefore, Eichner’s general position is that Suhrawardī’s theory of presential knowledge should 
be considered as a perfection of Avicenna’s epistemology rather than a theory conflicting with it, 
as she argues at the beginning of her article: 
But al-Suhrawardī’s theory in fact presupposes Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the 
internal senses, and takes as its starting point Ibn Sīnā’s definition of 
universal expressions, which in turn is based on Ibn Sīnā’s concept of 
“essence” as ontologically neutral (that is, an essence can exist either in 
external or mental reality).   3
Eichner is right in pointing out and showing elaborately that Suhrawardī’s notion of 
“presence” has the potential to be used to solve the mind-body relationship problem facing 
Avicenna (and probably also facing Suhrawardī himself, since Peripatetic knowledge by forms 
has its place in Suhrawardī’s epistemology). However, I think this is not among Suhrawardī’s 
immediate aims with his theory of presential knowledge.  As pointed out at the beginning of this 4
chapter, I argue that Suhrawardī aims first to solve the problem regarding the nature of human 
knowledge, and also to explain God’s knowledge of particulars. 
Moreover, Eichner’s overall reading of Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge as a perfection 
of Avicenna’s epistemology differs from mine. I hold that presential knowledge is introduced by 
 Eichner 2011: 135.1
 Eichner 2011: 136.2
 Eichner 2011:118.3
 Kaukua also points out that Eichner seems to miss Suhrawardī’s immediate intention. For his criticism, see Kaukua 2013: 312, 4
316.
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Suhrawardī to replace altogether Avicenna’s account of the nature of knowledge rather than as a 
perfection of Avicenna’s epistemology. This will become clearer as my reconstruction in this 
chapter goes on. 
Furthermore, Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge, in my view, does not presuppose 
Avicenna’s theory of internal senses. I suspect a passage in al-Talwīḥāt—[LWḤ3 71.10–17]—
leads Eichner to the belief that Suhrawardī accepts Avicenna’s theory of internal senses, and he is 
above all concerned with the mind-body relationship. But a careful reading of that passage 
convinces me that Suhrawardī is, in fact, arguing against Avicenna in the Peripatetic context. For 
the sake of argument, Suhrawardī is making use of the Peripatetic theory of internal senses to 
show that the human soul must be able to understand particulars and even the Peripatetics 
themselves acknowledge this point, consciously or unconsciously. But this does not mean that 
Suhrawardī accepts Avicenna’s theory of internal senses. Moreover, if Suhrawardī’s discussion 
of the imaginal world (الــــعـالــــم الــــمـثـالــــي, al-ʿālam al-mithālī) in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is taken into 
consideration at this point, it is immediately clear that Suhrawardī rejects Avicenna’s theory of 
internal senses.   1
I largely agree with what Kaukua says in “Suhrawardī’s Knowledge as Presence in 
Context” (2013) except for several minor points.  However, Kaukua argues that Suhrawardī does 2
not introduce a new type of knowledge:  
The concept of presence, instead of introducing a new type of knowledge, 
signals a shift of approach from a psychological account of the genesis of 
knowledge to a consideration of knowledge as a matter of experience.   3
… The concept signals a shift of approach from psychological explanation of 
cognition as a natural process to a consistent consideration of knowledge as 
a first-personal experience phenomenon. Thus, the concept does not 
introduce a new type of knowledge.  4
 For a discussion of Suhrawardī’s imaginal world, see Sinai 2015. For my further discussion of Suhrawardī’s theory of 1
imagination, see 2.3.2.
 These points will be pointed out in due course as footnotes.2
 Kaukua 2013: 315.3
 Kaukua 2013: 322.4
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By introducing presential knowledge, which is not “a new type of knowledge”, according to 
Kaukua, Suhrawardī aims mainly, if not merely, to make more sense of God’s knowledge of 
particulars, that is, to “make conceptual room for knowledge of particulars, absolutely speaking
—that is, including the special case of God” and “to use ordinary human knowledge, … as a 
point of departure to discuss God’s knowledge”.   1
First, I shall go much further in this chapter than Kaukua to argue that Suhrawardī is 
indeed introducing a new type of knowledge, namely, presential knowledge, which must be 
essentially different from Avicenna’s knowledge by forms. This is because these two theories are 
founded upon two fundamentally incompatible premises, that is, whether particulars or 
universals are the proper objects of human knowledge. Moreover, it is undeniable that the 
highest stage of Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge is the immediate “mystical” knowledge—
spiritual witnessing (مـشاھـدة, mushāhada) or tasting (ذوق, dhawq)—of particulars in the immaterial 
world. Therefore, presential knowledge has to be something entirely new. 
Secondly, although God’s knowledge of particulars is a major problem Suhrawardī aims to 
tackle, it is not his only concern. The fundamental problem for Suhrawardī, as argued above, is 
how to make sense of the nature of apprehension in general. Rather than treating presential 
knowledge merely as Suhrawardī’s solution to a specific theological problem, I make an attempt 
to reconstruct this theory as the epistemological foundation of Illuminationist philosophy. 
In what follows, I shall reconstruct Suhrawardī’s discussion of presential knowledge in al-
Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, with parallel passages in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. 
 Kaukua 2013: 316.1
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2.2 Establishing the Illuminationist presential knowledge 
In the first part of his discussion of the nature of apprehension, Suhrawardī aims to prove 
that there must be four kinds of human apprehension—self-apprehension, the apprehension of 
the body, the apprehension of the pain caused by amputation and visual perception—that cannot 
be explained by knowledge by forms, for none of them requires a form as an intermediary. 
Rather, they must all be immediate knowledge which requires nothing but the very presence (or 
non-absence) of objects of knowledge themselves. 
Arguments that will be reconstructed in this section can be found in the following 
locations: 
• Self-apprehension (2.2.1)  
  Argument I:  [LWḤ3 70.9–71.4] = [ṬRḤ3 484.10–14] 
  Argument II:  [ṬRḤ3 484.7–10] = [Ḥ.Sh 111.5–9, ¶115] 
  Argument III: [Ḥ.Sh 115.9–14, ¶115] 
• Apprehension of the body (2.2.2)  
    [LWḤ3 71.5–17] = [ṬRḤ3 484.14–485.6] 
• Apprehension of the pain caused by amputation (2.2.3)  
    [ṬRḤ3 485.7–485.12] 
• Visual perception (2.2.4)  
    [ṬRḤ3 485.13–486.17] 
2.2.1 Self-apprehension 
Suhrawardī starts off by arguing that self-apprehension (اإلدراك لـلذات, al-idrāk lil-dhāt)—the 
most general and undeniable human knowledge—must be presential knowledge rather than 
knowledge by forms. Three arguments can be found in Suhrawardī’s three major philosophical 
works. I call them respectively: (1) the argument from the particularity of the self, (2) the 
argument from I-ness and (3) the argument from the priority of self-knowledge. 
2.2.1.1 The argument from the particularity of the self 
The argument from the particularity of the self is found in both al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 70.9–
71.4] and al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 484.10–14]. With this argument, Suhrawardī aims to prove that 
 45
the apprehension of the soul of its self does not require any form as an intermediary, for every 
form in the soul is universal in itself, whereas the self of the soul is particular in itself.  
The argument in al-Talwīḥāt is as follows: 
[Text 4] 
[Aristotle said: …] If you apprehend your self (ذاتـــك, dhātuka)  by your self, [do 1
you apprehend your self] by considering an impression (أثـر, athar) of your self 
in your self?  
I said: Of course. 
He said: If that impression does not correspond to (لــم یــطابــق, lam yuṭābiq) your 
self, then it is not the form of your self, and then you would not apprehend 
your self. 
I said: Then that impression must be the form of my self. 
He said: Does your form belong to absolute soul (نـــفس مـــطلق, nafs muṭlaq) or a 
soul particularised by other properties (نــــفـس مــــتـخـّصصــــة بــــصـفـات أخــــرى, nafs 
mutakhaṣṣiṣa bi-ṣifāt ukhrā)?  
I chose the second. [LWḤ3 70.9–12] 
Supposing the soul apprehends its self by means of an intermediary, then (1) either this 
intermediary is an impression (أثــــر, athar) which does not correspond to its self, (2) or it is an 
impression that corresponds to its self, namely, the form of its self. (1) The first option is absurd, 
because if the impression does not correspond to the self of the soul, then the soul’s 
apprehension of it would not be equivalent to the apprehension of its self. (2) Therefore, the soul 
must know its self by the form of its self.   2
Two further possibilities follow: (2-A) either the form belongs to “absolute soul” (نـفس مـطلق, 
nafs muṭlaq), that is, soul inasmuch as it is soul, or the very definition of the term “soul”; (2-B) 
or the form belongs to “a soul particularised by other properties” (نـفس مـتخّصصـة بـصفات أخـرى, nafs 
mutakhaṣṣiṣa bi-ṣifāt ukhrā). (2-A) The first option is absurd. Otherwise, by knowing “absolute 
soul”—the very definition of “soul”—I would know my self; if I am ignorant of what “soul” is, I 
 The term “ذات” (dhāt) is rendered as “self” rather than “essence” in Suhrawardī’s discussion of self-apprehension. In addition, I 1
use, for example, “your self” to render “ذاتــــك” (dhātuka) rather than “yourself” in this particular context, because “yourself” is 
likely to be taken as a reflexive pronoun, but “your self” refers to the self, the soul, or the I-ness of yours. Likewise, expressions 
like “my self”, “its self” and “his self” will also appear in this chapter.
 This part of the argument is found as well in §1.1.2— “On conception and assent”—of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. There, Suhrawardī aims 2
to prove that we must apprehend a thing absent from us by the form or the “image of a thing’s reality” (مـثال حـقیقة الشـيء, mithāl ḥaqīqat 
al-shayʾ), which corresponds to the thing, rather than an impression (أثــــر, athar) which does not correspond to the thing. See [Ḥ.Sh 
15.3–7, ¶8].
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would be ignorant of my self. (2-B) However, even if the form belongs to a soul particularised 
by properties, it is still universal when considered merely in itself. With regard to this point, 
Suhrawardī goes on: 
[Text 5] 
He said: Every form in the soul is universal. Even if it is composed, still, [it 
must be composed] from multiple universals. So it does not make impossible 
the participation in itself (الشــركــة لــنفسھا, al-sharika li-nafsihā). If the impossibility 
of the participation is assumed, that must be due to another hindrance. You 
apprehend your self, and your self makes impossible the participation [in 
itself] by itself. So this apprehension must not be by means of any form. 
[LWḤ3 70.12–14]   1
That is to say, if I know Zayd “by the fact that he is the tall, the black and the son of someone” 
[LWḤ3 69.13] and so on (I can add in my mind as many properties as I wish to the form of 
Zayd), the form of Zayd is still universal in itself in the sense that it does not make the 
participation in itself impossible. In principle, there could be more than one individual in the 
real world that corresponds to the form of Zayd in my mind. (Moreover, in my mind, I can 
always imagine multiple individuals that correspond to the form of Zayd.) Therefore, 
Suhrawardī claims that no form “makes impossible the participation in itself”. In fact, the 
impossibility of the participation in the form of Zayd can be assumed only when there is a 
hindrance which is not from the form itself but from the outside: I know the fact that there is 
only one individual called Zayd in the real world that corresponds to this form in my mind. 
However, the self of the soul is particular in itself, for it “makes impossible the 
participation [in itself] by itself” [LWḤ3 70.14], rather than by any external hindrance. It is 
inconceivable that there could be any other individual that corresponds to my self.  
Therefore, the apprehension of the form, which is universal in the sense that it does not 
make the participation in itself impossible, is decidedly not the apprehension of the self, which is 
unconditionally particular in the sense that it makes the participation in itself impossible merely 
by itself. 
 From an Avicennan point of view, one might refuse Suhrawardī’s claim that “every form in the soul is universal”, for 1
universality attaches to a form only when the form is related in the mind to many; but Suhrawardī is using the term “universal” in 
a less strict sense: no form in itself “makes impossible the participation in itself”.
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Therefore, the soul must know its self directly without any intermediary, be it an 
impression or a form. This is because every form in the soul must be universal in the sense that it 
does not make the participation in itself impossible by itself, whereas the self of the soul is 
decidedly particular in itself.  1
The argument above is then rephrased in al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 484.10–14], as the second 
argument regarding self-apprehension there:  
[Text 6] 
If the soul apprehends its self by means of a form, then every form that 
occurs in the soul is universal, and its correspondence to many (مــطابــقتھا لــكثرة, 
muṭābaqatuhā li-kathra) is not impossible. Even if a form is taken as an 
aggregate of universals, the totality of which belongs exclusively to one 
individual soul, it cannot escape from being universal. But every human being 
apprehends his self in the sense that the participation [in his self] is 
impossible, so it is not suitable at all that his understanding of his particular 
self (تـعّقلھ لـذاتـھ الجـزئـیة, taʿaqquluhu li-dhātihi al-juzʾiyya) is by means of any form. 
[ṬRḤ3 484.10–14] 
2.2.1.2 The argument from I-ness 
The argument from I-ness, located in both al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 484.7–10] and Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh 111.5–9, ¶115], is based on the premise that the form of the soul is an “it” to the 
soul, whereas the self of the soul is decidedly the “I” to the soul. The argument in al-Muṭāraḥāt 
is as follows: 
[Text 7] 
The form which is in the soul cannot be the very same thing as the soul. But 
the self-apprehender apprehends the very thing due to which its I-ness/
being-“I” (أنــائــیتھ, anāʾiyyatuhu) is, rather than something that corresponds to it 
[i.e. the self-apprehender]. But every form—which is in the apprehender and 
added to its self (زائـــدة عـــلى ذاتـــھ, zāʾida ʿalā dhātihi)—is an “it” in relation to the 
 There is another possibility considered by Suhrawardī in this argument, [LWḤ3 70.14–71.1]. One might argue that the soul 1
apprehends its self by the “meaning of I” (مــــفھوم أنــــا, mafhūm anā), which seems to make the participation in itself impossible by 
itself. Suhrawardī responds that the meaning of the term “I”, when considered merely in itself, is as well a “universal intelligible 
intention” (مـــعنى مـــعقول كـــلّي, maʿnan maʿqūl kullī). Only when the term “I” is related to a certain individual and when it carries a 
“particular reference” (إشارة جزئیّة, ishāra juzʾiyya), does it become a particular term and does its intention become particular.
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apprehender, rather than the “I” to it. So self-apprehension is not by means of 
any form. [ṬRḤ3 484.7–10] 
Every self-apprehender in its self-apprehension must apprehend “the very thing due to 
which its I-ness/being-‘I’ is” (عــین مــا بــھ أنــائــیتھ, ʿayn mā bi-hi anāʾiyyatuhu) [ṬRḤ3 484.8], or the 
very thing which is the “I” to it. However, every form in the soul must be an “it”, or in other 
words, something other than the “I”, in relation to the soul. This point needs elaboration. I think 
it can be proved in two ways. First, every form is something added to the soul. But if B is added 
to A, then B cannot be A itself, for A must be logically prior to B in order for B to be added to A. 
So no form can be the very same thing as the self of the soul. If we adopt this approach, this 
premise—everything added to a thing is not identical to the thing—is crucial to this argument, 
although Suhrawardī only gives us a hint in the text above: “added to its self” [ṬRḤ3 484.9]. 
Secondly, by intuition, I simply know the form of my self is not my self: the form is an “it” to 
me but my self is the “I”. This, in my view, is Suhrawardī’s preferred way, because even the 
slight hint—“added to its self”—in al-Muṭāraḥāt is missing in the parallel passage in Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq. The same argument, converted to a reduction to absurdity form, in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is as 
follows: 
[Text 8] 
If self-knowledge is by means of an image (مــــثـال, mithāl), but the image of I-
ness is not the I-ness [itself], for the image is an “it” in relation to the I-ness 
and in that case the object of apprehension would be the image [rather than 
the I-ness], then it follows that the apprehension of I-ness would be the very 
same thing as the apprehension of what is an “it” (مــا ھــو ھــو, mā huwa huwa), 
and the apprehension of the I-ness itself would be the very same thing as the 
apprehension of something other than I-ness. This is absurd. This is different 
from [the case of the apprehension of] external things, for an image and what 
that image belongs to, are both “it” [in relation to the soul]. [Ḥ.Sh 111.6–9, 
¶115] 
Therefore, the soul cannot know its self, which is the “I” to it, by any form, which must be 
an “it”—something other than the “I”—to it. 
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2.2.1.3 The argument from the priority of self-knowledge  1
The argument from the priority of self-knowledge, found only in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, [Ḥ.Sh 
115.9–14, ¶115], is based on the premise that the apprehension of the self of a self-apprehender 
must be logically prior to the apprehension of the image of its self. Suhrawardī argues:  
[Text 9] 
Moreover, supposing [self-knowledge] is by means of an image (مـــثال, mithāl), 
and [1] if [the apprehender] does not know that it is an image that belongs to 
its self, then it must not know its self; [2] if it knows that it is an image of its 
self, then it must have known its self already, rather than by that image.  
Whatever the case, it is inconceivable that a thing knows its self by anything 
added to its self (أمـر زائـد عـلى نـفسھ, amr zāʾid ʿalā nafsihi), for that thing must be 
a property (صــــفـة, ṣifa) that belongs to it. If it has been judged that every 
property added to its self—be it knowledge or anything else—is something 
that belongs to its self, then it must have known its self already prior to all the 
properties and without them. So it is not the case that it has known its self by 
the properties which are added. [Ḥ.Sh 111.9–14, ¶115] 
Supposing a self-apprehender apprehends its self by means of an image, two possibilities 
follow: (1) either it does not know that the image belongs to its self; (2) or it knows that it is an 
image of its self. (1) If it does not know, then even if it apprehends the image, it would not 
apprehend its self by that image, for the image apprehended in this case would have nothing to 
do with its self. This contradicts the assumption that the self-apprehender apprehends its self by 
the image. (2) If it knows that it is an image of its self, then it must have already known its self 
before it knows the image is something that belongs to its self. So it must have known its self 
already without that image. This also contradicts the premise. 
From this argument, it can be inferred that it is impossible for a self-apprehender to know 
its self by anything that is added to its self, be it an image or anything else. This is because 
everything that is added to its self must be a property that belongs to its self (صــفة لــھ, ṣifa la-hu).  2
 For an alternative reconstruction, see Aminrazavi 2003: 209–210. But Aminrazavi’s reconstruction is somewhat confusing: first, 1
one cannot find the text of “Suhrawardī’s second argument” (it should be from [Ḥ.Sh 110], according to Aminrazavi’s note 26, 
but it is not there); secondly, it is unclear to what “Suhrawardī’s third and final argument” refers.
 I assume Suhrawardī is using the term “property” (صــــفـة, ṣifa) in a very broad sense: “a property is simply whatever can be 2
attributed to something by a predicate” (Miller 1996: 19, footnote 10; 28). See Chapter III for a comprehensive analysis of 
Suhrawardī’s discussion of various properties.
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But it must have already known its self, before it knows something is a property that belongs to 
its self. Therefore, every self-apprehender must know its self by its self, rather than by anything 
that is added to its self. 
From all the three arguments above, it is plain to see that self-apprehension must be 
presential knowledge rather than knowledge by forms, for it is impossible for a self-apprehender 
to apprehend its self by anything that is other than its self, be it a form or anything else. 
2.2.2 Apprehension of the body and bodily faculties 
After proving that self-apprehension is presential knowledge rather than knowledge by 
forms, Suhrawardī turns to our apprehension of the body and bodily faculties, which, according 
to him, must as well be presential knowledge. The line of this argument, found in both al-
Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 71.5–17] and al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 484.14–485.6], is rather similar to that of 
the first argument regarding self-apprehension; I call it the argument from the particularity of the 
body and bodily faculties. 
In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 10] 
He said: You move your particular body, and you know it as a specific and 
particular body (بــدن خــاّص جــزئــي, badan khāṣṣ juzʾī). But what you take from a 
form (مــــا أخــــذَت مــــن الــــصـورة, mā akhadhta min al-ṣūra)  itself does not make 1
impossible the participation in the form from happening. So your 
apprehension of the form is not the apprehension of your body, the meaning 
of which (مــــفـھـومــــھ, mafhūmuhu) is inconceivable to belong to anything else. 
[LWḤ3 71.7–10] 
Every human being moves and controls his own body, and considers it as unique and particular 
in itself. In other words, the meaning of my body cannot belong to anything else except my 
particular body itself. However, every form in the soul must be universal in itself, for the 
meaning of a form does not make impossible the participation in that form, as established above 
(2.2.1.1). Therefore, it is impossible for any human being to know his body by a form. 
 This phrase seems to refer to the meaning of a form, or what is understood from a form.1
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In the same way, it can be proved that we likewise need no form as an intermediary to 
know our bodily faculties, such as imagery (الـخیال, al-khayāl), imaginative faculty (الـقّوة الـمتخیّلة, al-
quwwa al-mutakhayyila) and estimation (الـوھـم, al-wahm),  for they are particular in themselves as 1
well. Otherwise, as Suhrawardī argues in al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[Text 11] 
The soul apprehends its body and apprehends its estimation and imagery. If 
it apprehends these things by means of a form in its self, and that form is 
universal, then the soul would be moving a universal body and using a 
universal faculty, and it would not have an apprehension of its body or the 
faculties of its body. This is incorrect. [ṬRḤ3 484.14–17] 
Therefore, Suhrawardī concludes in al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[Text 12] 
A human being must apprehend his present particular body (بـدنـھ الجـزئـي الـحاضـر, 
badanuhu al-juzʾī al-ḥāḍir) and its present particular faculties, and use a 
particular faculty. So [every] human being must apprehend his self not by 
means of any form, all of his faculties not by means of any form, and all of his 
body not by means of any form. [ṬRḤ3 485.3–6] 
2.2.3 Apprehension of the pain caused by amputation 
There are two other cases of presential knowledge analysed by Suhrawardī in al-
Muṭāraḥāt: the knowledge of the pain caused by amputation, [ṬRḤ3 485.7–12], and visual 
perception or witnessing (الـــمشاھـــدة, al-mushāhada), [ṬRḤ3 485.13–486.16]. It is noteworthy that 
nothing is mentioned in al-Talwīḥāt about these two cases, probably because Suhrawardī does 
not intend to argue against the Peripatetic theory of external senses in al-Talwīḥāt. This is a task 
he undertakes in al-Muṭāraḥāt. 
About the pain caused by amputation, Suhrawardī writes: 
 Following Avicenna, Suhrawardī distinguishes between imagery, imagination and estimation in his Peripatetic works. Imagery 1
is “the storage (خــزانــة, khizāna) of all forms of the common sense (الــحّس المشــترك, al-ḥiss al-mushtarak) when they are absent from 
the common sense”. Estimation is “the faculty which makes particular judgements in animals…By this faculty, a sheep 
apprehends in a wolf the intention that makes it flee”. Imagination is “responsible for conjoining and disjoining; it separates parts 
of a single species and combines parts of different species”. See [LMḤ 115.13–21] and also [LWḤ 153–154]. However, in §2.4.7
—“On that internal senses are not limited to five”—of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī argues “the truth is that these three 
[faculties] are one thing and one faculty, which is expressed by various expressions due to various considerations” [Ḥ.Sh 210.12–
13, ¶224]; “the imaginal forms are assumed to be stored in the imagery, but this is invalid” [Ḥ.Sh 209.1, ¶221], but rather, they 
are ontologically suspended (معلّقة, muʿallaqa). For a discussion of Suhrawardī’s suspended forms, see Sinai 2015.
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[Text 13] 
The following fact ensures that we have apprehensions which do not require 
any form except the presence of the thing apprehended itself. If a human 
being feels the pain caused by the separation of connection in a limb of his 
[i.e. amputation] and senses it, then this is not because the separation of 
connection makes another form occur to him either in that limb or anywhere 
else. Rather, the thing apprehended must be that separation itself (نــــفـس ذلــــك 
 nafs dhālika al-tafarruq). The separation is that which is sensed, and ,الــــتـقـّرق
the pain is due to the separation itself rather than any form that occurs from 
it. [ṬRḤ3 485.7–11]  1
Supposing there is a human being, one of whose limbs is separated/amputated from him, he 
would feel pain and have knowledge of this pain. His knowledge of the pain, however, must not 
be due to the occurrence of any form either in that limb or any other part of his body. This is 
because, apparently, he has lost something—his limb—rather than gained anything; perhaps this 
is why Suhrawardī chooses the pain of this particular sort—the pain caused by amputation—to 
analyse. The object of knowledge, in this case, must be “that separation itself” (نــــفس ذلــــك الــــتفّرق, 
nafs dhālika al-tafarruq), and the pain is caused by that very separation. 
Therefore, the knowledge of the pain caused by amputation must be presential knowledge 
rather than knowledge by forms. It must be noted that this is the only sort of pain analysed by 
Suhrawardī; whether or not this argument could apply to knowledge of pains of other kinds is 
open to question.  I think the point Suhrawardī wants to make here is simply that it is not the 2
case that all knowledge requires a form as an intermediary; here is a counterexample: the 
knowledge of the pain caused by amputation.  Therefore, Suhrawardī writes: 3
[Text 14] 
[The case above] proves that among things apprehended, there are those 
the occurrence of whose selves is enough in apprehension, either to the soul 
 Kaukua’s (2013: 319) interpretation of this passage is more or less problematic. He says that “the wound that is seen” is 1
different from “the pain itself”, but nothing about “the wound that is seen” is mentioned in the text. Also, Suhrawardī is analysing 
a specific kind of wound, namely, the one caused by amputation.
 A discussion of the apprehension of pain in general can be found in Yazdi 1992: 57–68 (Chapter 4, especially 67–68).2
 One might wonder whether Suhrawardī is talking about phantom limb pain. I think that he is not; Suhrawardī is considering a 3
rather simple case: the moment when someone’s limb is amputated from him.
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[immediately] or to something which has a special presential relation to the 
soul.  [ṬRḤ3 485.11–12] 1
2.2.4 Visual perception 
Suhrawardī’s discussion of visual perception begins with an analysis of an everyday 
experience: looking without seeing. We all have such experience as looking without seeing, when 
occupied, for example, by thinking or by another sense. If visual perception is due simply to the 
occurrence (حــــصــول, ḥuṣūl) of the form of a visible object, then there should be no such 
experience; rather, as long as the form of the visible object occurs in our visual organ, we should 
have visual perception. This, however, is not true. This experience suggests that visual 
perception requires the “soul’s attention” (التفات النفس, iltifāt al-nafs), as Suhrawardī writes:  
[Text 15] 
The Peripatetics must acknowledge this point: they accept that a form may 
occur in the visual organ (آلــة الــبصر, ālat al-baṣar) but a human being does not 
feel it, if he is immersed in his thinking (فــــكـره, fikruhu) or what another sense 
brings to him. So the soul’s attention to that form (الـتفات الـنفس إلـى تـلك الـصورة, iltifāt 
al-nafs ilā tilka al-ṣūra) is necessary. [ṬRḤ3 485.13–15] 
When Suhrawardī mentions “the soul’s attention to that form” [ṬRḤ3 485.15], he is 
arguing in the Peripatetic context; he aims first to establish that even within the Peripatetic 
framework, visual perception requires the soul’s attention. Suhrawardī’s second step is to argue 
that visual perception, in fact, only requires the soul’s attention to an extramental present object 
itself without any imprinted form as an intermediary, as he goes on: 
[Text 16] 
So the apprehension must be by means of the soul’s attention when it sees 
something by witnessing (مـشاھـدًة, mushāhadatan). Witnessing is not by means 
of any universal form; rather, witnessing is by means of a particular form. So 
 Self-apprehension is an example where the object of knowledge—the self of the soul—is present to the soul immediately; 1
likewise is the apprehension of the body and bodily faculties. The apprehension of the pain caused by amputation is an example 
where the object of knowledge is present to the soul by means of an intermediary, namely, the faculty of touch, which is present 
immediately to the soul, or in other words, which “has a special presential relation to the soul”. See 2.5 for more on this 
distinction.
 54
the soul must have Illuminationist presential knowledge (عـلم إشـراقـي حـضوري, ʿilm 
ishrāqī ḥuḍūrī) which is not by means of any form. [ṬRḤ3 485.15–18]  1
“Universal form” [ṬRḤ3 485.16–17] in the text above refers to an object’s form imprinted in the 
visual organ; this is corroborated by Suhrawardī’s previous argument that every form in the mind 
is universal in itself in the sense that it does not make the participation in itself impossible. 
“Particular form” [ṬRḤ3 485.17] refers to an object’s inherent form. Witnessing only requires 
the object’s inherent particular form without its imprinted universal form. Therefore, 
Suhrawardī’s position is that visual perception is presential knowledge.  
Suhrawardī then goes on immediately to argue against the Peripatetic intromission theory 
of vision in al-Muṭāraḥāt:  
[Text 17] 
Those who reject that seeing (الــــرؤیــــة, al-ruʾya) is by means of a ray (شــــعـاع, 
shuʿāʿ) either hold that it is by means of the imprinting of a visual image 
 al-inṭibāʿ al-shabḥī) or do not. If one holds that it is by means of ,االنـطباع الشـبحي)
the imprinting of an image, then one would be faced with the following 
problem: how would it be proper for the form of great magnitudes (الــــمـقـادیــــر 
 al-maqādīr al-ʿaẓīma) which are witnessed to be imprinted in the ,الــــعـظـیـمـة
crystalline humour (الجلیدیة, al-jalīdiyya) or the like? [ṬRḤ3 486.1–3] 
As the context of Suhrawardī’s discussion of visual perception, there are two theories: (1) 
the extramission theory: vision is by means of rays coming out from the eye; (2) the intromission 
theory: vision is by means of the imprinting of images. (1) The extramission theory is rejected by 
Avicenna in the physics. For example, in al-Najāt, Avicenna writes:  
There is a group of people who assume that perhaps there is something 
which comes out from the eye (الــبصر, al-baṣar), so it encounters what is seen 
and obtains its form from the outside. That is visual perception (إبــــصار, ibṣār). 
In most cases, they call the thing which comes out a “ray” (شــــعاع, shuʿāʿ). [NJ 
323.11–13]  
 Eichner (2011) does not deal with Suhrawardī’s discussion of visual perception in al-Muṭāraḥāt. Kaukua’s (2013: 319–320) 1
interpretation is rather brief and not very clear: “It is not sufficient for perception that a physical process takes place in the organ 
of perception. The process has to be attended by the soul, or it has to be present to the soul.” What Kaukua means by “physical 
process” is somewhat unclear, especially, whether or not this process involves form of any kind.
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Then, Avicenna argues against this theory in detail.  Following Avicenna, Suhrawardī also 1
disproves this theory in the physics of his Peripatetic works. For instance, he writes in al-Talwīḥāt:  
[Text 18] 
Those who assume that seeing (الــــرؤیــــة, al-ruʾya) is by means of a ray which 
comes out from the eye and encounters visible objects, are wrong. [LWḤ 
152.2] 
Suhrawardī’s detailed argument against this theory can be found in ¶101 of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. 
(2) The intromission theory of vision is the one held by Avicenna; Avicenna claims that visual 
perception “apprehends the form of the images (أشـــباح, ashbāḥ) of coloured bodies, imprinted in the 
crystalline humour” [NJ 322.1–2]. This is Suhrawardī’s main target. After introducing his general 
objection above in [Text 17], Suhrawardī further rejects two defences of the Peripatetic 
intromission theory in [ṬRḤ3 486.3–12]. Later, Suhrawardī’s discussion in al-Muṭāraḥāt is fleshed 
out in ¶¶101–103 of §1.3.9—“On weakening what is said [by the Peripatetics] about vision”—of 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq:  
• Suhrawardī’s general objection to the Peripatetic intromission theory of vision 
  [ṬRḤ3 486.2–3] = [Ḥ.Sh 100.6–9, ¶102] 
• Objection to the first Peripatetic defence 
  [ṬRḤ3 486.3–6] = [Ḥ.Sh 100.9–15, ¶102] 
• Objection to the second Peripatetic defence 
  [ṬRḤ3 486.6–12] = [Ḥ.Sh ¶103, 100.16–101.12] 
Due to the space constraints, I do not propose to look at in detail Suhrawardī’s criticism of the 
intromission theory. I only introduce Suhrawardī’s general objection in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, a 
parallel passage to [Text 17] from al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[Text 19] 
Some knowledgeable people say that seeing is the imprinting of a thing’s 
form in the crystalline humour. Then they would be faced with the following 
problem: if we see a great mountain, and seeing is indeed by a form and 
because of a form, and if this magnitude belongs to the form, then how would 
this great magnitude occur in the small pupil? [Ḥ.Sh 100.6–9, ¶102] 
 See, for instance, al-Najāt [NJ 323.14–327.3].1
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It is worth mentioning that Suhrawardī is not the only philosopher who holds that visual 
perception is not by means of any imprinted form. Rāzī likewise writes in his commentary on 
Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt:  
Visual perception is an expression of the relational state (حـالـة إضـافـیة, ḥāla iḍāfiyya) 
that occurs between the visual faculty and a visible object that exists in the 
outside, without the form of the visible object being imprinted in the visual faculty 
or its substrate. The same goes for hearing, taste, smell and touch. [RZ2 218.15–
16] 
Then, in [RZ2 224.2–226.2], Rāzī argues against Avicenna’s theory in two ways; the first 
objection is the same as that of Suhrawardī:  
Those who prove that visual perception does not require the imprinting of the 
forms of visual objects in the eye have several arguments. First, we see half 
of the earth, but it is impossible for the great to be imprinted in the small. 
[RZ2 224.2–3] 
After rejecting the Peripatetic intromission theory, Suhrawardī puts forward his own theory: 
[Text 20] 
Visual perception is simply the encounter (مـــقابـــلة, muqābala) of a lighted thing 
 al-ʿuḍw al-bāṣir), so ,الــعضو الــباصــر) al-mustanīr) with the visual organ ,المســتنیر)
the presential illumination (إشــراق حــضوري, ishrāq ḥuḍūrī)  of the soul falls upon 1
it, and nothing else. [ṬRḤ3 486.15–16] 
Suhrawardī holds that visual perception is nothing but the encounter of an extramental object 
with a subject’s visual organ; moreover, the subject must pay attention to that object. The same 
theory is mentioned in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq as well: 
[Text 21] 
Since you already know that visual perception is not by the imprinting of the 
form of a visible object (الــمرئــي, al-marʾī) in the eye, nor is it by the coming-out 
of something from the eye, it must be by the encounter of a lighted thing with 
the healthy eye, and nothing else. [Ḥ.Sh 134.11–13, ¶145] 
 Apparently, “presential illumination” refers to the “soul’s attention” mentioned earlier in [ṬRḤ3 485.15, 16]. For a discussion 1
of the meaning of “illumination”, see 2.3.3.
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With the apprehension of the pain caused by amputation and visual perception as 
examples, I think it is safe to argue that Suhrawardī must hold that all external sense perceptions 
are presential knowledge. But presential sense perceptions differ from self-apprehension and the 
apprehension of the body and bodily faculties in a significant respect: sense perceptions require a 
subject’s sense organs as intermediaries, whereas, in self-apprehension and the apprehension of 
the body and bodily faculties, no intermediary whatsoever is needed. I will come back to this 
point later (2.5). 
It must be noted that, despite the similarities between Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge 
and Rāzī’s relational knowledge (عـلم إضـافـي, ʿilm iḍāfī), these two theories should not be confused 
with each other. Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640), for example, rejects Rāzī’s theory but accepts 
Suhrawardī’s.  Further studies are required to determine the exact similarities and differences 1
between these two theories. I simply aim to show that both Suhrawardī and Rāzī disapprove of 
the Avicennan thesis that sense perceptions are due to the imprinting of forms in sense organs, 
and, moreover, the Avicennan account of the nature of knowledge or apprehension in general 
(2.1). 
 See Rizvi 2009: 88–94.1
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2.3 Presence as the nature of all human knowledge 
After establishing that human apprehension of the four kinds above must all be presential 
knowledge, Suhrawardī goes even further to argue, in both al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 71.18–72.12] and 
al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 487.6–17], that the nature of all human knowledge, fundamentally, is the 
presence (or non-absence) of the known to the knower. 
2.3.1 Two conditions for knowledge 
In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes:  
[Text 22] 
He [i.e. Aristotle] said: If you have known that the soul apprehends neither by 
means of a corresponding impression nor by a form, then you should know 
that understanding (الــــتــعــّقــل, al-taʿaqqul) is the presence of a thing to an 
immaterial self (حـــضور الشـــيء للـــذات المجـــّردة عـــن الـــماّدة, huḍūr al-shayʾ lil-dhāt al-
mujarrada ʿan al-mādda). If you want, you could say [understanding is] the 
non-absence of a thing from an immaterial self (عـدم غـیبتھ عـنھا, ʿadam ghaybatihi 
ʿan-hā).  [LWḤ3 71.18–72.2]  1
In al-Muṭāraḥāt, he likewise writes:  
[Text 23] 
Knowledge or understanding (الــــعلم أو الــــتعّقل, al-ʿilm aw al-taʿaqqul) is the non-
absence of a thing from an immaterial self. [ṬRḤ3 487.6–7] 
From these texts, we can extract two conditions for knowledge: (a) the immateriality of the 
subject of knowledge, (b) the presence (or non-absence) of the object to the subject. This is true 
based on al-Talwīḥāt. But there is, in fact, a third condition—illumination—according to the 
relevant texts in al-Muṭāraḥāt and especially Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. We will come back to this point 
later (2.3.3). 
Let us first consider the presence (or non-absence) condition. “Presence” is 
understandable, but why does Suhrawardī mention “non-absence” (عـدم الـغیبة, ʿadam al-ghayba) in 
the texts above? The answer can be found in al-Talwīḥāt: 
 Kaukua claims that “non-absence” (or “absence of hiddenness”, his term) first appears in al-Muṭāraḥāt: “This (i.e. al-1
Muṭāraḥāt) is where we first encounter a term that is synonymous with ‘presence’ in the al-Talwīḥāt, that is, ‘absence of 
hiddenness’.” (Kaukua 2013: 317) This is not true; in al-Talwīḥāt, “non-absence” is already mentioned, as shown in [Text 22].
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[Text 24] 
This [i.e. non-absence] is more complete (أتــــّم, atammu), because it applies 
generally to a thing’s apprehension of its self and of another, for a thing 
cannot be present to itself, but it can be not absent from its self. [LWḤ3 72.2–
3] 
That is to say, in the case of self-knowledge, it is not accurate to say that my self is present to 
me, because my self is not something other than me; only when A is something other than B, can 
we say that A is present to B (or B is present to A). However, there is no such problem if we say 
my self is not absent from me. This point is also mentioned in §2.2.10 of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, 
[Ḥ.Sh 151.6–9, ¶161]. 
The immateriality condition is based on Suhrawardī’s belief in the immateriality of the soul 
or the self. By and large following Avicenna, Suhrawardī puts forward three sets of arguments 
for the immateriality of the soul in the Physics of both al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ 155–157, 163–166] 
and al-Lamaḥāt [LMḤ 116.12–119.8] (and of course al-Muṭāraḥāt and probably also al-
Muqāwamāt).  The first set of arguments are based on experiential analyses of the self from 1
various angles, showing that the self cannot be material. The first argument of this set is the 
famous Flying Man argument (or perhaps not an “argument” as demonstration but merely a 
thought experiment which works as an indicator, pointer or reminder).  The gist is that you, as a 2
flying man who is created at once with full body and intellect but deprived of all external and 
internal sense perceptions, would still apprehend your self with nothing else, especially nothing 
from your body, like its limbs and organs, and nothing material from the external world. This 
indicates that your self cannot be the same as the whole or any part of your body, or any other 
material thing. The other three arguments of this set share a similar indicative nature: the self is 
the “I” with everything else being an “it”; the body and its parts change all the time but the self 
remains the same; the body metabolises but the self does not. All of these show that the self must 
be something different from the body and must therefore be immaterial. 
Another set of arguments, which are demonstrations (sing. بــــرھــــان, burhān), take as their 
premise that the soul serves as the substrate (مـحــــّل, maḥall) of universal intelligibles. The soul 
understands universal intentions (الـمعانـي الـكلّیة, al-maʿānī al-kulliyya) by having them occurring or 
 I do not consult the Physics of al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt, which have not yet been edited.1
 There is a vast literature on the Flying Man argument, such as Marmura 1986, Black 2008, Kaukua 2007 (Chapter 4) & 2015 2
(Chapter 2). Most scholars agree that it should not be read as a demonstration; otherwise, it would involve a fallacy of 
“proceeding from an epistemic or phenomenological distinction to a metaphysical one” (Kaukua 2015: 37).
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imprinting in it. Since universals must be immaterial—otherwise, they would have magnitudes 
and positions (sing. مـــقدار ووضـــع, miqdār wa-waḍʿ) and cannot correspond to different things (مـــا 
 mā ṭābaqat al-mukhtalifāt) or be predicated of them—and since they inhere in the ,طـابـقت الـمختلفات
soul, the soul must be immaterial as well. Otherwise, various absurdities would arise, such as 
that universals would have magnitudes and positions and thus become material, and that they 
would be divisible with their divisible material substrate. The third set of arguments are all 
“persuasive observations” (االســــتـبـصـرات اإلقــــنـاعــــیـة, al-istibṣarāt al-iqnāʿiyya), listed briefly by 
Suhrawardī. 
These are merely some examples of Suhrawardī’s many arguments for the immateriality of 
the soul; further studies are needed to reconstruct the whole discussion (by taking into account as 
well the Physics of al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt) and determine whether or not 
Suhrawardī’s arguments are exactly the same as those of Avicenna. 
2.3.2 The nature of human knowledge 
Is it really the case that all human knowledge or understanding can be explained as the 
presence (or non-absence) of the known to the knower? Could this explanation, which is based 
on the notion of presence, apply at all to knowledge by forms, with which the Peripatetics are 
concerned? 
In both al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, similar answers are offered by Suhrawardī. In al-
Talwīḥāt, he writes:  
[Text 25] 
If the soul cannot make a thing itself present, such as the sky, the earth and 
other things, it makes its form present. As for particulars, [the soul makes 
their forms present] in faculties present to it (قـوى حـاضـرة لـلنفس, quwan hāḍira lil-
nafs); as for universals, [it makes their forms present] in its self, for in things 
apprehended there are universals which cannot be imprinted in bodies. [LWḤ3 
72.4–7] 
Things are first divided into two kinds: (1) those which are present (or not absent) to the 
soul, and (2) those which are absent from the soul. (1) If a thing is present (or not absent), the 
soul knows it directly and as it is; it needs no form as an intermediary. Examples of things 
present (or not absent) to the soul include the soul’s self, its particular body and bodily faculties, 
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and extramental sensible things which are present. The knowledge obtained in this case is called 
“presential knowledge” (علم حضوري, ʿilm ḥuḍūrī). 
(2) If a thing is absent from the soul, the soul makes its form present to it and knows it 
by means of its form. The knowledge obtained in this case is called “knowledge by forms” (عـلم 
 ʿilm ṣūrī). Things absent from the soul are sub-divided into two kinds: (2-A) those ,صــــوري
which are particular and (2-B) those which are universal. (2-A) If a thing absent from the soul 
is particular, such as an absent particular horse, the soul apprehends it by making its particular 
form present to it by means of “faculties present to the soul”, namely, imagination.  (2-B) If a 1
thing absent from the soul is universal, such as the conception or definition of horse, the soul 
understands it by making its universal form present to itself in its self. 
About (2-A) the way by which the soul apprehends an absent particular thing, more must be 
said. Based on §2.4.7—“On [the doctrine] that internal senses are not limited to five”—and §2.4.8—
“On the reality of forms in mirrors and imaginative forms”—of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, we know that the 
Illuminationist theory of internal senses is quite different from the Peripatetic theory. Suhrawardī 
holds that imaginal forms (الــــصـور الــــخـیـالــــیـة, al-ṣuwar al-khayāliyya) are, in fact, not stored in the 
imagery (الـخیال, al-khayāl); rather, they are ontologically suspended (مـعلّقـة, muʿallaqa): they are self-
subsistent (قــــائــــمة بــــذاتــــھا, qāʾima bi-dhātihā) and form a world in-between the light world and the 
material world.  Our faculty of imagination (الــــتــخــیّــل, al-takhayyul) is, in fact, their locus of 2
manifestation (مـظـھــــر, maẓhar) rather than the storage [Ḥ.Sh ¶225, 211.12–213.1]. Therefore, in 
Suhrawardī’s view, the soul apprehends an absent particular thing by making its suspended 
imaginative form manifest in the faculty of imagination, so that the particular imaginative form of 
that thing becomes present to the soul by means of the imagination.  However, Suhrawardī’s theory 3
of imaginal forms is found only in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; nothing is mentioned about it in his Peripatetic 
works, neither in al-Talwīḥāt nor in al-Muṭāraḥāt, as Suhrawardī indicates in al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[Text 26] 
If there is a study of imaginal forms, we would not reveal it to anyone except 
 I assume the reason Suhrawardī says “faculties present to the soul” (plural) rather than “a faculty present to the soul” (singular) is 1
that in al-Talwīḥāt, imagery, imagination and estimation are still considered as three different faculties. However, in al-Muṭāraḥāt, 
Suhrawardī begins to use “something present to the soul” (singular) [ṬRḤ3 487.13, 16], as will be shown in [Text 27] below. In 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, these three faculties are proved to be one and the same, namely, imagination. This point has already been 
explained in a long footnote in 2.2.2.
 So there are three worlds in Illuminationist philosophy, as mentioned in the introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh 11.7].2
 It should now be obvious that Suhrawardī does not presuppose Avicenna’s theory of internal senses, as held by Eichner (2011).3
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a group of Illuminationists (طـــائـــفة مـــن جـــملة اإلشـــراق, ṭāʾifa min jumlat al-ishrāq). 
[ṬRḤ3 487.16–17] 
Now let us turn to Suhrawardī’s explanation of the nature of knowledge in al-Muṭāraḥāt:  
[Text 27] 
All things that the soul apprehends should be divided into several kinds. As 
for universals, [the soul apprehends them] by the presence of their forms, for 
they are imprinted in its self. As for particulars, [the soul apprehends them] 
either by the presence of themselves and the illumination belonging to the 
soul (لــــلـنـفـس  ishrāq lil-nafs), or by the occurrence of their forms in ,إشــــراق 
something present to the soul (شــــيء حــــاضــــر لــــلنفس, shayʾ ḥāḍir lil-nafs), upon 
which the illumination belonging to the soul falls. So the soul apprehends the 
particulars either by their presence to it, or by their presence in something 
present to it, such as imaginal forms (الــــصور الــــخیالــــیة, al-ṣuwar al-khayāliyya). 
[ṬRḤ3 487.12–16] 
In the text above, things are first divided into (I) universals and (II) particulars. (I) The soul 
apprehends universals by making their universal forms present to it in its self, corresponding to 
(2-B) in the analysis above. (II) As for particulars, they are either present (or not absent) to the 
soul, or absent from the soul. In the first case, the soul apprehends them directly without any 
intermediary, corresponding to (1) above. In the second case, the soul knows them by making 
their particular imaginal forms present to it by means of “something present to it”, that is, the 
faculty of imagination, corresponding to (2-A) above. 
An inference we can make at this point is that presential knowledge must be more perfect 
than knowledge by forms. This is because only when “the soul cannot make a thing itself 
present” [LWḤ3 72.4–5], does it resort to the thing’s form to know it. If the thing is present, the 
soul can apprehend it as it is without any form as an intermediary. Therefore, presential 
knowledge must be more perfect, for it is immediate, particular, continuous and comprehensive; 
by contrast, knowledge by forms is indirect, universal and somewhat one-sided. This is 
especially true and obvious if we think about self-knowledge and our knowledge of the body. 
This inference is essential for Suhrawardī’s discussion of God’s knowledge (2.4.1). 
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2.3.3 Illumination as the third condition 
It must be noted that, in al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī begins to use the term 
“illumination” (إشــــراق, ishrāq) and its derivatives frequently,  in order to make preparations for 1
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. “The illumination belonging to the soul” (إشـــراق لـــلنفس, ishrāq lil-nafs) [ṬRḤ3 
487.14, 15], which is mentioned twice in [Text 27] above (2.3.2), seems to be a third condition 
for knowledge, in addition to the two conditions extracted from [Text 22] and [Text 23] (2.3.1): 
(1) the immateriality of the subject of knowledge, and (2) the presence (or non-absence) of the 
object to the subject. But is it really the case? What is the exact meaning of illumination? 
A possible answer can be found in §2.1.6—“Judgement: a thing’s apprehension of its self 
is its manifestation to its self, rather than its immateriality, as held by the Peripatetics”—of 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh ¶119–120, 114.11–116.15]. The background of this judgement (حــكومــة, 
ḥukūma) is presumably the Avicennan thesis that self-subsistence, with an emphasis on 
immateriality, is sufficient for self-intellection, based on Avicenna’s “default argument”—as 
Adamson (2018) names it—in al-Ishārāt [ShWR 146.10–12].  “Avicenna treats self-intellection 2
as a kind of ‘default’ condition. Any self-subsisting thing, he contends, will engage in self-
directed thought unless it is impeded from doing so, the possible impediment being matter.”  3
Suhrawardī, however, argues that immateriality (التجــــّرد عــــن الــــماّدة, al-tajarrud ʿan al-mādda) is 
insufficient for self-knowledge; “the manifestation of a thing to its self”(ظـھور الشـيء لـذاتـھ, ẓuhūr al-
shayʾ li-dhātihi) is necessary as well. Otherwise, a taste (طــــعـم, ṭaʿm) which is deprived of matter 
would apprehend itself due to its immateriality; moreover, prime matter (الھــــیولــــى, al-hayūlā), as 
that which is “deprived of other matter” [Ḥ.Sh 115.6], would have self-apprehension as well. 
Both cases are absurd.  But what does Suhrawardī mean by “manifestation”?  In self-4 5
apprehension, if I say my self is manifest to me, this implies not only that my self is not absent 
from me, but also that I have the power to make my self manifest/evident/apparent to me. If I do 
not have such a power, then even though my self is not absent, I cannot apprehend it and 
 Here is a list of the places where “illumination” and its derivatives appear in §7.1 of al-Muṭāraḥāt: “Illumination” [ṬRḤ3 1
487.14, 15, 18, 20], “Illuminationist presential knowledge” [ṬRḤ3 485.18, 487.5, 488.10]; “Illuminationist knowledge” (الــــعـلـم 
 ishrāq ḥuḍūrī) [ṬRḤ3 486.15]; “the ,إشــراق حــضوري) ”al-ʿilm al-ishrāqī) [ṬRḤ3 487.2, 489.3]; “presential illumination ,اإلشــراقــي
Illuminationist relation” (اإلضـافـة اإلشـراقـیة, al-iḍāfa al-ishrāqiyya) [ṬRḤ3 489.5]; “the Illuminationist presence” (الـحضور اإلشـراقـي, al-
ḥuḍūr al-ishrāqī) [ṬRḤ3 489.8].
 For a detailed discussion of Avicenna’s “default argument”, see Adamson 2018: 260–261.2
 Adamson 2018: 261.3
 Suhrawardī’s arguments may be problematic, considering that neither a taste nor prime matter is self-subsistent, but this 4
requires a closer look. I simply report here what Suhrawardī writes.
 For a more detailed discussion of Suhrawardī’s manifestation, see 5.4.3.4.5
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therefore cannot say my self is manifest to me, just as neither an immaterial taste nor prime 
matter can apprehend its self. This kind of power, by which I make myself manifest to me, in my 
view, is an instance of what Suhrawardī means by “illumination”. If this is the case, then 
illumination is indeed the third condition for self-apprehension, in addition to immateriality and 
non-absence.  
Following Suhrawardī’s line of argument above, we can prove that illumination is the third 
condition for human knowledge of all kinds, in addition to immateriality and presence (or non-
absence). Illumination, in general, should be interpreted as the subject’s power to make the object 
manifest to itself. The “soul’s attention” (الــــنـفـس  iltifāt al-nafs) [ṬRḤ3 485.15, 16], as ,الــــتـفـات 
mentioned in visual perception (2.2.4), is, in fact, another instance of illumination: by attending 
to a visible object, the soul makes it manifest to itself by means of the eye. 
Illumination, in my view, has more to do with the immateriality condition rather than the 
presence (or non-absence) condition. In fact, illumination can be considered as a qualification 
added to immateriality: it is not the case that every immaterial thing has illumination; only those 
which are both immaterial and have such illumination can apprehend themselves and other 
things. Every immaterial thing that has such illumination is an “immaterial light” (نـور مجـّرد عـن الـما
مـجــــّرد ,nūr mujarrad ʿan al-mādda, or simply ,ّدة .(nūr mujarrad ,نــــور   This is a point that 1
Suhrawardī aims to establish in Book I of the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq on light 
metaphysics, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter V.  
Therefore, there is indeed a difference between the accounts of the nature of knowledge in 
al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.  The difference consists in the third condition 2
for knowledge: illumination. Nothing whatsoever about illumination is mentioned in al-Talwīḥāt; 
in al-Muṭāraḥāt, we can find traces of it; in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, there is a detailed explanation for 
why illumination is necessary. 
 See 5.2.2 for my justification of rendering “نور مجّرد” (nūr mujarrad) as “immaterial light”.1
 The difference is also pointed out by Eichner (2011: 128): “Modern analyses, following the traditional exegesis, tend to treat the 2
accounts in the Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt and in the Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq as presenting one single theory. This, however, has to be seen in a 
more nuanced way.”
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2.4 Presential knowledge as God’s knowledge 
If one goes back to the texts in al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt on presential knowledge, one 
immediately realises that Suhrawardī aims to account not only for the nature of human 
knowledge in general, but also for God’s knowledge in particular. To achieve the second goal, 
Suhrawardī takes an approach from the lower to the higher, that is, from human knowledge to 
God’s knowledge, as he writes in al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[Text 28] 
The approach is for human beings to investigate their self-knowledge first, 
and then ascend to what is higher (ما ھو أعلى, mā huwa aʿlā). [ṬRḤ3 484.4–5] 
In his discussion of God’s knowledge in both al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 72.13–73.7] and al-
Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 486.18–488.19], Suhrawardī aims to establish two significant points: (1) 
God must have presential knowledge of everything, so He can surely know particulars as 
they are, rather than merely in a universal manner, as held by Avicenna. (2) God’s presential 
knowledge does not threaten His immutability or simplicity. Later, these two points are 
briefly mentioned again in §2.2.10—“On explaining His knowledge, according to what is 
the Illuminationist principle”—of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: 
• (1) [LWḤ3 72.13–73.2] = [ṬRḤ3 487.6–9; 487.17–488.2] = [Ḥ.Sh ¶160, 150.8–12] 
• (2) [LWḤ3 73.2–73.6] = [ṬRḤ3 488.2–488.12] = [Ḥ.Sh 152.7–153.4, ¶162] 
2.4.1 God’s presential knowledge of everything 
As mentioned above (2.3.2), for human beings, presential knowledge must be more perfect 
than knowledge by forms. God’s knowledge, therefore, must be presential in every respect, for 
God is infinitely more perfect than us, as Suhrawardī writes in al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[Text 29] 
If it is correct that Illuminationist knowledge (الــعلم اإلشــراقــي, al-ʿilm al-ishrāqī) is 
not by means of any form or impression, but rather, it is simply by means of a 
special relation (إضـافـة خـاّصـة, iḍāfa khāṣṣa), namely, the presence of a thing in 
the Illuminationist way (حــــضور الشــــيء حــــضورا إشــــراقــــیا, ḥuḍūr al-shayʾ ḥuḍūran 
ishrāqiyyan), as in the case of the soul, then in the case of the Necessary 
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Existent (الــــوجــــود  wājib al-wujūd), this knowledge should be more ,واجــــب 
appropriate and complete (أولي وأتّم, awlā wa-atamm). [ṬRḤ3 487.2–4] 
Suhrawardī’s full argument that God has presential knowledge of everything is found in al-
Talwīḥāt: 
[Text 30] 
The self of the Necessary Existent is immaterial, and He is pure Existence 
 al-wujūd al-baḥt). Things are present to Him by virtue of a relation ,الـوجـود الـبحت)
of being principle and having total control (أضـافـة مـبدأیـة وتسـلّطـیة, iḍāfa mabdaʾiyya 
wa-tasalluṭiyya), because everything is an implicate of His self (الزم ذاتـــھ, lāzim 
dhātihi). His self is not absent from Him, nor is an implicate of His self. The 
non-absence of Him from His self and His implicates, together with His 
immateriality (الــــمـاّدة عــــن   al-tajarrud ʿan al-mādda) account for His ,الـتـجــــّرد 
apprehension, as we have established in the case of the soul. All knowledge 
is attributed to the non-absence of a thing from [a self which is] immaterial, 
and that thing could be either a form or not a form. [LWḤ3 72.15–73.2] 
As established above (2.3), knowledge/understanding is the presence (or non-absence) of a 
thing to an immaterial self which has illumination. So in order to prove that God has presential 
knowledge of everything, Suhrawardī must establish the three following points: (1) God is 
immaterial; (2) God has illumination over everything (and His self), or in other words, He has 
the power to making everything manifest to Himself. (3) Nothing is absent from God. The 
second point is not addressed in the text above, because illumination has not yet been introduced 
as the third condition for knowledge in al-Talwīḥāt (2.3.3). But illumination is indeed mentioned 
in al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[Text 31] 
The Necessary Existent does not need forms. He has illumination and 
absolute control (الـتـســــلّـط الــــمـطـلـق, al-tasalluṭ al-muṭlaq). So nothing can escape 
from Him. [ṬRḤ3 487.17–19] 
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Here is Suhrawardī’s complete argument. (1) The first point is obvious. God, as the 
Necessary Existent, is pure Existence (الــــوجــــود الــــبحت, al-wujūd al-baḥt),  so He must be free of 1
anything else including matter. Therefore, He must be immaterial. 
(2) In the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, God is proved to be the Light of lights (نــور األنــوار, 
nūr al-anwār), the most perfect immaterial light. All immaterial lights (e.g. God, intellects, human 
souls) have illumination over their selves and other things, so God must have illumination. 
Otherwise, God would be inferior to human beings. 
(3) The third point is twofold: (a) God’s self is not absent from Him; (b) everything (الكّل, al-
kull) is present to God. (a) God is pure Existence, so nothing stands in the way between Him and 
His self, so God’s self must not be absent from Him. Also, if God’s self is absent from Him, then 
God would be inferior to human beings. (b) Everything is an implicate of His self, for God is the 
complete cause (عـلّة تـاّمـة, ʿilla tāmma)  of everything. So He must have “absolute control” [ṬRḤ3 2
487.18] over everything. This is why the relation between God and everything is called the 
“relation of being principle and having total control” (أضـافـة مـبدأیـة وتسـلّطـیة, iḍāfa mabdaʾiyya wa-
tasalluṭiyya) [LWḤ3 72.16]. If A has control over B, then B is present to A. This point can be 
established by considering the case of human beings: the soul has control over the body, so the 
body is present to the soul, as Suhrawardī argues in al-Talwīḥāt: 
[Text 32] 
If we have control (ســـلطنة, salṭana) over things other than our body, just as [we 
have control] over our body, then we would apprehend other things in the 
same way by which we apprehend our body, that is, in a way without the 
need of any form, as mentioned above. [LWḤ3 73.5–6] 
God is infinitely more perfect than human beings in the sense that He has absolute control over 
everything. So everything must always be present to God, just as our body is present to our soul. 
Therefore, based on the three sub-arguments above, God must have presential knowledge of 
everything.  
 In Chapter III, I shall argue that God must be the most perfect systematically ambiguous Existence rather than univocal 1
existence. Univocal existence is, in fact, nothing but a mental/intellectual consideration which cannot possibly exist in the real 
world; seven arguments are put forward by Suhrawardī to prove this point (3.4). But Suhrawardī accepts systematically 
ambiguous existence as real. In Illuminationist metaphysics, systematically ambiguous existence is replaced by light—the most 
important sub-section of existence—as the subject matter of metaphysics (Chapter V, especially 5.1).
 In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī explains that “we mean by ‘cause’ that whose existence necessitates the existence of another 2
thing absolutely, without any conceivable delay” [Ḥ.Sh 62.15–16].
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A principle can be extracted from the argument above: if A is the complete cause of B, then 
A has absolute control over B; then B is always present to A; then A has presential knowledge of 
B. This principle applies not only to God’s knowledge of everything, but also to the knowledge 
of separate intellects of what is below them. We shall return to this point later (2.5). 
Suhrawardī concludes in al-Talwīḥāt: 
[Text 33] 
It is obvious from this that God comprehends everything (مـحیط بـكّل الشـيء, muḥīṭ 
bi-kull al-shayʾ) and He apprehends all instances of existence (أعــــداد الــــوجــــود, 
aʿdād al-wujūd).  And that [i.e. His knowledge or apprehension] is nothing but 1
the presence to Him and His total control, without the need of any form or 
image. [LWḤ3 73.6–7] 
2.4.2 God’s presential knowledge and His immutability and simplicity 
According to Avicenna, God cannot have knowledge of particulars. As argued 
convincingly by P. Adamson (2005), the primary reason is that, following Aristotle, Avicenna 
argues that knowledge in the strict sense must always be of universals, so knowledge of 
universals is, of course, the only knowledge that God can have. It goes without saying that 
Suhrawardī—who holds that presential knowledge of particulars is, in fact, superior and more 
appropriate for God—would never accept Avicenna’s primary argument. 
Moreover, Avicenna argues that since material particulars are changing all the time, the 
knowledge of them would threaten God’s immutability; since particulars are multiple, the 
knowledge of them would again threaten God’s simplicity.  This kind of threat, however, only 2
exists in the Peripatetic epistemological framework. If the nature of knowledge/understanding is 
the mental representation or the occurrence (حــــصـول, ḥuṣūl) of forms in the mind, then the 
knowledge of multiple and changing particulars would surely imply multiple and changing forms 
in the self/essence (ذات, dhāt) of God, and thereby threaten His immutability and simplicity. But 
this threat does not exist in the Illuminationist epistemological framework at all. Since the nature 
of knowledge is the presence (or non-absence) of the known to the knower and this presence is 
nothing but a special [cognitive] relation (إضـــافـــة خـــاّصـــة, iḍāfa khāṣṣa) [ṬRḤ3 487.2], and since 
 “Existence” here also refers to systematically ambiguous existence rather than univocal existence, as will be shown in Chapter 1
III (3.3).
 See Adamson 2005: 269; cf. Sinai 2016: 288–289.2
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God must have the most perfect knowledge which is purely presential without the need of any 
form, God’s knowledge of multiple and changing particulars only implies changes and 
multiplicity in the cognitive relations between Him and the objects of knowledge, rather than in 
His self/essence. Therefore, Suhrawardī argues: 
[Text 34] 
Relation (اإلضـافـة, al-iḍāfa) is permissible in His reality (حـّقھ, ḥaqquhu) … It does 
not harm His oneness (وحدانیتھ, waḥdāniyyatuhu). [LWḤ3 73.2–3] 
[Text 35] 
If His knowledge is presential and Illuminationist (إشــــراقــــي  ḥuḍūrī ,حــــضـوري 
ishrāqī), rather than by means of any form in His self, then if something 
ceases to exist, for example, and the relation ceases to exist, this does not 
imply any change in His self. [ṬRḤ3 488.3–6] 
[Text 36] 
The plurality of intellectual relations (تــعّدد اإلضــافــات الــعقلیة, taʿaddud al-iḍāfāt al-
ʿaqliyya) does not necessitate multiplicity in His self. [Ḥ.Sh 153.3–4, ¶162] 
In al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī acknowledges that God does not know temporal events 
directly, because such knowledge is knowledge by forms which is not proper for Him, and 
besides, it would lead to changes. Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 37] 
Temporal knowledge (الـعلم الـزمـانـي, al-ʿilm al-zamānī), insofar as it necessitates 
changes, is impossible in the reality of the Necessary Existent (حـّق واجـب الـوجـود, 
ḥaqq wājib al-wujūd) … This points to knowledge by forms. [ṬRḤ3 488.7–8; 
488.10] 
However, God has presential knowledge of them indirectly, namely, by means of the heavenly 
souls: 
[Text 38] 
Past and future events, of which the forms are stable in the heavenly 
managing [souls] (الـمدّبـرات الـسماوّیـة, al-mudabbirāt al-samāwiyya), are present to 
Him, because He has comprehension and illumination over the bearers (حـامـل, 
ḥāmil) of these forms. [ṬRḤ3 487.19–20] 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2.5 Various degrees of presential knowledge 
Although the various degrees of presential knowledge are not distinguished explicitly by 
Suhrawardī in the relevant texts, the analysis above allows and indeed requires us to do so. God’s 
presential knowledge is clearly much superior to our presential knowledge of the body and 
bodily faculties, which again is more perfect than our presential knowledge of extramental 
sensible objects. 
Presential knowledge of the highest level may be called “presential knowledge by being 
principle and having total control”.  At this level, the subject (S) is the principle or the complete cause 1
of the object (O), so S implies O, so S has absolute control (التسـلّط الـمطلق, al-tasalluṭ al-muṭlaq) [ṬRḤ3 
487.18] over O, so O is constantly present to S. As a result, O can never escape from the knowledge of 
S, and S can never be deprived of the knowledge of O. God’s presential knowledge of everything 
certainly belongs to this level, and so does the presential knowledge of separate intellects of what is 
below them. Another example seems to be self-knowledge, for every self-knower implies its self and 
the knowledge of its self, as Suhrawardī puts it:  
[Text 39] 
Your self is the understanding, that which understands and that which is 
understood (العقل والعاقل والمعقول, al-ʿaql wa-l-ʿāqil wa-l-maʿqūl). [LWḤ3 71.3–4] 
The second level may be called “presential knowledge by control”. At this level, S is not 
the principle of O, so S does not imply O; nevertheless, S has control (ســــلـطـنـة, salṭana) [LWḤ3 
73.5] over O. It is due to this control that O is constantly present to S, so S has presential 
knowledge of O. It is not impossible, however, for O to escape from the knowledge of S, or for S 
to be deprived of the knowledge of O. As soon as S loses control over O, S would lose the 
presential knowledge of O. An example of knowledge as such is our knowledge of the body and 
bodily faculties. 
The lowest level is our presential sense perception of extramental sensible objects. In sense 
perception, S neither is the principle of O nor has any control over O; the occurrence of S’s 
knowledge of O is due simply to the encounter (مــــقـابــــلـة, muqābala) of S’s corresponding sense 
organ with O. According to Suhrawardī, sense perception must arise in the following way. First, 
S has control over its sense organs, so S has second-level presential knowledge of them. When 
 This is because, in this most perfect presential knowledge, the relation between the subject and the object is called by 1
Suhrawardī “a relation of being principle and having total control” [LWḤ3 72.16], as mentioned above (2.4.1).
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S’s corresponding sense organ encounters O, O would thereby enter S’s “field of presence”, to 
borrow Kaukua’s helpful expression,  and become present to S by means of this sense organ. In 1
this way, S’s presential sense perception of O arises. Therefore, a major difference between sense 
perception and presential knowledge of the first and second levels is that sense perception 
requires S’s sense organs as intermedia, whereas presential knowledge of the first and second 
levels requires no intermediary. Moreover, in sense perception, O can escape easily from the 
knowledge of S, and S can be deprived easily of the knowledge of O. As soon as S’s encounter 
with O ceases to exist, S would lose the presential knowledge of O; even when S does not pay 
attention to O, S would lose the presential knowledge of O, such as the experience of looking 
without seeing (2.2.4). As inferior as it is, sense perception is still presential knowledge, for the 
objects of knowledge are extramental things themselves rather than their forms or impressions. 
Knowledge by forms, in Suhrawardī’s view, is inferior to presential knowledge of all three 
levels. This is because the objects of knowledge, in this case, are no longer extramental things 
themselves, but rather, their forms, either universal or particular. Note that only when we cannot 
make an object itself present to us due to our weakness, do we resort to its form to know it. 
However, since the nature of knowledge by forms is also presence, that is, the presence of forms 
to the subject, Suhrawardī’s exposition of the nature of knowledge still applies to knowledge by 
forms (2.3.2). 
At the end of §7.1 of al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 489.6–13], Suhrawardī points out that it is 
knowledge by forms that can be divided into conception (تـــصّور, taṣawwur) and assent (تـــصدیـــق, 
taṣdīq), as put forward by Avicenna. This division, however, does not apply at all to presential 
knowledge, for no form whatsoever is involved in such knowledge; we know conception and 
assent are all about forms.   2
Another thing which sets presential knowledge apart from knowledge by forms is its 
infallibility: presential knowledge cannot be erroneous or deceptive. Even when I see a stick that 
appears bent in water, the sense data I obtain by presential visual perception is not erroneous or 
deceptive in itself. It is my judgement that the stick actually bends in water that is false. But this 
judgement is not my original presential knowledge itself, but rather, a wrong inference drawn 
 Kaukua 2013: 319.1
 This point is mentioned by Yazdi (1992: 46–47).2
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from it; as an assent, it falls into the domain of knowledge by forms.  Perhaps what B. Russell 1
writes about knowledge by acquaintance can shed some light on this point: 
Our knowledge of truths, unlike our knowledge of things, has an opposite, 
namely error. So far as things are concerned, we may know them or not 
know them, but there is no positive state of mind which can be described as 
erroneous knowledge of things, so long, at any rate, as we confine ourselves 
to knowledge by acquaintance. Whatever we are acquainted with must be 
something; we may draw wrong inferences from our acquaintance, but the 
acquaintance itself cannot be deceptive. Thus there is no dualism as regards 
acquaintance. But as regards knowledge of truths, there is a dualism. We 
may believe what is false as well as what is true. We know that on very many 
subjects different people hold different and incompatible opinions: hence 
some beliefs must be erroneous.  2
 This is also pointed out in Yazdi 1992: 45–46.1
 Russell 2001: 69. I am not arguing that Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge is the same as Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance, 2
but they surely have some similarities. There is a comparative study between these two theories by Yazdi (1992: 59–61), although 
I do not think Yazdi’s interpretation of Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge is accurate.
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2.6 Summary of Chapter II 
To sum up, due to the general dissatisfaction in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries with 
Avicenna’s account of the nature of apprehension/knowledge, Suhrawardī puts forward his own 
theory of knowledge, that is, presential knowledge. Several significant points have been 
established in this chapter. (1) There are at least four kinds of human knowledge that cannot be 
explained by Avicenna’s idea, for none of them requires a form as an intermediary. They are self-
apprehension, the apprehension of the body and bodily faculties, the apprehension of the pain 
caused by amputation and visual perception. All of them are presential knowledge which 
requires nothing but the presence (or non-absence, in self-apprehension) of the objects of 
knowledge themselves. (2) Suhrawardī further argues that the nature of all human knowledge/
understanding must be the presence (or non-absence) of an object to an immaterial self which 
has illumination. The object could be either an extramental particular thing itself, or a particular 
or universal form: if the object is an extramental thing itself, the knowledge of it is called 
presential knowledge; if the object is a form, the knowledge of it is called knowledge by forms. 
(3) God has presential knowledge of everything, and His knowledge of particulars does not 
threaten His immutability or simplicity. (4) From Suhrawardī’s whole discussion, it can be 
inferred that presential knowledge has three levels. But even presential knowledge of the lowest 
level—sense perception—is superior to knowledge by forms. This is because presential 
knowledge is always of extramental particular things themselves rather than their forms; note 
that only when we cannot make an object itself present to us due to our weakness, do we resort 
to its form to know it. Presential knowledge cannot be divided into conception and assent at all, 
and it is infallible. 
What Suhrawardī aims to achieve ultimately with his Illuminationist philosophy is 
revealed to a very large extent by his efforts discussed in this chapter. First of all, Suhrawardī 
firmly believes that the proper objects of human knowledge are extramental particular things 
rather than their universal forms, so he is not satisfied at all with the Peripatetic account of how 
we know particular things, that is, by means of forms or in a universal manner (2.1). He then 
argues extensively that we are capable of knowing particulars immediately and as they are, as 
long as they are present (not absent) to us (2.2 & 2.3). Therefore, by constructing Illuminationist 
philosophy, Suhrawardī must aim ultimately to exhaust human beings’ cognitive ability to know 
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all the extramental particular things as they are, including not only material things in this world, 
but also immaterial things in the light world (عالم النور, ʿālam al-nūr). 
My contention is that presential knowledge is what Suhrawardī means by “another 
path” (سیاق, siyāq) or “road” (طریق, ṭarīq) in the introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq:  
[Text 1] 
This is another path and a road which is shorter, more ordered, more 
accurate and much easier to obtain than the method of the Peripatetics. It did 
not occur to me at first by thinking, but rather, its occurrence is by something 
else. [Ḥ.Sh 10.8–9, ¶3] 
Presential knowledge is always of extramental things themselves rather than their forms, and it is 
infallible, so it is “more accurate”. It requires no conception, judgement or demonstration, but 
merely the presence (or non-absence) of extramental things themselves; in this sense, it is 
“shorter”, “more ordered” and “much easier to obtain” than knowledge by forms, which is the 
Peripatetic method. It does not occur to Suhrawardī by thinking (فــــكـر, fikr), because thinking 
refers to the “transition from the known to the unknown” (انــتقال مــن الــمعلوم إلــى الــمجھول, intiqāl min 
al-maʿlūm ilā al-majhūl) [LMḤ 58.7–8], that is, either from a known conception to an unknown 
conception, or from a known assent to an unknown assent, so it falls necessarily into the domain 
of knowledge by forms; instead, it occurs to Suhrawardī by something else, namely, immediate 
presential knowledge. 
Moreover, presential knowledge must be what Suhrawardī means by deification (تــــألّــــھ, 
taʾalluh), or to become God-like, as pointed out in Chapter I (1.3.1). This is because the more 
proficient a philosopher becomes in presential knowledge, the more God-like he is, for God has 
presential knowledge of everything. Therefore, for one to become God-like is for one to have 
presential knowledge of as many extramental particular things as possible like God. 
Investigation (بــــحـث, baḥth) must then refer to knowledge by forms, which is the Peripatetic 
method. 
Suhrawardī is, however, fully aware of the limits of human power: we are so weak and 
small that it is impossible for most of us to make everything in the material world present to us, 
let alone those immaterial things in the light world. Perhaps, eventually, only very few blessed 
people have the ability and luck to ascend to the higher world, to escape from the cave, and to 
witness those beautiful things outside the cave by their own eyes. Therefore, most of us have to 
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resort to knowledge by forms to know those material and immaterial things that are absent from 
us. Although we may never have presential knowledge of God, separate intellects and the 
immaterial world, at least by investigation (الــــبــحــث, al-baḥth) or knowledge by forms—the 
Peripatetic method—we can prove, for instance, God’s existence, His absolute oneness, and the 
existence of separate intellects, and we can learn a few things about the world outside the cave. 
This explains the indispensability of Peripatetic philosophy in Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist 
project in terms of epistemology.  1
Although Peripatetic philosophy may be the perfect wisdom inside the cave, it is not free 
from fundamental problems in the view of Suhrawardī, a divine philosopher who has been 
outside the cave and who has presential knowledge of perhaps everything. The most serious 
problem is that the Peripatetics confuse mental things (sing. ذھــــني, dhihnī) with real things (sing. 
 ʿaynī). They are so addicted to universal forms/intentions created by the mind that they treat ,عـیني
these purely mental/intellectual considerations (اعــــتبارات ذھــــنیة أو عــــقلیة, iʿtibārāt dhihniyya aw ʿ
aqliyya) as metaphysical constituents of things in the real world, and even build their whole 
metaphysics on univocal existence, a mental consideration. This confusion is absolutely 
unacceptable to Suhrawardī. So if Suhrawardī intends to incorporate Peripatetic philosophy in 
his Illuminationist project, he has to correct this fundamental error and draw a clear distinction 
between mental things and real things. This is the topic of Chapters III & IV.  




On Mental Considerations 
—Univocal Existence 
In Chapter III and Chapter IV, I propose to reconstruct Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental 
or intellectual considerations (اعـتبارات ذھـنیة أو عـقلیة, iʿtibārāt dhihniyya aw ʿaqliyya).  This chapter 1
is devoted exclusively to univocal existence; the next deals with other mental considerations: 
oneness, contingency, necessity by another, determinables (e.g. colourness), differentiae of 
determinates (e.g. the differentia of blackness), genera and differentiae. 
Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental considerations can be found respectively in the 
Metaphysics of all three Peripatetic works: al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 19.7–26.9] (8 pages), al-
Muqāwamāt [QWM3 162.10–176.6] (15 pages), al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 340.1–371.5] (32 pages); 
and in §1.3.3.1—“On intellectual considerations”—of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh ¶¶56–69, 64.9–
73.4] (10 pages).  The significance of Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental considerations is not 2
only indicated by the length of the texts (around 65 pages in total) but revealed by its very 
nature: this is Suhrawardī’s fundamental criticism of Peripatetic metaphysics. There is a grave 
fallacy underlying Peripatetic metaphysics: taking mental considerations as real things. The 
serious consequence is that some mental considerations are treated erroneously as real 
metaphysical constituents of things in the real world; metaphysics then becomes nothing but a 
mind game, which is concerned mainly with those mental considerations rather than what is real. 
Therefore, by many carefully constructed arguments, Suhrawardī aims to draw a clear line 
between what is real and what is merely generated by the mind. 
Despite its significance, there is, as far as I know, no systematic analysis in modern 
scholarship of Suhrawardī’s significant discussion of mental considerations,  perhaps due to its 3
length (65 pages) or great difficulty (one might find it nearly impenetrable). But without an in-
depth understanding of this discussion, one cannot grasp the true nature of Illuminationist 
 See 3.2 for what this term refers to.1
 In §1.3.3—“On some judgements (الــحكومــات, al-ḥukūmāt) on Illuminationist points (نــكت إشــراقــیة, nukat ishrāqiyya)”—of Ḥikmat 2
al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī presents a comprehensive criticism of ten Peripatetic doctrines, with this discussion on mental 
considerations being the very first criticism.
 Izutsu (1971: 109–117) has dealt with some aspects of this discussion, but not in a systematic way. 3
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philosophy, or what Suhrawardī’s is actually doing with his epistemology (Chapter II) and light 
metaphysics (Chapter V). 
In this chapter, I first introduce Suhrawardī’s two arguments against any real infinite 
regress or infinite chain (ســــلــســلــة, silsila) whose individuals exist both simultaneously and 
sequentially, because most of his arguments in this chapter and the next are based on the 
absurdity of various infinite regresses (3.1). Then I explain in detail what Suhrawardī refers to by 
the term “mental/intellectual considerations” and his purpose of examining them (3.2). This is 
followed by my argument that what Suhrawardī takes issue with must be univocal existence 
rather than systematically ambiguous existence; rather, he takes systematically ambiguous 
existence as the subject matter of his modified Peripatetic metaphysics (3.3).  Lastly, I present a 1
comprehensive reconstruction of three—all based on the absurdity of infinite regresses—of 
Suhrawardī’s seven arguments that univocal existence cannot be added to quiddity in the real 
world and must be purely mental (3.4). Two of the three arguments are based on a single-species-
chain of existence; the other is based on a hybrid chain of existence and relation. I argue that a 
single-species-chain must be generated by Self-Predication with Non-Identity, whereas a hybrid 
chain is generated by Mutual-Predication.  It is crucial to reveal these premises (especially Non-2
Identity); otherwise, one cannot show the full strength of Suhrawardī’s arguments. I defer 
Suhrawardī’s discussion of other mental considerations to Chapter IV. 
I am aware that Suhrawardī’s criticism of Peripatetic metaphysics may sound unfair to 
some readers of Avicenna, since scholars hold different opinions about how to read Avicenna.  In 3
Chapters III & IV, I aim simply to reconstruct Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental considerations 
as it is. It should also be noted that Suhrawardī may not be attacking Avicenna himself, but 
rather, “the followers of the Peripatetics” (أتـباع الـمّشائـین, atbāʿ al-mashshāʾīn) [Ḥ.Sh 65.10, ¶58]. In 
 In Chapter I (1.3.2), I noted that Suhrawardī is reconstructing Peripatetic philosophy in his Peripatetic works. This is a crucial 1
aspect.
 A more detailed investigation into hybrid chains is deferred to Chapter IV (4.3).2
 For instance, Izutsu (1971: 97) writes: “it has often been claimed that Avicenna’s metaphysics is fundamentally ‘essentialistic’. 3
This view is due to a misunderstanding of the basic structure of his thought.” According to Izutsu’s (1971: 98) reading, “the 
distinction between ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence’ is in Avicenna a conceptual distinction”. However, I do not find Izutsu’s argument 
utterly convincing, for if the quiddity—existence distinction in Avicenna is purely mental or conceptual, then Avicenna is not 
entitled to use such a mental distinction in theology; but, following Farābī, he does use it in theology. See Izutsu 1971: 91–98. It 
must also be noted that Suhrawardī, in al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 34.4–9], criticises Avicenna—with the name “Avicenna/Ibn Sīnā” 
mentioned explicitly this time—for using the quiddity—existence distinction in theology (see 3.3.3). Avicenna’s real ontological 
position, in my opinion, is open to question.
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this sense, it could be argued that Suhrawardī is at least helping us rule out a wrong reading of 
Avicenna’s metaphysics.  1
A highly plausible hypothesis is offered by R. Wisnovsky (2011) about whom “the 
follower of the Peripatetics” might refer to: “Suhrawardī was targeting the Avicennian ontology 
of mutakallimūn such as Rāzī, rather than Avicenna’s own ontology; and that Suhrawardī 
therefore intended to make an implicit distinction when he criticised the followers of the 
Peripatetics, and not the Peripatetics themselves, for holding that existence is something 
superadded to quiddity.”  Wisnovsky, however, points out that “it is unlikely that Rāzī himself 2
was in Suhrawardī’s sight”; “Jīlī  as well as Rāzī’s father and his Ashʿarite circle in Rayy present 3
themselves as possibilities, but further research will be needed in order to determine this”.  4
Another valuable observation offered by Wisnovsky is that ʿUmar Khayyām (d. 1123) 
precedes Suhrawardī in putting forward the distinction between existential properties (sing. صــــفة 
 ,(ṣifa iʿtibāriyya ,صــــفـة اعــــتـبـاریــــة .ṣifa wujūdiyya) and consideration properties (sing ,وجــــودیــــة
corresponding to Suhrawardī’s distinction between real properties (sings. صـفة عـینیة, ṣifa ʿayniyya) 
[Ḥ.Sh 71.5, ¶68] and mental properties (sing. ذھــــنـیـة  ,ṣifa dhihniyya) (3.2). Moreover ,صــــفـة 
Khayyām and Suhrawardī both “deny that existence is an attribute superadded to quiddity in 
concrete reality”, “and the example he [i.e. Suhrawardī] gives of a mental construct (iʿtibār 
dhihnī) that falls into this trap is ‘colourness’ (lawniyya)—the same example that Khayyām had 
given before him”.  In general, Wisnovsky’s sketch (2011)—“Essence and Existence in the 5
Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Islamic East”—is highly informative and very helpful for readers 
to get a general idea of the possible context of Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental considerations.  
In this chapter and the next, I concentrate on presenting Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental 
considerations as it is (without paying much attention to the context), so that further research can 
be built upon this foundational reconstruction. 
 Based on his reading of Avicenna’s metaphysics, which is not “essentialistic”, Izutsu (197: 98; 109–112) finds Suhrawardī’s 1
criticism unfair to Avicenna. However, Suhrawardī may not be attacking Avicenna himself in the discussion of mental 
considerations; rather, he is attacking “the followers of the Peripatetics”. Therefore, Izutsu’s criticism is unfair to Suhrawardī.
 Wisnovsky 2011: 46. For an analysis of Rāzī’s ontological and theological position, see Wisnovsky 2011: 40–44.2
 Majd al-Dīn al-Jīlī (n.d.) is the teacher of Rāzī.3
 Wisnovsky 2011: 30.4
 Wisnovsky 2011: 45. For an analysis of Khayyām’s distinction between existential properties and consideration properties, see 5
Wisnovsky 2011: 37–39. One of Khayyām’s argument about colourness might have to do with Suhrawardī’s as well (see 4.4.1.2).
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3.1 Two arguments against real infinite chains 
Before introducing his discussion of mental considerations, Suhrawardī first puts forward an 
important rule (ضـــابـــط, ḍābiṭ) about infinite regresses, or in his term, “infinite chains” (sing. ســـلسلة, 
silsila) in both al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 20.3–21.3] and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh ¶55, 63.9–64.6]: 
• Two arguments against real infinite chains:  
    [LWḤ3 20.3–21.3] = [Ḥ.Sh ¶55, 63.9–64.6] 
  Argument I:  [LWḤ3 20.6–13] = [Ḥ.Sh 63.15–64.5, ¶55]  
    = [ṬRḤ3 355.15–356.5] (no exposition) 
  Argument II:  [LWḤ3 20.13–21.1] = [Ḥ.Sh 63.10–13, ¶55] 
This rule, which will “benefit us in what follows” [LWḤ3 20.4], is as follows: 
[Text 1] 
Every number , whose individuals exist together [i.e. at the same time or 1
simultaneously] (آحــاده مــوجــودة مــعا, āḥāduhu muwjūda maʿan) and which has a 
positional or natural sequence (تـرتـیب وضـعي أو طـبیعي, tartīb waḍʿī aw ṭabīʿī), must 
be finite. A positional sequence is as in the case of bodies and its 
demonstration is mentioned before, whereas a natural [sequence] is as in the 
case of causes and effects, and properties and those to which these 
properties are attributed (الـــصفات والـــموصـــوفـــات, al-ṣifāt wa-l-mawṣūfāt) , which 2
exist sequentially (مترّتبة, mutarattiba) and together. [LWḤ3 20.4–6] 
[Text 2] 
Know that every chain (ســــلـسـلـة, silsila), where there is a sequence—whatever 
the sequence is—and whose individuals exist together (مــــجـتـمـعـة, mujtamiʿa), 
must be finite. [Ḥ.Sh 63.9–10] 
That is to say, if a chain meets two conditions—(1) its individuals exist together or at the same 
time (وجـود اآلحـاد مـعا, wujūd al-āḥād maʿan) [I.K3 97.5], rather than one following another in time; 
(2) its individuals form a sequence (تــــرتــــیـب اآلحــــاد, tartīb al-āḥād) [I.K3 97.9], for example, a 
sequence of causes and effects, or properties and those to which these properties are attributed—
 By “number” (عدد, ʿadad) here, Suhrawardī means a chain which has a number of individuals, rather than a chain of numbers.1
 Suhrawardī is using “property” (صـفة, ṣifa) and “that to which the property is attributed” (مـوصـوف, mawṣūf) in a very broad sense: 2
“property” here means whatever can be attributed to something by a predicate. See 3.2.1 for detail.
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and if this chain exists in the real world, then it must be finite. If it is infinite, then it exists 
merely in the mind. 
The reason Suhrawardī says this rule will “benefit us in what follows” [LWḤ3 20.4] is that 
later he makes use of it as a key premise to prove that things like univocal existence, oneness, 
contingency and necessity by another must exist merely in the mind. If they were to exist in the 
real world, they would necessarily form real infinite chains, which are logically impossible. 
Therefore, it is essential first to reconstruct Suhrawardī’s arguments against real infinite chains. 
3.1.1 Argument I: the argument by correspondence 
The first argument—found in both al-Talwīḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq—is very much like a 
thought experiment, which is named by Ibn Kammūna “the argument by correspondence” (الـبرھـان 
 .[al-burhān al-taṭbīqī) [I.K3 97.3 ,التطبیقي
Suppose that there is an infinite chain as mentioned above (call it “C”) in the real world. 
Let us first remove a certain number of its individuals from the middle and then reconnect what 
is left following the previous sequence. In this way we get another chain (call it “B”): 
…OOOOOO…   C  
…OO(OO)OO…  (OO) = certain number of individuals removed from C  
…OOOO…    B 
Now let us compare C with B, and there should be two possibilities: (1) C is the same as B in 
the sense that each individual in B corresponds to each individual in C. This is, however, 
impossible, for we have already removed a certain number of individuals from C, so the number of 
the individuals in C necessarily exceeds that in B by “the number removed” (الــعدد المحــذوف, al-ʿadad 
al-maḥdhūf) [LWḤ3 20.10]: 
...OOOOOO...  C  
...OOOO...  B 
(2) C differs from B in the sense that C exceeds B by the number removed. Since we have 
reconnected the chain after removing a certain number of individuals from C, the difference 
between B and C must be found “at one end” (فــي جــانــب, fī jānib) [LWḤ3 20.12] rather than in the 
middle. Supposing that the difference is found at the end (rather than the beginning) of the 
chains, then B must end before C, so B is finite. Since C exceeds B by the number removed, 
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which is finite, and since “what exceeds the finite by finite is finite” [LWḤ3 20.13; Ḥ.Sh 64.5], 
then C must be finite as well. This contradicts the premise that C is an infinite chain which exists 
in the real world: 
...OOOOOO  C  
...OOOO  B 
In other words, it is inconceivable that an infinite number exceeds another infinite number by a 
finite number, for they are both infinite; rather, only a finite number can exceed another finite 
number by a finite number. So C and B are both finite chains. 
This argument calls to mind Kindī’s argument that no infinite body can exist in the real 
world,  and Avicenna’s similar argument.  1 2
3.1.2 Argument II: “the argument from the throne”  3
The second argument, found in both al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 20.13–21.1] and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 
[Ḥ.Sh 63.10–13, ¶55], is named by Suhrawardī himself “the argument from the throne” (الـــبرھـــان 
 al-burhān al-ʿarshī), probably because this is his original argument and his preferred one ,الـعرشـي
due to its neatness. 
Let us consider the number of individuals between any two individuals of a chain. Two 
possibilities follow: it is either infinite or finite. (1) If the number is infinite, then it would lead to 
the absurdity that an infinite number “is limited between two sequential limits” (یـنحصر بـین حـاصـریـن 
 yanḥaṣiru bayna ḥāṣirayn mutarattibayn) [LWḤ3 20.15; Ḥ.Sh 63.11]. This is impossible ,مــترتّــبین
because no infinite number can be limited by two limits. To be infinite is, by definition, to be 
without any limit or bound; otherwise, it would be finite. (2) If the number of individuals 
between any two individuals is finite, then the whole chain must be finite, for we cannot find any 
infinite number in this chain. 
Therefore, based on the two arguments above, every real chain whose individuals exist 
simultaneously and sequentially must be finite. If there is an infinite chain of this sort, it cannot 
exist except in the mind. 
 See Kindī. Kitāb al-Kindī fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā, in Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-Falsafiyya (al-Qism al-Awwal): 47–49.1
 See, for example, al-Najāt [NJ 244.15–245.11].2
 Aminrazavi (1997: 36–37) claims that by this argument Suhrawardī aims to prove “an infinite divisibility within a limited set 3
with a beginning and an end can exist”, and “this discussion concerning limit and infinity for Suhrawardī has bearing upon his 
epistemology”. First, this is an argument against real infinite chains whose individuals exist simultaneously and sequentially, 
rather than an argument about infinite divisibility. Secondly, Suhrawardī uses this argument as a key premise in his metaphysical 
discussion of mental considerations, as we shall see in 3.4; it has barely anything to do with Suhrawardī’s epistemology.
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3.2 The real consideration—mental consideration distinction  1
Right after establishing the rule above, Suhrawardī begins his discussion of mental/
intellectual considerations. But first of all, what are mental considerations exactly? 
3.2.1 What are mental considerations? 
The discussion of mental considerations is introduced first in §3.2—“On universal and 
particular, finiteness and infinity, real and mental considerations”—of the Metaphysics of al-
Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 21.4–26.9]. Suhrawardī starts off by writing: 
[Part of Text 7 below in 3.2.2] 
There are things added to quiddity both in the mind (ذھــــنا, dhihnan) and in the 
real world (عــینا, ʿaynan), and there are things added [to quiddity] merely in the 
mind. [LWḤ3 21.5] 
“Things added to quiddity both in the mind and in the real world” are called “real 
considerations” (sing. اعــتبار عــیني, iʿtibār ʿaynī), whereas “things added to quiddity merely in the 
mind” are “mental considerations” (sing. ذھــــنــي .(iʿtibār dhihnī ,اعــــتــبــار   Therefore, the 2
“considerations” in question refer specifically to “things added to quiddity”. Suhrawardī aims to 
distinguish between which things among those added to quiddity exist both in the real world and 
in the mind, and which exist merely in the mind. This explains why Suhrawardī also calls these 
considerations “properties” (صفات, ṣifāt).   3
3.2.1.1 The real property—mental property distinction 
In §3.3.6—“On intellectual considerations”—of al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
 Another discussion of this distinction is found in Mousavian 2014b: 491–493; it seems to be the only treatment of this topic 1
in modern scholarship, though it is based merely on Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh ¶68, 71.5–72.10]. The term “الــصفة الــعینیة” (al-ṣifa 
al-ʿayniyya), rendered as “objective attribute” by Mousavian and “concrete attribute” by Walbridge & Ziai (1999), is 
translated as “real property” in my discussion.
 It is worth noting that the real (عــــیـنـي, ʿaynī)—mental (ذھــــنـي, dhihnī) contrast is already in Avicenna: every existent quiddity is 2
either real or mental. Avicenna’s discussion, however, is usually confined to quiddity as common nature. (For Avicenna on mental 
existence, see Black 1999.) Suhrawardī, by contrast, is concerned with everything that can be predicated of real quiddity, with the 
“quiddity” in question being particular it-ness (ھویة, huwiyya) rather than Avicenna’s universal quiddity (see 3.3.3 & 4.4.3.2).
 B. Miller, in Chapter 3—“The Reality and the Wealth of Existence”—of A Most Unlikely God, remarks that he is using the term 3
“property” in a very broad sense: “a property is simply whatever can be attributed to something by a predicate” (Miller 1996: 19, 
footnote 10; 28), “properties are what predicables stand for” (Miller 1996: 21; 23); this is exactly how Suhrawardī is using the 
term “ṣifa” (صــفة), rendered as “property”. Suhrawardī aims to distinguish which properties are real, and which are purely mental/
intellectual, as will be explained in 3.2.3.
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[Text 3] 
The fact is that properties are divided into [1] properties which have existence 
both in the mind and in the real world, such as whiteness (الــــبـیـاض, al-bayāḍ), 
and [2] properties which are attributed to quiddities (صـفات ُتـوصـف بـھا الـماھـیات, ṣifāt 
tūṣafu bi-hā al-māhiyyāt) and they only have existence in the mind, and their 
real existence (وجـودھـا الـعیني, wujūduhā al-ʿaynī) is [the fact] that they are in the 
mind, such as being-a-species (الـنوعـیة, al-nawʿiyya) predicated of human, and 
particularity/being-particular (الجـــزئـــیة, al-juzʾiyya) predicated of Zayd. … They 
are secondary intelligibles (الــــمـعـقـوالت الــــثـوانــــي, al-maʿqūlāt al-thawānī). [ṬRḤ3 
346.14–347.1] 
Likewise, in the concluding paragraph ¶68 of §1.3.3.1—“On intellectual considerations”—of 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 4] 
Therefore, all properties are divided into two kinds: (1) real property (صـفة عـینیة, 
ṣifa ʿayniyya), and it has a form in the intellect, such as blackness, whiteness 
and motion; (2) property whose existence in the real world (فــي الــعین, fī al-ʿayn) 
is its very existence in the mind, and it only has existence in the mind. So its-
being-in-the-mind (الـكون فـي الـذھـن لـھا, al-kawn fī al-dhihn la-hā) is in accordance 
with (فـي مـرتـبة, fī martaba)  others’-being-in-the-real-world (1 ,كـون غـیرھـا فـي األعـیان
kawn ghayrihā fī al-aʿyān), such as contingency (اإلمــــكـــان, al-imkān), 
substantiality/being-a-substance (الـجوھـریـة, al-jawhariyya), colourness/being-a-
colour (الـلونـیة, al-lawniyya), existence and other things that we have mentioned 
before. If a thing has existence outside the mind (فـــي خـــارج الـــذھـــن, fī khārij al-
dhihn), then that which is in the mind by virtue of it  should correspond to it. 2
That which is only in the mind has no existence outside the mind so that the 
mental thing (الذھني, al-dhihnī) could correspond to it. [Ḥ.Sh 71.5–11, ¶68] 
“Real property” and “mental property” here are alternative terms to “real consideration” 
and “mental consideration”. Real properties exist in the real world, and they can have 
corresponding forms in the mind. So real properties are added to real quiddities in the real world, 
 This phrase is rendered by Mousavian as “on a par with” and by Walbridge & Ziai as “equivalent to”. See Mousavian 2014b: 1
491, 498–499 (note 30); Walbridge & Ziai 1999: 50.11–13.
 Namely, the mental form of a real property.2
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and their corresponding forms are added to mental quiddities in the mind.  The examples given 1
by Suhrawardī are blackness, whiteness and motion. As mentioned in Chapter I (1.1.1), in all the 
four Peripatetic works, ten Peripatetic categories are reduced by Suhrawardī to four: substance, 
relation, quantity and quality, with motion introduced as a fifth category. Place, time, position 
 malaka) are reduced to relation; action and affection to ,مــــلـكـة) waḍʿ) and disposition ,وضــــع)
motion.  In addition, relation is proved to be nothing but a mental consideration by Suhrawardī 2
in §1.3.3.1 of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh ¶65, 70.2–8]; the same goes for discontinued quantity as 
number (4.1). Therefore, real properties must refer merely to the following three categories of 
accidents: continued quantity as magnitude (مــــقـدار, miqdār), quality and motion.  But on what 3
ground are these properties taken as real? I think this is because everyone can apprehend these 
properties by presential knowledge and prove immediately that they actually exist. I can see the 
blackness of a real crow with my own eyes, so its blackness must be real. 
Mental properties, by contrast, exist merely in the mind, so they are added merely to 
mental quiddities in the mind. The examples mentioned by Suhrawardī include existence, 
oneness, contingency, necessity by another, substantiality/being-a-substance, colourness, 
being-a-species, particularity and so on. Suhrawardī says explicitly that these mental 
properties or considerations are “secondary intelligibles” (الــــمـعـقـوالت الــــثـوانــــي, al-maʿqūlāt al-
thawānī) [ṬRḤ3 346.17].  Although they exist merely in the mind, they are still “in 4
accordance with (فــي مــرتــبة, fī martaba) others’-being-in-the-real-world (كــون غــیرھــا فــي األعــیان, 
kawn ghayrihā fī al-aʿyān)” [Ḥ.Sh 71.8]. That is to say, mental properties are still proper 
 The corresponding mental form of a real property is a primary intelligible (مــــعـقـول أّول, maʿqūl awwal), although this point is not 1
mentioned by Suhrawardī. For a helpful discussion of primary and secondary intelligibles, see Izutsu 1971: 82–84.
 For a short discussion, see [LMḤ 123.13–124.21].2
 In Illuminationist light metaphysics, these three categories of accidents are named “states attributed to darkness” (sing. 3 ھــــیـئـة
.hayʾa ẓulmāniyya). See Chapter V (5.2.3) for detail ,ظلمانیة
 This is also pointed out by Walbridge (2014: 483). Izutsu (1971: 83–84) distinguishes two kinds of secondary intelligibles: 4
“logical secondary intelligibles” (e.g. being-universal) and “philosophical secondary intelligible” (e.g. being-father); 
Suhrawardī’s mental properties belong to the second class.
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reflections of how real things are, rather than merely arbitrary conceptions.  One could say 1
mental properties are what our mind generates to help us better understand things in the real 
world. 
3.2.1.2 Mental considerations as intellectual predicates 
There is still another kind of mental considerations: intellectual predicates (المحــموالت الــعقلیة, 
al-maḥmūlāt al-ʿaqliyya), as Suhrawardī writes in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: 
[Text 5] 
Know that the predicates analysed by them [i.e. the Peripatetics] are all 
mental considerations, inasmuch as their being-a-category and being-a-
predicate (ومـحــــمـولــــیـتـھـا مــــقـولــــیـتـھـا  حــــیـث  -min ḥaythu maqūliyyatihā wa ,مــــن 
maḥmūliyyatihā). [Ḥ.Sh 74.4–5, ¶71] 
To be more specific, Suhrawardī goes on: 
[Text 6] 
The predicates, inasmuch as they are predicates, are mental. Blackness is 
real. Since “_____ is black” (األســــودیــــة, al-aswadiyya) is an expression of 
“something in which blackness subsists” (شـيء مـا قـام بـھ الـسواد, shayʾ mā qāma bi-
hi al-sawād), being-a-body (الـجسمیة, al-jismiyya) or being-a-substance (الـجوھـریـة, 
al-jawhariyya) does not enter it. Rather, even if blackness subsists in 
something which is not a body (غــیر الــجسم, ghayr al-jism), “it is black” (أّنــھ أســود, 
anna-hu aswadu) could still be said of it. So if “something” (شــيء مــا, shayʾ mā) 
enters “_____ is black”, then it is nothing but an intellectual thing (أمــــر عــــقـلـي, 
 Based on this sentence—“so its-being-in-the-mind is in accordance with others’-being-in-the-real-world” [Ḥ.Sh 71.7–8]—1
Mousavian (2014b: 497, note 20) argues: “According to Suhrawardī, I believe, they [i.e. intellectual attributes, Mousavian’s 
rendering] have no factual existence (being or individuation) among the objective essences (aʿyān) though they may have being 
in some sense and thus be real.” Likewise, Mousavian (2014b: 492) argues: “Moreover, from the premise that contingency is not 
an objective attribute, it does not follow that contingency is not a real attribute.” 
If what Mousavian means by “real” is that a mental property is a proper rather than arbitrary reflection of how real things are 
outside the mind, I agree. But obviously, Mousavian is suggesting more than this. If he argues that a mental property is somehow 
“real” ontologically, I would not agree. About this, Mousavian (2014b: 492) writes: “Put differently, Suhrawardī does not 
presuppose that reality should be identified with objectivity. This position well coheres with his views regarding, for example, 
imagination (khayāl) and suspended forms (ṣuwar muʿallaqa).” But Mousavian does not explain in detail the ontological status 
of “real” mental properties he has in mind; this is the closest thing to an explanation that I can find in his article. I think it is 
dangerous to grant mental properties any existence other than existence in the mind, for example, some existence similar to that 
of suspended imaginal forms. Nothing whatsoever about this is suggested by Suhrawardī; rather, Suhrawardī explicitly says that 
mental properties exist merely in the mind. 
Therefore, my position is that mental properties are “real” only in the sense that they are proper rather than arbitrary reflections 
of how real things are outside the mind. But they do not have any existence—such as that of suspended imaginal forms—other 
than existence in the mind. I tend to share Walbridge’s (2014: 483) position that “these [i.e. rational considerations] are not 
metaphysical constituents of the things of the world but rather are products of our thinking about the world”.
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amr ʿaqlī), although blackness has existence in the real world. 
If something derives from an intellectual property and becomes a predicate, 
for example, if we say “every C is contingent”, then both “_____ is 
contingent” (الـــممكنیة, al-mumkiniyya) and “contingency” are merely intellectual. 
This is different from “_____ is black”, for although “_____ is black” is an 
intellectual predicate (المحــمول الــعقلي, al-maḥmūl al-ʿaqlī), blackness is real, and 
blackness itself cannot be predicated of substance. [Ḥ.Sh 71.11–72.2, ¶68] 
Two kinds of predicates are distinguished by Suhrawardī: (1) predicate derived from a real 
property, e.g. “_____ is black” (األســــودیــــة, al-aswadiyya)”; (2) predicate derived from a mental 
property, e.g. “_____ is contingent” (الــــمـمـكـنـیـة, al-mumkiniyya)”. Let us first consider “_____ is 
black”. 
(1) Blackness is a real property, but when blackness becomes a predicate—“_____ is 
black”—and is predicated of a subject (e.g. this horse is black), it becomes purely mental. Why 
must “_____ is black” be purely mental? Here is Suhrawardī’s argument. What we understand 
from the predicate “_____ is black” is merely “something in which blackness subsists”. But this 
“something” (شـــيء مـــا, shayʾ mā), which is included in the predicate “_____ is black”, cannot be 
real, because this “something” can refer to anything, be it a real thing or a purely mental thing. 
For example, we can predicate “_____ is black” of a real crow, a mental unicorn, a mental 
squared circle (whatever this is), or whatever in the real world or in the mind. This must be what 
Suhrawardī means by saying: 
[Part of Text 6] 
Rather, even if blackness subsists in something which is not a body, “it is 
black” (أّنھ أسود, anna-hu aswadu) could still be said of it. [Ḥ.Sh 71.13–14, ¶68] 
Since this “something” enters the predicate “_____ is black”, this predicate cannot be real, but 
must be purely mental. The same goes for every predicate derived from any real property 
(magnitude, quality or motion). 
(2) Contingency is a mental property; when contingency becomes a predicate—“_____ is 
contingent” (الــممكنیة, al-mumkiniyya)—and is predicated of a subject, it is still purely mental. Our 
argument above applies to “_____ is contingent” here. 
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Therefore, considerations are first divided into two kinds: (1) real considerations and (2) 
mental/intellectual considerations. (1) Real considerations refer merely to real properties (e.g. 
magnitude, quality and motion), which are themselves added to real quiddities in the real world, 
and whose corresponding forms are added to mental quiddities in the mind. (2) Mental 
considerations are subdivided into two kinds: (2-a) mental/intellectual properties and (2-b) all 
the intellectual predicates derived from either real properties or mental properties (e.g. “______ 
is black”, “_____ is contingent”).  1
3.2.1.3 Why “considerations”? 
Why does Suhrawardī use the term “consideration”, which sounds so strange? Suhrawardī 
does not tell us why. But I can think of two possible answers. First, Suhrawardī might be 
following Avicenna in talking about “consideration”.  For example, in §1.2 of al-Shifāʾ: al-2
Manṭiq: al-Madkhal, Avicenna says that quiddity can be considered in the following three ways: 
“consideration of quiddity inasmuch it is that quiddity” (اعـتبار الـماھـیة بـما ھـى تـلك الـماھـیة, iʿtibār al-
māhiyya bi-mā hiya tilka al-māhiyya); “consideration of quiddity inasmuch as it is in external 
instances” (اعـتبار لـھا مـن حـیث ھـى فـي األعـیان, iʿtibār la-hā min ḥaythu hiya fī al-aʿyān); “consideration 
of quiddity inasmuch as it is in conception” (اعــتبار لــھا مــن حــیث ھــى فــي الــتصّور, iʿtibār la-hā min 
ḥaythu hiya fī al-taṣawwur) [Sh.N.D 15.1–5, §1.2]. This is just an example; my point is that 
Avicenna indeed uses “consideration” very often. So Suhrawardī might be following Avicenna, 
and he aims to distinguish which consideration—the way we consider quiddity—is real, and 
which is purely mental. 
Here is another answer. Supposing our friend Zayd is standing right in front of us, we can 
consider him in many different ways. When we consider Zayd as white, for example, we are also 
predicating “_____ is white” of Zayd, at least in the mind; consideration is, in fact, a mental act 
of predication. In this sense, the property—whiteness—we attribute to Zayd by predicating 
“_____ is white” of Zayd can be called a “consideration”. In fact, we can consider Zayd in many 
ways and predicate many things of Zayd: Zayd exists; Zayd is one; Zayd is contingent; Zayd is 
necessary by another; Zayd is human; Zayd is animal; Zayd is rational; Zayd is white; Zayd is 
 This is noted as well by Mousavian (2014b: 492): “Here is a subtle point: attributes are divided into objective and intellectual. 1
The former does not belong to the iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya, and the latter does. Predicates derived from attributes all belong to the 
iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya.”
 Alternatively, one could argue that Suhrawardī is following ʿUmar Khayyām (d. 1123), who, according to Wisnovsky, precedes 2
Suhrawardī in putting forward the distinction between existential properties and consideration properties (sing. صــفة اعــتباریــة, ṣifa 
iʿtibāriyya). See Wisnovsky 2011: 37–39.
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running; Zayd is the son of Amr… In each one of these considerations or predications, we are 
attributing a property to Zayd: univocal existence (or systematically ambiguous existence), 
oneness, contingency, necessity by another, humanity, animality, rationality, whiteness, being-
running, being-the-son-of-Amr… Suhrawardī aims not only to distinguish between which 
properties among these are real and which are generated by our mind; furthermore, but also to 
prove by arguments why some properties (e.g. existence, oneness, animality, rationality) must be 
mental. 
3.2.2 A test for mental considerations 
In (and only in) al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 21.4–22.9], one can find a thought experiment—
Suhrawardī calls it a “criterion” (قسـطاس, qusṭās) or a “measure” (مـیزان, mīzān) —which I think is 1
quite significant; it explains the origination of mental considerations and can work as a test for 
them. Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 7] 
Section: Since the discussion reaches here, let us set up a measure (مــــیـزان, 
mīzān) for mental and real considerations. This is because there are things 
added to quiddity both in the mind (ذھــــنا, dhihnan) and in the real world (عــــینا, 
ʿaynan), and there are things added [to quiddity] merely in the mind. 
The foremost criterion (الـقـســــطـاس األّول, al-qusṭās al-awwal) : Let us take in real 2
existence (فــــي الــــوجــــود الــــعیني, fī al-wujūd al-ʿaynī) a certain extension (امــــتداد, 
imtidād)—three cubits (ثــالثــة اذرع, thalāthat adhruʿ), for example—and name it 
and everything that equals it “C”, so that C is the name for everything whose 
extent (مــــقـدار, miqdār) is like this. [Let us also take] another extension and 
name it and everything that equals it “B”.  
So we have in the mind the universal form of C, which falls on (الــواقــعة عــلى, al-
wāqiʿa ʿalā) its particulars univocally (بـالـتواطـؤ, bi-l-tawāṭuʾ);  the same happens 3
to B. [Moreover,] we have in the mind absolute extension (االمــــتـداد الــــمـطـلـق, al-
imtidād al-muṭlaq), said of C, B and others [univocally]. So absolute 
extension corresponds to (طــابــق, ṭābaqa) the real particulars of C and those of 
 These two synonymous terms also mean “scale” or “balance”.1
 Since there is no “second criterion”, I assume by “األّول” (al-awwal) Suhrawardī means “foremost” or “primary” rather than 2
“first”.
 That is, which is predicated of its particulars univocally.3
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B; C corresponds to its [real] particulars and B to its [real] particulars. 
We then say that the particulars of C in the real world do not have two 
aspects (جـھــــتـان, jihatān): by one aspect [absolute] extension corresponds to 
them and by the other being-C/C-ness (الــــجـیـمـیـة, al-jīmiyya) [corresponds to 
them]. Rather, it is a single extension in the real world—three cubits, for 
example—and it corresponds to being-an-extension (االمـــتدادیـــة, al-imtidādiyya) 
due to itself and to being-C as well. Everything from it that corresponds to 
being-an-extension also corresponds to being-C in the real world… 
In the mind, [however,] the meaning (مــــفـھـوم, mafhūm) of being-C and [that of] 
being-an-extension are not the same; otherwise, [since] extension can be 
said of B, C could be likewise [said of B], but the fact is not like this. Rather, 
every particular of C is a single extension, a single C and a single individual; 
the same goes for B. 
Here, two rules (ضـابـطان, ḍābiṭān) can be determined. One rule is that a mental 
distinction (الـتغایـر الـذھـني, al-taghāyur al-dhihnī) does not imply a real distinction 
… (al-taghāyur al-ʿaynī ,التغایر العیني)  [LWḤ3 21.4–22.4] 1
In the text above, obviously, Suhrawardī is talking about a determinable—determinate 
distinction: the one between absolute extension and C (the name of every three-cubit extension 
in the real world). Suhrawardī holds that when “_____ is C” is predicated of its real instances 
univocally (بـــالـــتواطـــؤ, bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) [LWḤ3 21.8], being-C—the universal property attributed to 
them——must be a mental consideration, which is not a metaphysical component of the real 
instances. Likewise, being-an-extension, attributed to the real instances by the univocal predicate 
“_____ is an extension”, is also a mental consideration. In the real world, there is nothing but “a 
single extension, a single C and a single individual” [LWḤ3 22.3], whose metaphysical structure 
is absolutely simple and indivisible. In the mind, however, being-an-extension is obviously 
different from being-C.  But this “mental distinction (الـتغایـر الـذھـني, al-taghāyur al-dhihnī) does not 2
imply a real distinction (الـتغایـر الـعیني, al-taghāyur al-ʿaynī)” [LWḤ3 22.4]; later, Suhrawardī offers 
 The second rule is about differentiation, which is not our immediate concern here. For Suhrawardī’s distinction between 1
differentiation and individuation, see Chapter IV (4.4.3.2).
 Note that according to Suhrawardī, being-an-extension is not even a part of the mental structure of C (so in the mind, the 2
structure of C is not being-an-extension plus the differentia/characteristic of C). Rather, being-an-extension is nothing but a 
mental consideration which the mind generates and relates to C. For Suhrawardī’s argument that blackness (a determinate) cannot 
be divided in the mind, see [QWM3 170.6–11] and [ṬRḤ3 367.9–18]. This point will be mentioned again towards the end of 
4.4.1.
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three arguments to prove that the determinable—differentia of determinate distinction cannot be 
real (4.4.1). 
However, the question is that to what extent we could generalise this criterion or measure. 
This criterion, in my view, certainly should not be limited to the determinable—determinate 
distinction. First, Suhrawardī tells us explicitly that this is “a measure (مــــیـزان, mīzān) for mental 
and real considerations” [LWḤ3 21.4]. Secondly, the place—right after his arguments against 
real infinite chains [LWḤ3 20.3–21.3] and just before his many arguments against univocal 
existence as a real property [LWḤ3 22.10–23.11]—where Suhrawardī puts it forward also 
indicates that this is a general test for mental considerations, with the determinable—determinate 
distinction being but an example. If this is the case, then the test for mental considerations is as 
follows: 
If “_____ is X” is predicated of X’s real particulars or instances univocally (بـالـتواطـؤ, 
bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) or by a single meaning, that is, neither systematically 
ambiguously (بـــالـــتشكیك, bi-l-tashkīk) nor equivocally (بـــاالشـــتراك, bi-l-ishtirāk) , then 1
being-X or X-ness—the universal or univocal property attributed to them by 
“_____ is X”—must be a mental consideration, which cannot be a metaphysical 
component of X’s real particulars or instances. 
In short, every univocal property is a mental consideration, be it univocal existence, oneness, 
contingency, necessity by another, a determinable, a determinate, or a differentia of determinate, 
a genus or a differentia. Note again that the term “property” here is used in a very broad sense: 
“a property is simply whatever can be attributed to something by a predicate”.  So although 2
animality, for example, is an essential part of (mental) quiddity rather than something added to 
quiddity, it can still be called a property (صـفة, ṣifa). By contrast, blackness is a real consideration, 
because Suhrawardī holds that blackness can be predicated of its instances only in a 
systematically ambiguous way: this blackness always differs from that blackness by perfection or 
deficiency.  
Suhrawardī’s challenge is to prove by philosophical arguments that these univocal 
properties cannot exist in the real world. Therefore, my focus in Chapters III & IV (from 3.4 
onwards) is on examining these arguments; as we shall see, Suhrawardī’s most powerful weapon 
 See 3.3.1 & 3.3.2 for detail.1
 Miller 1996: 19 (footnote 10), 28.2
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is the infinite regress: the real existence of a univocal property always leads to an infinite regress 
in one way or another. 
3.2.3 Suhrawardī’s purpose 
In the discussion of considerations, Suhrawardī is mainly concerned with (1) real 
properties and (2-a) mental properties. He aims to draw a clear line between which properties 
are real and which are purely mental/intellectual. This is crucial, for, according to him, there are 
many people in his time who commit the following fallacy: “taking something mental as a real 
essence” (أخـــذ أمـــر ذھـــني ذاتـــا عـــینیا, akhdh amr dhihnī dhātan ʿayniyyan) [LWḤ3 26.5–6], “taking 
mental considerations as real things” (أخــــذ االعــــتبارات الــــذھــــنیة أمــــورا عــــینیة, akhdh al-iʿtibārāt al-
dhihniyya umūran ʿayniyya) [ṬRḤ3 358.16–17] or “taking mental things as things which are 
actual and independent in the real world” (أخـذ األمـور الـذھـنیة واقـعة مسـتقلّة فـي األعـیان, akhdh al-umūr al-
dhihniyya wāqiʿatan mustaqillatan fī al-aʿayān) [Ḥ.Sh 72.5, ¶68]. Concerning this, Suhrawardī 
writes in the concluding paragraph of the section on mental considerations in al-Talwīḥāt: 
[Text 8] 
You should understand and examine every discussion/doctrine (كــــالم, kalām) 
until no mental thing is taken as a real essence (عــــیـنـیـة  ;(dhāt ʿayniyya ,ذات 
[otherwise,] it would lead to absurdity. [The reason] I have been fussy (أطــــنبُت, 
aṭnabtu) [about this point] is that there is a great need (عـــظم حـــاجـــة, ʿaẓm hāja) 
for it later and the great confusion (كــثرة الــخبط, kathrat al-khabṭ) in this respect. 
[LWḤ3 26.5–7] 
Suhrawardī likewise writes in al-Muqāwamāt: 
[Text 9] 
You should understand that many fallacies arise from the lack of knowledge 
of considerations (عـــدم مـــعرفـــة االعـــتبارات, ʿadam maʿrifat al-iʿtibārāt) and taking 
them as real. [QWM3 172.13–14] 
We have established above (3.2.1.2) that (2-b) considerations as intellectual predicates 
(e.g. “______ is black”, “_____ is contingent”) cannot be real, for “something” enters them. 
However, Suhrawardī’s major challenge is to prove by arguments that (2-a) considerations as 
mental properties (e.g. univocal existence, oneness, contingency, necessity by another) cannot be 
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real either. If these mental properties are taken erroneously as real or actual things which are 
added to real quiddities in the real world, then the consequence is that they would be regarded as 
true metaphysical components of real things. As a result, metaphysics would be built upon these 
purely mental considerations rather than real extramental things, as Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 10] 
Some Peripatetics build everything in metaphysics on [univocal] existence.  1
[Ḥ.Sh 67.4–5, ¶60] 
Suhrawardī, however, argues: 
[Part of Text 7 in 3.2.2] 
One rule is that a mental distinction (الــتغایــر الــذھــني, al-taghāyur al-dhihnī) does 
not imply a real distinction (التغایر العیني, al-taghāyur al-ʿaynī). [LWḤ3 22.4] 
That is to say, although properties like existence, oneness and contingency exist in the mind and 
can be distinguished from mental quiddities as things added to them, it does not follow that these 
properties also exist in the real world as real properties added to real quiddities. By his 
discussion of mental considerations, Suhrawardī aims to prove that it is impossible for these 
properties to exist in the real world as things added to real quiddities; otherwise, it must lead to 
infinite regresses in one way or another, as will be shown later in Chapters III & IV (3.4 
onwards). 
Let us begin by examining univocal existence. 
 Existence in this context refers to univocal existence rather than systematically ambiguous existence. Suhrawardī argues that 1
univocal existence is merely a mental property, as will be shown later in this chapter (3.4).
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3.3 Univocal existence vs. systematically ambiguous existence: Suhrawardī’s 
ontological position 
First of all, it must be noted that the “existence” which Suhrawardī aims to prove as purely 
mental is univocal existence rather than systematically ambiguous existence. In fact, Suhrawardī 
accepts systematically ambiguous existence and even considers it as the subject matter of 
Peripatetic metaphysics, as modified and reconstructed by him in his Peripatetic works. 
My contention above apparently goes against that of Mulla Ṣadrā and the majority of 
modern scholars who follow his lead. According to Mulla Ṣadrā, Suhrawardī’s ontological 
position should be labelled as “the primacy/principality/foundationality of quiddity/
essence” (أصـالـة الـماھـیة, aṣālat al-māhiyya), because very clearly Suhrawardī argues at great length 
in all his major philosophical works—al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt and Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq—that existence is merely a mental consideration. For instance, T. Izutsu claims: 
The most notable representative of the third position [i.e. the principality of 
quiddity] is by common consent Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d. 1191).  1
R. Wisnovsky (2005) likewise writes: 
To illustrate the framing role that Avicenna played, I shall point to a number of 
post-Avicennian philosophers, two of whom staked extreme, though 
opposing, positions on the essence/existence distinction, with the others 
fighting over the middle ground. At one end of the spectrum, Suhrawardī (d. 
1191) maintained that essence was primary and basic, that is to say, real in 
the most basic sense, while existence got lumped together with other unreal 
products of conceptual distinction-making. For Mulla Ṣadrā (d. 1640), 
existence was primary and real, whereas essence was a mental construct. 
These two opposing positions came to be termed, respectively, aṣālat al-
māhiyya (literally, the “foundationality” of essence) and aṣālat al-wujūd (the 
“foundationality” of existence).  2
 Izutsu 1971: 100.1
 Wisnovsky 2005: 111. However, it must be noted that Wisnovsky (2011) later points out the problem with labelling 2
Suhrawardī’s position as “the primacy of quiddity”: “Partly because of Suhrawardī’s insistence on the subjective nature of 
existence, his view was later used as an essentialist foil by Mullā Ṣadrā and other members of that school of Islamic metaphysics 
which saw itself as upholding ‘the fundamentality of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd)’.” “This label would probably have surprised 
Suhrawardī, given that in the passages just cited he maintains the subjective nature not only of existence but also of the various 
ways of conceptualising essence, including quiddity (māhiyya), thingness (shayʾiyya) and inner reality (ḥaqīqa).” See Wisnovsky 
2011: 27–28 (cf. 45).
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However, Izutsu (as well as many other scholars) in his analysis sees merely one side of 
the story: Suhrawardī’s argument that univocal existence must be a purely mental consideration;  1
the other side he overlooks is Suhrawardī’s discussion of systematically ambiguous existence in 
his modified Peripatetic metaphysics. It is crucial always to keep in mind the distinction between 
univocal existence (“the concept of existence”, Izutsu’s term) and systematically ambiguous 
existence (“the reality of existence”, Izutsu’s term) if one intends to grasp Suhrawardī’s real 
ontological position.  2
By showing briefly some aspects of Suhrawardī’s discussion of systematically 
ambiguous existence in what follows, I argue Suhrawardī’s position must be the primacy of 
existence (أصــالــة الــوجــود, aṣālat al-wujūd) rather than the primacy of quiddity, on condition that 
the “existence” here is systematically ambiguous rather than univocal.  The significance of my 3
contention is that one could further argue that Suhrawardī—rather than Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640)—
is the founder of Islamic existential metaphysics. Izutsu argues that Suhrawardī is the founder 
of what he calls the “Ḥikmat philosophy”, but only in the sense that Suhrawardī first 
formulates the “formal structure” of Ḥikmat-type of thinking: “a perfect fusion of mystical 
experience and analytical thinking”,  corresponding to Suhrawardī’s distinction between 4
deification (تـــألّـــھ, taʾalluh) and investigation (بـــحث, baḥth) (see 1.3.1). One could further argue 
that Suhrawardī is the founder of “Ḥikmat philosophy” also in the sense that he precedes 
Mullā Ṣadrā by more than 400 years in formulating existential metaphysics in his Peripatetic 
works.  My hypothesis, therefore, is that Mullā Ṣadrā, in fact, adopts and develops 5
Suhrawardī’s modified Peripatetic existential metaphysics, but abandons Illuminationist light 
metaphysics (which will be reconstructed in Chapter V). 
 For his whole argument that Suhrawardī’s position is the primacy of quiddity, see Izutsu 197: 98, 109–112.1
 Izutsu seems to confuse these two sorts of existence throughout his Chapter 5 “The Primacy of Existence over Quiddity” (Izutsu 2
1971: 99–118).
 Walbridge (2017: 268, note 6) also finds “the primacy of quiddity” problematic, as he remarks: “These terms, especially aṣālat 3
al-māhiyya, appear to me to be somewhat loaded in favour of the view that existence is primary. I do not believe that Suhrawardī 
would have accepted this formulation, since he would also have considered quiddity to be intentional.”
 See Izutsu 1971: 59–62.4
 I intend to do such a research in Philosophy inside the Cave—the second work of my trilogy which offers a thorough 5
reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy (especially metaphysics)—which will deal with Suhrawardī’s modified 
Peripatetic metaphysics presented in his Peripatetic works; my hypothesis is that it is the very existential metaphysics which 
Mullā Ṣadrā adopts (so Mullā Ṣadrā is not the founder).
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3.3.1 Univocal existence  and equivocal existence 1
In §1.3.3.1—“Judgement: on intellectual considerations”—of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī 
starts off by writing: 
[Text 11] 
Existence falls upon yaqaʿu ʿalā) blackness, substance, human and 2 ,یــقع عــلى) 
horse by a single intention and a single meaning (بــــمعنى واحــــد ومــــفھوم واحــــد, bi-
maʿnan wāḥid wa-mafhūm wāḥid), so it is an intelligible intention (مـــعنى مـــعقول, 
maʿnan maʿqūl) which is more general than each one [of them]… We claim 
that these predicates  must be purely intellectual (عـــقلیة صـــرفـــة, ʿaqliyya ṣirfa). 3
[Ḥ.Sh 64.10–13, ¶65] 
That is to say, if “_____ exists” is predicated univocally (بـالـتواطـؤ, bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) of multiple things, 
then the existence attributed to each thing by the predicate “_____ exists” is the same in terms of 
intention or meaning. This univocal existence, as Suhrawardī claims, must be a purely mental/
intellectual property, which cannot be added to quiddity extramentally. Therefore, the existence 
Suhrawardī aims to prove as purely mental must be univocal existence. 
Univocity of existence entails the ontological position that univocal existence is added to 
quiddity not only in the mind but also in the real world, as Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 12] 
A group of people take existence in terms of its meaning (مــن حــیث مــفھومــھ, min 
ḥaythu mafhūmihi), [as well as] contingency and oneness, as things added to 
[real] things and actual in the real world. [ṬRḤ3 343.9–10] 
As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, this is the ontological position of “the followers 
of the Peripatetics” (الــــمـّشـائــــیـن  atbāʿ al-mashshāʾīn) [Ḥ.Sh 65.10, ¶58]. According to ,أتــــبـاع 
Wisnovsky’s (2011) helpful observation, “the followers of the Peripatetics” might refer to the 
mutakallimūn (or theologians) such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) (but unlikely Rāzī himself, 
maybe “Jīlī as well as Rāzī’s father and his Ashʿarite circle in Rayy” ). This is Suhrawardī’s 4
 For a discussion of univocal existence—or “the concept of existence”, Izutsu’s phrase—in Sabzawārī’s metaphysics, see Izutsu 1
1971: 76–85 (Chapter 3).
 Which means “is predicated/said of”.2
 By “predicates” Suhrawardī refers clearly to “mental properties” (e.g. existence), rather than “intellectual predicates” (e.g. 3
“_____ exists”).
 Wisnovsky 2011: 30.4
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target and he proves by seven arguments that univocal existence must not be a real property 
which is added to quiddity extramentally (3.4). 
Another point must be noted is that in both al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 343.12–344.8] and 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh 64.13–14, ¶65], Suhrawardī argues that existence cannot be equivocal. 
An often used example of equivocal terms is “عــــیـن” (ʿayn). The term ʿayn has many meanings, 
such as eye, spring, source, concrete instance and so on. Although these meanings are signified 
by the same term, namely, ʿayn, they are essentially different from each other. Apparently, 
existence is not an equivocal term like ʿayn. Otherwise, if “_____ exists” were predicated 
equivocally (بــاالشــتراك, bi-l-ishtirāk) of blackness, whiteness and substance, then the existence of 
blackness would be blackness itself, the existence of whiteness would be whiteness itself, and 
the existence of substance would be substance itself. But this is certainly different from the way 
we use the term “existence”. Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 13] 
If existence were an expression of mere blackness, then it would not fall 
upon whiteness, blackness and substance by a single intention. [This is 
absurd.] [Ḥ.Sh 64.13–14, ¶65] 
Equivocity of existence entails the ontological position that existence is not added to 
quiddity at all, neither in the real world nor in the mind. But rather, equivocal existence is the 
thing predicated itself. Shahrazūrī remarks that this is the position of some theologians (بــــعـض 
 baʿḍ al-mutakallimīn) [Sha 180.15–18]. Again, according to Wisnovsky (2011), we ,الــــمـتـكـلـمـیـن
know that this is the ontological position first put forward by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 936), 
“who maintained that thing and existent were also intensionally identical [not only extensionally 
identical], in the sense that thing means no more or less than existent, and vice versa”.  1
Suhrawardī points out that these mutakallimūn are not among those with whom he has 
conversation [ṬRḤ3 343.14], because their doctrine does not deserve investigation [ṬRḤ3 
344.7–8]. 
3.3.2 Systematically ambiguous existence? 
Although Suhrawardī does not accept univocal existence as a real property, and he argues 
against the equivocal use of existence as well, it does not follow that he rejects systematically 
 Wisnovsky 2011: 31 (cf. 43, 45).1
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ambiguous existence. On the contrary, the ontological position he puts forward in his Peripatetic 
works is indeed the systematic ambiguity of existence (تــــشكیك الــــوجــــود, tashkīk al-wujūd), or the 
primacy of systematically ambiguous existence. 
Existence can be predicated not only univocally of multiple things but also in a 
systematically ambiguous manner (بــــالــــتشكیك, bi-l-tashkīk). For example, when “_____ exists” is 
predicated of this amoeba, this gazelle, and this human being  systematically ambiguously, the 1
existence attributed to each one of them is systematically ambiguous rather than univocal, in the 
sense that the existence of this human being is stronger or more perfect than that of this gazelle 
or this amoeba. In this case, the existence of this human being, as an instance of systematically 
ambiguous existence, is a real property rather than mental. Note that the term “property” here is 
used in a very broad sense: “a property is simply whatever can be attributed to something by a 
predicate”.  So even though systematically ambiguous existence is said to be a real property, it 2
does not follow that it must be added to quiddity like an accident. On the contrary, systematically 
ambiguous existence, as the most special property, must be ontologically prior to quiddity, as 
will be shown shortly (3.3.3). 
Systematic ambiguity of existence entails the ontological position that systematically 
ambiguous existence is not added at all to real quiddity in the real world (rather, they are 
inseparable), although univocal existence—the universal meaning of systematically ambiguous 
existence—is added to mental quiddity mentally in the mind. Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 14] 
Another group of people admit that these things [e.g. univocal existence, 
contingency and oneness] are things added to quiddities in terms of their 
meanings, but they have no form in the real world. [ṬRḤ3 343.10–11] 
Can we prove that Suhrawardī’s ontological position is systematic ambiguity of existence? 
I can think of at least two pieces of solid textual evidence. First, at the beginning of the 
metaphysics of both al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī claims that the subject matter of 
 These helpful examples are borrowed from Miller 1997: 39.1
 Miller 1996: 19 (footnote 10), 28.2
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Peripatetic metaphysics is “absolute existence” (الــــمـطـلـق (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq ,الــــوجــــود   and 1
metaphysics is concerned with the essential accidents of existence and its different kinds:  
[Text 15] 
Theoretical philosophy (الــــحـكـمـة الــــنـظـریــــة, al-ḥikma al-naẓariyya) has several 
branches. One branch is concerned with things which are by no means 
material, such as the true Necessary (الــــحـّق  al-wājib al-ḥaqq), the ,الــــواجــــب 
intellects and so on, and with those sorts of absolute existence which by no 
means require matter by their nature, even though some of them are mingled 
with matter. This branch is named “the highest science” (الـــعلم األعـــلى, al-ʿilm al-
aʿlā). Its subject matter (مــــوضــــوعــــھ, mawḍūʿuhu) is the most general thing, 
namely, absolute existence (الــــمــطــلــق  al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), and it ,الــــوجــــود 
investigates its essential accidents and its various kinds (أعــراضــھ الــذاتــیة وأقــسامــھ, 
aʿrāḍuhu al-dhātiyya wa-aqsāmuhu). [The highest science] includes the 
universal science (الــعلم الــكلي, al-ʿilm al-kullī), namely, [the science] which deals 
with the structure of existence (تــقاســیم الــوجــود, taqāsīm al-wujūd), and theology 
 [al-ilāhī). [LWḤ3 3.5–9 ,اإللھي)
If Suhrawardī is concerned merely with univocal existence, which, according to the Peripatetics, 
is a real property added to quiddity in the real world, then how would it be appropriate for this 
univocal existence to be divided into different kinds, such as universal and particular, one and 
multiple, cause and effect, necessary and contingent? Since Suhrawardī himself argues at great 
length that univocal existence must be purely mental, would he not contradict himself by 
claiming here that the subject matter of metaphysics is this univocal existence which is not even 
a real thing? Therefore, “absolute existence”—the subject matter of Peripatetic metaphysics—
refers obviously to systematically ambiguous existence. 
Moreover, if Suhrawardī is concerned merely with univocal existence which is then proved 
by himself to be purely mental (3.4), then surely he would never take God or the Necessary by 
Itself (الـواجـب بـذاتـھ, al-wājib bi-dhātihi) as pure existence (الـوجـود الـبحت, al-wujūd al-baḥt). It would 
 Note that Avicenna claims that the subject matter of metaphysics is “absolute existent” (الـموجـود الـمطلق, al-mawjūd al-muṭlaq) [NJ 1
493.5, 6] or “existent qua existent” (الــموجــود بــما ھــو مــوجــود, al-mawjūd bi-mā huwa mawjūd), rather than “absolute existence”. This 
point, according to Izutsu (1971: 70–72), is “of decisive significant”, because it sets Avicenna’s metaphysics apart from the 
existential metaphysics of Mullā Ṣadrā and Sabzawārī. Izutsu (1971: 71) writes: “In this respect we must admit that Avicenna 
remains within the confines of Aristotelian metaphysics which, as Heidegger has pointed out, is primarily and directly concerned 
with the ‘existent’, and which has to do with ‘existence’ only in a secondary and indirect way.” Based on this section (3.3), I 
argue Suhrawardī should be taken as the founder of Islamic existential metaphysics, which is, in fact, the modified Peripatetic 
metaphysics in his Peripatetic works, but proving such an assumption thoroughly is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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make no sense at all for him to take such a mental property as God. But in his discussion of the 
Necessary, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 16] 
Therefore, if there is something that is Necessary among existence, then It 
must not have any quiddity behind/other than existence (لـیس لـھ مـاھـیة وراء الـوجـود, 
laysa lahu māhiyya warāʾa al-wujūd) so that the mind could divide it into two 
things. So It is pure and sheer Existence (الـوجـود الـصرف الـبحت, al-wujūd al-ṣirf al-
baḥt) which is not stained by anything at all (ال یـشوبـھ شـيء, lā yashūbuhu shayʾ), 
neither specifically nor generally (مـــن خـــصوص وعـــموم, min khuṣūs wa-ʿumūm). 
What is other than It is either a ray from It (لـمعة عـنھ, lamʿa ʿan-hu) or a ray from 
another ray (لــــمعة عــــن لــــمعة, lamʿa ʿan lamʿa). They differ only in [degrees of] 
perfection, because all of It is existence and everything is existence (كـلّھ الـوجـود 
.(kulluhu al-wujūd wa-kull al-wujūd ,وكّل الوجود  [LWḤ3 35.8–11] 1
Quite a few significant points can be drawn from [Text 16]. (1) One fundamental 
difference between the Necessary and contingents is that the Necessary cannot be divided into 
quiddity and univocal existence in the mind, whereas contingents can. (2) But neither the 
Necessary nor contingents can be divided into quiddity and univocal existence in the real world, 
for the Peripatetic quiddity—existence distinction is merely a mental distinction rather than real. 
(3) The Necessary is the “pure and sheer Existence” (الـوجـود الـصرف الـبحت, al-wujūd al-ṣirf al-baḥt). 
(4) Everything is an instance of existence. (5) Existence is divided into two kinds: pure 
Existence, which is the Necessary Existent or God; other instances of existence—contingent 
existents—which are weaker or less perfect than pure Existence. (6) Pure Existence—the 
Necessary—is the complete cause of all other instances of existence, namely, contingents. If the 
Necessary is the Light, then contingents are rays from the Light or rays from other stronger rays. 
(7) The Necessary and contingents, as instances of systematically ambiguous existence, differ 
merely in degrees of perfection or intensity.  2
Since Suhrawardī maintains that everything is an instance of existence, either pure 
Existence Itself, or other instances of existence which are weaker or less perfect than pure 
 According to Ibn Kammūna [I.K3 174.4–7], the last sentence means that all of It (كـــلّھ, kulluhu)—the Necessary by Itself or God1
—is existence (الــــوجــــود, al-wujūd), because it cannot be divided into existence and quiddity in the mind; everything (كــــّل, kull), 
including the Necessary by Itself and all other instances of existence, are all existence (الوجود, al-wujūd).
 For readers of Mullā Ṣadrā, it is immediately clear that this is exactly his existential metaphysics; Mullā Ṣadrā even borrows the 2
Light—ray analogy from Suhrawardī (Izutsu 1971: 104). For an analysis of Mullā Ṣadrā’s primacy of existence, see Izutsu 1971: 
102–105.
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Existence, Suhrawardī’s own ontological position must be the systematic ambiguity of existence. 
Suhrawardī’s modified or reconstructed Peripatetic metaphysics in his Peripatetic works must be 
the existential metaphysics. 
Moreover, three objections against the Necessary Existent as pure Existence are introduced 
by Suhrawardī. These objections are all based on univocity of existence; Suhrawardī responds to 
them one by one from the position of systematic ambiguity of existence. The first objection is as 
follows: 
[Text 17] 
Question: Existence is universal, so it has contingent particulars. Is this not 
established according to what is before? [LWḤ3 35.12] 
The second objection: 
[Text 18] 
Question: The Necessary Existent participates with [other] things in 
existence, so It must have something [else] to distinguish It from them. Then 
It would be a composite and would become an effect. [LWḤ3 36.11–12] 
The third objection: 
[Text 19] 
Question: If absolute existence requires being necessary, then every existent 
would be like that. If It does not require [being necessary], then necessity 
would be contingent, so the Necessary Existent and Its Necessity would be 
contingent. [LWḤ3 36.16–17] 
I do not propose to present a detailed analysis of Suhrawardī’s responses; instead, I only 
mention his main ideas. (1) Univocal existence is universal, but every instance of systematically 
ambiguous existence is particular. So the Necessary can be pure Existence without being universal.  
(2) It is in the mind that the Necessary Existent participates with contingent existents in 
univocal existence, that is, the abstracted meaning of instances of systematically ambiguous 
existence. But in the real world, instances of systematically ambiguous existence differ from 
each other merely in degrees of perfection or intensity. So the Necessary Existent does not need 
anything other than Itself to distinguish Itself from others.  
 101
(3) The third objection applies only to univocal existence. But the Necessary Existent is the 
most perfect systematically ambiguous existence, and It requires being necessary due merely to 
Its own perfection. It does not follow that other instances of existence also require being 
necessary, for they are all weaker or less perfect than pure Existence. 
3.3.3 The relation between systematically ambiguous existence and real quiddity 
Since Suhrawardī acknowledges that particular quiddity —not universal quiddity—is real, 1
and so is systematically ambiguous existence, does this mean that he has to accept the quiddity—
existence distinction as a real one? 
In Chapter 3—“The Reality and the Wealth of Existence”—of A Most Unlikely God, two 
kinds of relation between quiddity and existence are introduced by Barry Miller, which are 
particularly helpful here.  2
The first quiddity—existence relation is the one between substrate of inherence (مـحــــّل, 
maḥall) and what inheres in the substrate (حـــاّل, ḥāll), or the one between recipient (قـــابـــل, qābil) 
and what is received (مــــقـبـول, maqbūl). In this relation, quiddity is the substrate or recipient; 
existence inheres in quiddity or is received by quiddity. That is to say, in terms of actuality, 
quiddity must be logically prior to existence. As a consequence, existence would become the 
“thinnest or most impoverished property”, for existence is simply “that attribute which is 
common to mice and men, dust and angels”.  3
The second quiddity—existence relation is the so-called “bound—bounded relation”.  In 4
this relation, quiddity is no longer the substrate or recipient; existence no longer inheres in 
quiddity or is received by quiddity. Rather, quiddity is nothing but the bound or limit of 
existence; existence is what is bounded or limited. In terms of actuality, existence, as what is 
bounded, must be logically prior to quiddity, so existence is the ontologically basic element in 
this relation and quiddity is ontologically parasitic. In this case, existence is “extraordinarily 
rich”, and “the ways in which existence might be manifested are extraordinarily wide-ranging, 
and no one individual comes even close to manifesting them all.”   5
 Particular quiddity is also called “it-ness” (ھویة, huwiyya) by Suhrawardī, see 4.4.3.2.1
 The interpretation in this section is largely based on Miller 1996: 27–45.2
 By A. Kenny; see Miller 1996: 38.3
 This useful expression is borrowed from Miller 1996.4
 Miller 1996: 34.5
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To illustrate better the bound—bounded relation, Miller puts forward three analogies. I find 
the third one particularly helpful: 
Consider a light beam whose cross-section is not white at all but is entirely a 
pattern of different colours or mixtures of colours. Throughout the whole 
length of the beam—from its source and for as far as it shines—its cross-
section exhibits this same colour pattern. In other words, at any point along 
the beam at which a white surface was interposed, it would reflect that same 
pattern of colours. Suppose, too, that the light source is such as to be able to 
generate a multitude of differently patterned beams but unable to generate 
any that are patternless (white), or any with more than one pattern. That is to 
say, the beams are either generated qua configured with just one pattern or 
they are not generated at all. I make this stipulation to preclude the pattern 
from being thought to be imposed on a beam that had already been 
generated, as might happen by passing white light through a patterned filter. 
Rather, the beam emerges from its source as a package, as configured with 
just one pattern.  1
In this analogy, “light beam” is proposed as a parallel for existence, and “pattern in the beam” as 
a parallel for quiddity. No light beam can be deprived of a certain pattern, that is, no beam is 
patternless, just as no instance of existence can be deprived of quiddity (except pure Existence, 
or God, which has no bound whatsoever). No pattern can exist at all without being a pattern of a 
light beam, just as no quiddity can exist without being as a bound of existence; in other words, 
pattern and quiddity are both parasitic. 
In addition, Miller introduces two possible questions, both of which are inappropriate for 
one who accepts the bound—bounded relation. First, it is inappropriate to ask what existence 
would add to quiddity. This is because in the bound—bounded relation, existence is not added to 
quiddity at all, for existence is logically prior to quiddity. In exactly the same way, it is 
unreasonable to ask what a light beam would add to its pattern. Second, it is inappropriate even 
to ask what quiddity would contract/subtract from existence. This is because quiddity must exist 
first in order to contract something from existence; moreover, there must be “a mass of 
existence” for quiddity to contract from. However, quiddity, as the bound of existence, does not 
 Miller 1996: 42.1
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exist at all before existence; furthermore, it would be absurd to conceive of “a mass of 
existence”. In exactly the same way, it is unreasonable to ask what a pattern contracts from a 
light beam, for it is supposed that “the beam emerges from its source as a package, as configured 
with just one pattern.” 
Back to Suhrawardī. The first relation mentioned by Miller is the same as the one put 
forward by the Peripatetics, for their position is that “existence is added to quiddity in the real 
world” (الـوجـود فـي األعـیان زائـد عـلى الـماھـیة, al-wujūd fī al-aʿyān zāʾid ʿalā al-māhiyya) [LWḤ3 22.10], 
as reported by Suhrawardī. This is the very position against which Suhrawardī argues at great 
length (see 3.4). 
The relation between systematically ambiguous existence and real particular quiddity, 
namely, it-ness, should be the same as the second relation put forward by Miller: the bound—
bounded relation. In this relation, existence is not added to quiddity at all; but rather, existence is 
logically prior to quiddity (its bound), and quiddity is nothing but the bound or pattern of 
existence. Every instance of systematically ambiguous existence is, in fact, an ontological block, 
the quiddity—or the bound or the pattern—of which is not separable at all from it in the real 
world, although on the conceptual level, mental universal quiddity—a definition of a natural 
kind—is separable from univocal existence, as Suhrawardī writes in al-Talwīḥāt: 
[Text 20] 
If we say the existence of something is not its quiddity, we, in fact, mean [that 
they are distinguishable] according to mental distinction (الـتفصیل الـذھـني, al-tafṣīl 
al-dhihnī). [LWḤ3 23.16–17] 
Therefore, it is inappropriate at all to call such a distinction a “real distinction”, as Izutsu writes: 
… “Existence” and “quiddity” are in concreto completely unified with one 
another, there being no real distinction between them. On the level of rational 
analysis, however, each concretely existent thing can be divided into 
“existence” and “quiddity”, as if these were two different things.  1
The historical significance of Suhrawardī’s thesis that the quiddity—existence distinction 
is purely mental rather than real is beyond doubt. Here I only mention a crucial point, which is a 
 Izutsu 1971: 78. See also, Izutsu 1971: 134.1
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hypothesis of mine:  in his Peripatetic works, Suhrawardī is, in fact, separating the quiddity—1
existence distinction from the necessary existent—possible existent distinction, the two key 
distinctions which Avicenna decides to bind together in his middle and later works, that is, in al-
Shifāʾ: al-Ilahiyyāt and especially in al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt.  According to Wisnovsky’s 2
(2011) helpful analysis, Avicenna does this for the following reason:  
I maintain that it is because he [i.e. Avicenna] realised, during the process of 
writing the Ilahiyyāt of the Shifāʾ, that he could use the intensional 
distinctiveness between quiddity and existence to show how beings other 
than God were composites, that is, composed of quiddity and existence. 
God, by contrast, could be held to be simple by virtue of the identity of 
quiddity and existence in Him. Because every composite needs a composer 
to bring its components together, and because of the impossibility of an 
infinite regress, the chain of composites and composers must originate in a 
non-composite composer, namely, God.  3
In al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 34.4–9], Suhrawardī, however, criticises Avicenna—with the name 
“Avicenna/Ibn Sīnā” mentioned explicitly this time—for binding together the quiddity—
existence distinction with the necessary existent—possible existent distinction: necessary 
existent is not equivalent to that whose existence is identical to its quiddity extramentally; 
contingent existent is also not equivalent to that whose existence is other than its quiddity 
extramentally. This is because the quiddity—existence distinction is purely mental, and if 
Avicenna employs it in metaphysics and theology, he would commit a fallacy: “taking mental 
considerations as real things” [ṬRḤ3 358.16–17] (3.2.3). Since Avicenna does use the quiddity
—existence distinction in metaphysics, it seems plausible to argue that Avicenna’s ontological 
position might not be very different from that of “the followers of the Peripatetics”, that is, the 
position Suhrawardī attacks.  This is not the place for a detailed discussion, but this crucial point 4
is worth noting. 
Let us now proceed to Suhrawardī’s arguments against univocal existence as a real 
property added to quiddity extramentally.  
 I intend to prove this hypothesis in the second work of my trilogy: Philosophy inside the Cave.1
 For an excellent discussion of Avicenna’s two distinctions, see Wisnovsky 2011: 30–32.2
 Wisnovsky 2011: 32.3
 This is the reason I question Izutsu’s (1971: 98) reading: “the distinction between ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence’ is in Avicenna a 4
conceptual distinction”.
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3.4 Univocal existence as a mental consideration  1
Suhrawardī’s argument that univocal existence cannot be added to quiddity in the real 
world is extremely rich and complicated. As far as I know, there is no systemic reconstruction of 
Suhrawardī’s discussion of existence in modern scholarship. Due to the space constraints, I 
cannot deal with all seven arguments in this section; I concentrate on three arguments, all of 
which are based on the absurdity of infinite regresses, and which, in my view, should be taken as 
Suhrawardī’s main arguments. As will become obvious in what follows, Suhrawardī’s four 
philosophical works—al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq—must 
be read and analysed together to reconstruct each argument. Here is a list of the locations of the 
seven arguments:  2
• Argument I: from an infinite chain of existence 
  [ṬRḤ3 358.17–359.5] (part) = [Ḥ.Sh 64.14–65.9, ¶65] (whole) 
• Argument II: objection against the main Peripatetic argument 
  [LWḤ3 22.10–23.5] (detailed) = [QWM3 164.6–13]  
       = [Ḥ.Sh ¶57, 65.10–14] 
• Argument III: from a hybrid chain of existence and relation 
  [LWḤ3 24.1–3] = [QWM3 165.3–4] = [ṬRḤ3 358.9–13] (detailed)  
       = [Ḥ.Sh ¶58, 65.15–16] 
• Argument IV: from four absurdities resulting from taking existence as a 
state/accident 
  [LWḤ3 23.5–9] (first sub-argument) = [Ḥ.Sh 65.17–66.11, ¶59] (whole)  
• Argument V: objection to another Peripatetic argument 
  [QWM3 163.16–164.5] (abbreviated) = [ṬRḤ3 345.7–10; 347.17–348.16] 
       = [Ḥ.Sh 66.11–15, ¶59] 
• Argument VI: another objection to the main Peripatetic argument 
  [Ḥ.Sh 66.16–67.4, ¶60] 
• Argument VII: a thought experiment 
  [LWḤ3 23.9–11] 
In what follows, I reconstruct Arguments I & II & III in detail.  
 “Existence” in this section (3.4) refers exclusively to univocal existence unless otherwise indicated.1
 These seven arguments are arranged according to their importance and strength.2
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3.4.1 Argument I: from an infinite chain of existence  1
This argument is the first one put forward by Suhrawardī in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh 64.14–
65.9, ¶65]; part of this argument can be found in al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 358.17–359.5] as well. 
Shahrazūrī says it is a “sound demonstration” (برھان حسن, burhān ḥasan): 
The Peripatetics maintain that existence is added to quiddity [both] in the real 
world and in the mind. He [i.e. Suhrawardī] proves its invalidity by a sound 
demonstration (برھان حسن, burhān ḥasan). [Sha 181.9–10] 
3.4.1.1 The argument in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 
Suhrawardī’s argument is based on the premise that every real thing is either a substance or 
an accident. If existence exists in the real world, it must be either of the two, but both options 
lead to absurdity. The structure of this argument is as follows: 
• Existence is either a substance or an accident [Ḥ.Sh 64.14–15] 
• (1) Existence cannot be a substance [Ḥ.Sh 64.15–16] 
• (2) Existence cannot be an accident [Ḥ.Sh 64.16–65.9] 
  PremiseA: existence is existent [Ḥ.Sh 64.16–65.1] 
  PremiseB: existence is not equivalent to existent [Ḥ.Sh 65.1–6] 
   ArgumentA for PremiseB [Ḥ.Sh 65.1–4] 
   ArgumentB for PremiseB [Ḥ.Sh 65.4–6]  
       = [ṬRḤ3 358.17–359.3] 
  Consequence: an infinite chain of existence [Ḥ.Sh 65.6–9] 
       = [ṬRḤ3 359.3–5] 
The first part of the argument goes as follows: 
[Text 21] 
If existence is taken as an intention (مــــعـنـى, maʿnan) which is more general 
than being-a-substance/substantiality (الـــجوھـــریـــة, al-jawhariyya), then either it 
occurs in a substance and subsists in it, or it is independent by itself (مـســــتـقـّل 
 mustaqill bi-nafsihi). If it is independent by itself, then it cannot be ,بــــنـفـسـھ
 Aminrazavi (1997: 33–35) claims that this argument contains Suhrawardī’s two arguments for the “principality of essence”, 1
which I cannot agree. Aminrazavi’s reconstruction is problematic as well; in addition, there are quite a few mistakes in his 
translation of Suhrawardī’s texts. Other arguments about univocal existence in §1.3.3.1 of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq are not mentioned in 
Aminrazavi’s book.
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attributed to any substance (ال ُیـوصـف بـھ الـجوھـر, lā yūṣafu bi-hi al-jawhar), for its 
relation with it is equivalent to [its relation] with other things. [Ḥ.Sh 64.14–16, 
¶65] 
Supposing that existence is added to quiddity in the real world, as held by the Peripatetics, two 
possibilities follow: (1) either it is “independent by itself” (مســتقّل بــنفسھ, mustaqill bi-nafsihi), that 
is, a “self-subsistent substance” (جـوھـر قـائـم بـذاتـھ, jawhar qāʾim bi-dhātihi) [Sha 181.11]; (2) or it is 
an accident subsistent in a substance. This is because every real thing is either a substance or an 
accident. 
(1) If existence is a self-subsistent substance, then it is impossible for it to be a general 
property of quiddities, for no substance can be a property of another thing, let alone be a general 
property belonging to multiple things. By stating “for its relation with it is equivalent to [its 
relation] with other things”, I assume Suhrawardī means that if existence is a self-subsistent 
substance, then the relation between substanceA with existence—a substance—is equivalent to 
that between substanceA with any other substance (substanceB, substanceC…). If one still 
maintains that existence is a property of substanceA, then any other substance (substanceB, 
substanceC…) would merit as much being a property of substanceA. This is absurd.  1
The second part of the argument is complicated: 
[Text 22] 
If existence occurs in a substance, then there is no doubt that existence is 
something that has occurred for the substance (لــــھ  .(ḥāṣil la-hu ,حــــاصــــل 
Occurrence (الــــحـصـول, al-ḥuṣūl) is existence, so if existence is something that 
has occurred, it is existent. 
But if its-being-existent (كــــونــــھ مــــوجــــودا, kawnuhu muwjūdan) is taken as an 
expression of existence itself, then [the term] “existent” would not be [applied] 
to existence and other things by a single intention. This is because its meaning 
in [other] things is that it-is-a-thing-which-has-existence (أنـھ شـيء لـھ الـوجـود, annahu 
shayʾ la-hu al-wujūd), whereas its meaning in existence itself is that it-is-
existence (أنــھ ھــو الــوجــود, annahu huwa al-wujūd). But we only apply [existent] to 
everything by a single intention.  
 Another possible interpretation by Shīrāzī of this sentence is that “for the relation between existence and substance is equivalent 1
to that between existence and others” [Shī 181.6–10]. But I am not convinced by Shīrāzī’s reconstruction. Shahrazūrī does not 
comment on this sentence; his interpretation is straightforward: “existence is suitable to be a property of all quiddities, but no 
substance is suitable to be like that, so no existence is a substance.” [Sha 181.12–14].
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Moreover, we say: if blackness is non-existent (مــــعـدوم, maʿdūm), then its 
existence does not occur, so its existence is not existent, for its existence is 
as well non-existent. If we have understood existence but [at the same time] 
make the judgement that it is not existent, then the meaning (مــــفـھـوم, mafhūm) 
of “existence” is not the meaning of “existent”. 
Furthermore, if we say: the blackness, which we first took as non-existent 
and whose existence did not occur, becomes existent, and its existence now 
occurs, then the occurrence of existence is not the existence [itself]. Then 
existence would have another existence; the same goes for the existence of 
existence. This would go on to infinity. But it is impossible for sequential 
infinite properties to exist simultaneously. [Ḥ.Sh 64.16–65.9, ¶65] 
(2) Suhrawardī takes two steps to prove that it is impossible for existence to be an accident 
subsistent in a substance. First, he aims to establish two premises. PremiseA: the existence in 
question must be existent. This is evident, for if existence is an accident subsistent in a substance, 
it must have occurred already in that substance, that is, it must be existent. PremiseB: existence is 
not equivalent to existent. This premise is crucial; two arguments are devoted to establishing it.  
By ArgumentA, Suhrawardī aims to show that existence is not equivalent to existent on the 
conceptual level, for the meaning of the term “existent” is “a-thing-which-has-existence” (شـيء لـھ 
 shayʾ la-hu al-wujūd)” [Ḥ.Sh 65.2–3, ¶65], which is obviously different from the meaning ,الـوجـود
of “existence”, which we know instinctively or intuitively.  This seems to me the gist of the first 1
argument, but the way by which Suhrawardī presents it is more complicated. 
The point of ArgumentB is that the fact we can understand existence without knowing 
whether this existence is existent or not proves that existence and existent must not be equivalent 
to each other; if they are equivalent, whenever we understand existence, we would know this 
existence is existent. Let us consider the example given by Suhrawardī: a non-existent blackness. 
Suppose that there is a non-existent blackness; even in such a case, we can still understand the 
existence of this non-existent blackness. Since blackness is non-existent, its existence must be 
non-existent as well. If we understand existence but make the judgement that this existence is not 
existent, then the meaning of existence is obviously different from that of existent. 
 It is hard to say what the exact meaning of “existence” is, for it is generally agreed that “existence” cannot be defined.1
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After establishing the two premises above, Suhrawardī’s second step, which is crucial, is to 
generate an infinite chain of existence (and this is the first of many infinite chains we will 
encounter in what follows in Chapters III & IV). Since existence is not equivalent to existent 
(PremiseB), and since the existence in question must be existent (PremiseA), then in order to 
become existent—a-thing-which-has-existence—the existenceA in question (e.g. the existence of 
the non-existent blackness) must require another existenceB added to it. The same goes for the 
existenceB of existenceA: the existenceB of existenceA is also not equivalent to existent 
(PremiseB), so it would likewise require a third existenceC added to it. Therefore, a real infinite 
chain of existence arises: 
quiddity—existenceA—existenceB—existenceC… 
 But this kind of infinite chain has been proved impossible (3.1).  
Therefore, existence cannot exist in the real world, for it is equally impossible for 
existence to be a substance or an accident. 
3.4.1.2 The argument in al-Muṭāraḥāt 
In al-Muṭāraḥāt, the crucial part of the argument—ArgumentB for PremiseB and the 
generation of an infinite regress—in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq can be found: 
[Text 23] 
Perhaps you can say to them [i.e. the Peripatetics]: if a thing is non-existent, 
is its existence non-existent or does it occur (معدوم أو حاصل, maʿdūm aw ḥāṣil)?  
[1] It is impossible that the thing is non-existent but its existence is stable 
  .thābit). So its existence must be non-existent ,ثابت)
[2] If the thing’s existence is understood together with the judgement that it 
must be non-existent (مـــع الـــحكم بـــأنـــھ مـــعدوم بـــالـــضرورة, maʿa al-ḥukm bi-annahu 
maʿdūm bi-l-ḍarūra), then the existence’s being-existent (مــــوجــــودیــــة الــــوجــــود, 
mawjūdiyyat al-wujūd) must not be the existence itself. Otherwise, the 
understanding of existence (تــــعــّقــلــھ, taʿaqquluhu) would not be conceived 
together with the judgement that it is non-existent in the real world.  
So its-being-an-existent (كـــونـــھ مـــوجـــودا, kawnuhu mawjūdan) must be due to 
another thing (بــأمــر, bi-amr) which occurs [to the existence] when the quiddity 
becomes actualised and its existence becomes actualised (عـند تـحّقق الـماھـیة وتـحّقق 
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 ʿinda taḥaqquq al-māhiyya wa-taḥaqquq wujūdiha). So the existence ,وجـــودھـــا
must have another existence, and they would form a chain to infinity. [ṬRḤ3 
358.17–359.5] 
This argument in al-Muṭāraḥāt should be taken as an abbreviated version of the one in 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; however, it is, in my view, preferable due to its neatness. 
Apparently, most of [Text 23]—[ṬRḤ3 358.17–359.3]—is devoted to proving PremiseB: 
the meaning of existence is not equivalent to that of existent, or in other words, existence is not 
identical to the existence’s being-existent (مـوجـودیـة الـوجـود, mawjūdiyyat al-wujūd) [ṬRḤ3 359.2] or 
its-being-an-existent (كـــونـــھ مـــوجـــودا, kawnuhu mawjūdan) [ṬRḤ3 359.3]. This is because if they 
were identical, then whenever we understand existence we would necessarily know that this 
existence is existent. However, this is not the case if we consider the existence of any non-
existent thing, for example, the existence of a non-existent blackness, a phoenix, or a jinni:  their 1
existence must be non-existent (otherwise, they would not be non-existent). Since existence can 
be either existent in the real world or non-existent, or in other words, existence is indifferent or 
neutral to being-existent and being-non-existent, then existence must not be identical to being-
existent. 
Since everything requires existence in order to exist in the real world, and since existence 
is not identical to its-being-an-existent (PremiseB is crucial), then existenceA must require 
another existenceB in order to exist. By the same reasoning, the second existenceB also requires a 
third, and this would go on without an end. But a real infinite chain of existence is absurd. 
3.4.1.3 *Key: Self-Predication with Non-Identity 
Obviously, Suhrawardī’s argument above is based on the absurdity of an infinite chain of 
existence. Is there any neat explanation for how this chain arises? 
I argue that every “single-species-chain” (ســلسلة فــي نــوع واحــد, silsila fī nawʿ wāḥid) [QWM3 
167.8] must arise according to the principle of Self-Predication with Non-Identity, or in other 
words, Self-Predication without Tautology.  
Let me apply this principle to univocal existence. If we can predicate “_____ exists” of 
existence—“existence exists” (Self-Predication)—without leading to tautology, or in other 
words, the property—the existenceB of existenceA—attributed to existenceA by “_____ exists” is 
 These two examples will be mentioned in Argument II (3.4.2).1
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not identical to existenceA itself (Non-Identity), then existenceA must have a real property: 
existenceB. By the same reasoning, if “existenceB exists” (Self-Predication) and existenceB is 
also not identical to the property—existenceC—attributed to it by “_____ exists”, then existenceB 
must also have another real property: existenceC. This would necessarily lead to an infinite 
regress, namely, an infinite chain of existence. 
By contrast, if “existence exists” (Self-Predication) does lead to tautology, or in other 
words, the property—the existenceB of existenceA—attributed to existenceA by “_____ exists” is 
identical to existenceA itself (no Non-Identity), then existenceA would not have a real property, 
namely, existenceB, for they are identical. No infinite regress, therefore, would arise. For 
example, when we say “blackness is black” (Self-Predication), this is nothing but a tautology, or 
to put differently, the property—the blacknessB of blacknessA—attributed to blacknessA by 
“_____ is black” is nothing but blacknessA itself (no Non-Identity). 
This is why Suhrawardī takes pains in the argument above—[Ḥ.Sh 65.1–65.6, ¶65] 
(3.4.1.1) and [ṬRḤ3 358.17–359.3] (3.4.1.2)—to establish PremiseB, namely, Non-Identity: 
existence is not identical to the existence of existence. Arguments for Non-Identity can be found 
as well in Argument II: [LWḤ3 22.15–23.2] (3.4.2.3) = [Texts 29 + 30], and [QWM3 164.10–13] 
(3.4.2.3) = [Text 31]. 
Let me summarise Suhrawardī’s argument for Non-Identity again. Suhrawardī argues that 
existence can be either existent in the real world or non-existent. In other words, existence is 
indifferent or neutral to being-existent and being-non-existent.  This can be proved by the fact 1
that we understand existence, but doubt whether or not it is existent or actual in the real world 
(think about the existence of a non-existent blackness, a phoenix, or a jinni). Therefore, existence 
is not identical to the being-existent of existence. If this is the case, then “existence exists” (Self-
Predication) would not lead to tautology, for existence in itself can either exist or not exist in the 
real world. By Non-Identity, existenceA would have a real property, namely, existenceB. By the 
same reasoning, existenceB also has existenceC. In this way, we can generate an infinite chain of 
existence by Self-predication with Non-Identity. 
It is crucial to reveal these two premises, especially Non-Identity; otherwise, one cannot 
show the full strength of Suhrawardī’s arguments. A typical inadequate reconstruction is as 
follows:  
 This calls to mind the indifferent or neutral ontological statues of horseness considered merely in itself in Avicenna’s theory of 1
universals: pure horseness is as well indifferent or neutral to being-existent and being-non-existent.
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According to Suhrawardī, the position of the followers of the Peripatetics 
suffers from an infinite-regress problem: If existence really existed concretely, 
it would itself have to be a concrete existent; otherwise, the existence would 
be non-existent, and a contradiction would ensue. But if existence were itself 
a concrete existent, it would exist through yet another existence; and this 
would lead to an infinite regress of existences.  1
Without the Non-Identity premise, Suhrawardī’s argument loses the strength it deserves: one 
could object that although existence exists in the real world, it does not require another 
existence, for existence is identical to its being-existent and existence could exist by itself. 
Therefore, no infinite regress of existence can be generated. This, in fact, is a Peripatetic 
objection (3.4.2.3). Only by establishing the Non-Identity premise—existence is not identical to 
the existence of existence—can we generate an infinite regress of existence and make 
Suhrawardī’s argument work. 
Now we see the main reason that Suhrawardī does not allow univocal existence to be a real 
property: if it is real or actual, it leads necessarily to a real infinite chain of existence, which is 
logically impossible (3.1). But this does not mean univocal existence cannot be a mental 
property, for it is permissible that such an infinite chain exists in the mind. This also does not 
mean Suhrawardī would not allow systematically ambiguous existence to be real or actual, for 
this would not lead to any infinite regress. This is because the relation between systematically 
ambiguous existence and real quiddity is the one between the bounded and the bound: existence 
is ontologically basic and quiddity is ontologically parasitic (3.3.3); so systematically 
ambiguous existence is not at all added to quiddity or any other thing. Therefore, no infinite 
regress is involved. 
In Chapter IV, I shall make use of the principle of Self-Predication with Non-Identity to 
analyse Suhrawardī’s arguments regarding oneness (4.1), contingency (4.2.1) and necessity by 
another (4.2.2.3). 
3.4.1.4 Using the Third Man argument (TMA) against the Peripatetics? 
At this point, it is tempting to argue that Suhrawardī might be using the Third Man 
argument (TMA) from Plato’s Parmenides (132a–b) in a strikingly different way: he uses it to 
 Wisnovsky 2011: 45. Wisnovsky’s reconstruction is certainly correct, but, in my opinion, inadequate.1
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argue against the actuality of univocal existence (also, oneness, contingency, and necessity by 
another) in Peripatetic metaphysics (rather than the actuality of Platonic Forms). How so? 
There must be at least three premises of the TMA: One-over-Many, Self-Predication and 
Non-Identity. The first premise is obvious, but the other two are not fully revealed until Vlastos 
(1954). Here is a helpful reconstruction by Rickless (2016) of the TMA: 
Parmenides generates the infinite regress as follows. Consider a plurality of 
large things, A, B, and C. By One-over-Many, there is a form of largeness 
(call it “L1”) by virtue of partaking of which A, B, and C are large. By Self-
Predication, L1 is large. So there is now a new plurality of large things, A, B, 
C, and L1. Thus, by One-over-Many, there is a form of largeness (call it “L2”) 
by virtue of partaking of which A, B, C, and L1 are large. Hence L1 partakes 
of L2. At this point, Parmenides assumes something like the following Non-
Identity assumption: (Non-Identity) No form is identical to anything that 
partakes of it. (Notice that Non-Identity follows directly from Separation.) 
From the fact that L1 partakes of L2, Non-Identity entails that L2 is 
numerically distinct from L1. Thus, there must be at least two forms of 
largeness, L1 and L2.  
But this is not all. By Self-Predication, L2 is large. So there is now a new 
plurality of large things, A, B, C, L1, and L2. Thus, by One-over-Many, there 
is a form of largeness (call it “L3”) by virtue of partaking of which A, B, C, L1, 
and L2 are large. Hence L1 and L2 both partake of L3. But then, by Non-
Identity, L3 is numerically distinct from both L1 and L2. Thus, there must be 
at least three forms of largeness, L1, L2, and L3.  
Repetition of this reasoning, based on One-over-Many, Self-Predication, and 
Non-Identity, then generates an infinite hierarchy of forms of largeness, with 
each form partaking of every form that lies above it in the hierarchy. (That is, 
for every m and n such that m<n, Lm partakes of Ln.)  1
Obviously, the TMA and Suhrawardī’s main argument against the actuality of univocal 
existence—[Ḥ.Sh 65.1–9, ¶56] & [ṬRḤ3 358.17–359.5]—share two same premises: Self-
Predication and Non-Identity. Moreover, they share a similar line of reasoning. Suhrawardī’s 
argument is, in fact, very similar to a slightly simplified TMA as follows:  
 Rickless 2016: “4.3”.1
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Consider a plurality of large things, A, B, and C. By One-over-Many, there is a form of 
largeness (call it “L1”) by virtue of partaking of which A, B, and C are large. From this step, we 
only consider L1 without A, B, and C; this is what I mean by “slightly simplified”. By Self-
Predication, L1 is large. So L1 must have another form of largeness (call it “L2”) by virtue of 
partaking of which L1 is large. This is because, by Non-Identity, no form is identical to anything 
that partakes of it, so L2 cannot be identical to L1. Again, by Self-Predication, L2 is large as well. 
So L2 must also have another form of largeness (call it “L3”), for, by Non-Identity, L3 cannot be 
identical to L2. In this way, an infinite chain of largeness is generated. 
Now let us consider Suhrawardī’s argument. If univocal existence is added to quiddity in 
the real world, as held by the Peripatetics, then, by Self-Predication, existenceA exists. So 
existenceA must have another real existenceB by virtue of which existenceA exists. This is 
because, by Non-Identity, existenceA is not identical to the existenceB of existenceA, a point 
Suhrawardī takes pains to establish. Again, by Self-Predication, existenceB exists as well. So 
existenceB must also have another real existenceC, for, by Non-Identity, existenceB cannot be 
identical to its existenceC. In this way, an infinite chain of existence is generated.  
Therefore, the essential similarity of the TMA and Suhrawardī’s argument is plain to see. 
This leads me to suspect that Suhrawardī might be inspired by the TMA. If this is the case, then 
Suhrawardī might be the first philosopher not only to reveal the two key premises of the TMA, 
which are not clear among modern scholars until Vlastos (1954), but also to make use of them to 
formulate an original argument against the Peripatetics. 
This is not Suhrawardī’s only invention; he even comes up with ten hybrid infinite chains 
based on the principle of Mutual-Predication. In Argument III (3.4.3), we will come across the 
first hybrid chain of existence and relation. More hybrid chains will be mentioned and analysed 
in Chapter IV (4.2.2 & 4.3). 
3.4.2 Argument II: an objection against the main Peripatetic argument 
Suhrawardī’s second argument—located in al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 22.10–23.5], al-Muqāwamāt 
[QWM3 164.6–13] and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh ¶57, 65.10–14]—is, in fact, an objection against 
the main Peripatetic argument that existence is added to quiddity extramentally as a real property. 
The following reconstruction is based mainly on the relevant text in al-Talwīḥāt, where the 
complete discussion is found. The structure of this argument is as follows: 
 115
• Suhrawardī’s objection against the main Peripatetic argument  
  [LWḤ3 22.10–13] = [QWM3 164.6–9] = [Ḥ.Sh 65.10–12, ¶57] 
• An inference [Ḥ.Sh 65.12–14, ¶57] 
• A Peripatetic defence [LWḤ3 22.14] 
  & Suhrawardī’s response to the Peripatetic defence  
     [LWḤ3 22.15–23.2] = [QWM3 164.10–13] 
• Another argument against any real infinite chain of existence 
  [LWḤ3 23.2–5] = [QWM3 164.9–10] 
3.4.2.1 The main Peripatetic argument and Suhrawardī’s objection 
Suhrawardī’s argument in al-Talwīḥāt goes as follows: 
[Text 24] 
It is not permissible to say that existence is added to (زائــــد عــــلـى, zāʾid ʿalā) 
quiddity in the real world (األعــــیـان  fī al-aʿyān) [simply] because we can ,فــــي 
understand quiddity without existence. This is because we can understand as 
well the existence of a phoenix (وجـود الـعنقاء, wujūd al-ʿanqāʾ)  inasmuch as it is 1
like that (مـن حـیث ھـو كـذا, min ḥaythu huwa kadhā),  but we do not know whether 2
it is existent in the real world or not.  So existence would need another 3
existence, and they would form an infinite chain whose individuals exist 
sequentially and simultaneously, and you have already known its 
impossibility. [LWḤ3 22.10–13] 
In order to reconstruct Suhrawardī’s objection above, one must know the original Peripatetic 
argument first. Ibn Kammūna’s commentary in this case has proved to be informative and 
helpful.  According to him, Suhrawardī’s argument is an objection to a Peripatetic argument as 4
follows. 
 The Arabic term “عـنقاء” (ʿanqāʾ) refers to a legendary bird; it can be traced back to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (Chapter VII). 1
See Izutsu 1971: 88 (note 56).
 That is to say, we can understand the existence of a phoenix inasmuch as it is existence, without knowing whether the phoenix’s 2
existence exists in the real world or not.
 Another translation of the text up to here can be found in Fakhry 2004: 305. But Fakhry, in my opinion, misunderstands 3
Suhrawardī’s argument. Fakhry writes: “His [i.e. Suhrawardī’s] own position is that ‘it is not correct to say that the being of 
particulars is superadded to their essence. For we can conceive of it [i.e. the essence] apart from being, and we cannot conceive 
of the being [of a fictitious animal] directly, without knowing whether or not it exists in any particular entity.’” On the contrary, 
Suhrawardī is arguing that we can indeed understand univocal existence directly, without knowing whether or not it exists in any 
particular entity. This is how Suhrawardī establishes the crucial Non-Identity premise.
 For Ibn Kammūna’s reconstruction, see [I.K3 102.6–104.13].4
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If two things are distinct from each other in the mind, then they must be distinct as well in 
the real world. Ibn Kammūna says that this major premise is left out [I.K3 102.9–12].  Since we 1
can understand quiddity without existence (for we understand quiddity but doubt whether it 
exists in the real world or not), quiddity and existence must be distinct from each other in the 
mind. So they must as well be distinct from each other in the real world. Therefore, existence is 
added to quiddity in the real world, just as it is added to quiddity in the mind.  2
As the first step of his objection, Suhrawardī aims to establish Non-identity: existence is 
not identical to the existence of existence. Just as we can understand quiddity without existence, 
we can also understand existence without its existence, that is, without knowing whether 
existence is actual in the real world or not (or to put differently, we doubt whether existence is 
actual or not). Suhrawardī’s example of the phoenix makes this point clear: we can understand 
the existence of a phoenix, but doubt whether its existence is actual in the real world or not. 
Otherwise, if the existence of the phoenix were nothing but its actual existence, then we would 
know definitely that it is actual in the real world; this is, however, not the case.  
Suhrawardī’s second step is to generate an infinite regress. If from the fact that we can 
understand quiddity without existence in the mind, it follows that existence is added to quiddity 
in the real world (the Peripatetic argument), then from the fact that we can understand existence 
without the existence of existence in the mind (as in the case of the phoenix’s existence), it must 
likewise follow that the existence of existence is added to existence in the real world. By the 
same reasoning, a third existence must be added to the second existence. An infinite chain of 
existence arises. Therefore, the Peripatetic argument fails, due to the absurdity of such a chain 
(3.1). 
A parallel objection is found in al-Muqāwamāt: 
[Text 25] 
We understand existence, but we differ on whether or not it has existence in 
the real world, just as we understand the root of quiddity (أصـــل الـــماھـــیة, aṣl al-
 This Peripatetic argument is also mentioned by Shahrazūrī and Shīrāzī in their analysis of [Ḥ.Sh, 65.10–12, ¶57]. For their 1
reconstruction, see respectively [Sha 182.11–13] and [Shī 182.11–16].
 It is likely that Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950) is the first Peripatetic philosopher to put forward such an argument; moreover, he is 2
also “the first to introduce into Islamic philosophy the dichotomy of ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence’ in a clear and definite 
form” (Izutsu 1971: 91). According to Izutsu’s analysis, Fārābi argues in Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam that existence is adventitious (عــــارض, 
ʿāriḍ) to quiddity not only in the mind but also in the real world. But Izutsu does not think this is Avicenna’s position as well; 
rather, “the distinction between ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence’ is in Avicenna a conceptual distinction” (Izutsu 1971: 98). However, as 
mentioned above, I do not find Izutsu’s argument convincing; Avicenna’s real ontological position is open to question. For 
Fārābī’s argument, see Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, pp. 47 (line 3)–50 (line 1); for an English translation, see Izutsu 1971: 91–94. For 
Izutsu’s analysis of Fārābī and Avicenna’s different positions, see Izutsu 1971: 91–99.
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māhiyya), but doubt its existence.  So if understanding with doubt (1 الــــتـعـّقـل مــــع
 al-taʿaqqul maʿa al-tashakkuk) necessitates existence-being-added [to ,الــتشّكك
quiddity] (كــــون الــــوجــــود زائــــدا, kawn al-wujūd zāʾidan) there [i.e. in the case of 
quiddity], then it would also necessitate [existence-being-added-to-existence] 
here [i.e. in the case of existence]. Existences would then form a chain where 
there is a sequence and whose parts exist together, but it is impossible, as 
we have demonstrated. [QWM3 164.6–9] 
Moreover, this objection is summarised in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: 
[Text 26] 
Those who are against these people—the followers of the Peripatetics—
understand existence, and they doubt whether it occurs in the real world (فــــي 
 fī al-aʿyān ḥāṣil) or not, just as the case of the root of quiddity ,األعــــیان حــــاصــــل
 aṣl al-māhiyya). So existence would have another existence and ,أصــل الــماھــیة)
this implies a chain. [Ḥ.Sh 65.10–12, ¶57] 
This is, according to Shīrāzī, Suhrawardī’s “general objection” (نــــقض إجــــمالــــي, naqḍ ijmālī) [Shī 
183.9] against the main Peripatetic argument. 
3.4.2.2 An inference: God cannot be univocal existence 
Furthermore, an inference is put forward by Suhrawardī in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: it is 
impossible for “anything whose very quiddity is existence” (مــــا عــــین مــــاھــــیتھ الــــوجــــود, mā ʿayn 
māhiyyatihi al-wujūd) to exist in the real world. The “existence” here refers to univocal existence 
(rather than systematically ambiguous existence). Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 27] 
It is clear from this that there is nothing in the [real/actual] existence whose 
very quiddity is existence (مــا عــین مــاھــیتھ الــوجــود, mā ʿayn māhiyyatihi al-wujūd). 
This is because after we conceptualise its meaning (مــــفــھــومــــھ  ,نــــتــصــّور 
nataṣawwaru mafhūmahu), we may doubt whether it has existence or not. So 
it would have an added existence, and they would form a chain. [Ḥ.Sh 65.12–
14, ¶57] 
 “The root of quiddity” (أصــــل الــــمـاھــــیـة, aṣl al-māhiyya) refers to pure quiddity (e.g. pure horseness), quiddity inasmuch as it is 1
quiddity, or quiddity considered merely in itself, as in Avicenna’s theory of universals: it is the very definition of a natural kind, 
and it is indifferent to existence and non-existence, particularity and universality, and so on.
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As pointed out by Shīrāzī, “that whose very quiddity is existence” must be “the Necessary 
by Itself” (الـواجـب بـذاتـھ, al-wājib bi-dhātihi) [Shī 183.11] or God. With this inference, Suhrawardī 
aims to prove that if the Peripatetics consider univocal existence as real, then they would be in no 
position to argue God is “that whose very quiddity is existence” or “pure existence” (الــــوجــــود 
 .al-wujūd al-maḥḍ), for pure univocal existence cannot exist in the real world at all ,المحض
Based on the Non-Identity premise established above in 3.4.2.1 (and in 3.4.1 as well), 
existence is not identical to the existence of existence. If “that whose very quiddity is existence” 
were to exist in the real world, then this existence must require another existence added to it; the 
second existence likewise requires a third. This leads to a real infinite chain of existence. 
Instead, Suhrawardī holds that the Necessary by Itself must be the most perfect 
systematically ambiguous existence, as mentioned in [Text 16] above (3.3.2). 
3.4.2.3 A Peripatetic defence 
After disproving the Peripatetic argument, a Peripatetic defence is introduced by 
Suhrawardī: 
[Text 28] 
Question: Existence and its-being-existent are one and the same thing (الـوجـود 
 al-wujūd wa-kawnuhu mawjūdan wāḥid), so what belongs to ,وكـونـھ مـوجـودا واحـد
others [and comes] from it [i.e. existence] (مـــا لـــغیره مـــنھ, mā li-ghayrihi minhu), 
[must] belong to it by its essence (لھ بذاتھ, la-hu bi-dhātihi). [LWḤ3 22.14] 
Unsurprisingly, the target of the Peripatetic defence is the crucial Non-Identity premise of 
Suhrawardī’s argument. Some Peripatetics argue that existence and its-being-existent (كـونـھ مـوجـودا, 
kawnuhu mawjūdan) are one and the same thing (no Non-Identity), for its-being-existent in the 
real world must “belong to existence by its essence” (لــــھ بــــذاتــــھ, la-hu bi-dhātihi). Therefore, 
although existence is added to quiddity in the real world, existence cannot and need not be added 
to itself, for existence is identical to its-being-existent. If this is the case, then there would be no 
infinite chain of existence in the real world, and Suhrawardī’s objection would fail. 
Suhrawardī’s response is as follows: 
[Text 29] 
Answer: We can understand existence as [that which is] related to a jinni, for 
example, as mentioned above, and we do not know if it occurs [in the real 
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world]. So the existence of existence is not existence [itself], just as what is 
said in the root of quiddity (أصل الماھیة, aṣl al-māhiyya). [LWḤ3 22.15–23.1] 
If existence and its-being-existent are one and the same, then even when we understand the 
existence which is related to a jinni, we would not doubt whether its existence is actual in the 
real world or not, but rather, we would know definitely that its existence is actual. This is, 
however, not the case. Just as the “root of quiddity” (e.g. pure horseness) in Avicenna’s theory of 
universals is indifferent or neutral to existence and non-existence, existence is likewise 
indifferent to existence and non-existence. This argument is the same as the one from a non-
existent blackness ([Text 22], 3.4.1.1), or a non-existent thing ([Text 23], 3.4.1.2) in Argument I, 
or the one from a phoenix ([Text 24], 3.4.2.1). 
Suhrawardī further argues: 
[Text 30] 
If [existence] is existent [in the real world] merely because of its-being-
existence (كـونـھ وجـودا, kawnuhu wujūdan), then its quiddity would be like this as 
well; then it is inconceivable that any quiddity would be non-existent. [LWḤ3 
23.1–2] 
From the example of a jinni’s existence, it is established that existence and its-being-existent are 
different. If one still insists that existence must be existent in the real world merely because of 
its-being-existence (كـونـھ وجـودا, kawnuhu wujūdan), then any quiddity would merit as much being 
existent in the real world merely because of its-being-that-quiddity: horseness, for instance, 
would always exist in the real world merely because of its-being-horseness. This is absurd. 
Therefore, existence and its-being-existent are decidedly different (Non-Identity); 
Suhrawardī’s objection is tenable. 
A parallel response can be found in al-Muqāwamāt: 
[Text 31] 
Their view that existence and its-being-existent are one and the same thing 
 al-wujūd wa-kawnuhu mawjūdan wāḥid) is refuted by ,الـوجـود وكـونـھ مـوجـودا واحـد)
what follows. If a thing is not existent, then its existence is not existent as 
well. So it is suitable to negate the existence’s being-existent (سـلب الـموجـودیـة عـن 
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(salb al-mawjūdiyya ʿan al-wujūd ,الــــوجــــود . [On the other hand,] if that thing 1
exists, it is suitable to affirm the existence’s being-existent (إثــبات الــموجــودیــة عــلیھ, 
ithbāt al-mawjūdiyya ʿalayhi). So existence is understood together with being-
existent and not-being-existent (الـــموجـــودیـــة والـــالمـــوجـــودیـــة, al-mawjūdiyya wa-l-
lāmawjūdiyya). So its-being-existent must not be it. [QWM3 164.10–13] 
Among Suhrawardī’s many arguments—[Texts 22, 23, 24, 29]—for the Non-Identity of 
existence, this passage [Text 31], in my view, offers the best version. Suhrawardī aims to 
establish the indifferent or neutral ontological status of univocal existence. If a thing exists in 
the real world, then its existence is existent; if it is non-existent (and we can still understand its 
existence), then its existence must be non-existent. So existence can be either existent or non-
existent in the real world; existence is indifferent to being-existent and being-non-existent. 
Therefore, existence cannot be the same as its-being-existent. This argument calls to mind 
Avicenna’s many arguments for the indifferent ontological status of pure quiddity, or the “root of 
quiddity” (to borrow Suhrawardī’s terms).  It is tempting to argue that Suhrawardī is using 2
Avicenna’s line of argument to argue against the Peripatetics: existence, just as pure quiddity, is 
likewise indifferent to being-existent and being-non-existent. 
In al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 23.2–5] and al-Muqāwamāt [QWM3 164.9–10], as the last part of 
Argument II, Suhrawardī introduces another argument against a real infinite chain of existence. 
According to him, such a chain would lead to the consequence that no temporal thing could 
happen in time, for every temporal thing would require infinite existences (existenceA, 
existenceB of existenceA…); this is absurd. This argument, in my view, is not as important and 
essential as the others, so I do not analyse it in detail here. 
To sum up, both Argument I and Argument II are based on the absurdity of an infinite 
chain of univocal existence. In order to generate such a chain, we have seen Suhrawardī takes 
pains to argue for the crucial Non-Identity premise: existence is not identical to the existence of 
existence.  
But these two arguments are essentially different. Argument I should be taken as an 
independent argument. Suhrawardī aims to prove that if existence is real or actual, it must be 
 I replace “الموجودي” (al-mawjūdī)—which must be an error—in the original text with “الموجودیة” (al-mawjūdiyya).1
 See, for example, [Sh.N.D 65.11–19] for Avicenna’s argument that animal in itself/animality is neither general nor particular. 2
Half of §5.1 of al-Shifāʾ: al-Ilahiyyāt—[Sh.I 196.6–200.12]—is devoted to an elaborated explanation of the indifferent 
ontological status of quiddity inasmuch as it is quiddity (based on six questions posed and answered by Avicenna himself).
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either a substance or an accident, but both options lead to absurdity: if existence is a substance, it 
cannot be added to quiddity as a real property; if it is an accident, then, by Self-Predication with 
Non-Identity, an infinite chain of existence must follow. Argument II, by contrast, is introduced 
as an objection to the main Peripatetic argument for existence as a real property added to 
quiddity. Since the Peripatetics hold that mental distinction entails real distinction and use this as 
a premise to establish the real distinction between quiddity and existence, Suhrawardī makes use 
of the same Peripatetic premise to argue that the distinction between existence and the existence 
of existence must likewise be a real one (Non-Identity); so the Peripatetic argument would lead 
to an infinite chain of existence. 
3.4.3 Argument III: from a hybrid chain of existence and relation 
The third argument can be found respectively in al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt 
and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: 
[LWḤ3 24.2–3] = [QWM3 165.3–4] = [ṬRḤ3 358.9–13] = [Ḥ.Sh ¶58, 65.15–
16] 
If we say that both Argument I and Argument II are based on a “single-species-chain” (سـلسلة فـي 
واحــــد  silsila fī nawʿ wāḥid) [QWM3 167.8] of existence, then the special thing about ,نــــوع 
Argument III is that it involves a “hybrid/mixed chain” (مــــخـتـلـطـة  (silsila mukhtalaṭa ,ســــلـسـلـة 
[QWM3 164.14] of existence and relation. A comprehensive discussion of hybrid chains can 
be found in both al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, where ten hybrid chains are introduced by 
Suhrawardī; the chain with which we are concerned here is, in fact, one of the ten. The 
essential difference between a single-species-chain and a hybrid chain is the way by which 
they are generated: a single-species-chain is generated by Self-Predication with Non-Identity 
(3.4.4.3), whereas a hybrid chain is generated by Mutual-Predication. I shall present a detailed 
analysis of Suhrawardī’s discussion of hybrid chains in Chapter IV (4.3).  
The full version of Argument III is found in al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[Text 32] 
If existence is added to quiddity, then it would have a relation to quiddity (نســـبة 
 nisba ilā al-māhiyya). If our judgement that “something exists in the ,إلــى الــماھــیة
real world” requires its existence to occur in the real world, then its-existence-
 122
having-a-relation-to-quiddity (كــون وجــوده لــھ نســبة إلــى الــماھــیة, kawn wujūdihi la-hu 
nisba ilā al-māhiyya) would likewise require this relation to occur in the real 
world.  Then this relationA would have a second existenceB, and the second 1
existenceB would have another relationB. It would go on like this to infinity. 
[ṬRḤ3 358.9–13] 
Based on the principle of Mutual-Predication, Suhrawardī needs to establish two premises 
to generate an infinite hybrid chain of existence and relation: (1) “existence is related to a 
subject”; (2) “relation exists”. This is exactly what Suhrawardī is doing in the argument. 
• Mutual-Predication I: existence is related to a subject 
Supposing that existence, as a real property, is added to quiddity in the real world, then 
obviously, existence is related to a subject, namely, the quiddity to which it is attributed. So it is 
reasonable to say “existence is related to a subject”; existence would thus have a real property, 
namely, a relationA to a subject. 
• Mutual-Predication II: relation exists 
Since existence has a real relationA to quiddity, this relationA between existence and 
quiddity must exist. Otherwise, if this relationA does not exist, existence would not be related to 
quiddity; this contradicts the premise that existence is added to quiddity. So it is reasonable to 
predicate “_____ exists” of relationA: “relationA exists”; relationA would thus have a real 
property, namely, existenceB. 
• Infinite regress 
By the same reasoning, since “existenceB is related to a subject”—relationA—as well, 
existenceB must have a real relationB to a subject: relationA. “RelationB exists”, so relationB must 
have a real existenceC. This leads to an infinite chain of existence and relation: 
existenceA—relationA—existenceB—relationB—existenceC… 
Later in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, an abbreviated version of this argument is put forward by 
Suhrawardī: 
 Suhrawardī is arguing that the relation between quiddity and existence must be real. Since the Peripatetics hold that every 1
predicate attributes a real property to its subject (e.g. “_____ exists” predicated of quiddity attributes real univocal existence to 




Another respect (وجـــھ, wajh) [i.e. objection]: if existence belongs[/is related] to 
quiddity, then existence would have a relation to quiddity. The relationA has 
[another] existenceB, and the existenceB of the relationA has [another] 
relationB to that relationA. This would form a chain to infinity. [Ḥ.Sh ¶58, 
65.15–16] 
Also, in al-Muqāwamāt: 
[Text 34] 
Another [chain] is between existence and a relation to a subject (الـنـســــبـة إلــــى 
 al-nisba ilā al-mawḍūʿ). So existenceA has relationA, and relationA ,الــــمـوضــــوع
has existenceB, and it would go on like this. [QWM3 165.3–4] 
Based on the three arguments analysed above, it is plain to see that univocal existence must 
be a mental/intellectual consideration; otherwise, real infinite chains of univocal existence (and 
infinite chains of existence and relation) must arise, but this sort of chain has been proved 
logically impossible. 
Therefore, the absurdity of building metaphysics on univocal existence is obvious. Instead, 
the subject matter of metaphysics must be systematically ambiguous existence. Systematically 
ambiguous existence is fundamentally different from univocal existence in the sense that it is 
ontologically basic, whereas quiddity, as nothing but its bound or pattern, is ontologically 
parasitic. So the distinction between systematically ambiguous existence and quiddity is not a 
real one; rather, every instance of systematically ambiguous existence is an ontological block, 
the quiddity—or the bound or the pattern—of which is not separable at all from it extramentally, 
as Suhrawardī writes in al-Talwīḥāt: 
[Text 20 in 3.3.3] 
If we say the existence of something is not its quiddity, we, in fact, mean [that 
they are distinguishable] according to mental distinction (الـتفصیل الـذھـني, al-tafṣīl 
al-dhihnī). [LWḤ3 23.16–17] 
Let us move on to Chapter IV on other mental considerations; I shall summarise Chapters 
III & IV together at the end of Chapter IV (4.5).
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Chapter IV  
On Other Mental Considerations 
Univocal existence is obviously not the only mental consideration. In this chapter, I 
introduce Suhrawardī’s discussion of other mental considerations: oneness, contingency, 
necessity by another, determinables, differentiae of determinates,  genera, and differentiae.  1 2
None of them exists in the real world; otherwise, absurdity would arise. 
I do not propose to discuss these mental considerations in great detail; instead, I choose the 
most appropriate text (or texts) in each case to translate and analyse. As far as I know, there is no 
secondary literature that even touches upon the issues discussed in this chapter, let alone any 
systematic analysis. So I focus on Suhrawardī’s own texts. 
In the first half of this chapter, I introduce Suhrawardī’s discussion of oneness, contingency 
and necessity by another. As we shall see, Suhrawardī in his arguments makes use of both single-
species chains, generated by Self-Predication with Non-Identity, and hybrid chains, generated by 
Mutual-Predication. Then I summarise Suhrawardī’s discussion of ten hybrid chains, an 
invention of which he is quite proud, because he finds the arguments based on hybrid chains 
even more irrefutable than those based on single-species chains. This is followed by a summary 
of Suhrawardī’s many arguments from infinite chains; I make an attempt to find some universal 
patterns of these arguments (4.3.3). 
In the second half of this chapter, I analyse Suhrawardī’s discussion of the determinable—
differentia-of-determinate distinction and the genus—differentia distinction. The significance of 
this discussion is that it reveals immediately Suhrawardī’s position on the problem of universals: 
he holds that every real thing is particular in its own right (with common nature being nothing 
but a mental consideration). As we shall see, Suhrawardī refuses not only the real determinable
—differentia-of-determinate distinction but also the real genus—differentia distinction. 
Determinables, differentiae of determinates, genera, and differentiae, according to him, are all 
 I am aware that it is not accurate to use such a term as “differentia of determinate”, since a “differentia of determinate” is, in 1
fact, not a differentia, as in the genus—differentia distinction. This is because a “differentia of determinate” is not logically 
independent of its determinable (e.g. the characteristic of blackness and colourness), whereas a differentia is logically 
independent of its genus (e.g. rationality and animality). I use “differentia of determinate” due to the lack of a better term (and I 
am following Suhrawardī); the “differentia” here should be understood in a broad sense: a differentiator. An excellent explanation 
of this issue can be found in the passage quoted from Granger 1980 in 4.4.1.
 Note that in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh 70.2–71.4], there are still three mental considerations which will not be examined in this 2
chapter: relation (اإلضـــافـــة, al-idāfa), being-non-existent (الـــعدمـــیة, al-ʿadamiyya), being-a-substance/substantiality (الـــجوھـــریـــة, al-
jawhariyya). But substantiality will be examined in Chapter V (5.2.3.1 & 5.4.3.3).
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mental considerations. This is closely related to his significant distinction between individuation 
 tamayyuz): individuation is a process that occurs ,تـــمیّز) tashakhkhuṣ) and differentiation ,تـــشّخص)
in the real world, whereas differentiation is purely mental. Although Suhrawardī rejects the real 
genus—differentia distinction, it does not follow he would take all species as simple; he 
acknowledges composite species. But a composite species are of course not composed of a genus 
and a differentia, but of body and soul, a real distinction Suhrawardī accepts, for it can be proved 
by everyone through direct experience or presential knowledge.  
Lastly, I summarise Chapters III & IV: Suhrawardī’s whole discussion of mental 
considerations. These two chapters and Chapter II provide the necessary preparation for Chapter 
V on Suhrawardī’s light metaphysics.  
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4.1 Oneness 
Two arguments are put forward by Suhrawardī to prove that oneness is merely a mental 
consideration which cannot possibly exist in the real world as a property added to quiddity. Al-
Talwīḥāt contains the first argument; al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt have the second; both can 
be found in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq:  
• Argument I: [LWḤ3 23.11–14] = [Ḥ.Sh 67.13–15, ¶61] 
• Argument II: [QWM3 167.10–168.5] = [ṬRḤ3 357.18–358.5] = [Ḥ.Sh 67.15–
68.3, ¶61] 
Our focus is on Argument I, which is based on an infinite single-species chain of oneness, 
similar to that of existence analysed in detail in Chapter III (3.4.1 & 3.4.2). As we shall see, the 
infinite chain of oneness is likewise generated by Self-Predication with Non-Identity. Then I 
mention Argument II briefly; the second part of Argument II, in fact, overlaps Argument I. 
4.1.1 An argument from a single-species chain of oneness 
In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī argues: 
[Text 1] 
Know that oneness (الــوحــدة, al-waḥda) is also not an intention added (مــعنى زائــد, 
maʿnan zāʾid) to something in the real world. Otherwise, oneness would be 
one thing among things (شــيء واحــد مــن األشــیاء, shayʾ wāḥid min al-ashyāʾ), so it 
would have [another] oneness. Also, we say “one and multiple ones” (واحــــد 
 .”wāḥid wa-āḥād kathīra), just as we say “thing and multiple things ,وآحـــاد كـــثیرة
[Ḥ.Sh 67.13–15, ¶61] 
To generate an infinite chain of oneness by Self-Predication with Non-Identity, Suhrawardī 
needs to establish the following two premises: (1) it is reasonable to say “oneness is one” (Self-
Predication); (2) oneness is not identical to the oneness of oneness (Non-Identity). 
• Self-predication: oneness is one 
Supposing that oneness is a real property added to quiddity in the real world, then, as 
something real, oneness must be “one thing among things” [Ḥ.Sh 67.14, ¶61] or “one existent 
among all existents” (مـــوجـــود واحـــد مـــن جـــملة الـــموجـــودات, mawjūd wāḥid min jumlat al-mawjūdāt) 
[LWḤ3 23.12]. So it is reasonable to predicate “____ is one” of oneness: oneness is one. 
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Therefore, onenessA would have a property, namely, another onenessB, attributed to it by the 
predicate “____ is one”.  
The challenge is to establish the Non-Identity premise. Only if onenessA is not identical to 
onenessB, can we further argue that onenessB, as a real property of onenessA, is likewise one, so 
it is permissible to say that “onenessB is one”. As a result, another onenessC is attributed to 
onenessB by the predicate “____ is one”. A real infinite chain of oneness, therefore, arises: 
quiddity—onenessA—onenessB—onenessC… 
Otherwise, if onenessA is identical to onenessB, onenessA would not have a real onenessB; no 
infinite chain of oneness can be generated. 
• Non-identity: oneness is not identical to the oneness of oneness 
In both al-Talwīḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 2] 
This is because, just as we say “essence and multiple essences”, we also 
say “one and multiple ones” (واحـــد وآحـــاد كـــثیرة, wāḥid wa-āḥād kathīra). [LWḤ3 
23.13–14] 
[Part of Text 1] 
Also, we say “one and multiple ones”, just as we say “thing and multiple 
things”. [Ḥ.Sh 67.14–15, ¶61] 
As brief and obscure as it is, this is Suhrawardī’s argument for Non-Identity. Fortunately 
enough, a detailed version can be found in and only in al-Muqāwamāt:  
[Text 3] 
Moreover, if we say “essence and essences”, or “man and men”, the nature 
[i.e. the nature of essence or man] must accept oneness and multiplicity. 
Likewise, when we say “oneness and onenesses” (وآحــــاد -waḥda wa ,وحــــدة 
āḥād) , there is an indication in it [i.e. this statement] of the oneness in the 1
nature of oneness and the multiplicity in it [i.e. the nature of oneness] (إشـارة إلـى 
-ishāra ilā waḥda fī ṭabīʿat al-waḥda wa-kathra fī ,وحــدة فــي طــبیعة الــوحــدة وكــثرة فــیھا
 It seems Suhrawardī is using “آحاد” (āḥād) as the plural form of both “واحد” (wāḥid, one) and “وحدة” (waḥda, oneness).1
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hā).  If a thing accepts oneness and multiplicity, then the two [i.e. oneness 1
and multiplicity] must be added to it. The fact that oneness accepts 
multiplicity proves that its oneness is not implied by its quiddity. We bring up 
this point so that you can understand what is in al-Talwīḥāt. [QWM3 168.1–5] 
Since it is reasonable to say “oneness and multiple onenesses” or “one and multiple ones”, it 
follows that “the nature of oneness” (طـــبیعة الـــوحـــدة, ṭabīʿat al-waḥda) is neutral or indifferent to 
oneness and multiplicity: it can accept both oneness and multiplicity, though not simultaneously. 
Therefore, oneness cannot be identical to the oneness of oneness, due to the indifference of 
oneness to oneness and multiplicity. In this way, the Non-Identity premise is established.  
The line of this argument is quite similar to Suhrawardī’s argument that existence is 
indifferent to being-existent and being-non-existent in al-Muqāwamāt [QWM3 164.10–13], 
introduced as [Text 31] in Chapter III (3.4.2.3). Again, it calls to mind Avicenna’s argument that 
pure quiddity, or the “root of quiddity” (to borrow Suhrawardī’s terms), is indifferent to oneness 
and multiplicity. It could be argued that Suhrawardī is using Avicenna’s line of argument to argue 
against the Peripatetics: oneness, just as pure quiddity, is likewise indifferent to oneness and 
multiplicity. 
Argument II can be summarised as follows. If the distinction between quiddity and oneness 
is real, then quiddity and oneness must be two different things. It follows that quiddity is one, 
and oneness is also one. Two absurdities arise. First, the quiddity to which oneness is not yet 
added has another onenessB. By the same reasoning, the distinction between quiddity and 
onenessB is also real, so the quiddity to which onenessB is not yet added also has another 
onenessC. This leads to an infinite regress. Second, oneness is one; an infinite chain of oneness 
must arise. This part of Argument II overlaps Argument I analysed above. One might argue that 
Argument I should be reconstructed as a part of Argument II. However, in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, 
they are presented by Suhrawardī himself as two distinct arguments: Argument I in [Ḥ.Sh 67.13–
15, ¶61] and Argument II in [Ḥ.Sh 67.15–68.3, ¶61]; so I follow Suhrawardī in treating them as 
two arguments. 
 That is to say, the fact that we can say “oneness and onenesses” indicates that the nature of oneness accepts both oneness and 1
multiplicity (but not at the same time, of course).
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4.1.2 An inference: all numbers  are mental considerations 1
After establishing that oneness cannot exist extramentally, Suhrawardī further argues that 
all numbers must likewise be mental considerations in both al-Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; 
this is also mentioned very briefly in al-Muqāwamāt: 
[QWM3 169.3–4] = [ṬRḤ3 358.6–8] = [Ḥ.Sh 68.3–12, ¶¶61–62] (detailed) 
In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī argues: 
[Text 4] 
If the case of oneness is like this, then [every] number must as well be an 
intellectual thing (أمــر عــقلي, amr ʿaqlī). This is because if a number comes from 
onenesses/ones (اآلحــاد, al-āḥād), and oneness is an intellectual property (صــفة 
 [ṣifa ʿaqliyya), then the number must be like that. [Ḥ.Sh 68.3–4, ¶61 ,عقلیة
This is Suhrawardī’s first argument, which is straightforward: since oneness is a mental property 
and all numbers come from onenesses (e.g. fourness comes from four onenesses), all numbers 
must likewise be mental properties. 
The second argument found in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq goes as follows:  
[Text 5] 
Another respect [i.e. argument]: if four, for example, is an accident which 
subsists in human beings, then either there is a fourness in the complete 
sense (األربـعیة تـاّمـًة, al-arbaʿiyya tāmmatan) in each individual, but this is not the 
case. Or in each one there is something from the fourness (شــــيء مــــن األربــــعیة, 
shayʾ min al-arbaʿiyya), and that thing must be oneness. So the aggregate of 
fourness cannot have any substrate other than the intellect, for it is not the 
case that in each one there is [a complete] fourness or something from it.  So 2
due to this consideration, fourness as well cannot exist except in the intellect. 
[Ḥ.Sh 68.5–9, ¶62] 
Supposing that fourness is a real property which is added to four human beings, two possibilities 
follow. (1) There is a complete fourness in each human being. This is obviously absurd; 
 “Number” in this section refers to any number except oneness.1
 That is to say, it is impossible that each human being has a complete fourness (see what follows); it is equally impossible that 2
each human being has a real oneness (established in 4.1.1).
 130
otherwise, we can predicate “_____ is four” of every human being. (2) There is something from 
fourness in each human being, and that thing must be oneness. But it has already been 
established that oneness cannot exist in the real world (4.1.1), so this is absurd as well. Another 
absurdity which is not spelt out in the text above seems to be that even if we suppose, for the 
sake of the argument, that oneness is real, fourness, as the aggregate of four onenesses, cannot be 
real. It must be the mind that puts four onenesses together and generates fourness, so fourness 
must subsist in the mind. 
Suhrawardī concludes the discussion of numbers in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq by explaining the way by 
which numbers arise in the mind: “intellectual observation” (مــالحــظة عــقلیة, mulāḥaẓa ʿaqliyya) [ṬRḤ3 
358.8]:  
[Text 6] 
Obviously, if the mind gathers one thing in the east and another thing in the 
west, it observes (یــــالحــــظ, yulāḥiẓu) twoness. If one sees a large group [of 
people], one would take from them three, four or five, according to what one’s 
sight falls on by grouping (بــــاالجــــتـمـاع, bi-l-ijtimāʿ). One would also take [from 
these people] a hundred, hundreds, ten, tens, and other numbers. [Ḥ.Sh 
68.9–12, ¶62] 
That is to say, numbers arise due to mental observation: for example, when our mind groups four 
things together, we observe fourness in the mind.  
One weakness of this explanation seems to be that, obviously, not all numbers arise due to 
mental observation. I have the concept of one billion in my mind, but I have never observed in 
my life one billion real things at the same time. I assume Suhrawardī could say he is more 
concerned with how numbers arise in the mind in the first place; but it is true that when we have 
enough numbers in the mind, we can produce infinite numbers without resorting to mental 
observation. 
Therefore, it is plain to see that no number exists extramentally. 
 131
4.2 Contingency and necessity by another 
Suhrawardī’s discussion of contingency and necessity by another is found primarily in 
al-Talwīḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. There are some relevant arguments in al-Muqāwamāt and 
al-Muṭāraḥāt as well, when Suhrawardī is dealing with hybrid chains (الســـالســـل الـــمختلطة, al-
salāsil al-mukhtalaṭa): 
• An argument about contingency 
[LWḤ3 25.7–10] = [QWM3 167.8–10] = [ṬRḤ3 357.16–18] = [Ḥ.Sh 68.13–
69.4, ¶63] (detailed) 
• Three arguments about necessity by another 
  • Argument I from a hybrid chain of necessity and contingency 
[QWM3 165.5–6] = [ṬRḤ3 357.5–12] (detailed) = [Ḥ.Sh 69.4–6, ¶63] 
  • Argument II from a hybrid chain of necessity and existence 
[LWḤ3 25.10–11] = [QWM3 165.7] = [ṬRḤ3 357.15–16] = [Ḥ.Sh 69.8–9, ¶63] 
  • Argument III from a single-species chain of necessity? 
[Ḥ.Sh 69.6–7, ¶63] 
4.2.1 An argument from a single-species chain of contingency 
Suhrawardī’s detailed argument about contingency in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq goes as follows: 
[Text 7] 
Know that the contingency of a thing must be prior to the thing’s existence in 
the intellect. This is because contingents must become contingent [first]; then 
they exist. It is not appropriate to say that “it exists, and then becomes 
contingent”. Contingency falls upon (یـقع عـلى, yaqaʿu ʿalā)  different things by a 1
single meaning.  2
Moreover, contingency belongs to quiddity as an accident (عـرضـي لـلماھـیة, ʿaraḍī 
lil-māhiyya), and it is attributed to quiddity. So contingency is not a self-
subsistent thing (شــيء قــائــم بــنفسھ, shayʾ qāʾim bi-nafsihi) and it is not necessary 
existent, for if its existence becomes necessary by itself, it would subsist by 
itself, and then it would not require a relation to a subject (إضـــافـــة إلـــى مـــوضـــوع, 
 That is, “is predicated/said of”.1
 That is to say, we are considering univocal contingency here.2
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iḍāfa ilā mawḍūʿ). Therefore, contingency is contingent.  
[Moreover,] its contingencyB is understood before its existence, for whatever 
does not become contingent first cannot exist. So its contingencyB is not 
itself. The same goes for the contingencyC of its contingencyB without an end. 
This leads to an impossible chain, because its individuals exist 
simultaneously and sequentially. [Ḥ.Sh 68.13–69.4, ¶63] 
To generate an infinite chain of contingency by Self-Predication with Non-Identity, 
Suhrawardī needs to establish the following two premises: (1) it is reasonable to say 
“contingency is contingent” (Self-Predication); (2) contingency is not identical to the 
contingency of contingency (Non-Identity). 
• Self-predication: contingency is contingent 
Supposing that contingency is a real property added to quiddity in the real world, it must 
be either necessary in itself or contingent in itself. However, contingency must not be a “self-
subsistent thing” or “necessary existent” [Ḥ.Sh 68.16, ¶63], for contingency “belongs to quiddity 
as an accident” [Ḥ.Sh 68.15, ¶63], and every accident must require “a relation to a 
subject” [Ḥ.Sh 69.1, ¶63]. 
Therefore, “contingency is contingent” [Ḥ.Sh 69.1–2, ¶63]. Only by its relation to quiddity, 
does contingency become necessary and exist in the real world. So it is reasonable to predicate 
“_____ is contingent” of contingency: contingency is contingent. 
• Non-identity: contingency is not identical to the contingency of contingency 
The second step is to establish the Non-Identity premise; otherwise, no infinite chain of 
contingency can be generated. This is why Suhrawardī argues in [Text 7]: 
[Part of Text 7] 
Know that the contingency of a thing must be prior to the thing’s existence in 
the intellect. This is because contingents must become contingent [first]; then 
they exist. It is not appropriate to say that “it exists, and then becomes 
contingent”. [Ḥ.Sh 68.13–14, ¶63] 
[Moreover,] its contingencyB is understood before its existence, for whatever 
does not become contingent first cannot exist. So its contingencyB is not 
itself. [Ḥ.Sh 69.2, ¶63] 
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Another similar argument can be found in al-Muṭāraḥāt (also, in al-Muqāwamāt): 
[Text 8] 
The contingencyB of contingencyA is not contingencyA [itself]. This is because 
the contingency of a thing must be prior to [the thing] itself, but a thing cannot 
be prior to itself. [ṬRḤ3 357.17–18] 
That is to say, since the contingency of every existent thing must be prior to the thing itself 
(for, in the mind, a thing must become contingent first, then it exists), and contingency exists (for 
it is presupposed to be a real property), the contingencyB of contingencyA must be prior to 
contingencyA itself. Since nothing can be prior to itself, but the contingencyB of contingencyA is 
prior to contingencyA itself, the contingencyB of contingencyA, therefore, cannot be contingencyA 
itself.  
• Infinite regress 
Since “contingency is contingent” (Self-Predication), contingencyA has a property—the 
contingencyB of contingencyA—attributed to it by the predicate “_____ is contingent”. Since the 
contingencyB of contingencyA is not identical to contingencyA itself (Non-Identity), 
contingencyB must be a real property. By the same reasoning, “contingencyB is contingent” (Self-
Predication), and by Non-Identity, contingencyB must have another real property: contingencyC. 
A real infinite chain of contingency can be generated: 
quiddity—contingencyA—contingencyB—contingencyC… 
But such a chain has been proved to be logically impossible (3.1). So contingency cannot exist 
extramentally. 
4.2.2 Necessity by another  1
In Chapter III (3.4.3), we came across the first hybrid chain of existence and relation. The 
first two arguments about necessity by another involve another two hybrid chains: one of 
necessity and contingency, and the other of necessity and existence. I will present a detailed 
analysis of all ten hybrid chains immediately after this section. For the time being, let us just say 
if a single-species chain is generated by Self-Predication with Non-Identity, then a hybrid chain 
is produced by Mutual-Predication. Whether there is a third argument from a single-species 
 “Necessity” in this chapter refers exclusively to “necessity by another” unless otherwise indicated.1
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chain of necessity depends on how one reads [Text 11] below; in my opinion, there is indeed a 
third argument (4.2.2.3). 
4.2.2.1 Argument I: from a hybrid chain of necessity and contingency 
The detailed version of the first argument is found in al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 357.5–12]: 
[Text 9] 
Another chain is generated from (تــــتـولّــــد مــــن, tatawalladu min) necessity and 
contingency. This is because the necessity of the existence of the heaven, 
the intellect and temporal things (حـادث مـن الـحوادث, ḥādith min al-ḥawādith) is by 
another (بـــغیره, bi-ghayrihi) [rather than by itself]. If necessityA1  is an intention 1
 maʿnan) added to its existence and quiddity in the real world, then there ,مـعنى)
is no doubt that the necessityA1 of a temporal thing occurs after it did not 
occur. So that necessityA1 must be contingent. Moreover, the contingencyA1 
[of necessityA1] itself is not necessary existent, for it is an accident in 
quiddities. So it is contingent, and it would not happen unless by its 
necessityB1 by another (بــــغـیـره  bi-wujūbihi bi-ghayrihi). And that ,بــــوجــــوبــــھ 
necessityB1 is contingent [as well].  
The eternal things also have necessityA2 by another (الــوجــوب بــغیره, al-wujūb bi-
ghayrihi). If the necessityA2 is a thing in the real world, and it is a property of 
another thing, and its occurrence depends on that thing, then it is contingent. 
The contingencyA2 also becomes necessary by another. So its necessityB2 
has [another] contingencyB2. [Therefore,] an infinite chain occurs, but its 
absurdity has been proved. [ṬRḤ3 357.5–12] 
First of all, it must be made clear that the “necessity” in question refers to “necessity by 
another” (الــوجــوب بــغیره, al-wujūb bi-ghayrihi) rather than “necessity by itself” (الــوجــوب بــذاتــھ, al-
wujūb bi-dhātihi). Necessity by itself belongs exclusively to God, whereas necessity by another 
belongs to anything else that exists in the real world.  
In [Text 9], two kinds of necessity by another are considered by Suhrawardī: the necessity 
of temporal things, and that of eternal things. Examples of eternal things include the heaven and 
the intellect; the heaven is material and the intellect is immaterial, but they are both eternal. 
 I add marks like “A1”, “B1”, “A2” or “B2” behind “necessity” and “contingency” for clarity. Necessity/contingencyA1/B1 belongs to 1
temporal things; necessity/contingencyA2/B2 belongs to eternal things.
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However, it seems unnecessary to consider the necessity of temporal things in particular; for the 
sake of neatness, I only take into account necessity by another in general (regardless of whether 
it belongs to a temporal thing or an eternal thing), as Suhrawardī does in the parallel argument in 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh 69.4–6, ¶63].  1
Based on the principle of Mutual-Predication, Suhrawardī needs to establish two premises 
to generate an infinite hybrid chain of necessity by another and contingency: (1) “necessity by 
another is contingent”; (2) “contingency is necessary by another”. 
• Mutual predication I: necessity by another is contingent 
Supposing that necessity by another is a real property added to quiddity in the real world, 
as held by the Peripatetics, then necessity by another must depend on quiddity and “it cannot 
subsist by itself” [Ḥ.Sh 69.5]. So it is reasonable to say “necessity by another is contingent”; 
necessity would thus have a real property: contingencyA. 
• Mutual predication II: the contingency of necessity is necessary by another 
Since contingencyA is a real property added to necessityA by another, it “is not necessary 
existent”, “so it is contingent” [ṬRḤ3 357.8–9]. Since contingencyA has already occurred, it is 
reasonable to say “contingencyA is necessary by another” (for every contingent thing which 
exists must be necessary by another); contingencyA would thus have a real property: necessityB 
by another. 
• Infinite regress 
By the same reasoning, since “necessityB by another is contingent” as well, necessityB by 
another must have a real contingencyB. “ContingencyB is necessary by another”, so contingencyB 
must have a real necessityC by another. This leads to an infinite chain of necessity by another and 
contingency: 
necessityA by another—contingencyA—necessityB by another—contingencyB—
necessityC by another… 
Based on the analysis above, a hybrid chain of necessity by another and contingency is 
generated by Mutual-Predication. Suhrawardī does not need to worry about Non-Identity here, 
for necessity by another and contingency are obviously not identical. This is, in fact, the 
advantage of hybrid chains (see 4.3.1 for detail). 
 However, the argument in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is oversimplified; it is not as helpful as the one in [Text 9] from al-Muṭāraḥāt.1
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4.2.2.2 Argument II: from a hybrid chain of necessity and existence 
One cannot find a detailed version of the second argument, so it requires to be spelt out. In 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 10] 
Moreover, existence must have necessity, and necessity must have 
existence. In this way, another infinite chain follows: it is generated from the 
repetition of existence on necessity, and necessity on existence. But it is 
impossible as proved above. [Ḥ.Sh 69.8–9, ¶63] 
Based on the principle of Mutual-Predication, we need to establish two premises to 
generate an infinite hybrid chain of necessity by another and existence: (1) “necessity by another 
exists”; (2) “existence is necessary by another”. In the text above, however, Suhrawardī does not 
say much about Mutual-Predication, probably due to the similarity in reasoning to the previous 
argument; I spell out this argument as follows. 
• Mutual predication I: necessity by another exists 
Supposing that necessityA by another is a real property added to quiddity in the real world, 
then obviously, necessityA exists. So it is reasonable to say “necessityA by another exists”; 
necessityA by another would, therefore, have a real property: existenceA. 
• Mutual predication II: existence is necessary by another 
ExistenceA, as a real property added to necessityA, must be contingent by itself (it cannot 
be necessary by itself, for it depends on a subject). Since existenceA has already occurred, it is 
reasonable to say “existenceA is necessary by another”, for every contingent thing which exists 
must be necessary by another. ExistenceA would, therefore, have a real property: necessityB by 
another. 
• Infinite regress 
By the same reasoning, “necessityB by another also exists”, so it must have a real 
existenceB. “ExistenceB is also necessary by another”, so it must have a real necessityC by 
another. An infinite hybrid chain of necessity by another and existence arises: 
necessityA by another—existenceA—necessityB by another—existenceB—
necessityC by another… 
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4.2.2.3 Argument III: from a single-species chain of necessity? 
One might be puzzled by the following [Text 11] which comes right before [Text 10] above 
(I introduce [Text 10] again to present the problem clearly): 
[Text 11] 
The necessity of a thing is prior to that thing, so it is not that thing. This is 
because a thing must become necessary and then exist; it does not exist and 
then becomes necessary. [Ḥ.Sh 69.6–7, ¶63] 
[Text 10] 
Moreover (ثــــّم, thumma), existence must have necessity, and necessity must 
have existence. In this way, another infinite chain follows: it is generated from 
the repetition of existence on necessity, and necessity on existence. But it is 
impossible as proved above. [Ḥ.Sh 69.8–9, ¶63] 
There seem to be two ways to read [Text 11]. (1) It is a part of Argument II analysed 
above, and Suhrawardī aims to establish the Non-Identity between necessity and existence.  (2) 1
Alternatively, it is a separate argument, which involves a single-species chain of necessity by 
another; Suhrawardī is arguing for its crucial Non-Identity premise: necessityA is not identical to 
the necessityB of necessityA. I think this is a more plausible interpretation. Note that this 
argument is quite similar to that for the Non-Identity of contingency (4.2.1, [Texts 7 & 8]). 
Moreover, the adverb “ثـّم” (thumma)—which usually marks the beginning of a new argument or a 
new topic (at least in Suhrawardī)—in [Text 11] also indicates that [Text 10] is another 
argument. If this is the case, then we have a third argument from a single-species chain of 
necessity by another.  
I do not propose to spell out the third argument. Suhrawardī’s argument for the Non-
Identity of necessity is similar to that for the Non-Identity of contingency, analysed above in 
4.2.1. Self-Predication of necessity—“necessity by another is necessary by another”—is easy to 
establish: necessity exists and it cannot be necessary by itself, so it must be necessary by another. 
By Self-Predication with Non-Identity, an infinite chain of necessity by another can be 
generated.  
 A separate argument for Non-Identity, however, is unnecessary for generating a hybrid chain; this is the very advantage of 1
hybrid chains (4.3.1). Instead, it is sufficient simply to point out that the meanings of necessity and existence are not identical.
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4.3 Ten hybrid infinite chains 
Up to now, we have come across three hybrid infinite chains: the first of existence and 
relation (3.4.3), the second of necessity by another and contingency (4.2.2.1), and the third of 
necessity and existence (4.2.2.2). There are, in fact, seven more of such hybrid chains. 
In al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 25.10–11], only one hybrid chain of necessity and existence is 
mentioned briefly; in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, we can find the three above. Suhrawardī’s full 
discussion of all ten hybrid chains can be found only in al-Muqāwamāt [QWM3 164.14–
165.14] and al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 355.4–359.5]: in al-Muqāwamāt, Suhrawardī puts forward 
nine out of ten hybrid chains without analysing them, but in al-Muṭāraḥāt, all of them are 
mentioned with seven analysed in detail (see 4.3.2).  1
4.3.1 The advantage of hybrid chains 
When reconstructing the hybrid chain of necessity and contingency (4.2.2.1), I remarked 
the advantage of hybrid chains is that one need not worry about Non-Identity. This is 
corroborated by what Suhrawardī writes respectively in al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[Text 12] 
The advantage (الـــفائـــدة, al-fāʾida) of hybrid/mixed chains (الســـالســـل الـــمختَلطة, al-
salāsil al-mukhtalaṭa) is that they can break their [i.e. the Peripatetics’] 
delusion (وھــــمـھـم, wahmuhum) mentioned above: existence and its being-
existent is one and the same thing (الـوجـود أّنـھ نـفس مـوجـودیـتھ, al-wujūd annahu nafs 
muwjūdiyyatihi).  This is because the intention of contingency and [that of] 2
oneness or existence or relation do not become the same thing, for two 
things do not become one. [Otherwise,] if there is contingency, there would 
be no oneness; if there is oneness, there would be no contingency. [QWM3 
165.11–14] 
[Text 13] 
Supposing that you refuse the infinite chain of existence by [arguing] that 
existence is [identical to] being-existent (الــموجــودیــة, al-mawjūdiyya), then there 
is no doubt that the meanings of oneness, existence and contingency are all 
 In this case, the discussion in al-Muqāwamāt is obviously the summary of what is in al-Muṭāraḥāt (my hypothesis in 1.1.2).1
 See 3.4.2.3 for the Peripatetic argument for the identity of existence and its-being-existent, with Suhrawardī’s objection.2
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different: any of them can be understood without the others. So the intention 
of contingency would never be reduced to existence, nor would the intention 
of oneness to either of the other two. [ṬRḤ3 355.4–7] 
In both 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we have seen how Suhrawardī takes great pains to prove Non-
Identity—existence is not identical to the existence of existence/its-being-existent—so as to 
generate a single-species chain of existence. However, Suhrawardī is still worried that his 
argument for Non-Identity may not convince everyone. This urges him to take one step further 
and invent these hybrid chains, of which he seems quite proud. If his opponents insist on the 
identity of existence and the existence of existence, or oneness and the oneness of oneness, or 
contingency and the contingency of contingency, and thereby refuse Suhrawardī’s single-species 
chains of existence, oneness or contingency, then obviously, they cannot reject any of the hybrid 
chains for the same reason. This is because any two different intentions, such as existence and 
oneness, can never be reduced to one and the same, for one is understood without the other. 
Therefore, all Suhrawardī needs to do to generate a hybrid chain is to establish Mutual-
Predication.  
4.3.2 Ten hybrid chains and their key premises 
In this section, I analyse one by one the ten hybrid chains invented by Suhrawardī. These 
chains are generated from any two of the following five intentions: existence, oneness, 
contingency, necessity by another and a relation to a subject (النسـبة إلـى الـموضـوع, al-nisba ilā al-
mawḍūʿ) [QWM3 165.4]. What follows is a list of the places where each hybrid chain is 
found:  
(1) existence and oneness:   [QWM3 165.2–3] = [ṬRḤ3 355.7–14] 
(2) existence and contingency:  [QWM3 164.14–16] = [ṬRḤ3 356.15–357.5] 
(3) existence and necessity: [LWḤ3 25.10–11] = [QWM3 165.7]  
    = [ṬRḤ3 357.15–16] = [Ḥ.Sh 69.6–9, ¶63] (4.2.2.2)  
(4) oneness and contingency: [QWM3 165.1–2] = [ṬRḤ3 356.9–15] 
(5) oneness and necessity:  [QWM3 165.6–7]  
    = [ṬRḤ3 357.15] (no exposition) 
(6) contingency and necessity: [QWM3 165.5–6] = [ṬRḤ3 357.5–12] 
    = [Ḥ.Sh 69.4–6, ¶63] (4.2.2.1)  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(7) existence and relation:  [LWḤ3 24.2–3]= [QWM3 165.3–4]  
    = [ṬRḤ3 358.9–13] = [Ḥ.Sh ¶58, 65.15–16] (3.4.3)  
(8) oneness and relation:  [QWM3 165.4–5]  
    = [ṬRḤ3 358.15–16] (no exposition) 
(9) contingency and relation:  [QWM3 165.1] = [ṬRḤ3 358.13–15] 
(10) necessity and relation:  [ṬRḤ3 358.15] (no exposition) 
Note that there are nine hybrid chains mentioned in al-Muqāwamāt, with (10) the chain of 
necessity and relation missing. In al-Muṭāraḥāt, although all ten chains are put forward, not all 
of them are expounded: (5) the chain of oneness and necessity, (8) that of oneness and relation, 
and (10) that of necessity and relation remain unanalysed.  
I do not propose to examine the remaining seven hybrid chains in detail, but it is necessary 
to establish the Mutual-Predication premise of each chain. I let Suhrawardī speak for himself 
whenever possible. 
(1) Existence and oneness 
• Existence is one 
Since the distinction between existence and quiddity is real, it is reasonable to say 
“existence and quiddity are two”. Each of them, therefore, must be one, so existence is one. 
[Text 14] 
So we say: if existence is added to quiddity in the real world, then there is no 
doubt that they are two, for if they are one and the same, then if there is 
existence alone, there is no quiddity, and if there is quiddity, there is no 
existence. If they are two, then existence has oneness and quiddity has 
another oneness, for it is impossible for twoness to occur without two 
onenesses. Therefore, existence must have oneness. [ṬRḤ3 355.7–11] 
• Oneness exists 
Oneness, as a real property, has already occurred in the real world, so obviously, “oneness 
exists”. 
[Text 15] 
That oneness must have existence, for if it has no existence, then oneness 
would not exist in the real world. [This is absurd.] [ṬRḤ3 355.11–12] 
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(2) Existence and contingency 
• Existence is contingent 
Existence, as a real property, must be in need of a subject, so “existence is contingent”. 
[Text 16] 
This is because existence is not necessary due to itself; otherwise, it would 
not need any subject (موضوع, mawḍūʿ). [ṬRḤ3 356.16–17] 
• Contingency exists 
Contingency, as a real property, has already occurred in the real world, so “contingency 
exists”. 
(3) Existence and necessity (4.2.2.2) 
(4) Oneness and contingency 
• Contingency is one 
Since multiple quiddities must have multiple contingencies, one quiddity must have one 
contingency. So “contingency is one”.  1
[Text 17] 
This is because the contingencies of quiddities are multiple, so contingency 
must have oneness. [ṬRḤ3 356.9–10] 
• Oneness is contingent 
Oneness, as a real property, is in need of a subject, so “oneness is contingent”. 
[Text 18] 
If oneness is added to contingency and it is related to it, then it is not 
necessary existent by itself. Otherwise, it would need no subject. So oneness 
is contingent. [ṬRḤ3 356.11–12] 
(5) Oneness and necessity 
• Oneness is necessary by another 
 This seems to be Suhrawardī’s another argument for “X-ness is one”, somewhat different from the argument from a real 1
distinction as in [Text 14].
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Oneness, as a real property, is contingent by itself. Every contingent which exists must be 
necessary by another, so “oneness is necessary by another”. 
• Necessity by another is one 
The distinction between oneness and necessity is real, so they must be two; “necessity by 
another is one” (following [Text 14]). Alternatively, we can follow the line of argument in [Text 
17]. 
(6) Contingency and necessity (4.2.2.1) 
(7) Existence and relation (3.4.3) 
(8) Oneness and relation 
• Oneness is related to a subject 
Oneness, as a real property, is added to quiddity, so it must be related to a subject, namely, 
quiddity; “oneness is related to a subject”. 
• Relation is one 
The distinction between oneness and relation is real, so they must be two different things 
rather than one and the same thing; “relation is one” (following [Text 14]). 
(9) Contingency and relation 
• Contingency is related to a subject 
Contingency, as a real property, is added to quiddity, so it must be related to a subject, 
namely, quiddity; “contingency is related to a subject”. 
• Relation is contingent 
The relation between quiddity and contingency, as a real property, is in need of its subjects; 
so “relation is contingent”. 
[Text 19] 
Relation is not necessary existent by itself, for it is a state (ھـیئة, hayʾa), and all 
states are contingent due to their dependence on their subjects (تــــوّقــــفھا عــــلى 
 .tawaqqufuhā ʿalā mawḍūʿātihā). So relation has contingency ,مــــوضــــوعــــاتــــھا
[ṬRḤ3 358.13–14]  
(10) Necessity and relation 
• Necessity by another is related to a subject 
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Necessity by another, as a real property, is added to quiddity, so it must be related to a 
subject, namely, quiddity; “necessity by another is related to a subject”. 
• Relation is necessary by another 
The relation between quiddity and necessity by another, as a real property, is contingent by 
itself. Every contingent which exists must be necessary by another, so “relation is necessary by 
another”. 
4.3.3 Summary of Suhrawardī’s arguments from infinite chains 
According to the analysis above, there are two steps to generate a hybrid chain of any two 
of the following five intentions: existence, oneness, contingency, necessity by another, relation to 
a subject. The first step is to establish Mutual-Predication between any two intentions. 
Suhrawardī’s universal arguments for Mutual-Predication can be summarised as follows.  
(1) “X-ness exists.”  X-ness, as a real property, has already occurred, so it must exist. 1
(2) “X-ness is one.” Since the distinction between X-ness and the subject to which it is 
added is real, they must be two, so X-ness is one. 
(3) “X-ness is contingent.” X-ness, as a real property, is in need of a subject, so it must be 
contingent. 
(4) “X-ness is necessary by another.” X-ness, as a real property, is in need of a subject, so it 
must be contingent by itself. Every contingent which exists must be necessary by another, so X-
ness is necessary by another. 
(5) “X-ness is related to a subject.” X-ness, as a real property, is added to a subject, so it 
must be related to a subject. 
The second step is to generate a hybrid chain in the following way. Since X1-ness is Y 
(Mutual-Predication I), X1-ness has a real Y1-ness; since Y1-ness is X (Mutual-Predication II), Y1-
ness has a real X2-ness; since X2-ness is Y, X2-ness has a real Y2-ness.  An infinite hybrid chain 2
arises:  
X1-ness—Y1-ness—X2-ness—Y2-ness… 
 Note: X-ness stands for any of the four intentions other than the intention from which the predicate of X-ness is derived (e.g if 1
“X-ness exists”, X-ness ≠ existence).
 Note: X/Y stands for the predicate derived from X-ness/Y-ness (e.g. existent, existence; one, oneness).2
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To generate a single-species chain, there are two steps as well.  The first step is to establish 1
Non-Identity of any of the following four intentions: existence, oneness, contingency, necessity 
by another. Suhrawardī’s arguments for Non-Identity is summarised as follows. Note that the 
first two arguments share the same line (from the indifferent status of existence or oneness); the 
third and forth share another line (from the logical priority of contingency or necessity). 
(1) “Existence is not identical to the existence of existence.” Existence is indifferent to 
existence and non-existence (cf. Avicenna’s indifferent quiddity), so existence must not be 
identical to the existence of existence (3.4.1 & 3.4.2). 
(2) “Oneness is not identical to the oneness of oneness.” Oneness is indifferent to oneness 
and multiplicity (cf. Avicenna’s indifferent quiddity), so oneness must not be identical to the 
oneness of oneness (4.1.1). 
(3) “Contingency is not identical to the contingency of contingency.” Nothing can be prior 
to itself, but the contingency of contingency is prior to contingency itself (for, in the mind, a 
thing must become contingent first, and then it exists), so they cannot be identical (4.2.1). 
(4) “Necessity is not identical to the necessity of necessity.” Nothing can be prior to itself, 
but the necessity of necessity is prior to necessity itself (for, in the mind, a thing must become 
necessary by another first, and then it exists), so they cannot be identical (4.2.2.3). 
The second step is to generate a single-species chain. Since X1-ness is X (Self-Predication), 
X1-ness has a real X2-ness (due to Non-Identity); since X2-ness is X, X2-ness has a real X3-ness.  2
An infinite chain arises:  
X1-ness—X2-ness—X3-ness…  
 Self-Predication is easy to establish, so I do not mention Suhrawardī’s arguments here.1
 Note: X stands for the predicate derived from X-ness (e.g. existent, existence; one, oneness).2
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4.4 Genus and differentia, determinable and differentia of determinate 
Enough has been said about existence, oneness, contingency and necessity by another, let 
us move on to the last part of Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental considerations: the genus—
differentia distinction, and also, the determinable—differentia-of-determinate distinction. 
Suhrawardī’s treatment of this issue is found primarily in al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt; 
some relevant discussion can be found in al-Talwīḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq as well: 
 [LWḤ3 19.7–11; 21.4–22.9; 24.4–25.5] 
= [QWM3 169.12–173.14] 
= [ṬRḤ3 §3.7, 365.1–371.5] 
= [Ḥ.Sh 69.10–70.1] 
As we shall see, Suhrawardī rejects not only the real determinable—differentia-of-
determinate distinction (e.g. colourness—the differentia of blackness) by three arguments, but 
also the real genus—differentia distinction (e.g. animality—rationality) by two arguments. 
This, however, does not mean Suhrawardī would take all species as simple; he accepts a 
certain sort of composite species: those whose individuals are composed of body and soul. So 
the distinction between body and soul is a real distinction that Suhrawardī acknowledges. 
Lastly, I introduce Suhrawardī’s significant distinction between differentiation (ـتمیّز, tamayyuz)/
becoming-specific (ـتخّصص, takhaṣṣuṣ) and individuation (ـتشّخص, tashakhkhuṣ). 
4.4.1 Determinable—differentia-of-determinate distinction 
Suhrawardī himself does not use the term “determinable” or “differentia of determinate”, 
but when he talks about the “genus” and “differentia” of a simple species, such as colourness 
 faṣl al-sawād) or the characteristic ,فــصل الــسواد) lawniyya), and the differentia of blackness ,لــونــیة)
of blackness (الــــســواد  khuṣūṣ al-sawād), he obviously means “determinable” and ,خــــصــوص 
“differentia of determinate”. 
A very clear explanation of the fundamental logical difference between the determinable—
differentia-of-determinate relation and the genus—differentia relation can be found in H. 
Granger 1980:  
A species is a complex of its genus and another element (or set of elements) 
called its differentia—man, for instance, is often said to be a complex of the 
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genus animal and the differentia rational—and it is differentiated within its 
genus through the addition of its differentia to its genus: man is marked off as 
a more specific form of animal and distinguished from other animal species 
through the addition of rational to animal. Furthermore, genus and differentia 
must be logically independent; that is, an analysis of one of them does not 
reveal the other as an entailment. For if the genus entailed its differentiae, it 
would entail incompatible properties, since many of the differentiae of a 
genus are incompatible; if the differentia entailed its genus, it would be 
difficult to see what would prevent the species from being equivalent to its 
differentia and, in turn, what would keep the differentia itself from being a 
species of the genus. The logical independence of the genus and differentia 
would mean, among other things, that at least in principle the differentia 
could belong to quite different sorts of genera: rational might belong to spirit 
and machine as well as animal.  
Now, a determinate is not a complex composed of its determinable and some 
element logically independent of its determinable; it may be thought of as an 
area within its determinable marked off and distinguished from the other 
determinates of that determinable without the aid of any additional elements: 
white, red and blue are all distinct determinates of the determinable colour, 
but they are not distinguished by means of any items analogous to 
differentiae. Whatever might appear to be a determinate’s differentia is 
probably logically dependent on its determinable and should be identified 
with the determinate itself. For example, a sphere is a shape having each 
point on its surface equidistant from a common centre. ‘Having each point on 
its surface equidistant from a common centre’ might appear to be the 
sphere’s differentia because it seems to be added to shape to distinguish the 
sphere from other determinate shapes. Yet it is not a differentia; for it is 
identical with the sphere and thus is not logically independent of the 
characteristic shape.  1
In short, the determinable—differentia-of-determinate relation and the genus—differentia 
relation differ fundamentally in two respects: (1) a determinate (e.g. blackness), is not a complex 
of a determinable (colourness) and a differentia of determinate (the differentia of blackness), 
 Granger 1980: 38.1
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whereas a species (e.g. humanity) is a complex of a genus (animality) and a differentia 
(rationality); (2) the differentia of a determinate (the differentia of blackness) is logically 
dependent on its determinable (colourness), whereas a differentia (rationality) is logically 
independent of its genus (animality).  
Suhrawardī, however, is not quite concerned with the logical difference between these two 
relations. His main concern is to prove that determinables and differentiae of determinates, 
genera and differentiae are all mental considerations rather than metaphysical components of real 
things. Here, I simply aim to show that Suhrawardī must have the determinable—differentia-of-
determinate distinction in mind, although he does not use the same terms. 
Three arguments are put forward by Suhrawardī to prove that the determinable—
differentia-of-determinate distinction cannot be real, found in the following places: 
• Argument I: from the replaceability of the differentia of determinate 
  [LWḤ3 24.7–10] = [QWM3 169.12–14] = [Ḥ.Sh 69.11–14, ¶64] 
  A Peripatetic defence and Suhrawardī’s response: 
  [QWM3 169.15–170.2] 
• Argument II: from the duality of the determinate 
  [QWM3 170.2–4] = [ṬRḤ3 366.8–12, 14–15; 368.3–5,14–17]  
     = [Ḥ.Sh 69.14–70.1, ¶64] 
• Argument III: from an infinite regress of differentia 
  [ṬRḤ3 366.12–14] 
4.4.1.1 Argument I: from the replaceability of the differentia of determinate 
I call Suhrawardī’s first argument against the real determinable—differentia-of-determinate 
distinction the “argument from the replaceability of the differentia of determinate”. It is found 
respectively in al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; in al-Muqāwamāt, one can 
also find a Peripatetic defence with Suhrawardī’s response to it (which I will not introduce). The 
reconstruction below is based on the text in al-Talwīḥāt: 
[Text 20] 
This is because if colourness has an existence which is not the existence by 
virtue of which the characteristic of blackness (خـصوص الـسواد, khuṣūṣ al-sawād) 
is, and colourness does not invoke the characteristic of blackness due to its 
quiddity—otherwise, the characteristic of blackness would be implied by 
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colourness (الزمــــھــا, lāzimuhā)—then we could retain the colourness of 
blackness, but remove its characteristic and connect to it the characteristic of 
whiteness, just as we retain matter and remove [its original] form which we 
replace [with another form]. [This is absurd.] [LWḤ3 24.7–10] 
Supposing that the determinable—differentia-of-determinate distinction is real, such as the 
one between colourness and the characteristic of blackness, then each of them would have a real 
existence which is not that of the other. Another premise is that “colourness does not invoke the 
characteristic of blackness due to its quiddity” [LWḤ3 24.8]; otherwise, if the characteristic of 
blackness is a “condition for colourness” (شــــرط لــــلـونــــیـة, sharṭ lil-lawniyya) [Ḥ.Sh 69.13, ¶64], 
colourness would imply the characteristic of blackness: every colour is black. This is absurd. 
Based on the two premises above, (1) it should be permissible to remove the characteristic 
of blackness from colourness, and colourness without any characteristic should be able to exist 
in the real world. This is absurd, for one cannot imagine what pure colourness is like. Note that 
this absurdity is not revealed in the argument above, but I think it is there, and so does Ibn 
Kammūna [I.K3 110.7–8]. (2) Moreover, we could replace the original characteristic of 
blackness with another differentia of determinate, such as the characteristic of whiteness, and 
connect the latter to colourness, just as we can replace the original form of a body with another 
form. The absurdity here—which is not spelt out by Suhrawardī—seems to be that one simply 
cannot do this: one cannot change the blackness of this crow to whiteness;  by contrast, a 1
carpenter can easily make this piece of wood into a chair.  
As we shall see, in al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī further applies this argument to the genus— 
differentia distinction. This will be analysed in 4.4.2.1. 
4.4.1.2 Argument II: from the duality of the determinate 
Suhrawardī’s second argument—found in al-Muqāwamāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq—can be called the “argument from the duality of the determinate”. The complete 
argument is found in al-Muṭāraḥāt:  
[Text 21] 
Moreover, if colourness and the differentia of blackness (فــــصـل الــــسـواد, faṣl al-
sawād) exist in the real world, then obviously, neither of them is a substance. 
 One might think of painting or dyeing. Painting does not change a colour; rather, it adds a different colour to the original one; 1
the same goes for dyeing (but probably more complicated).
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So [both of them] must subsist in a substrate. [1] Either, they are two states 
both of which subsist in the substrate of blackness (الــــسـواد -maḥall al ,مـحــــّل 
sawād), but blackness would be two accidents rather than one. [This is 
absurd.] [2] Alternatively, the differentia is a state in colour, or colour is a state 
in the differentia.  Whatever the case, it follows that the differentia and colour 1
are two independent accidents rather than one. [ṬRḤ3 366.8–12] 
If the distinction between colourness and the differentia of blackness is real, each of them 
would have a distinctive existence. Another premise is that they both require a substrate, for 
apparently, neither of them is substance. Two possibilities follow. (1) Both of them take the 
substrate of blackness as their shared substrate. But in this case, blackness would be two 
accidents rather than a single accident. This contradicts the fact that blackness is one. 
(2) One is the substrate of the other: (2-a) either, colourness is the substrate of the 
differentia; (2-b) or, the differentia is the substrate of colourness. In both cases, colourness and 
the differentia are still two independent accidents rather than one.  If (2-a), then colourness is an 2
accident in the substrate of blackness, and the differentia is an accident in colourness; we have 
two accidents. If (2-b), the differentia is an accident in the substrate of blackness, and colourness 
is an accident in the differentia; we have two accidents as well. Moreover, according to the text 
in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, there is another absurdity involved in option (2-b):  
[Text 22] 
Moreover, if colourness has an independent existence, then it would be a 
state. Either, it is a state in blackness, then blackness would exist prior to it 
and not by virtue of it.  [This is absurd.] [Ḥ.Sh 69.14–15, ¶64] 3
That is to say, if (2-b) colourness, as an accident, subsists in the differentia of blackness, and we 
know every substrate must exist prior to its accident, then the differentia would exist prior to 
colourness rather than by virtue of it. This is absurd. 
In short, the real determinable—differentia-of-determinate distinction must lead to the 
duality of every determinate, which is absurd. One of ʿUmar Khayyām’s (d. 1123) argument 
 By “colour”, Suhrawardī means colourness or colour as colour, namely, a determinable, rather than a colour such as blackness, 1
that is, a determinate.
 They are “independent” in the sense that each of them counts as an accident, rather than a part or constituent of an accident.2
 If we take the argument in al-Muṭāraḥāt—[Text 21]—into account, then by “blackness”, Suhrawardī means the differentia/3
characteristic of blackness, rather than blackness as a determinate or a species.
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about colourness, summarised by Wisnovsky (2011), might have to do with Suhrawardī’s 
argument above.  But establishing such a historical connection requires a further study.  1
4.4.1.3 Argument III: from an infinite regress of differentia 
The third argument—found only in al-Muṭāraḥāt—involves two infinite regresses: 
[Text 23] 
Moreover, the two accidents [i.e. colourness and the differentia of blackness] 
fall into one category (مــــقـولــــة, maqūla) [i.e. “accident”]. Then the discussion 
goes back to the genus-intention (الــــمـعـنـى الـجـنـســــي, al-maʿnā al-jinsī) and the 
differentia-intention (الــمعنى الــفصلي, al-maʿnā al-faṣlī), and it applies to each one 
of them. This would lead to impossible chains. [ṬRḤ3 366.12–14] 
This argument is, in fact, a further application of an argument about the real genus—differentia 
distinction. The original argument shall be analysed in 4.4.2.2 below; I will also explain the 
origination of infinite regresses of this kind there. Here, I simply reconstruct this argument based 
on the original one. 
The premise of the third argument is the same as that of the second: supposing that the 
distinction between colourness and the differentia of blackness is real, then both of them must be 
accidents. If this is the case, then “accident” would be a genus, with colourness and the 
differentia of blackness being two species under it. Then colourness must require a differentia 
(X) (colourness is composed of being-an-accident and X); the differentia of blackness likewise 
requires a differentia (Y) (the differentia of blackness is composed of being-an-accident and Y). 
We are not concerned with the question of what X or Y refers to.  
Now, let us consider X and Y. They must be two accidents rather than two substances. Then 
they would be another two species under the genus “accident”. By the same reasoning, X 
requires another differentia (X2) (X is composed of being-an-accident and X2); Y likewise 
requires another differentia (Y2) (Y is composed of being-an-accident and Y2). Eventually, two 
infinite chains are generated: one from infinite differentiae of colourness, and the other from 
infinite differentiae of the differentia of blackness: 
 For Khayyām’s argument, see Wisnovsky: 2011: 38. However, Khayyām argues that colourness cannot be superadded to 1
blackness extramentally (according to Wisnovsky), whereas Suhrawardī is concerned with the relation between colourness and 
the differentia of blackness (rather than blackness).
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differentia X—differentia X2—differentia X3… 
differentia Y—differentia Y2—differentia Y3… 
Based on the three arguments above, Suhrawardī concludes: 
[Text 24] 
The fact is that colourness is something considered (اعـتباریـة, iʿtibāriyya) [in the 
mind]. If it is something considered, it is not a part in the reality (فـي الـحقیقة, fī al-
ḥaqīqa), for the subsistence of a real thing is not by virtue of it (لخـــلّو الـــعیني عـــن 
 li-khuluwwi al-ʿaynī ʿan al-taqawwum bi-hā). … Rather, colourness is ,الــتقّوم بــھا
a consideration, which the mind relates to quiddity. [QWM3 170.4–5, 7–8] 
[Text 25] 
In reality, colourness is a description which is considered (وصـــف اعـــتباري, waṣf 
iʿtibārī), and so are genera and differentiae. [ṬRḤ3 368.10–11] 
Another crucial point is that according to Suhrawardī, [QWM3 170.6–11] and [ṬRḤ3 
367.9–18], the determinable—differentia-of-determinate distinction is not even a mental one. 
That is to say, the mental structure of blackness, for example, is not colourness plus the 
differentia of blackness. Rather, colourness is nothing but a mental consideration which the mind 
generates and relates to blackness (and so is the differentia of blackness). This is because the 
mental form of blackness should be absolutely simple, corresponding to its simple metaphysical 
structure, so it cannot be divided even in the mind.  The significance of this point is that it is 1
closely related to one aspect of Suhrawardī’s theory of definition: a determinate cannot be 
defined at all, as he writes in al-Muqāwamāt, following [Text 24]:  
[Text 26] 
The simple [things] among those which are directly sensed (الــــمـشـاھــــدات, al-
mushāhadāt),  such as blackness, do not have any definition or any part at 2
all, and they cannot be defined. A person who has [the corresponding] 
sensation has already sensed blackness; everything by which blackness is 
defined must be more hidden/obscure (أخــــفـى, akhfā) than it [i.e. the sensed 
 Another way to prove this point is by using Granger’s (1980) argument above: the differentia of blackness is logically 1
dependent on colourness, so blackness cannot be a complex of the two.
 In visual perception, “مــشاھــدة” (mushāhada) means that which is directly witnessed; but here “مــشاھــدة” (mushāhada) is used in a 2
broad sense: that which is directly sensed (e.g. witnessed, smelled, tasted and so on).
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blackness]. The definition [of blackness] cannot benefit a person who does 
not have that sensation. Moreover, no sensible can make the conception of 
another sensible happen.  The same goes for sound and so on.  [QWM3 1 2
170.8–12] 
The conception of blackness is an example of “فــــطـري” (fiṭrī) knowledge, which I render as 
“instinctive knowledge”. A significant characteristic of fiṭrī conceptions (so we have fiṭrī assents 
as well) is that they cannot be defined at all; one cannot acquire a fiṭrī conception (e.g. the 
conception of blackness) except by using the corresponding fiṭra or instinct (e.g visual 
perception).  I do not propose to deal with Suhrawardī’s theory of definition in this thesis.   3 4
The truth of determinables and differentiae of determinates, such as colourness and the 
differentia of blackness, will be revealed in 4.4.3. 
4.4.2 The genus—differentia distinction 
As mentioned above, Suhrawardī rejects the real genus—differentia distinction as well. His 
position is clearly expressed at the very beginning of §3.7 of al-Muṭāraḥāt:  
[Text 27] 
Investigation and determination (بــــحـث وتــــحـصـیـل, baḥth wa-taḥṣīl): if you have 
known this, then they cannot go back and establish in the real world one 
nature for animality (طــبیعة لــلحیوانــیة, ṭabīʿa lil-ḥayawāniyya) and another nature 
for rationality (طــــبـیـعـة لــــلـنـاطــــقـیـة, ṭabīʿa lil-nāṭiqiyya), and they are two [different 
natures]. Those who are outstanding among the knowledgeable people 
 al-mutamayyizūna min ahl al-ʿilm) acknowledge this ,الــــمتمّیزون مــــن أھــــل الــــعلم)
point.  Therefore, they say: it is not suitable to say “[something is] created as 5
 That is to say, the conception of blackness, for example, cannot give us the conception of a sound; we must use our 1
corresponding sense-organ to perceive each sensible separately.
 This is especially true if one thinks about perfumes, for example, Aventus (2010) by Creed. It is impossible to have a conception 2
of Aventus unless one smells it directly. Of course I could describe Aventus by breaking it down to many notes and explain how 
these notes develop during a few hours; but still, one can never know the exact scent of Aventus through such a description. 
Moreover, even this description of notes must depend on the smell of other things (e.g. pineapple, birch, vanilla, musk, ambergris 
and so on), all of which cannot be known except by direct experience or presential knowledge as sense perception.
 There are three philosophically intriguing short articles on Suhrawardī’s fiṭrī knowledge: Mousavian 2014a and 2014b, 3
Walbridge 2014. By these three articles, Aminrazavi’s (2003) claim that Suhrawardī’s fiṭrī (فــــطري) knowledge refers to pre-given 
and a priori knowledge is undermined, and so is Ziai’s (1990) similar claim, and probably, Marcotte’s (2012). Fiṭrī knowledge, in 
fact, has nothing to do with pre-given-ness or a priori-ness.
 For a discussion of Suhrawardī’s theory of definition, see Ziai 1990: 77–128 (Chapter 3). But Ziai’s incorrect understanding of fiṭrī 4
knowledge as a priori knowledge must be noted.
 Apparently, Suhrawardī is not the only one who holds such a position; it would be interesting to see to whom “those who are 5
outstanding among the knowledgeable people” refer, but this requires a further study of the context.
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animal and then created after that as rational (ُیجــعل حــیوانــا ثــّم ُیــجعل بــعد ذلــك نــاطــقا, 
yujʿalu ḥayawānan thumma yujʿalu baʿda dhālika nāṭiqan)”; rather, creating 
something as animal (جــعلھ حــیوانــا, jaʿluhu ḥayawānan) is by itself creating it as 
human (جعلھ انسانا, jaʿluhu insānan). [ṬRḤ3 365.7–10] 
That is to say, Suhrawardī does not take genera and differentiae as real metaphysical components 
of real things (e.g. animality and rationality are not metaphysical constituents of human). In al-
Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī puts forward two arguments to prove that the genus—
differentia distinction cannot be real; they resemble respectively the first and third arguments 
about the determinable—differentia-of-determinate distinction in the line of reasoning: 
• Argument I: from the replaceability of the differentia (≈ Argument I in 4.4.1)  
  [ṬRḤ3 365.10–17] 
• Argument II: from an infinite regress of differentia (≈ Argument III in 4.4.1)  
  [LWḤ3 24.11–15] = [ṬRḤ3 365.17–366.8] 
4.4.2.1 Argument I: from the replaceability of the differentia 
The first argument—found only in al-Muṭāraḥāt—is quite similar in the line of reasoning 
to the argument analysed in 4.4.1.1; let us call it the “argument from the replaceability of the 
differentia”. Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 28] 
Suppose that animality and rationality are two [different] existent [things] in 
the real world, and animality has an existence which is not that of the 
differentia. But animality inasmuch as it is animality (مـن حـیث حـیوانـیة, min ḥaythu 
ḥayawāniyya) is not conditioned by any single differentia; otherwise, it is not 
suitable for animality to occur together with another differentia which is not 
that differentia. [This is absurd.] Since animality is not conditioned by any 
differentia, and it has existence in the real world, then it is suitable to 
suppose an animality on which multiple differentiae replace each other (حـیوانـیة 
 ḥayawāniyya yatabaddalu al-fuṣūl ʿalayhā), but it remains as ,یــتبّدل الــفصول عــلیھا
it is, just as matter in which [different forms] participate (الھــــیولــــى المشــــتَركــــة, al-
hayūlā al-mushtaraka). [ṬRḤ3 365.10–15] 
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Suppose that animality (genus) and rationality (differentia) both exist in the real world as 
metaphysical components of real human beings. Another premise is that animality does not 
require rationality by itself; otherwise, animality would imply rationality: every animal is 
rational. This is absurd. Based on these two premises, (1) it should be permissible to remove 
rationality from animality, and animality without any differentia should be able to exist in the 
real world. But pure animality is inconceivable. Note that, again (like the argument in 4.4.1.1), 
this absurdity is not revealed in the argument above. (2) Moreover, we could replace rationality 
with another differentia, such as the differentia of the horse (whatever it is), and connect the 
latter to animality, just as we replace the original form of a body with another form. Again, the 
absurdity here is not spelt out by Suhrawardī. The absurdity seems to be that one simply cannot 
do such things: one cannot change the rationality of this man to the differentia of the horse; the 
animality of this man must belong exclusively to this man.  By contrast, a carpenter can easily 1
make this piece of wood into a chair. Therefore, the genus—differentia distinction cannot be real. 
4.4.2.2 Argument II: from an infinite regress of differentia 
The second argument—found in both al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt—is the original 
argument from which the argument analysed in 4.4.1.3 is derived. In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī 
writes: 
[Text 29] 
If a genus has an existence which is not that of a differentia in the real world, 
then the substantiality/being-a-substance (الــجوھــریــة, al-jawhariyya) predicated 
of matter (الھــیولــى, al-hayūlā) and form would have an existence in matter [and 
another existence in form]. Then it would have another existent differentia 
[call it “X”].  Its differentia [X] is another substance as well, for that which is 2
not a substance cannot make a substance subsist (یـقّوم الـجوھـر, yuqawwimu al-
jawhar). Then that by which the differentia [X] is added to substantiality (مـــا زاد 
 mā zāda bi-hi al-faṣl ʿalā al-jawhariyya) [X2] would have ,بــھ الــفصل عــلى الــجوھــریــة
another existence in the real world. So it must have substantiality as well. In 
this way, a chain with a certain sequence is generated. Moreover, the 
 If one does not take into account some crazy experiments in sci-fi novels, I think this is plausible.1
 For clarity, let us call this differentia “X”; matter is composed of substantiality and X. 2
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composition of a recipient and a form (تـركـیب قـابـلي وصـوري, tarkīb qābilī wa-ṣūrī) 
would occur in matter.  [LWḤ3 24.11–15] 1
In this argument, Suhrawardī uses “substance” as an example of genera, with “matter” and 
“form” as examples of species; matter and form are both substances, according to the 
Peripatetics.  
Supposing the genus—differentia distinction is real, or in other words, genera and 
differentiae are both metaphysical components of real things, then matter (a species) must be 
composed of substantiality (a genus) and a differentia (call it “X”). We are not concerned here 
with what X refers to. X must be a substance, for if it is an accident, then it cannot make a 
substance subsist, but it is supposed that a differentia makes a species subsist. Since X is a 
substance, then by the same reasoning, X must be composed of substantiality and another 
differentia (X2). Note that X2 is what Suhrawardī means by “that by which the differentia [X] is 
added to substantiality” [LWḤ3 24.13–14] in the text above, for X cannot subsist except by its 
differentia, X2. Moreover, X2 must be a substance as well. So X2 must have another differentia 
(X3). An impossible infinite chain thus arises: 
differentia X—differentia X2—differentia X3… 
Therefore, the genus—differentia distinction cannot be real. 
Moreover, by the last sentence of the text above, Suhrawardī points out another absurdity: 
matter would be composed of substantiality and a differentia (X), so it is no longer simple. This 
contradicts the Peripatetic view.  2
The argument reconstructed in 4.4.1.3 is, in fact, a further application of this argument: 
Suhrawardī applies it to the real determinable—differentia-of-determinate distinction. 
Colourness is an accident, so it must require a differentia (X) (colourness is composed of being-
an-accident and X). X is also an accident, so it must require another differentia (X2). This leads to 
an infinite regress of differentia as well. 
The key to generating this type of infinite chain is to find the highest genus to which both 
sides of a distinction belong: in the genus—differentia distinction, the highest genus Suhrawardī 
 For Ibn Kammūna’s reconstruction, see [I.K3 112.3–113.8].1
 For Ibn Kammūna’s explanation, see [I.K3 113.3–5].2
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finds is substance, for both genus and differentia are substances;  whereas in the real 1
determinable—differentia-of-determinate distinction, the highest genus is accident or state (ھـــیئة, 
hayʾa). Since “_____ is the highest genus” can be predicated of both sides, each of them must 
require another differentia [X or Y] to differentiate them from other members of the highest 
genus. Since “_____ is the highest genus” can be predicated as well of this differentia [X or Y], it 
must require another differentia [X2 or Y2]. This leads to an infinite regress of differentia.  
4.4.3 The truth of determinables and differentiae of determinates, genera and 
differentiae 
After proving that neither the determinable—differentia-of-determinate distinction nor the 
genus—differentia distinction is real, Suhrawardī reveals the truth of determinables and 
differentiae of determinates, genera and differentiae in both al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt:  
[QWM3 172.3–15] = [ṬRḤ3 368.8–12] 
4.4.3.1 Determinables and differentiae of determinates, genera and differentiae as mental 
considerations 
In al-Muqāwamāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 30] 
So a genus is a consideration that spreads/diffuses (االعــتبار الــشائــع, al-iʿtibār al-
shāʾiʿ), which is suitable to be predicated of multiple things insofar as it is a 
quiddity in which they participate (مـاھـیة مشـتَركـة لـھا, māhiyya mushtaraka la-hā). 
…  
A differentia is a consideration exclusive to a thing’s substance, and it is a 
differentiator (مـــمّیز, mumayyiz) of it in understanding. But it does not attach to 
a thing (ال یـــلحقھ, lā yalḥaquhu) due to an external property (لـــصفة خـــارجـــة, li-ṣifa 
khārija). [It is different from] the ability to laugh (الـــضاحـــكیة, al-ḍāḥikiyya) or the 
ability to write (الـكاتـبیة, al-kātibiyya), both of which attach [to a human being] by 
the consideration of external motions (بــاعــتبار حــركــات خــارجــة, bi-iʿtibār ḥarakāt 
khārija). A differentia itself is not a real external property (صــفة خــارجــة عــینیة, ṣifa 
 The argument in [Text 29] is a special case: the genus—substance—in that distinction (matter = substantiality + X) is identical 1
to the highest genus, so we do not need to consider the genus. But if the example is the animality—rationality distinction, then 
we need to consider the genus, animality: animality is a substance, and it must require a differentia [X]; X is a substance, so X 
requires X2. This leads to an infinite regress of differentia.
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khārija ʿayniyya); rather, it is a consideration that the mind considers, as if it 
comes from the substance of a thing. 
To sum up, a genus is the nearest common consideration to a thing’s 
substance (أقــرب االعــتبارات الــعاّمــة إلــى جــوھــر الشــيء, aqrabu al-iʿtibārāt al-ʿāmma ilā 
jawhar al-shayʾ), and a differentia is the nearest differentiating consideration 
to a thing’s substance (أقـرب االعـتبارات الـممّیزة إلـى جـوھـر الشـيء, aqrabu al-iʿtibārāt al-
mumayyiza ilā jawhar al-shayʾ). [QWM3 172.3–10] 
A genus is nothing but a common consideration (اعـــتبار عـــاّم, iʿtibār ʿāmm) generated by the 
human mind. Animality, for example, is a common mental quiddity in which human beings and 
horses in the real world participate, for we can predicate “_____ is animal” of both a human 
being and a horse. But animality, as proved above, cannot be a metaphysical component of a 
human being or a horse.  
A differentia, by contrast, is a differentiating consideration (اعــــتـبـار مــــمـیّـز, iʿtibār mumayyiz) 
generated by the human mind. Rationality, for example, is a mental form exclusive to human 
beings in the real world, and it allows us to differentiate human from other species of animal, for 
we cannot predicate “_____ is rational” except of human beings. However, rationality as a mental 
consideration is different from real properties like “the ability to laugh” (الـــضاحـــكیة, al-ḍāḥikiyya) or 
“the ability to write” (الــــكـاتــــبـیـة, al-kātibiyya). This is because the ability to laugh has “external 
motions” (حـركـات خـارجـة, ḥarakāt khārija) as its foundation in the real world, whereas rationality has 
no such foundation.  
The analysis above applies to determinables and differentiae of determinates as well, such 
as colourness and the differentia of blackness. 
4.4.3.2 Differentiation and individuation 
At this point, it is necessary to introduce Suhrawardī’s significant distinction between 
differentiation (تـمیّز, tamayyuz)/becoming-specific (تـخّصص, takhaṣṣuṣ), and individuation (تـشّخص, 
tashakhkhuṣ) in al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[LWḤ3 18.7–19.6] (only on differentiation) = [QWM3 161.8–162.9]  
= [ṬRḤ3 333.2–339.18]  1
 Again, the discussion in al-Muqāwamāt is the summary of what is in al-Muṭāraḥāt (1.1.2)1
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This discussion is, in fact, quite complicated, since many scattered points are addressed there by 
Suhrawardī. I focus on what concerns us directly and summarise the main points. 
To make a long story short, individuation has to do with real things themselves, whereas 
differentiation has nothing to do with real things themselves but only with apprehenders, that is, 
us. In al-Muqāwamāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 31] 
Individuation (تــــشـّخـص, tashakhkhuṣ) is not differentiation (تــــمـّیـز, tamayyuz), 
according to what is mentioned above. This is because differentiation is in 
relation to an apprehender (بــــالنســــبة إلــــى مــــدرك, bi-l-nisba ilā mudrik), and it is 
something considered (اعـــتباري, iʿtibārī) [in the mind]. If a thing is unique (انـــفرد, 
infarada), then it needs no differentiator, but it still needs individuation. 
[QWM3 162.8–9] 
Also, in al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 32] 
Individuation of a thing is in terms of itself. But its differentiation (تــــمـایــــزه, 
tamāyuzuhu) is by comparison to other things which participate with it in the 
same common intention (الـمشاركـات فـي مـعنى عـاّم, al-mushārikāt fī maʿnan ʿāmm), 
and by consideration of multiplicity (اعــتبار كــثرة, iʿtibār kathra), so that if there is 
a thing that has no participator (مــــشــارك, mushārik), it would need no 
differentiator added [to it], although it still has individuation. [ṬRḤ3 335.12–
14] 
That is to say, only when a real thing participates with another real thing or things in 
something universal (أمـر كـلّي, amr kullī) [ṬRḤ3 333.16] or a common intention (مـعنى عـاّم, maʿnan 
ʿāmm) in the mind, do we add to the mental form of that thing a differentiator (مــــمـیّـز, mumayyiz)
—which is another universal—to differentiate it from others. To elaborate, based on what 
Suhrawardī says in [ṬRḤ3 333.16–334.10], there are three types of added differentiators: 
quiddity itself, differentia and accident.  (1) If two real things participate in that which is an 1
accident (عــرضــي, ʿaraḍī) in the mind, we differentiate them by their very quiddities (e.g. a white 
 Note that there is indeed a fourth type of (but non-added) differentiator: perfection and deficiency (e.g. this real whiteness and 1
that real whiteness). But a differentiator of this type is not something added but it is due to quiddity itself. Suhrawardī also points 
out the Peripatetics’ weakness on this point. See [LWḤ3 22.4–9] and [ṬRḤ3 334.4–10]. 
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man and a white horse). (2) If they participate in a genus-intention (مــعنى جنســي, maʿnan jinsī), we 
differentiate them by their differentiae (e.g. a man and a horse). (3) If they participate in a 
species intention (مــــعنى نــــوعــــي, maʿnan nawʿī), they are differentiated by their accidents (e.g. a 
white man and a black man). 
However, this does not mean the differentiator we add to a thing in the mind also exists as 
a metaphysical component of that thing in the real world. Suhrawardī proves that differentiation 
is merely a mental process by the following argument: supposing there is a thing which is unique 
in every respect in the real world, or to put differently, it does not participate with any other thing 
in any universal or common intention in the mind, then no differentiation or added differentiator 
is needed. But its individuation in the real world is necessary, for everything that exists in the 
real world is individual or particular in itself, in the sense that it makes impossible by itself the 
participation in itself.  
What, however, is the cause of individuation, according to Suhrawardī? First, in both al-
Muqāwamāt [QWM3 161.12–162.3] and al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 334.13–335.5], Suhrawardī 
argues against the popular Peripatetic thesis that individuation is by matter: 
[Text 33] 
Whoever says that which makes the participation impossible (الــمانــع عــن الشــركــة, 
al-māniʿ ʿan al-sharika) is matter is not cautious. This is because, in the 
mind, matter has equivalence (ســــویــــة, sawiyya) with others in not making the 
participation impossible (عـدم مـنع الشـركـة, ʿadam manʿ al-sharika). If the fact that 
matter does not make the participation impossible in the mind does not imply 
that it does not make the participation impossible in the real world, then other 
things have equivalence with matter. [QWM3 161.12–161.14] 
That is to say, if in the mind matter does not make the participation in itself impossible, then in 
the real world it should likewise not make the participation impossible. So matter cannot serve as 
the cause of individuation, for every individual thing must make the participation in itself 
impossible. Otherwise, if matter can be the cause of individuation regardless of the fact that it 
cannot make the participation impossible in the mind, then other universal mental things would 
merit as much being the cause of individuation; this is absurd. In short, there is simply nothing 
special about matter, which can make it the cause of individuation. 
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Matter cannot be the cause of individuation; neither can any differentiator (مــــمــیّــز, 
mumayyiz). Suhrawardī writes in al-Muqāwamāt: 
[Text 34] 
Principle (قــــاعــــدة, qāʿida): Know that a differentiator is not suitable to make a 
thing particular or individual, that is, by making the participation [in that thing] 
impossible. A differentia, such as rationality, is a differentiator of animal, but it 
does not individuate it. The same is the case with blackness, whiteness and 
other [accidents]. The meaning (مــــفـھـوم, mafhūm) [in the mind] of those which 
are accidents (الـــعرضـــیات, al-ʿaraḍiyyāt) or everything that is supposed [by the 
Peripatetics] to necessitate making the participation impossible does not 
make the participation impossible; the aggregate (مـجــــمـوع, majmūʿ) of what 
does not make the participation impossible must not make the participation 
impossible either, such as the mental composition of [multiple] universals 
 [tarkīb dhihnī min umūr kulliyya). [QWM3 161.8–12 ,تركیب ذھني من أمور كلّیة)
That is to say, no differentiator, be it quiddity, a differentia or an accident, makes the 
participation in itself impossible, for every differentiator is a universal (albeit a universal which 
differentiates a group of things from another group). So apparently, it cannot individuate a thing, 
for every individual thing must make the participation in itself impossible. Even if two or more 
differentiators form an aggregate, the aggregate cannot be the cause of individuation either, for 
the aggregate of universals is still universal in itself and does make the participation impossible.  1
Suhrawardī’s position is that the cause of individuation is nothing but the very it-ness/
being-it (ھویة, huwiyya) of a thing:  
[Text 35] 
So there is no judgement except that individuation is by consideration of the 
it-ness that occurs in the real world (بـاعـتبار الـھویـة الـواقـعة عـینا, bi-iʿtibār al-huwiyya 
al-wāqiʿa ʿaynan). Every it-ness that occurs in the real world is individuated 
and makes the participation [in itself] impossible. [QWM3 162.3–4] 
[Text 36] 
So things make impossible the participation [in themselves] by their real it-
 This calls to mind Suhrawardī’s dissatisfaction with the Peripatetic thesis that we must know a particular in a universal manner, 1
as analysed in Chapter II (2.1, especially [Text 2]); this urges Suhrawardī to come up with the theory of presential knowledge, of 
which the aim is to know a real particular as it is, or in a particular manner.
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nesses (بـھویـاتـھا الـعینیة, bi-huwiyyātihā al-ʿayniyya). But its differentiation (امـتیازھـا, 
imtiyāzuhā) is by things which make it specific (بــمخّصصاتــھا, bi-mukhaṣṣiṣātihā) 
[i.e. differentiators]. [ṬRḤ3 335.11–12] 
Suhrawardī’s “ھــــویــــة” (huwiyya, literally, “being-it” or “it-ness”) refers to the whole particular 
essence (ذات, dhāt) of an individual thing in the real world.  Everything in the real world is 1
individuated by its particular it-ness, rather than by matter or any universal differentiator.  
The reason I think Suhrawardī’s discussion of the genus—differentia distinction in general 
and his distinction between differentiation and individuation in particular are so significant is 
that it immediately reveals Suhrawardī’s position on the problem of universals. Suhrawardī holds 
that everything in the real world is individual or particular in its own right.  Since he has already 2
established that neither genus nor differentia can be a metaphysical component of real things, 
then apparently, common nature (e.g. humanity), as the composite of a genus and a differentia, 
cannot enter a real thing’s metaphysical structure either. Common nature, such as horseness, is 
nothing but a mental consideration—albeit “the nearest consideration to a thing’s substance”, as 
pointed out in [Text 30] above—that we generate in order to group real natural things. As a 
result, Suhrawardī need not concern himself with the task of explaining the individuation of real 
things, for every real thing is individual in its own right; he only needs to explain how universal 
intentions are generated by the mind. 
4.4.4 Simple species and composite species 
Since Suhrawardī refuses both the determinable—differentia-of-determinate distinction 
and the genus—differentia distinction, does this mean that he would hold that every real thing is 
simple, be it blackness, a horse or a human being? Suhrawardī’s position on this issue can be 
found in al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt: 
[LWḤ3 19.7–11; 24.4–7] = [QWM3 170.12–171.2] = [ṬRḤ3 366.16–367.3] 
 Suhrawardī’s huwiyya is not to be confused with Duns Scotus’s haecceity. Although they both mean “it-ness” or “being-it” 1
literally, they are, in fact, quite different. Suhrawardī’s huwiyya refers to the whole particular essence (ذات, dhāt) of a real 
individual thing, rather than merely some component that individuates common nature, as in Scotus’s theory. In Suhrawardī’s 
theory, every nature in the real world is particular in itself; common nature is nothing but a mental consideration.
 Walbridge, as far as I know, is the first scholar to argue that Suhrawardī is a “nominalist” in the sense of accepting only real 2
particulars. For example, Walbridge (2005: 207–208) writes: “Thus in metaphysics Suhrawardī rejects realism with regard to 
universals, holding that everything that exists is a particular; in this he may be compared to nominalists like Ockham.”
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In short, the only real distinction that Suhrawardī acknowledges is the one between body 
and soul, for a very simple reason: everyone can prove this distinction by direct experience. For 
example, if an animal dies, its soul vanishes from its body but its body remains, so body and soul 
must be different from each other in the real world. Every natural thing in the real world is either 
simple in the sense that it cannot be divided into body and soul, or composite in the sense that it 
can be. In al-Muqāwamāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 37] 
Know that whoever defines simple things among the sensibles (بــــســائــــط 
-al ,الـــحقیقة البســـیطة) basāʾiṭ al-maḥsūsāt) is stupid. [1] Simple reality ,الـــمحسوســـات
ḥaqīqa al-basīṭa) is that which does not at all have two creations (جــــعـالن, 
jaʿlān) in it. The key to knowing/identifying the species among simple things 
is that which is taken as a species has the perfection of quiddity (كـــمال مـــاھـــیة, 
kamāl māhiyya): the quiddity cannot be divided except by relations (إضــــافــــات, 
idāfāt),  such as blackness, body or human soul.   1 2
[2] Things other than these are composite things (ـــبات  [murakkabāt). [2-a ,مـــركَّ
Either a [composite] thing is natural, such as a horse, a man and water.  The 3
rule of being-a-species for these things is being-perfection (ضـابـط نـوعـیة ھـذه كـمالـیة, 
ḍābiṭ nawʿiyyat hādhihi kamāliyya): if you imagine what is other than them is 
replaced, such as the whiteness of Zayd or the blackness of a horse, their 
natural it-nesses (الـــھویـــات الـــطبیعیة, al-huwiyyāt al-ṭabīʿiyya) would remain. [2-b] 
Or a [composite] thing is not natural, such as a chair. [QWM3 170.12–171.2] 
Every real thing is either (1) a simple reality (الــــحقیقة البســــیطة, al-ḥaqīqa al-basīṭa), or (2) a 
composite reality (ــــبـة  al-ḥaqīqa al-murakkaba). (1) A simple reality has only one ,الــــحـقـیـقـة الــــمـركَّ
creation (جــــعـل, jaʿl), or to put differently, it has merely one metaphysical component, such as 
blackness. It is not the case that blackness is first created as pure colourness without any 
differentia in the real world, and then the differentia of blackness is created later and added to 
colourness, as proved above (4.4.1). This is because it is impossible to prove (or even imagine) 
the real existence of pure colourness. In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
 It is unclear what Suhrawardī means by “relations” here. Perhaps what he has in mind is something like this: when we relate 1
blackness to whiteness or other colours, we can divide the mental blackness into colourness and the differentia of blackness 
(although strictly speaking, the mental blackness is not a complex of the two, for the differentia of blackness is logically 
dependent on colourness, as mentioned towards the end of 4.4.1).
 Man, as a composite species, is a complex of body and soul, but body and soul are both simple species.2
 I do not think Suhrawardī holds that water is a composite reality. This is, perhaps, simply a mistake of the text.3
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[Text 38] 
A simple species (الـنوع البسـیط, al-nawʿ al-basīṭ) is that in which there are no two 
creations, that is, a creation for its genus and another creation for its 
differentia. [LWḤ3 19.8] 
[Text 39] 
It is not permissible to say [the following thing] of the essentials in simple 
species (الــذاتــیات فــي بــسائــط األنــواع, al-dhātiyyāt fī basāʾiṭ al-anwāʿ), such as the 
colourness in blackness: “it is created as colour and then created as 
blackness” (ُجـعل الـلون فـُجعل سـوادا, juʿila al-lawn fa-juʿila sawādan); just as [it is not 
permissible to say] “it is created as blackness and then as colour”. [LWḤ3 
24.4–6] 
(2) By contrast, a composite reality has two creations, that is, two metaphysical 
components, such as a horse or a human being. Suhrawardī holds that a human being is 
composite due to the following simple fact: when a human being dies, his soul which is 
responsible for things like motion, sensation and understanding vanishes, but his body remains. 
In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 40] 
A species which is not simple (الـبـســــیـط  ghayr al-basīṭ) is that whose ,غــــیـر 
differentia  changes the answer of what it is, and its genus and differentia 1
have two creations, such as the form of animality . This is because the 2
creation of animality and its existence are not the creation of its being-a-body 
in the real world; rather, being-a-body could remain in the real world, but 
animality does not. [LWḤ3 19.8–11] 
[Text 41] 
This is different from the essentials of species which are not simple (ذاتــیات غــیر 
 dhātiyyāt ghayr al-basāʾiṭ). It is permissible to say “it is created as a ,الــــبـسـائــــط
body [first], for example, and then created as an animal.” [LWḤ3 24.6–7] 
 Note that this “differentia” is not in the Peripatetic sense, like rationality; “differentia” here refers to the soul. See my following 1
analysis for detail.
 This “animality” is also not in the Peripatetic sense: being-an-animal or the definition of animal; “animality” here refers to the 2
animal soul. 
 164
It is crucial to note that “being-a-body” (الـــجسمیة, al-jismiyya) in the text above refers to the 
particular and real body of an animal, rather than body inasmuch as it is body, or the very 
definition of body, as in Avicenna; “animality” refers to the particular and real animal soul, 
rather than animal inasmuch as it is animal or the definition of animal. In addition, when 
Suhrawardī calls being-a-body a “genus”, and animality or the form of animal a “differentia”, he 
certainly does not mean “genus” and “differentia” in the Peripatetic sense. Otherwise, what 
Suhrawardī says in the text above would be in direct contradiction with his arguments against the 
real genus—differentia distinction. I assume the reason Suhrawardī still uses these Peripatetic 
terms—being-a-body, animality, genus and differentia—is that he intends to present al-Talwīḥāt 
as a more Peripatetic work. But it must be noted that they have already lost their Peripatetic 
meanings, and now they refer to new things: the real body and the real soul. Perhaps by changing 
the meanings of the Peripatetic terms, Suhrawardī is also indicating that this is how the true 
Peripatetic metaphysics—in which mental considerations are not confused with real things—
should be. 
But in al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī refuses to use “genus” and “differentia” to refer to the 
body and the soul, as he writes: 
[Text 42] 
Only single species (الـنوع الـوحـدانـي, al-nawʿ al-waḥdānī) exists in the real world. 
If there is composite [species], then the parts of which it is composed exist in 
it. Among composite [species], there is animal which occurs from soul and 
body (نــفس وبــدن, nafs wa-badan). But in the reality, it is not the case that one of 
them is a genus and another is a differentia. We have pointed out previously 
that the case of being-a-body of animal (الـجسمیة لـلحیوان, al-jismiyya lil-ḥayawān) 
is not that of colourness.  [ṬRḤ3 366.16–367.3] 1
In al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī no longer allows one to call the body a “genus”, or the soul a 
“differentia”. This signals that he is moving further away from Peripatetic philosophy. In Chapter 
II, we have witnessed a similar terminological (and theoretical) development: illumination—the 
third condition for presential knowledge—appears in al-Muṭāraḥāt without al-Talwīḥāt (2.3.3). 
 Being-a-body, which refers to the particular and real body (not to the definition of body), exists extramentally; colourness is but 1
a mental consideration.
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Composite reality is sub-divided by Suhrawardī into two kinds, as in [Text 37] above: (2-a) 
“natural composite reality” (ـبة الـطبیعیة  (al-ḥaqīqa al-murakkaba al-ṭabīʿiyya), and (2-b ,الـحقیقة الـمركَّ
“composite reality which is not natural” (ــبة الــغیر الــطبیعیة -al-ḥaqīqa al-murakkaba al ,الــحقیقة الــمركَّ
ghayr al-ṭabīʿiyya), such as chair. Although Suhrawardī does not give any further explanation, 
we can understand why a chair is composite. This is because a chair also has two creations in it: 
one creation is for the parts from which it is made, such as pieces of wood, nails and so on; the 
other is for the form of it. Only when its parts are composed in accordance with that form, can it 
function as a chair. But when it loses that form and no longer serves the purposes of a chair, its 
parts still remain in the real world. Therefore, a chair has two creations, as does any other 
artificial thing. 
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4.5 Summary of Chapters III & IV 
In Chapters III & IV, I have examined in detail Suhrawardī’s rather complicated but 
significant discussion of mental/intellectual considerations, a topic which is almost untouched by 
modern scholarship. 
Suhrawardī starts off by establishing the impossibility of any real infinite chain whose 
individuals exist both simultaneously and sequentially. Impossible infinite chains, or infinite 
regresses, then become Suhrawardī’s most powerful weapon. If we say the test for mental 
considerations (X-ness) is whether or not “_____ is X” is predicated of X’s real particulars or 
instances univocally (بــالــتواطــؤ, bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) (3.2.2), then the absurdity of an infinite regress of X-
ness is the most important way to prove X-ness as purely mental. As shown in Suhrawardī’s 
many arguments, the real existence of every mental consideration must lead to an infinite regress 
in one way or another. In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 43] 
Conclusion of the criterion (الــقــســــطــاس, al-qusṭās): The way of examining 
everything that you see its species repeat by way of [generating] a chain and 
by way of one succeeding another (كـّل مـا رأیـَت تـكّرر أنـواعـھ متسـلسال مـترادفـا, kull mā 
raʾayta takarrur anwāʿihi mutasalsilan mutarādifan) is like what I have said. 
You should understand and examine every discussion/doctrine (كــــالم, kalām) 
until no mental thing is taken as a real essence (عــــیـنـیـة  ;(dhāt ʿayniyya ,ذات 
[otherwise,] it would lead to absurdity. [The reason] I have been fussy (أطــــنبُت, 
aṭnabtu) [about this point] is that there is a great need (عـــظم حـــاجـــة, ʿaẓm hāja) 
for it later and the great confusion (كــثرة الــخبط, kathrat al-khabṭ) in this respect. 
[LWḤ3 26.4–7] 
Many infinite chains are generated by Suhrawardī in these two chapters. Single-species chains 
include the chains of existence (3.4.1 & 3.4.2), oneness (4.1.1), contingency (4.2.1), and 
probably, necessity by another (4.2.2.3). In addition, ten hybrid chains are invented by 
Suhrawardī (3.4.3 & 4.2.2.1 & 4.2.2.2 & 4.3). According to my analysis, single-species chains 
must be generated by Self-Predication with Non-Identity. It is tempting to argue that Suhrawardī 
may be inspired by the TMA ; if this can be established, then strikingly enough, he would be 1
using the TMA against the Peripatetics (3.4.1.4). Hybrid chains, by contrast, are generated by 
 That is, the Third Man argument, from Plato’s Parmenides (132a–b).1
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Mutual-Predication. By resorting to hybrid chains, Suhrawardī makes his arguments even more 
convincing: if his opponents refuse those arguments based on single-species chains by arguing 
against Non-Identity, then they cannot refuse any of the arguments based on hybrid chains for 
the same reason (4.3). It is crucial to reveal these premises (especially Non-Identity); otherwise, 
one cannot show the full strength of Suhrawardī’s arguments. 
Eventually, Suhrawardī has established that univocal existence, oneness, contingency, 
necessity by another and relation must all be mental considerations; otherwise, infinite regresses 
must arise. Moreover, infinite regress is also used to argue against both the real determinable—
differentia-of-determinate distinction and the real genus—differentia distinction, so 
determinables, differentiae of determinates, genera, differentiae must all be mental 
considerations (4.4.1.3 & 4.4.2.2). Infinite regress, however, is not the only weapon in 
Suhrawardī’s arsenal, albeit the most powerful one. Although three out of Suhrawardī’s seven 
arguments about univocal existence are based on infinite regresses, the other four (not introduced 
in this thesis) are not; also, in the discussion of the determinable—differentia-of-determinate 
distinction and the genus—differentia distinction, we find arguments using other techniques as 
well (4.4.1.1 & 4.4.1.2 & 4.4.2.2). 
By analysing Suhrawardī’s real consideration—mental consideration distinction (3.2), we 
know that he aims to distinguish between which properties are real and which are purely mental. 
Mental considerations are, in fact, generated by the mind for a certain purpose, such as 
philosophical analysis, differentiation and so on. But if these considerations are erroneously 
taken as metaphysical components of real things, the consequence would be devastating: 
metaphysics becomes nothing but a mind game, which is concerned mainly with those universal 
mental considerations rather than what is real.  
There are other relevant and significant points mentioned in these two chapters. For 
example, by showing some aspects of Suhrawardī’s discussion of systematically ambiguous 
existence, I have argued that Suhrawardī’s ontological position must be the primacy of 
(systematically ambiguous) existence (أصــالــة الــوجــود, aṣālat al-wujūd) rather than the primacy of 
quiddity. The significance of this contention is that one could further argue that Suhrawardī—
rather than Mullā Ṣadrā—is the founder of Islamic existential metaphysics.  By proving the 1
quiddity—existence distinction as purely mental, Suhrawardī is, in fact, separating the quiddity
 This is a hypothesis I intend to prove in the second work of my trilogy: Philosophy inside the Cave.1
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—existence distinction from the necessary existent—possible existent distinction, the two key 
distinctions which Avicenna decides to bind together in his middle and later works; Suhrawardī, 
however, forbids the use of the quiddity—existence distinction in metaphysics (3.3.3).  By 1
introducing Suhrawardī’s significant distinction between differentiation and individuation, I have 
revealed Suhrawardī’s position on the problem of universals: everything in the real world is 
individual or particular in its own right; common nature is but a mental consideration. Despite 
his arguments against the real genus—differentia distinction, he acknowledges the real body—
soul distinction (composite natural species are composed of body and soul), for everyone can 
prove their real existence by direct experience or presential knowledge: when an animal dies, its 
soul vanishes but its body remains. 
At this point, if we relate these two chapters to Chapter II, and consider Suhrawardī’s 
discussion of mental considerations and that of presential knowledge together, we will realise the 
coherence of his thought. 
In Chapter II, it is argued that since everything in the real world is particular in the sense 
that it makes the participation in itself impossible, the most accurate way to know a real 
particular thing must be by presential knowledge. This is because the object of knowledge by 
forms is a form, but every form is universal in itself in the sense it does not make the 
participation in itself impossible. Therefore, Suhrawardī’s ambition is to exhaust human power to 
know every particular thing in the real world, material or immaterial, by presential knowledge.  
Based on Chapters III & IV, we know that no universal intention, be it univocal existence, 
oneness, contingency, necessity by another, a genus or a differentia (also, a common nature), can 
enter the metaphysical structure of a real thing. So no real thing can be divided in the real world 
into quiddity and existence, or quiddity and oneness or contingency or necessity; it cannot even 
be divided into a genus and a differentia. In fact, every real thing is particular in its own right. 
The cause of their individuation is simply their particular it-ness (ھــــویــــة, huwiyya), rather than 
matter or any other differentiator generated by the mind. 
Therefore, it is plain to see that the discussion of mental considerations provides the 
necessary metaphysical foundation for the theory of presential knowledge. Since everything in 
the real world is particular in its own right (for every universal must be a mental consideration), 
 This is another hypothesis I intend to prove in Philosophy inside the Cave.1
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they require being apprehended by presential knowledge. This applies not only to material things 
but also to immaterial things: God, separate intellects, souls;  these immaterial things must be 1
apprehended by presential knowledge as well. 
However, as remarked in the summary of Chapter II (2.6), most of us have to resort to 
knowledge by forms to know those material and immaterial things which are absent from us, due 
to our weakness and deficiency; presential knowledge of those things is available only for the 
blessed few. This is why Suhrawardī does not abandon knowledge by forms; instead, he has even 
composed four Peripatetic works to reconstruct the ideal “cave philosophy” for general people. 
But at the same time, Suhrawardī is fully aware of the greatest danger of Peripatetic philosophy 
which is based on knowledge by forms: universal mental considerations are very likely to be 
taken erroneously as metaphysical components of real things. So he has to put forward this 
lengthy discussion of mental considerations in all his Peripatetic works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq to 
help readers distinguish what is real and what is purely mental, and prove to them by 
philosophical arguments why that must be the case.  2
At this point, one cannot help but wonder what Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist metaphysics 
would be like. Is it even possible to construct a metaphysics based on presential knowledge? 
How would he avoid falling back to Peripatetic metaphysics which he criticises so severely?  
Suhrawardī’s light metaphysics is the topic of Chapter V.  
 They are all “immaterial lights” in the Illuminationist context, see Chapter V.1
 This is my Answer (7) to the indispensability of the Peripatetic works: the elimination of the confusion between universal 2
mental considerations and particular real things. See the end of Chapter I.
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Chapter V  
On Light Metaphysics  
—An Analysis of Book I of the Second Part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 
After going through Suhrawardī’s severe criticism of Peripatetic metaphysics in his 
significant discussion of mental considerations, we must now consider what Suhrawardī has to 
offer in his Illuminationist metaphysics. With Chapters II & III & IV as necessary preparation, 
we are finally in a position to move on to Suhrawardī’s famous light metaphysics. 
In order to avoid overburdening this chapter, I focus on interpreting the rich meaning of 
light and thereby base this chapter mainly on Book I [Ḥ.Sh 106–124]  of the five books of the 1
second part—where Suhrawardī presents his Illuminationist philosophy—of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. I 
try not to touch upon topics in the other four books, though in some cases I may have to. I will 
not deal with topics like the emanation theory (that is, how things come into existence from the 
Light of lights or God), the hierarchical order of separate intellects, or their relations with natural 
kinds in this world; such topics are discussed in Book II. I will not even address all of Book I; 
even that would be too much.  Instead, I focus on what best serves the purpose of this chapter: an 2
interpretation of Suhrawardī’s light, which poses a major challenge.  With this chapter, I simply 3
aim to set an example for how to reconstruct Suhrawardī’s light metaphysics by using the Cave 
Story approach I propose; an accurate understanding of light is absolutely fundamental. 
First of all, it is essential to have a clear idea of what Suhrawardī is doing in the second 
part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. In my view, he is constructing Illuminationist philosophy—the result 
of deification (تــــألّــــھ, taʾalluh) or presential knowledge—step by step by using the Peripatetic 
method, namely, investigation (بــــحـث, baḥth) or knowledge by forms. Based on Chapter II, it 
should be obvious that the epistemological foundation of Illuminationist philosophy is presential 
knowledge, that is, the direct knowledge of particular things in both the material and the 
 The title of Book I reads “On light and its reality, [and on] the Light of lights and what arises from It first”. However, there 1
is nothing about “what arises from It first” in Book I; this is, in fact, a topic of Book II. The titles of some other chapters of 
Book I are questionable as well. Moreover, the paragraphing and the division of Book I into chapters are problematic. 
Walbridge and Ziai’s translation (1999) of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, which is based on Corbin’s edition, suffers from the same 
problems. More examples of such problems, with my suggestions, will be mentioned as footnotes as this chapter goes on.
 To be specific, I will not deal with Suhrawardī’s arguments for the existence of the Light of lights/God and Its absolute oneness, 2
which are the last topics of Book I. For a discussion of the Light of lights, see Kaukua 2011: 150–156.
 For example, see 5.2.2 for a criticism of Kaukua’s (2011) problematic interpretation of Suhrawardī’s “adventitious light” and 3
“dusky substance”.
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immaterial worlds. Therefore, for one who has presential knowledge of these things, such as a 
Sūfī or mystic, the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is unnecessary; the only thing that matters is 
the presential knowledge itself. Suhrawardī, however, is not a pure Sūfī. From the introduction to 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, we know that his ambition is to become a philosopher of the highest rank: 
“divine philosopher proficient in both deification  and investigation” (1 حــكیم إلھــي مــتوّغــل فــي الــتألــھ
 ḥakīm ilāhī mutawaghghil fī al-taʾalluh wa-l-baḥth) [Ḥ.Sh 12.1–2, ¶5] (1.3.1). This ,والــــبـحـث
requires him not only to have presential knowledge, spiritual witnessing (مــــشـاھــــدة, mushāhada), 
unveiling (مـكاشـفة, mukāshafa) or tasting (ذوق, dhawq) of every real thing, especially of immaterial 
things beyond this world, but also to make philosophical sense of whatever he apprehends by 
presential knowledge by resorting to investigation or knowledge by forms, that is, by 
philosophical arguments.  The second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq should be considered as the fruit 2
of such efforts. This explains why Suhrawardī requires his readers to study the Peripatetic works 
and to become proficient in investigation before reading Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (1.2).  The second 3
part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is the ultimate guide for every prisoner who intends to follow 
Suhrawardī and escape from the cave; it allows one to catch a glimpse of what the world outside 
the cave is like. 
In this chapter, I largely follow the order of Book I, and try to answer the following 
significant questions. What is light? Is it reasonable to take light as a serious subject matter of 
metaphysics? Is light equivalent to existence? Is the division of things in the real world into light 
and darkness reasonable? Is the existence of immaterial lights presupposed or established by 
argument? Is the equivalence of immaterial lights to self-apprehenders presupposed or 
established by argument?  
It is not hard to paraphrase Suhrawardī’s light metaphysics, as many scholars have done; the 
real challenge is to make philosophical sense of it. As we shall see, light metaphysics is neither 
Avicennism in peculiar light-based terminology (it is not Avicennan at all), nor Suhrawardī’s 
mystical delusion of which not much philosophical sense can be made.  In my view, it is an 4
extremely creative metaphysical system which deserves serious philosophical study.  
 In the summary of Chapter II (2.6), I have argued that deification, or to become God-like, means to have presential knowledge 1
of every particular thing in the real world like God.
 According to Izutsu (1971: 59–62), this is the “formal structure”—first formulated by Suhrawardī—of Ḥikmat-type of thinking: “a 2
perfect fusion of mystical experience and analytical thinking”. The second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is a great example.
 This is my Answer (8) to the indispensability of the Peripatetic works: Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq as a perfect fusion of deification 3
and investigation. See the end of Chapter I.
 Aminrazavi’s interpretation, as I understand it, almost makes Suhrawardī’s light metaphysics nothing but such a mystical 4
delusion. See Aminrazavi 1997: 78–87.
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5.1 Light and existence 
The first chapter of Book I, of which the title reads “On [the fact that] light needs no 
definition”, is only one sentence: 
[Text 1] 
If in existence  there is something that needs no definition or explanation, 1
then it is that which is manifest (الــــظـاھــــر, al-ẓāhir). Nothing is more manifest 
than light. So light is the last thing that needs definition. [Ḥ.Sh ¶109, 106.12–
13] 
The argument here is quite clear: since that which is manifest is that which needs no 
definition or explanation, and since light is the most manifest thing, light must need no 
definition. However, what troubles us is the purpose of this argument. In my opinion, Suhrawardī 
aims to establish that light is suitable to be the subject matter of metaphysics. 
5.1.1 Why light? 
Avicenna and Suhrawardī both hold that the subject matter of metaphysics must be that 
which is the most obvious or manifest, and that which needs no definition whatsoever; 
otherwise, a still higher science would be required to prove the existence of the subject matter of 
metaphysics, which is absurd. Since Suhrawardī has already established that univocal existence 
is nothing but a mental consideration, it cannot be the subject matter. But how about 
systematically ambiguous existence? In Chapter III, I argued that Suhrawardī indeed treats 
systematically ambiguous existence as the subject matter of Peripatetic metaphysics as 
reconstructed by him in the Peripatetic works (3.3.2). But obviously, he does not think 
systematically ambiguous existence is also the most appropriate subject matter of Illuminationist 
metaphysics. Suhrawardī, however, does not tell us why. I think there are at least two significant 
reasons. 
First, no matter how we emphasise the systematic ambiguity of existence, it can still be 
confused easily with univocal existence, especially for one who has never been trained in 
philosophy. Secondly, existence always carries with it the distinction between quiddity and 
existence, that is, some sort of duality; Suhrawardī certainly wants to avoid such a distinction 
 “Existence” here could be understood as systematically ambiguous existence, or simply, as things that exist in the real world.1
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which has caused enough trouble.  These two considerations persuade Suhrawardī to find an 1
alternative for existence, which must meet the following three conditions: (1) it must be the most 
manifest thing and therefore needs no definition, or to put differently, no one would doubt that it 
exists in the real world; (2) it would not be confused easily with any mental consideration; (3) it 
does not carry with it any distinction (e.g. the one between quiddity and existence) or duality. 
The subject matter that Suhrawardī finds is light. (1) Light is the most obvious or manifest 
thing (in the physical world at least) and therefore needs no definition. (2) Light is so real that it can 
hardly be confused with any mental consideration: when we think of light, the first thing that arises 
in the mind is the light in the real world. (3) Light does not carry with it any distinction or duality. 
However, is it appropriate at all to take light as a serious subject matter of metaphysics? 
Again, Suhrawardī offers no explanation. What follows is merely my assumption, which I hope 
reflects Suhrawardī’s thinking. 
One of the most significant features of Illuminationist philosophy, as shown clearly in 
Chapters II & III & IV, is that it is mainly, if not only, concerned with particular or individual 
things in the real world. No one would doubt the real existence of the following things: the self 
of every human being, a member of a natural kind (e.g. a horse), or this particular blackness. By 
contrast, universal intentions, with which the Peripatetics are concerned and whose real existence 
one may doubt, are proved by Suhrawardī to be nothing but mental considerations. It is crucial 
always to keep this feature in mind if one aims to have an accurate understanding of 
Suhrawardī’s metaphysics.  
Therefore, in order to find the most appropriate subject matter of metaphysics, where 
would Suhrawardī—an Illuminationist who is concerned mainly with real particular things—
start? The most straightforward source of inspiration must be the real material world. What is the 
most manifest thing in the material world? Suhrawardī’s answer is light, or more precisely, “the 
adventitious light” (النور العارض, al-nūr al-ʿāriḍ), that is, the material or physical light (5.2.2). 
Someone might object immediately: why cannot the most obvious or manifest material 
thing be the loudest sound, or the strongest smell, taste or touch? One might respond that this is 
because visual perception is the most developed human sensation, so light appears to be even 
more manifest than other objects of sensation. This is true. But a more essential reason is that 
light not only is manifest in itself but also manifests others. It is this ability to manifest others 
 In Chapter III (3.3.3) I have argued that Suhrawardī aims to remove the quiddity—existence distinction from metaphysics.1
 174
that distinguishes light from other contenders. A loud sound is manifest in itself, but it cannot 
manifest anything else; neither can a smell, taste or touch. Light, therefore, is the most manifest 
among all material things in this sense: it is so manifest that it even manifests others. In a rule 
about light, Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 2] 
If you want to have a rule (ضــابــط, ḍābiṭ) for light, then let it be that light is what 
is manifest in the reality of itself (الــظاھــر فــي حــقیقة نــفسھ, al-ẓāhir fī ḥaqīqat nafsihi) 
and what manifests others by itself (المظھـــر لـــغیره بـــذاتـــھ, al-muẓhir li-ghayrihi bi-
dhātihi). It is more manifest in itself than anything that manifestation is added 
to its reality. [Ḥ.Sh 113.5–7, ¶¶116–117]  1
Again, someone might object: even if I acknowledge that light is the most manifest 
material thing, it does not exist at all beyond this material world, so it cannot be the subject 
matter of metaphysics.  
In Book I, immediately after §2.1.1 on the indefinability of light, and §2.1.2 on the 
distinction between the rich and the impoverished (الــغنّي والــفقیر, al-ghanī wa-l-faqīr),  Suhrawardī 2
sets about proving that light of a higher level—the immaterial light (الـمـجــــّرد -al-nūr al ,الــــنـور 
mujarrad) —must exist in §2.1.3 and §2.1.4.  An immaterial light is different from an 3 4
adventitious light (i.e. a physical light) in the sense that it no longer subsists as a state/accident in 
a substrate, but rather, it subsists by itself as a substance. There is, in fact, nothing mysterious 
about the immaterial light. In §2.1.5 and §2.1.6, Suhrawardī explains in detail what an 
immaterial light is. By a very complicated argument, he proves that every immaterial light is 
equivalent to a self-apprehender. So God, separate intellects and souls are all immaterial lights.  
Yet again, someone might object: in what sense are these things called “lights”, albeit 
immaterial? Is this not merely arbitrary? 
 [Ḥ.Sh 113.5–7, ¶¶116–117] is an example of the paragraphing problem in Book I: a complete sentence is broken into two 1
paragraphs.
 See 5.3 for my translation and analysis of §2.1.2.2
 I shall justify my rending of “النور المجّرد” (al-nūr al-mujarrad) as “immaterial light” in 5.2.2.3
 The title of §2.1.3 reads “On light and darkness”, and that of §2.1.4 reads “On that bodies require immaterial lights in their 4
existence”. Both titles, in my opinion, are inaccurate. In the first half of §2.1.3, [Ḥ.Sh ¶109, 107.9–108.8], Suhrawardī is indeed 
dealing with the division of light and darkness, but in the second half, [Ḥ.Sh ¶110, 108.9–109.1], he is arguing that an 
adventitious light is deficient and its cause cannot be a dusky substance or a state attributed to darkness. In fact, the second half 
of §2.1.3 and the whole §2.1.4 constitute a two-page argument: immaterial lights must exist (see 5.3 for a reconstruction). 
Therefore, the division of Book I into chapters is also questionable.
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If we agree to call those which are the most manifest “lights” (be they material or 
immaterial), then we must acknowledge as reasonable Suhrawardī’s fourfold division of things 
in the real world into light substances (immaterial lights), light states (adventitious lights), 
darkness substances (dusky substances) and darkness states (states attributed to darkness) (5.2).  1
This division exhausts everything: a real thing must be either manifest/light or not manifest/
darkness, and either a substance or an accident. Suhrawardī then proves that immaterial lights 
must exist in the real world by a two-page argument [Ḥ.Sh ¶¶110–111, 108.9–110.7] and that 
every immaterial light must be equivalent to a self-apprehender by an eight-page argument [Ḥ.Sh 
¶¶114–123, 110.17–119.4] (5.3 & 5.4).  If Suhrawardī’s arguments can work, then God, separate 2
intellects and souls must all be immaterial lights. Therefore, it all boils down to whether or not 
one agrees to call those which are the most manifest “lights”; if one agrees, it is not at all 
arbitrary to identify God, intellects and souls with immaterial lights.  
I assume the main reason one might disagree in calling God, intellects and souls “lights” is 
simply that they are not manifest in the way physical lights are. We cannot see any human soul in 
darkness. However, if one opens up one’s mind, one may accept that it is not necessary that the 
way in which light substances (immaterial lights) manifest must be the same as the way in which 
light states (adventitious lights) manifest. The reason a physical light can be seen in darkness is 
that it is a state of a body, whereas the reason a light substance cannot be seen in darkness is 
simply that it is not a state of a body but is itself a substance. Since a light substance is not a state 
of a body and hence immaterial, it is unreasonable to expect to see a light substance by the eye. 
Later in 5.4, I will reconstruct Suhrawardī’s argument that every light substance is a self-
apprehender, and it manifests as self-apprehension. 
However, one might still feel uncomfortable calling immaterial manifest things “lights”. In 
this case, one should replace every “light” in Suhrawardī’s light metaphysics (manifest-thing-
metaphysics) with “that which is the most manifest” or “a most manifest thing”. This is 
permissible, for Suhrawardī has already told us at the very beginning of his metaphysics: 
[Part of Text 1] 
Nothing is more manifest than light. [Ḥ.Sh 106.13, ¶107] 
 Since Suhrawardī’s terms are not introduced until 5.2, in this section I use terms like “light substance”, “light state”, “darkness 1
substance” and “darkness state”. But after introducing Suhrawardī’s terms in 5.2, I shall follow him strictly in using his terms.
 As far as I know, these two points have not yet been noted by any other modern scholar. It seems that modern readers of 2
Suhrawardī all take the existence of immaterial lights and their equivalence to self-apprehenders as presupposed in light 
metaphysics. This prevailing reading inevitably makes Suhrawardī’s light metaphysics much less convincing or intelligible. 
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By doing this, one would find Suhrawardī’s metaphysics more appealing. 
5.1.2 The advantage of light 
In my view, there is another advantage to taking light (that which is the most manifest) as 
the subject matter of metaphysics. If one accepts light as the subject matter, then one naturally 
divides things in the real world into light and whatever is not light, namely, darkness (that which 
is not manifest), and further into light substances, light states, darkness substances, darkness 
states, as Suhrawardī does (5.2). This fourfold division reveals immediately the essential 
difference between all instances of systematically ambiguous existence. How? 
Let us consider the following question. What do instances of systematically ambiguous 
existence of the highest levels have in common that distinguishes them fundamentally from 
those of lower levels? One of the most promising answers must be that the instances of the 
highest levels not only are immaterial but also have life and self-apprehension, such as God, 
intellects and souls. By contrast, those of lower levels are material and have no life or self-
apprehension whatsoever. This distinction is the same as the one between immaterial lights 
(provided that Suhrawardī can prove the equivalence of immaterial lights to self-apprehending 
immaterial substances) and those which belong to the other three categories.  
Therefore, by taking light (that which is the most manifest) as the subject matter of 
metaphysics, Suhrawardī can concentrate his metaphysics on investigating the nature of immaterial 
lights. What are immaterial lights? What is the fundamental difference between them and instances 
of lower levels? How do they cause the existence of other things (the topic of Book II)? 
At this point, I think we are in a better position to understand what Suhrawardī says about 
the subject matter of metaphysics in al-Talwīḥāt: 
[Text 3] 
Theoretical philosophy (الــــحـكـمـة الــــنـظـریــــة, al-ḥikma al-naẓariyya) has several 
branches. One branch is concerned with things which are by no means 
material, such as the true Necessary (الــــحـّق  al-wājib al-ḥaqq), the ,الــــواجــــب 
intellects and so on, and with those sorts of absolute existence which by no 
means require matter by their nature, even though some of them are mingled 
with matter. This branch is named “the highest science” (الـــعلم األعـــلى, al-ʿilm al-
aʿlā). Its subject matter (مــــوضــــوعــــھ, mawḍūʿuhu) is the most general thing, 
namely, absolute existence (الــــمــطــلــق  al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), and it ,الــــوجــــود 
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investigates its essential accidents and its various kinds (أعــراضــھ الــذاتــیة وأقــسامــھ, 
aʿrāḍuhu al-dhātiyya wa-aqsāmuhu). [The highest science] includes the 
universal science (الــعلم الــكلي, al-ʿilm al-kullī), namely, [the science] which deals 
with the structure of existence (تــقاســیم الــوجــود, taqāsīm al-wujūd), and theology 
[al-ilāhī). [LWḤ3 3.5–9 ,اإللھي)  1
Let me translate the text above into the Illuminationist terms Suhrawardī uses in the second 
part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. The highest science of theoretical philosophy—metaphysics—is 
concerned with “things which are by no means material”, namely, immaterial lights, such as “the 
true Necessary”, namely, the Light of lights (األنــــوار  ,nūr al-anwār), “intellects”, namely ,نــــور 
dominating immaterial lights (األنـــوار الـــقاھـــرة, al-anwār al-qāhira) , and “those sorts of absolute 2
existence which by no means require matter by their nature, even though some of them are 
mingled with matter”, that is, souls, namely, controlling immaterial lights (األنـوار الـمدبّـرة, al-anwār 
al-mudabbira) . In metaphysics, there is “the universal science” which deals with the structure of 3
existence, that is, the fourfold division of systematically ambiguous existence into light and 
darkness (5.2), and there is theology, that is, the science concerned with the Light of lights.  
Are we saying that there are two subject matters of metaphysics: one systematically 
ambiguous existence and the other light? Light (that which is the most manifest), in my view, is 
the most important section of systematically ambiguous existence. In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, the 
subject matter of metaphysics is definitely light, rather than systematically ambiguous existence. 
One might be worried that light, as merely a section of systematically ambiguous existence, does 
not encompass everything, so it is not general enough to be the subject matter of metaphysics. 
However, encompassing everything is not a condition for being the subject matter of 
metaphysics; being the most manifest and therefore indefinable is the condition, and light meets 
this condition. By focusing his investigation on lights, Suhrawardī can better reveal the true 
nature of every instance of systematically ambiguous existence.  
Several scholars have suggested that the systematically ambiguous light in Illuminationist 
metaphysics should be equivalent to systematically ambiguous existence.  For example, Ziai writes: 4
 First introduced as [Text 15] in 3.3.2.1
 This is an Illuminationist term introduced in Book II.2
 Another Illuminationist term introduced in Book II.3
 For example, Izutsu 1971: 62; Rizvi 2000: 95. 4
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In Part One of the Philosophy of Illumination, Suhrawardī “proves” that 
existence in the univocal sense (as homonymous being, i.e. predicative 
being) is a mental concept that depends for its existence on the individual 
essences of things. … On the other hand, Suhrawardī does treat being in an 
“equivocal” sense, i.e. the being which corresponds to the differences that 
are apparent in things out there. But Suhrawardī calls this being “light,” and 
his “science of light” examines the essence of things out there, and their 
gradation in terms of intensity and priority.  1
I do not agree that Suhrawardī’s light is equivalent to systematically ambiguous existence.  2
An obvious reason is that instances of systematically ambiguous existence include not only 
lights (those which are the most manifest) but also those which are not lights: darkness 
substances, namely, bodies, and darkness states (5.2.3). My position is that light and 
systematically ambiguous existence are neither equivalent nor mutually exclusive; rather, light is 
the most important section of systematically ambiguous existence.  
Therefore, my whole hypothesis of what Suhrawardī is doing in metaphysics is as follows. 
In the Peripatetic works, he puts forward a carefully modified and reconstructed Peripatetic 
metaphysics, in which no mental universal consideration is taken as extramental particular things 
and whose subject matter is systematically ambiguous existence. This is the very existential 
metaphysics of which Mullā Ṣadrā claims to be the founder. In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī 
develops the Peripatetic existential metaphysics into light metaphysics, of which the subject 
matter becomes light (that which is the most manifest)—the most important section of 
systematically ambiguous existence—for the two significant reasons mentioned above,  so that 3
he can concentrate his metaphysics on investigating instances of systematically ambiguous 
existence of the highest levels, that is, immaterial lights. 
 Ziai 1990: 169. An obvious problem is that systematic ambiguity is confused with equivocity (see 3.3.1 & 3.3.2 for their 1
difference). It seems that by saying “Suhrawardī does treat being in an ‘equivocal’ sense”, Ziai actually means that “Suhrawardī 
does treat being in a ‘systematically ambiguous’ sense”. For his full discussion, see Ziai 1990: 168–171.
 Walbridge (1992: 40–41, 49) also questions the equivalence of light to existence. But I do not think Walbridge makes the 2
distinction between univocal existence and systematically ambiguous existence; he is, in fact, questioning the equivalence of light 
to univocal existence. So my argument should not be confused with that of Walbridge. I am concerned with whether or not light 
is equivalent to systematically ambiguous existence; it is beyond doubt that light is not equivalent to univocal existence, which is 
nothing but a mental consideration.
 (1) Systematically ambiguous existence can be confused easily with univocal existence; (2) existence always carries with it 3
the quiddity—existence distinction.
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5.2 Light and darkness 
After establishing light as an appropriate subject matter of metaphysics, Suhrawardī puts 
forward a fourfold division of all things in the real world in the first half of §2.1.3, ¶109. This 
passage, ¶109, is absolutely crucial for understanding Suhrawardī’s metaphysics, since it 
contains the fundamental division of all real things. As we shall see, this division also serves as 
the key premise of both Suhrawardī’s argument for the existence of immaterial lights (5.3), and 
his argument for the equivalence of immaterial lights to self-apprehenders (5.4).  In addition, 1
many unique Illuminationist terms are introduced in ¶109 for the first time. Therefore, I propose 
to analyse the whole passage sentence by sentence in this section.  
5.2.1 Light in the non-metaphorical sense 
Suhrawardī begins by putting forward his primary division of things in the real world: 
[Text 4] 
Things are divided into light and brightness in the reality of itself (نــور وضــوء فــي 
 nūr wa-ḍawʾ fī ḥaqīqat nafsihi) and what is not light or brightness in ,حــقیقة نــفسھ
the reality of itself (مــا لــیس بــنور وضــوء فــي حــقیقة نــفسھ, mā laysa bi-nūr wa-ḍawʾ fī 
ḥaqīqat nafsihi). [Ḥ.Sh 107.9–10, ¶109] 
In light metaphysics, things in the real world are first divided into light in itself and whatever is 
not light in itself, or in other words, into what is manifest in itself and what is not manifest in 
itself.  
This primary division is followed by a crucial qualification for what Suhrawardī means by 
“light”:  
[Text 5] 
Here, what I intend for light and brightness is the same, for I do not mean by 
light or brightness what is regarded as [something] metaphorical (مـا ُیـعّد مـجازیـا, 
mā yuʿaddu majāziyyan), such as that which means something obvious in 
the intellect (الــــعـقـل عــــنـد   al-wāḍiḥ ʿinda al-ʿaql), though at last its ,الــــواضــــح 
happening also goes back to this light.  [Ḥ.Sh 107.10–12, ¶109] 2
 It is also the premise of the arguments for the existence of the Light of lights/God and Its absolute oneness (not addressed in 1
this chapter).
 That is to say, the reason something obvious in the intellect is called “light” metaphorically is that real light or brightness is the 2
most obvious thing in the real world. My interpretation is the same as Shīrāzī’s [Shī 277.7–8].
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In the text above, Suhrawardī tells us explicitly that what he means by “light” in Illuminationist 
philosophy must not be taken as any metaphorical light. Whenever he says “light”, he means 
light in the real sense: either an adventitious light, which is a manifest accident, or an immaterial 
light, which is a manifest substance. This is, in my opinion, what makes Suhrawardī’s light 
metaphysics so special.  
Before Suhrawardī, when a philosopher talks about “light” in metaphysics, he is almost 
definitely using light in a metaphorical sense. There is a survey by N. Sinai (2016) of the use of 
“light imagery … in medieval Arabo-Persian literature prior to al-Suhrawardī”: Theology of 
Aristotle, the “Light Verse” (24: 35) of the Qurʾān, Ghazālī’s Niche of Lights and so on.  To this 1
literature I want to add a relatively “newly discovered Arabic translation of a very important 
passage from Plato’s Republic (Book VI, 506d3–509b10) found in the work entitled Kitāb fī 
Masāʾil al-umūr al-ilāhiyya, penned by the somewhat obscure Neoplatonist Abū Ḥāmid al-
Isfizārī (fl. mid-fourth/tenth c.)”.   2
For example, in the first chapter of Niche of Lights, Ghazālī claims that “the real light is 
God, may He be exalted, and that [applying] the expression ‘light’ to anything else is purely 
metaphorical and has no reality”. Ghazālī also argues that “the ‘seeing light’ (al-nūr al-bāṣir)—
i.e. the eye—is more appropriately called ‘light’ than the ‘seen light’ (al-nūr al-mubṣar)”, and 
“the intellect (ʿaql) more completely measures up to the concept of light than even the eye”.  3
These examples show clearly that Ghazālī is using “light” in a metaphorical rather than real 
sense. Suhrawardī would never agree with Ghazālī that the real light is merely God and light 
could only be applied to other manifest real things metaphorically.  For another example, Isfizārī 4
writes: “so just as the thing by means of which vision sees visible objects is called ‘light’, so too 
the thing by means of which one intellects the intelligibles is called ‘light’.”  Apparently, this is 5
another use of the term “light” in a metaphorical way.  
Now that Suhrawardī has made it perfectly clear that the light with which he is concerned 
is not any metaphorical light, we should always bear this rule in mind when reading Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq and try not to interpret Suhrawardī’s light in any metaphorical way. Otherwise, problems 
 Sinai 2016: 274–275.1
 D. C. Reisman 2004: 263. For the Arabic text and its English translation, see Reisman 2004: 280–300. 2
 Sinai 2016: 282–284.3
 But I am not arguing Suhrawardī would not be inspired by Ghazālī’s notion of light. See Sinai 2016 for a comparative study of 4
Suhrawardī’s light and Ghazālī’s. 
 Reisman 2004: 293.5
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will arise.  Light is nothing but light, that is, the most manifest real thing, either material or 1
immaterial, either as an accident or as a substance; there is nothing mysterious about light.  
5.2.2 The division of light 
Light is further divided into two kinds, as Suhrawardī goes on: 
[Text 6] 
Light is divided into what is a state of another (مــا ھــو ھــیئة لــغیره, mā huwa hayʾa 
li-ghayrihi), that is, the adventitious light (الــنور الــعارض, al-nūr al-ʿāriḍ), and light 
which is not a state of another, that is, the immaterial light (الـــنور المجـــّرد, al-nūr 
al-mujarrad) or the pure light (الـــنور الـــمحض, al-nūr al-maḥḍ). [Ḥ.Sh 107.12–14, 
¶109] 
Suhrawardī accepts the real distinction between substance and accident/state, so light is naturally 
divided into two kinds: light as a state, namely, the adventitious light (الــــنـور الــــعـارض, al-nūr al-
ʿāriḍ), and light as a substance, namely, the immaterial light (الــنور المجــّرد, al-nūr al-mujarrad) or 
the pure light (النور المحض, al-nūr al-maḥḍ). 
The Arabic term for “immaterial light” is “نـور مجـّرد” (nūr mujarrad), whose literal meaning 
is “deprived light”. In fact, it is short for “light deprived of body”. Therefore, my slightly 
subjective rendering of this term is “immaterial light”. Another rendering I used to prefer is 
“pure light”.  But the shortcoming of “pure light” is that for someone unfamiliar with 2
Suhrawardī, it might be confusing: one may wonder in what sense a physical light is not pure. 
With “immaterial light”, there is no such problem: nobody would confuse immaterial lights with 
physical lights. “Pure light” is my literal rendering of “نــــور مــــحـض” (nūr maḥḍ), a synonymous 
term with “نـور مجـّرد” (nūr mujarrad). But note that “نـور مجـّرد” (nūr mujarrad)—immaterial light
—is Suhrawardī’s more frequently used term. 
 For instance, Kaukua’s (2011) problematic interpretation of Suhrawardī’s “adventitious light” (see 5.2.2 for detail).1
 “Pure light” seems to be Kaukua’s (2011) preferred rendering of “مـجــــّرد nūr mujarrad). Sinai (2016) uses “luminous 2) ”نــــور 
substance”, and “luminous state” for “adventitious light” (نـــور عـــارض, nūr ʿāriḍ). But “luminous substance” loses the meaning of 
immateriality (e.g. a luminous rock can be called a “luminous substance” as well.). In addition, I find the meaning of “luminous” 
somewhat unclear: it could refer either to that which is light in itself, or simply to that which shines or glows or that which is 
illuminated by light. I think it is safer to render Suhrawardī’s terms literally and follow him strictly in using them. Walbridge and 
Ziai’s (1999) rendering is “incorporeal light”, and so is Aminrazavi’s (1997: 79). Walbridge (1992) uses “immaterial light”.
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“Adventitious light” is the literal rendering of “نـور عـارض” (nūr ʿāriḍ).  It is short for “light 1
adventitious to another”, with “another” referring to body. Here, we focus on the question of 
what an adventitious light is. I defer a thorough discussion of what an immaterial light is to 5.4. 
Kaukua (2011) suggests that Suhrawardī’s “adventitious lights” are, in fact, 
“manifestations of quiddities”,  or something “akin to the instantiations of Platonic Forms”:  2 3
Take for instance our example of a horse: it is manifest as a particular horse, 
or to put this in Suhrawardī’s terminology, it is illumined by an adventitious 
light in which it appears as a horse. But in itself the horse is a dusky 
substance, which can never become manifest in its entirety. This is because 
the horse is manifest to me only at a particular time, and from a particular 
perspective. The substance itself which underlies these appearances, from 
one moment to another, remains inaccessible to me. Thus, although I may 
form a concept of the horse as a single, independent and continuously 
existing substance, I can never experience it as such. And in the end, insofar 
as our being is being manifest, the substance of the individual horse is 
nothing but such a conception. Really, there are only so many manifest 
instantiations of light that advene in the form of a horse.  4
As interesting as Kaukua’s interpretation of adventitious light seems, I do not think it can 
work. First of all, the main example of adventitious light mentioned by Suhrawardī in Book I is 
the light of the sun: 
[Text 7] 
In barriers, there are those from which the light does not disappear, such as 
the sun and others. These barriers participate in being-a-barrier (الـــبرزخـــیة, al-
barzakhiyya) with those from which the brightness (الــــضــوء, al-ḍawʾ) can 
disappear; they differ from those by their eternal brightness (الــــضوء الــــدائــــم, al-
ḍawʾ al-dāʾim). But the light by which these barriers differ from those is 
 Walbridge and Ziai’s (1999) rendering of “نــور عــارض” (nūr ʿāriḍ) is “accidental light”; it tends to carry the impression that light 1
of this kind occurs simply by chance. Sinai’s “luminous state” loses the meaning of being-adventitious. Kaukua’s rendering is the 
same as mine.
 Kaukua 2011: 146 (note 17).2
 Kaukua 2011: 145 (note 16).3
 Kaukua 2011: 145–146.4
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added to being-a-barrier and subsists in it. So it is an adventitious light, and 
its bearer (حاملھ, ḥāmiluhu) is a dusky substance. [Ḥ.Sh 108.5–8, ¶109] 
From the text above, it is plain to see that Suhrawardī’s example of adventitious lights is nothing 
like the one given by Kaukua. Moreover, Kaukua is obviously using adventitious “lights” in a 
metaphorical sense (and Suhrawardī does not allow this, as shown in 5.2.1); I do not assume 
anyone would call “manifestations of quiddities” “lights” in the real sense. Furthermore, how 
would Kaukua’s adventitious light be suitable to be a state/accident; to which category would it 
belong?  
In addition, Kaukua’s understanding of Suhrawardī’s “dusky substance” is unacceptable as 
well. Suhrawardī would never call the form of a horse a “dusky substance”. In 5.2.3.1, I shall put 
forward a detailed analysis of what Suhrawardī means by “dusky substance”. It has nothing 
whatsoever to do with quiddities like horseness.  Also, if by “the form of a horse” or “quiddity” 1
Kaukua means common nature, more serious problems arise. It is clear from Chapter IV that 
Suhrawardī does not acknowledge any real common nature, for genera and differentiae are 
nothing but mental considerations. 
With the main example of adventitious lights being the light of the sun, it is safe to argue 
that adventitious lights are nothing but the lights we see every day in the physical world. There is 
nothing mysterious about Suhrawardī’s adventitious light. The real problem is what an 
immaterial light is; this shall be addressed in detail in 5.4. 
5.2.3 The division of darkness 
Also based on the real distinction between substance and accident/state, Suhrawardī 
divides “what is not light or brightness in the reality of itself” into the following two kinds: 
[Text 8] 
What is not light in the reality of itself is divided into what needs no substrate 
 mā huwa mustaghnin ʿan al-maḥall), that is, the dusky ,مــا ھــو مســتغٍن عــن المحــّل)
substance (الـجوھـر الـغاسـق, al-jawhar al-ghāsiq), and what is a state of another (مـا 
 mā huwa hayʾa li-ghayrihi), that is, the state attributed to darkness ,ھـو ھـیئة لـغیره
 [al-hayʾa al-ẓulmāniyya). [Ḥ.Sh 107.14–16, ¶109 ,الھیئة الظلمانیة)
 As we shall see, a dusky substance which exists is a body in the real world, but pure dusky substance is nothing but a mental 1
consideration which the mind generates when analysing philosophically a real barrier/body.
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As we can see, from this point the peculiar Illuminationist terms begin to crop up in Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq; all of them are rather hard to render. 
Following Walbridge and Ziai (1999), I use “dusky substance” to render “جــــوھــــر 
 ,jawhar ghāsiq), and so do Kaukua (2011) and Sinai (2016). It is unclear to me, however) ”غــاســق
what is the exact difference between “غــاســق” (ghāsiq, dusky) and “مــظلم” (muẓlim, dark). But one 
thing is for sure: Suhrawardī only uses “غــــاســــق” (ghāsiq, dusky) with substance: “جــــوھــــر 
 ھــیئة“ jawhar ghāsiq, dusky substance); he never uses it with state, so one can never find) ”غــاســق
 hayʾa ghāsiqa, dusky state) in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. When Suhrawardī simply mentions) ”غــــاســــقة
 ghawāsiq), we can be sure that he means) ”غـــواســـق“ ghāsiq, dusky) or its plural form) ”غـــاســـق“
“dusky substance” (jawhar ghāsiq) or “dusky substances” (jawāhir ghāsiqa). The term 
 muẓlim) appears) ”مـظلم“ ,ghāsiq). In Book I) ”غـاسـق“ muẓlim) does not appear as often as) ”مـظلم“
only four times (all in §2.1.3 = ¶¶109–110): three times out of the four, it refers definitely to 
substance [Ḥ.Sh 108.2, 4, ¶109; 108.12, ¶110]; in the other time, it seems to refer to substance 
and state together [Ḥ.Sh 108.3, ¶109]. So “مـظلم” (muẓlim, dark) seems more versatile than “غـاسـق” 
(ghāsiq, dusky). 
It is difficult to render “ھــیئة ظــلمانــیة” (hayʾa ẓulmāniyya). In Arabic, “ظــلمانــي” (ẓulmānī) is 
obviously different from “مــــظلم” (muẓlim), so the renderings must show this difference: if “dark” 
is used to render “مـظلم” (muẓlim), it cannot be used again to render “ظـلمانـي” (ẓulmānī); we need to 
come up with another rendering.  Just as “غــــاســــق” (ghāsiq, dusky) is used only with substance, 1
 ,jawhar ẓulmānī) ”جـوھـر ظـلمانـي“ ẓulmānī) is used only with state, so one can never find) ”ظـلمانـي“
substance attributed to darkness) in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. In my view, “ظــــلمانــــي” (ẓulmānī) refers to 
what is attributed to a dusky substance, namely, a state, so it cannot refer to a dusky substance 
itself. Therefore, my recommended rendering of “ھــــیـئـة ظــــلـمـانــــیـة” (hayʾa ẓulmāniyya) is “state 
attributed to darkness”. The reason “مــــظـلـم” (muẓlim, dark) can be used with both substance and 
state, as in [Ḥ.Sh 108.3, ¶109], is that neither a dusky substance nor a state attributed to darkness 
is light or that which is manifest in itself, so they are both dark in this sense.  
As for the state which is light, namely, the adventitious light, Suhrawardī sometimes uses 
 nūrānī) as “attributed to) ”نـــورانـــي“ nūrānī) to refer to it [Ḥ.Sh 122.3, ¶129]. I render) ”نـــورانـــي“
light”, corresponding to “ظــــلـمـانــــي” (ẓulmānī) as “attributed to darkness”. But in most cases, 
 This is why I do not use the rending—“dark state”—of Walbridge and Ziai (1999), Kaukua (2011) and Sinai (2016) of this term. 1
Walbridge (1992: 49) uses “dark mode”.
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Suhrawardī uses “نــــوري” (nūrī), because an adventitious light is also light in itself, though it is a 
state. So I render “ھیئة نوریة” (hayʾa nūriyya) as “light state” .  1
It should be noted that neither Shahrazūrī nor Shīrāzī follows Suhrawardī strictly enough in 
using these terms in their commentaries. In this chapter, I follow Suhrawardī in using them as 
strictly as possible. 
What is dusky substance and what is state attributed to darkness? Before answering these 
two questions, another term—barrier (بــــرزخ, barzakh)—must be introduced. These three terms 
must be analysed together. Suhrawardī goes on in ¶109: 
[Text 9] 
A barrier (الــــبـرزخ, al-barzakh) is a body (الــــجـسـم, al-jism). It is described as a 
substance which can be intended by pointing (الـجوھـر الـذي ُیقـصد بـاإلشـراة, al-jawhar 
al-ladhī yuqṣadu bi-l-ishāra). [Ḥ.Sh 107.16–17] 
It is unclear why Suhrawardī chooses such a strange term—“بــــرزخ” (barzakh)—as an 
Illuminationist synonym for “body”.  Literally, “بــــرزخ” (barzakh) means interval, gap, 2
obstruction, or isthmus in geography. Following Walbridge and Ziai (1999), I render 
 .barzakh) as “barrier”, and so do Kaukua and Sinai) ”برزخ“
Shahrazūrī has a comment on the term “بــــرزخ” (barzakh), which Shīrāzī simply repeats in 
his commentary [Shī 277.17–18]. Shahrazūrī writes: 
Since a barrier is an obstruction (الـحائـل, al-ḥāʾil) between two things, and since 
dense bodies are obstructive, a body should certainly be called a “barrier”. 
[Sha 288.13–14] 
Shahrazūrī’s remark is based on what Suhrawardī writes in Book IV of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 
about the division of barriers or bodies. I simply report what Suhrawardī says without further 
analysis: 
 Walbridge & Ziai (1999) and Sinai (2016) use “luminous state”, but “luminous” is somewhat unclear. As mentioned in a previous 1
footnote, “luminous” could refer either to that which is light in itself, or simply to that which is bright or illuminated by light.
 For a latest discussion of the meaning and etymology of barzakh in Illuminationist philosophy, see Karbassian 2018. 2
Karbassian (2018: 93) concludes “the Illuminationist word barzakh, meaning ‘body’, is a usage particular to Suhrawardī that 
cannot be traced back to Persian texts in pre-Islamic Iran”. Note that Karbassian (2018: 91) argues that, according to 
Suhrawardī, “barrier is prime matter without a state”; this, in my view, is a grave mistake, probably due to a misunderstanding 
of [Ḥ.Sh 193.3–5, ¶193]. When Suhrawardī writes “matter (الھـیولـى, al-hayūlā) is a barrier (بـرزخ, barzakh)” [Ḥ.Sh 193.4], he is 
giving the term “matter” (ھــــیـولــــى, hayūlā) a new Illuminationist meaning; one must not take this to mean that barrier is the 
Peripatetic prime matter. There is, in fact, no such thing as prime matter in light metaphysics. A “بــــرزخ” (barzakh) is an 
existent dusky substance, which must have certain states (5.2.3.2).
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[Text 10] 
Every simple [body] (فـــارد, fārid)  is either opaque (حـــاجـــز, ḥājiz), which blocks 1
light entirely, or transparent (لــــطـیـف, laṭīf), which does not block light at all, or 
translucent (مــــقتصد, muqtaṣad), which blocks light in an incomplete way and it 
has degrees in blocking. [Ḥ.Sh 187.9–11, ¶194] 
Earth is opaque; water is translucent; air is transparent (فـضاء, faḍāʾ) [Ḥ.Sh 187.14–15, ¶194]. It is 
plain to see that not every body is an obstruction (الــــحـائــــل, al-ḥāʾil): an opaque body is an 
obstruction, whereas a translucent or transparent body is not. But translucent and transparent 
bodies are also “barriers”. Therefore, Shahrazūrī’s interpretation above is not satisfactory. 
My preliminary assumption is as follows. In Arabic, “بــــرزخ” (barzakh) means literally “a 
thing that intervenes between two things”.  Body is that which is in between the four categories 2
of Suhrawardī’s fourfold division. Although bodies in themselves are dusky substances, they are 
not pure dusky substance which is but a mental consideration (5.2.3.1); rather, they are dusky 
substances with certain states attributed to darkness (5.2.3.2). Moreover, bodies can have lights: 
not only adventitious lights (e.g. the sun), but even immaterial lights (e.g. human beings 
composed of body and soul). Therefore, bodies can combine the four categories of the fourfold 
division; I think Suhrawardī is calling a body “برزخ” (barzakh) due to this consideration. 
5.2.3.1 Pure dusky substance as a mental consideration  3
Back to the previous questions. What is dusky substance and what is state attributed to 
darkness? What is their relation to barrier? 
In ¶111 of §2.1.4, there is a crucial description of dusky substance: 
[Text 11] 
The substantiality/being-a-substance (جــــوھــــریــــتـھ, jawhariyyatuhu) of dusky 
substance is intellectual (عــــقـلـیـة, ʿaqliyya), and its being-dusky (غــــاســــقـیـتـھ, 
ghāsiqiyyatuhu) is attributed to non-existence (عـــدمـــیة, ʿadamiyya). So it does 
not exist inasmuch as it is like that (فــال ُیــوجــد مــن حــیث ھــو كــذا, fa-lā yūjadu min 
 Body is divided into “simple body” (جـسم فـارد, jism fārid) and “composite body” (حـسم مـزدوج, jism muzdawij): a composite body is 1
composed of two different simple bodies.
 According to E. W. Lane’s An Arabic-English Lexicon (1968).2
 As far as I know, no other modern scholar has made such a claim as mine: pure dusky substance is nothing but a mental 3
consideration.
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ḥaythu huwa kadhā); rather, it exists in the real world together with 
characteristics (الخصوصیات, al-khuṣūṣiyyāt) . [Ḥ.Sh 110.6–7, ¶111] 1
That is to say, dusky substance inasmuch as it is dusky substance does not exist in the real world; 
put differently, we cannot find anything in the real world that is pure dusky substance without 
any characteristic. In fact, it is nothing but a consideration generated by the mind when we 
analyse philosophically a barrier/body in the real world: every barrier is a dusky substance 
together with certain states attributed to darkness, e.g. magnitude, quality, and perhaps also with 
light state/adventitious light, such as the sun. However, pure dusky substance without any state 
or characteristic is nothing but a mental consideration. 
Suhrawardī’s argument that pure dusky substance cannot exist in the real world is as 
follows:  
[Part of Text 11] 
The substantiality/being-a-substance of dusky substance is intellectual, and 
its being-dusky is attributed to non-existence. [Ḥ.Sh 110.6, ¶111] 
But why must substantiality be intellectual, and why must being-dusky be attributed to non-
existence? 
In §1.3.3.1 of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, when dealing with various mental considerations, 
Suhrawardī argues that substantiality must be one of these considerations that cannot possibly 
exist in the real world [Ḥ.Sh ¶67, 70.13–71.4]:  
[Text 12] 
Know that substantiality is also not something added to being-a-body (أمــر زائــد 
الــــجـسـمـیـة  amr zāʾid ʿalā al-jismiyya) in the real world; rather, creating ,عــــلـى 
something as a body (جـعل الشـيء جـسما, jaʿl al-shayʾ jisman) is by itself creating it 
as a substance (جــعلھ جــوھــرا, jaʿluhu jawharan). This is because substantiality, 
in our view, is nothing but the perfection of the quiddity of something (كـمال مـاھـیة 
 kamāl māhiyyat al-shayʾ) in the sense that it does not need any ,الــشــــيء
substrate for its subsistence (في قوامھ, fī qawāmihi). [Ḥ.Sh 70.13–15, ¶67] 
When we come across a body in the real world, our mind may predicate “_____ is a substance” 
of it univocally: “this body is a substance”. But it does not follow that the univocal property—
 Literally, “those which are characteristics”.1
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substantiality/being-a-substance—attributed by the predicate “_____ is a substance” must be a 
real property added to this body in the real world; rather, it is nothing but a consideration 
generated by our mind, because we consider this body as a substance, that is, something that 
needs no substrate for its subsistence. More about substantiality will be mentioned in 5.4.3.3, 
when I reconstruct Suhrawardī’s argument that substantiality cannot be my self or my I-ness. 
The reason why Suhrawardī says “being-dusky is attributed to non-existence” is as 
follows: 
[Text 13] 
Darkness (الــــظلمة, al-ẓulma) is nothing but an expression of the non-existence 
of light (عدم النور, ʿadam al-nūr). [Ḥ.Sh 107.17–108.1, ¶109]  
Then, in [Ḥ.Sh 108.1–3, ¶109], Suhrawardī argues that the non-existence of light does not 
require possibility (اإلمـكان, al-imkān)  as its condition. From the commentaries of Shahrazūrī [Sha 1
288.19–289.5] and Shīrāzī [Shī 277.21–278.16] on this point, we know the Peripatetics hold that 
only when it is possible for a thing to have light, do we use “darkness” to express the “non-
existence of light” of that thing. So air, which cannot possibly have light, is not dark, according 
to the Peripatetics. This Peripatetic thesis is unacceptable to Suhrawardī, because it would 
undermine the exhaustivity of Suhrawardī’s light—darkness division of all real things: air, for 
example, would be neither light nor darkness. Suhrawardī argues: 
[Text 14] 
It is certain that everything that is neither light nor what is attributed to light 
 [nūrānī) must be dark. [Ḥ.Sh 108.3, ¶109 ,نوراني)
So air must be dark as well. A brilliant remark on this point is made by Shahrazūrī: 
If we open our eyes at a dark night and we see nothing, then we name 
everything around us “dark”, be it a mountain, a wall or air, regardless 
whether it can accept light or not. So we know air must be dark, and this 
proves darkness is nothing but the non-existence of light. [Sha 289.2–5] 
Therefore, it is established that darkness is nothing but the non-existence or negation of light 
(without the possibility to have light as a condition). 
 In this case, by “إمــــكـان” (imkān), Suhrawardī means “possibility” (the negation of impossibility), rather than “contingency” (the 1
negation of both necessity and impossibility). For Avicenna’s distinction in al-Najāt, see [NJ 30.6–34.7].
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Now that substantiality/being-a-substance is a mental consideration and being-dusky is 
nothing but the non-existence of light, it is plain to see that pure dusky substance must be a 
mental consideration, which cannot exist in the real world. 
I remarked at the beginning of this chapter that Suhrawardī, in the second part of Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq, is constructing Illuminationist philosophy by using the Peripatetic method: investigation 
 baḥth) or knowledge by forms. This can be supported by Suhrawardī’s discussion of dusky ,بــحث)
substance here, a universal mental consideration introduced for the sake of philosophical 
analysis. Were it not the case, there would be no place for dusky substance—a mental 
consideration—in Illuminationist metaphysics. 
If one asks if there is any Peripatetic concept similar to Illuminationist “dusky substance”, 
I think there is not. The most similar concept seems to be prime matter, but dusky substance is 
still fundamentally different from prime matter. Pure dusky substance is a mental consideration 
that cannot exist in the real world; the ontological status of prime matter is famously (or 
notoriously) mysterious, but at least we cannot say prime matter does not exist in the real world, 
or prime matter is merely a consideration created by the mind. 
5.2.3.2 Barriers as dusky substances which exist 
Barriers/bodies exist in the real world; this is a fact. Suhrawardī aims to prove that every 
barrier in itself is a dusky substance. He argues: 
[Text 15] 
It has already been witnessed that if light disappears from a barrier, the 
barrier remains dark (مظلم, muẓlim). [Ḥ.Sh 107.17, ¶109] 
[Text 16] 
If light disappears from a barrier, the barrier does not need anything else to 
become dark. So these barriers must be dusky substances. [Ḥ.Sh 108.4–5, 
¶109] 
If a barrier—be it opaque like earth, or translucent like water (5.2.3)—loses its adventitious light, 
it necessarily becomes dark.  This fact proves that every barrier in itself is a dusky substance (not 1
pure dusky substance, but a dusky substance with certain states attributed to darkness).  
 A transparent barrier, like air, cannot have light.1
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Suhrawardī further argues that even though a barrier may never lose its adventitious light, 
like the sun, in itself it is still a dusky substance. It is conceivable for the sun to lose its light, and 
it would become dark. Suhrawardī goes on in ¶109:  
[Text 7 in 5.2.2] 
In barriers, there are those from which the light does not disappear, such as 
the sun and others. These barriers participate in being-a-barrier (الـــبرزخـــیة, al-
barzakhiyya) with those from which the brightness (الــــضــوء, al-ḍawʾ) can 
disappear; they differ from those by their eternal brightness (الــــضوء الــــدائــــم, al-
ḍawʾ al-dāʾim). But the light by which these barriers differ from those is 
added to being-a-barrier and subsists in it. So it is an adventitious light, and 
its bearer (حاملھ, ḥāmiluhu) is a dusky substance. [Ḥ.Sh 108.5–8, ¶109] 
Based on the arguments above, Suhrawardī concludes at the end of ¶109: 
[Text 17] 
So every barrier is a dusky substance. [Ḥ.Sh 108.8, ¶109] 
Since every barrier is a dusky substance, a light substance—an immaterial light—cannot be a 
barrier; it must be something else. After proving the existence of immaterial lights (5.3), 
Suhrawardī argues that every immaterial light must be a self-apprehender (5.4).  
At this point, one may wonder: since pure dusky substance is nothing but a mental 
consideration and since every barrier is a dusky substance, then why is barrier not a mental 
consideration? This is because a barrier is not pure dusky substance without certain states 
attributed to darkness, like magnitude, qualities and so on; rather, a barrier is a dusky substance 
with these states. It is due to these states that dusky substances exist in the real world as 
particular and individual barriers.  
5.2.3.3 States attributed to darkness 
In his commentary, Shahrazūrī remarks that Suhrawardī’s states attributed to darkness refer 
to the nine categories which are accidents [Sha 288.13]. Following Shahrazūrī, Shīrāzī as well 
writes:  1
 Following Shīrāzī, Walbridge (1992: 50) holds the same opinion.1
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States attributed to darkness are the nine categories which are accidents 
 al-maqūlāt al-tisʿ al-ʿaraḍiyya) and without adventitious ,الــمقوالت الــتسع الــعرضــیة)
light. [Shī 277.16] 
This, however, is not true. As mentioned twice in this thesis (1.1.1 & 3.2.1.1), in his 
Peripatetic works, Suhrawardī has reduced ten Peripatetic categories to four: substance, relation, 
quantity and quality, with motion introduced as a fifth category. Place, time, position (وضـع, waḍʿ) 
and disposition (مــــلـكـة, malaka) are reduced to relation; action and affection to motion.  In 1
addition, relation is proved to be nothing but a mental consideration by Suhrawardī in §1.3.3.1 of 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq—[Ḥ.Sh ¶65, 70.2–8]; the same goes for discontinued quantity as number (4.1). 
Therefore, states attributed to darkness must refer merely to the following three categories of 
accidents: continued quantity as magnitude (مــــقـدار, miqdār), quality and motion.  The main 2
examples of states attributed to darkness mentioned by Suhrawardī in Book I are shape [Ḥ.Sh 
109.5, ¶111] and magnitude [Ḥ.Sh 109.7, ¶111]. To these states, Shahrazūrī adds colour, taste 
and smell [Sha 291.18–19].  
With Suhrawardī’s fourfold division of real things in mind, we proceed to his argument for 
the existence of immaterial lights. 
 For a brief discussion by Suhrawardī, see [LMḤ 123.13–124.21].1
 We know motion is a real property in 3.2.1, as Suhrawardī writes in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: “Therefore, all properties are divided into 2
two kinds: real property (صــــفـة عــــیـنـیـة, ṣifa ʿayniyya), and it has a form in the intellect, such as blackness, whiteness and motion.” 
[Ḥ.Sh 71.5–6, ¶68]
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5.3 The argument for the existence of immaterial lights 
As remarked above, Suhrawardī never presupposes that immaterial lights exist in the real 
world; rather, this is established by a two-page argument [Ḥ.Sh ¶¶110–111, 108.9–110.7]: the 
second half of §2.1.3 and most (not all) of § 2.1.4.  1
The key premise of this argument is Suhrawardī’s fourfold division of things in the real 
world, as analysed in 5.2. Since this fourfold division exhausts everything in the real world, that 
is, every real thing must belong to one of the four categories, Suhrawardī aims to prove that (1) 
adventitious lights, dusky substances and states attributed to darkness are all impoverished (فــــقیر, 
faqīr) or deficient in themselves and furthermore, (2) they cannot cause each other. If Suhrawardī 
manages to establish these two points, then immaterial lights necessarily exist as their cause; 
otherwise, nothing would exist in the first place. The structure of the argument is as follows: 
Argument I: every adventitious light is impoverished, and its cause cannot be 
a dusky substance or a state attributed to darkness 
   [Ḥ.Sh ¶110, 108.9–109.1] 
Argument II: every state attributed to darkness is impoverished, and its cause 
cannot be a dusky substance 
   [Ḥ.Sh 109.5–10, ¶111] 
Argument III: every dusky substance is impoverished, and its cause cannot 
be another dusky substance 
   [Ḥ.Sh 109.10–110.2, ¶111] 
Argument IV: no adventitious light, dusky substance or state attributed to 
darkness can cause each other 
   [Ḥ.Sh 110.2–110.7, ¶111] 
As another premise, Suhrawardī’s distinction between the rich and the impoverished in 
§2.1.2 must be introduced. This chapter, §2.1.2, like §2.1.1 is also very brief: 
[Text 18] 
[That which is] rich (الــغني, al-ghanī) is that whose essence (ذاتــھ, dhātuhu) does 
not depend on another and nor does its perfection; [that which is] 
impoverished (الــــفـقـیـر, al-faqīr) is that whose essence depends on another and 
so does its perfection. [Ḥ.Sh ¶108, 107.4–5] 
 In this case, Corbin’s division of Book I into chapters is obviously misleading.1
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It must be noted that Suhrawardī’s distinction between the rich and the impoverished should not 
be confused with the Peripatetic distinction between necessary existent (واجـــب الـــوجـــود, wājib al-
wujūd) and contingent existent (مــــمكن الــــوجــــود, mumkin al-wujūd). First, although “the Absolute 
Rich” (الــــغني الــــمطلق, al-ghanī al-muṭlaq) refers to the Light of lights, namely, God, “those which 
are rich” refer to immaterial lights in the sense that they do not depend on anything else in the 
other three categories of the fourfold division. Things of the other three categories are all 
impoverished in the sense that they depend on something else from another category or 
categories (as will be proved shortly). By contrast, Necessary Existent by Itself (واجـب الـوجـود بـذاتـھ, 
wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātihi) refers exclusively to God, whereas necessary existent by another 
 wājib al-wujūd bi-ghayrihi) refers to anything that exists in the real world other ,واجـب الـوجـود بـغیره)
than God, with contingent existent by itself (مـــمكن الـــوجـــود بـــذاتـــھ, mumkin al-wujūd bi-dhātihi) to 
anything other than God and what is impossible in itself to exist. Therefore, these two 
distinctions obviously do not correspond to each other. Moreover and more fundamentally, 
Suhrawardī’s distinction between the rich and the impoverished is based on an analysis of 
systematically ambiguous existence: every instance of systematically ambiguous existence 
differs from another instance in degrees of perfection. The Peripatetic distinction between the 
necessary and the contingent, by contrast, is based on an analysis of univocal existence: 
Necessary Existent by Itself preponderates towards (تـــرّجـــح إلـــى, tarajjaḥa ilā) univocal existence 
(rather than systematically ambiguous existence, obviously) by itself; necessary existent by 
another preponderates towards univocal existence by another; contingent existent by itself is 
indifferent to univocal existence and non-existence, so it requires a cause—a preponderate (مـرّجـح, 
murajjiḥ)—to exist (or not to exist). 
5.3.1 Argument I: every adventitious light is impoverished, and its cause cannot be a 
dusky substance or a state attributed to darkness 
Suhrawardī starts off by arguing that every adventitious light must be impoverished in 
itself:  
[Text 19] 
A sensible adventitious light (الــنور الــعارض الــمحسوس, al-nūr al-ʿāriḍ al-maḥsūs) is 
not rich in itself; otherwise, it would not need a dusky [substance] (الـــغاســـق, al-
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ghāsiq). Since it subsists in it, it is needy (فــــاقــــر, fāqir)  and contingent. [Ḥ.Sh 1
108.9–10, ¶110] 
The argument is straightforward: since every state which subsists in a substrate is impoverished 
in itself, and since every adventitious light is a state which subsists in a dusky substance, it must 
be impoverished in itself.  
This argument is followed by two arguments that an adventitious light cannot be caused by 
a dusky substance or a state attributed to darkness. Suhrawardī goes on: 
[Text 20] 
The existence of an adventitious light is not from a dusky substance; 
otherwise, it would be implied by it (الزَمــــھ, lāzamahu) and follow it (اّطــــرد مــــعھ, 
iṭṭarada maʿahu). But this is not the case. [Ḥ.Sh 108.10–11, ¶110] 
Supposing that the cause of adventitious lights is dusky substances, then every dusky substance 
would imply an adventitious light, that is to say, every barrier or body in the real world would be 
luminous and no barrier would be dark. This is absurd. The same argument applies to states 
attributed to darkness. This is the first argument. 
Furthermore, Suhrawardī argues: 
[Text 21] 
Since a thing cannot necessitate what is nobler than itself (أشــــرف مــــن ذاتــــھ, 
ashrafu min dhātihi), then how [could a dusky substance necessitate an 
adventitious light]? So that which gives all dusky substances their 
[adventitious] lights cannot be their dark quiddities (مـاھـیاتـھا الـمظلمة, māhiyyātuhā 
al-muẓlima) or their states attributed to darkness. [Ḥ.Sh 108.11–13, ¶110] 
Since what is lower (أخــّس, akhassu) cannot necessitate what is nobler (أشــرف, ashrafu), and since 
an adventitious light is nobler than a dusky substance and a state attributed to darkness, so it 
cannot be caused or necessitated by either of the two. But in what sense is an adventitious light 
nobler? This is answered by what Suhrawardī says next: 
 The exact difference between “فـاقـر” (fāqir) and “فـقیر” (faqīr) is unclear. I render “فـاقـر” (fāqir) as “needy” simply to show that it is 1




[Dusky substances and states attributed to darkness] are hidden (خــــفــیــة, 
khafiyya) . Then how could they necessitate what is less hidden than them or 1
similar to them? [Ḥ.Sh 108.14, ¶110] 
That is to say, adventitious lights are nobler than dusky substances and states attributed to 
darkness in the sense that they are manifest, whereas the other two are hidden. Moreover, by 
“nobler” Suhrawardī clearly means higher in the hierarchy of systematically ambiguous 
existence. So the key premise of the second argument must be what is manifest is higher in the 
hierarchy of existence than what is hidden. However, one may argue that this premise has not yet 
been established, though intuitively, this seems to be true. The hierarchy of light and darkness 
can be fully established only after proving the existence of immaterial lights and explaining how 
immaterial lights cause everything else in the fourfold division of real things, a topic addressed 
in Book II.  
Therefore, in my view, the first argument that adventitious lights cannot be caused by 
dusky substances or states attributed to darkness should be considered as Suhrawardī’s main 
argument. The second argument is more like an indication of the hierarchy of light and darkness, 
which is established completely in Book II. 
5.3.2 Argument II: every state attributed to darkness is impoverished, and its cause 
cannot be a dusky substance 
Suhrawardī goes on to prove that no state attributed to darkness can be caused by a dusky 
substance or a barrier: 
[Text 23] 
These things by which barriers differ [from each other] do not belong to a 
barrier by itself; otherwise, barriers would participate in them (تــــشـاركــــت فــــیـھـا, 
tashārakat fī-hā). [For example,] the limits of quantities (حـدود الـمقادیـر, ḥudūd al-
maqādīr) do not belong to barriers by themselves; otherwise, all [barriers] 
would be equal in them. So they [i.e. states attributed to darkness] must 
belong to a barrier due to something else. [Ḥ.Sh 109.7–9, ¶111] 
 “Hidden” (خــــفـي, khafī) is opposed to “manifest” (ظــــاھــــر, ẓāhir). Those which belong to the two categories of darkness in the 1
fourfold division are hidden, whereas those which belong to the two categories of light are manifest.
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Supposing that states attributed to darkness are caused by barriers themselves, and since every 
barrier, in itself and without any state, must be the same dusky substance, as proved above 
(5.2.3.2), then they must necessitate and then participate in the same states, e.g. magnitude, 
quality and so on. This is absurd. 
Suhrawardī, however, does not argue that states attributed to darkness cannot be caused by 
adventitious lights either; on the contrary, he writes: 
[Text 24] 
You will know that most states attributed to darkness are effects of light (مـعلولـة 
  [maʿlūla lil-nūr), even if it is adventitious. [Ḥ.Sh 108.13–14, ¶110 ,للنور
That is to say, Suhrawardī holds that adventitious lights can cause some states attributed to 
darkness. But no further explanation is provided in Book I; this is a topic addressed in Book IV 
of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. A simple example I can think of is that sunlight makes bodies warm or even 
hot; being-warm or hot is a quality.  
Another sub-argument is that every state attributed to darkness is impoverished in itself, 
and it is straightforward: 
[Text 25] 
If shape and other states attributed to darkness are rich, then their existence 
would not depend on a barrier. [Ḥ.Sh 109.9–10, ¶111] 
5.3.3 Argument III: every dusky substance is impoverished, and its cause cannot be 
another dusky substance 
Suhrawardī’s third step is to prove that every dusky substance is impoverished in itself: 
[Text 26] 
If a reality as a barrier (الـحقیقة الـبرزخـیة, al-ḥaqīqa al-barzakhiyya) is rich by itself 
 ghaniyya bi-dhātihā) and necessary, it would not need states ,غــــنـیـة بــــذاتــــھـا)
attributed to darkness or other things which make it specific (الــــمـخـّصـصـات, al-
mukhaṣṣiṣāt) for the realisation of its existence (فــــي تــــحّقق وجــــوده, fī taḥaqquq 
wujūdihi). This is because if barriers are deprived of quantities and [other] 
states, then it is impossible for them to become multiple due to the lack of a 
differentiator from distinguishing states (لــعدم الــممّیز مــن الھــیئات الــفارقــة, li-ʿadam al-
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mumayyiz min al-hayʾāt al-fāriqa), and it is impossible for the essence of any 
barrier to become specific. [Ḥ.Sh 109.10–14, ¶111] 
Obviously, Suhrawardī here is arguing on the conceptual level: if we analyse a real barrier 
philosophically, then it must be composed of pure dusky substance and some differentiators, 
which make it specific and without which it cannot exist in the real world. So every barrier or 
dusky substance must be impoverished in itself. This is another example that Suhrawardī is 
constructing Illuminationist philosophy by using the Peripatetic method: investigation (بــــحـث, 
baḥth) or knowledge by forms.  From the Illuminationist point of view, we know from Chapter 1
IV (4.4.3.2) that differentiation is not a real but a mental process; every barrier is, in fact, 
individual and particular in its own right. The Illuminationist way of proving the deficiency of 
barriers is simply by presential knowledge: an Illuminationist can “witness” directly the 
hierarchy of systematically ambiguous existence, with immaterial lights being the causes of 
everything else, including barriers. 
Lastly, Suhrawardī argues that a dusky substance cannot be caused by another dusky 
substance:  
[Text 27] 
Intuition (الـحــــدس, al-ḥads) judges that it is not the case that the existence of 
some lifeless dusky substances (الــجواھــر الــغاســقة الــمّیتة, al-jawāhir al-ghāsiqa al-
mayyita)  is out of other [dusky substances], for there is no priority (ال أّولــــیـة, lā 2
awwaliyyata) [among them] according to the lifeless reality as a barrier (الـــحقیقة 
 [al-ḥaqīqa al-barzakhiyya al-mayyita). [Ḥ.Sh 109.17–110.1, ¶111 ,البرزخیة المّیتة
Since barriers in themselves are all dusky substances (5.2.3.2), they are the same in nature. So 
none of them has priority in existence over others so that some barriers may cause others. 
Suhrawardī does not further argue that the cause of dusky substances cannot be 
adventitious lights or states attributed to darkness, probably because this is obvious. Since every 
state must depend on a substance, it is impossible for a state to exist prior to a substance, let 
alone to cause a substance. 
Therefore, based on Arguments I & II & III above, we are faced with the following 
situation: (1) every adventitious light requires a cause, and its cause cannot be a dusky substance 
 The argument in [Text 23] above is also an example.1
 Suhrawardī later argues that only immaterial lights are “living” (5.4.3.6).2
 198
or a state attributed to darkness; (2) every state attributed to darkness requires a cause, and its 
cause cannot be a dusky substance (although some states may be caused by adventitious lights); 
(3) every dusky substance requires a cause, and its cause cannot be another dusky substance, an 
adventitious light or a state attributed to darkness. This situation can be illustrated as follows: 
cause ?     => adventitious lights 
cause ? (+ adventitious lights)  => states attributed to darkness 
cause ?    => dusky substances 
5.3.4 Argument IV: no adventitious light, dusky substance or state attributed to 
darkness can cause each other 
Although adventitious lights, dusky substances and states attributed to darkness are all 
impoverished or deficient in themselves, it still does not follow necessarily that their cause must 
be something different from all of them in nature. There is another possibility: they somehow 
cause each other. Suhrawardī must rule out this possibility as well, as he writes: 
[Text 28] 
It cannot be the case that the existence of a barrier, its states attributed to 
darkness or its light states (ھـیئاتـھ الـظلمانـیة والـنوریـة, hayʾātuhu al-ẓulmāniyya wa-l-
nūriyya) is out of each other by way of a circle (عــــلى ســــبیل الــــدور, ʿalā sabīl al-
dawr). This is because it is impossible for a thing to depend on what depends 
on it. [Otherwise,] the latter would make existent (ُیــــوجــــد, yūjidu) that which 
makes it existent (مــوجــده, mūjiduhu), so it would be prior to that which makes it 
existent and itself. This is absurd. [Ḥ.Sh 110.2–6, ¶111] 
This is Suhrawardī’s brilliant argument against a vicious circle. The case Suhrawardī is 
considering here involves three things: an adventitious light, a barrier and a state attributed to 
darkness. However, we can analyse the simplest model: A and B cannot cause each other. If this 
can be established, then the argument also applies to A and C, B and C. Therefore, A, B and C 
cannot cause each other.  
Supposing that there are two things, A and B: A makes B existent and B also makes A 
existent, then A and B would depend on each other and form a circle of dependence. Since A 
makes B existent, then necessarily A is prior to B. Since B also makes A—“that which makes it 
existent” (مـوجـده, mūjiduhu)—existent, then necessarily B is also prior to A. However, if B is prior 
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to A, and A is prior to B, then B would be prior to B itself. But nothing can be prior to itself, so 
every vicious circle of dependence is impossible. 
Since adventitious lights, barriers and states attributed to darkness are all impoverished or 
deficient in themselves, and since they cannot cause each other (otherwise, they would form an 
impossible vicious circle), there must be something different from all of them in nature that 
serves as their cause. Since Suhrawardī’s fourfold division has exhausted every real thing, this 
“something” in question must belong to the fourth category: immaterial lights. Therefore, 
immaterial lights must exist; otherwise, nothing would exist in the real world in the first place.  
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5.4 What are immaterial lights? 
We finally arrive at the last topic of this chapter: the true nature of immaterial lights. After 
the reconstruction above of Suhrawardī’s argument for the existence of immaterial lights, it 
should be plain to see that the existence of immaterial lights is not presupposed by Suhrawardī. 
This section aims to show that the equivalence of immaterial lights to self-apprehenders (e.g. 
God, separate intellects and souls) is likewise not presupposed, but established by an eight-page 
argument. 
Suhrawardī begins by showing two features of immaterial lights. 
5.4.1 Non-pointability 
The first feature of immaterial lights is non-pointability: they cannot be pointed to. 
Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 29] 
Since you have known that every light which can be pointed to (نـــور مـــشار إلـــیھ, 
nūr mushār ilayhi) is an adventitious light, if there is a pure light (نـور مـحض, nūr 
maḥḍ), then it cannot be pointed to, and it does not subsist in a body (ال یـحــــّل 
 .jiha) at all ,جـــھة) lā yaḥullu jisman). Moreover, it must have no direction ,جـــسما
[Ḥ.Sh ¶112, 110.8–10] 
“Which can be pointed to” (إلــــیـھ  mushār ilayhi) is standard terminology for a ,مــــشـار 
particular, corresponding to tode ti in Aristotle. But if Suhrawardī is using “which can be pointed 
to” in this sense, then by saying that “if there is a pure light, then it cannot be pointed to”, he 
would seem to mean that an immaterial light is a universal. This is clearly not the case. 
In fact, “which can be pointed to” in the passage above has more to do with the fact that 
something is material and sensible. Everything that can be pointed to must be either a particular 
body or a particular state which subsists in a body. Since an immaterial light is neither a 
particular body (otherwise, it would be a barrier) nor a particular state which subsists in a body 
(otherwise, it would be an adventitious light or a state attributed to darkness), it cannot be 
pointed to. Since it cannot be pointed to, it must have no direction. 
Therefore, by saying that an immaterial light cannot be pointed to, Suhrawardī means the 
following things: an immaterial light is neither a body nor a state which subsists in a body; it 
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cannot be perceived by sense; it has no direction. He does not mean that an immaterial light is a 
universal, but rather, it must be a particular. 
5.4.2 Self-subsistence  
Self-subsistence is the second feature of immaterial lights, as Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 30] 
An adventitious light is not a light which belongs to itself (نــــور لــــنـفـسـھ, nūr li-
nafsihi), for its existence belongs to another, so it is nothing but a light which 
belongs to another (نــور لــغیره, nūr li-ghayrihi). So an immaterial pure light (الــنور 
 al-nūr al-maḥḍ al-mujarrad) is a light which belongs to itself, and ,الــمحض المجــّرد
every light which belongs to itself is an immaterial pure light. [Ḥ.Sh ¶113, 
110.11–13] 
A distinction is introduced in the text above: light which belongs to itself—light which 
belongs to another. They correspond respectively to immaterial light and adventitious light. An 
adventitious light, as a light state, requires a substrate—a barrier—for subsistence, so its 
existence does not belong to itself but to another; since it is light in itself, it is a light which 
belongs to another (لــــغـیـره  nūr li-ghayrihi). An immaterial light, by contrast, is a light ,نــــور 
substance, so it subsists in itself; since it is also light in itself, it is a light which belongs to itself 
  .(nūr li-nafsihi ,نور لنفسھ)
However, it should be noted that although immaterial lights are self-subsistent, their self-
subsistence varies in degree (God’s self-subsistence is obviously more perfect than that of a 
separate intellect or that of a soul); in other words, “self-subsistent” is not said in the absolute 
sense. This is similar to the case where Suhrawardī says “immaterial lights are rich in 
themselves”; “rich in themselves” is also not said in the absolute sense (5.3). I think the most 
convincing way to justify such claims is as follows (5.3): immaterial lights are rich and self-
subsistent in the sense that they do not depend on anything else in the other three categories of 
the fourfold division, whereas things belonging to the other three categories must depend on 
something else from another category or categories; this has already been proved above (5.3.1 & 
5.3.2 & 5.3.3). To elaborate, adventitious lights require dusky substances; dusky substances 
require states attributed to darkness; states attributed to darkness require dusky substances and 
perhaps adventitious lights; moreover, all of them require immaterial lights as their causes. 
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5.4.3 Self-apprehension 
The third feature is what interests us the most: self-apprehension. As remarked several 
times above, the self-apprehension of immaterial lights is not presupposed but established by 
argument. This section is devoted to reconstructing this eight-page argument [Ḥ.Sh ¶¶114–123, 
110.17–119.4] = §§2.1.4–2.1.7 (with the last passage—¶124—excluded).  I will not address 1
every bit of this argument due to the space constraints. Instead, I concentrate on the first five sub-
arguments [Ḥ.Sh ¶¶114–118, 110.17–114.10]; I think they are sufficient to establish the 
equivalence of immaterial lights to self-apprehenders. But the last two sub-arguments—[Ḥ.Sh 
¶¶119–123, 114.11–119.4]—surely make the whole argument even more convincing. The 
structure of this argument is as follows: 
• Argument I: from the fourfold division 
  [Ḥ.Sh ¶114, 110.17–111.1] 
• Argument II: from the analysis of self-apprehension 
  [Ḥ.Sh ¶¶115–124, 111.5–119.4] 
  • Sub-argument 1: self-apprehension as presential knowledge 
    [Ḥ.Sh ¶115, 111.5–14] 
  • Sub-argument 2: the constancy of self-apprehension  
    [Ḥ.Sh 112.1–4, ¶116] 
  • Sub-argument 3: the equivalence of the self to a self-apprehender 
    [Ḥ.Sh 112.4–16, ¶116] 
  • Sub-argument 4: the equivalence of a self-apprehender to that  
   which is manifest to itself and to an immaterial light 
    [Ḥ.Sh 113.1–5, ¶116] 
  • Sub-argument 5: the equivalence of a self-apprehender to  
   manifestation and to an immaterial light 
    [Ḥ.Sh ¶¶117–118, 113.6–114.10] 
  • Sub-argument 6: self-apprehension is equivalent to manifestation  
   but not to immateriality (not analysed in this chapter)  2
    [Ḥ.Sh ¶¶119–120, 114.11–116.15] 
  • Sub-argument 7: no adventitious light, dusky substance or state  
 This is another example that shows Corbin’s division of Book I is not helpful.1
 A brief analysis can be found in 2.3.3.2
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   attributed to darkness is a self-apprehender (not introduced) 
    [Ḥ.Sh ¶¶121–124, 117.4–119.4]  1
5.4.3.1 Argument I: from the fourfold division 
Suhrawardī’s first argument is as follows: 
[Text 31] 
Whatever has a self  that cannot be neglected (ذات ال یـغفل عـنھا, dhāt lā yaghfulu 2
ʿanhā) is not a dusky [substance] due to the manifestation of its self at it (ظـھور 
عــــنـده  ẓuhūr dhātihi ʿindahu). Nor is it a state attributed to darkness in ,ذاتــــھ 
another, for even a light state (الھــــیئة الــــنوریــــة, al-hayʾa al-nūriyya) is not a light 
which belongs to itself, let alone a state attributed to darkness. So it must be 
an immaterial pure light to which one cannot point. [Ḥ.Sh ¶114, 110.17–111.1] 
It is undeniable that self-apprehenders exist in the real world. At least, all of us are 
apprehending ourselves and we exist. Since Suhrawardī’s fourfold division has exhausted 
everything in the real world, then if he can prove that a self-apprehender cannot be an 
adventitious light, a dusky substance, or a state attributed to darkness, then it must be an 
immaterial light. 
First, a self-apprehender cannot be a dusky substance. This is because every dusky 
substance or barrier is in itself darkness, and darkness, as the non-existence of light, cannot be 
manifest in any sense. But the self of every self-apprehender is manifest to itself, so it cannot be 
a dusky substance.  
One might object by arguing that a dusky substance is dark in the sense that it cannot be 
seen by sight, but it does not follow it is also “dark” in the sense that it does not have a manifest 
self. It is totally possible that a thing is dark as it cannot be seen by sight, but it is also not 
“dark” as it has a manifest self. Therefore, it is possible for a dusky substance to be a self-
apprehender.  
 The title of Chapter 7 of Book I reads “On lights and their divisions”, but only the first two sentences have to do with this 1
division; the main part of §2.1.7 is, in fact, Suhrawardī’s argument that no adventitious light, dusky substance or state 
attributed to darkness can apprehend itself.
 In a footnote of Chapter II (2.2.1.1), I remarked: “the term ‘ذات’ (dhāt) is rendered as ‘self’ rather than “essence” in 2
Suhrawardī’s discussion of self-apprehension. In addition, I use, for example, ‘your self’ to render ‘ذاتــــك’ (dhātuka) rather than 
‘yourself’ in this particular context, because ‘yourself’ is likely to be taken as a reflexive pronoun, but ‘your self’ refers to the 
self, the soul, or the I-ness of yours.” This applies to this section, 5.4.3.
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However, if a dusky substance has a manifest self, is it still a dusky substance? The answer 
is no (it would surely be a substance which is manifest). The proposition—“a dusky substance 
has a manifest self”—is self-contradictory, for to be a dusky substance is by definition to be a 
substance which is not manifest in any sense. As presupposed at the very beginning of light 
metaphysics, light is what is manifest in itself (rather than what can be seen), and darkness is 
what is not manifest in itself (rather than what cannot be seen). The fourfold division is based on 
this very distinction: what is manifest in itself and what is not manifest in itself (rather than what 
can be seen and what cannot be seen). Therefore, if one acknowledges this fourfold division as 
sound, one has to accept that when a dusky substance is said to be “dark”, this means it is not 
manifest in any sense, so it cannot have a manifest self.  
Moreover, a self-apprehender cannot be a state attributed to darkness or an adventitious 
light either. This is because a self-apprehender must be a substance rather than a state/accident in 
the first place. It is inconceivable that a state apprehends itself.  
Therefore, a self-apprehender has to be an immaterial light.  
Although the equivalence of self-apprehenders to immaterial lights can be established in 
this way, Suhrawardī is not satisfied. Immediately after this argument, he puts forward the 
second argument, which is much more complicated than the first; it is based on a thorough 
analysis of self-apprehension. 
5.4.3.2 Argument II: Sub-arguments 1 & 2: the constancy of self-apprehension  1
Suhrawardī starts off by proving that self-apprehension requires no intermediary, be it a 
form or something else. In Chapter II (2.2.1), I have already reconstructed all three arguments on 
this issue from al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq:  
 Argument I: from the particularity of the self (2.2.1.1)  
   [LWḤ3 70.9–71.4] = [ṬRḤ3 484.10–14] 
 Argument II:  from I-ness (2.2.1.2)  
   [ṬRḤ3 484.7–10] = [Ḥ.Sh 111.5–9, ¶115] 
 Argument III: from the priority of self-knowledge (2.2.1.3)  
   [Ḥ.Sh 115.9–14, ¶115] 
 Another analysis of ¶¶115–116 can be found in Kaukua 2011: 146–149. However, Kaukua is not aware that this is a part of 1
Suhrawardī’s eight-page argument for the equivalence of self-apprehenders to immaterial lights. His focus is on the similarity 
between Suhrawardī’s discussion of self-apprehension and Avicenna’s.
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After establishing in ¶115 that self-apprehension requires no intermediary whatsoever, 
Suhrawardī draws from it an inference as Sub-argument 2: self-apprehension must be constant 
and continuous, as he writes at the beginning of ¶116: 
[Text 32] 
You are not absent from your self or from your apprehension of your self, for 
it is impossible that [self-] apprehension is by means of a form or anything 
added (صـورة أو زائـد, ṣūra aw zāʾid). So you do not need, in your apprehension 
of your self, anything other than your self which is manifest to itself (ذاتـك الـظاھـرة 
 dhātuka al-ẓāhira li-nafsihā), or [your self] which is not absent from itself ,لـنفسھا
.(al-ghayr al-ghāʾiba ʿan nafsihā ,الـغیر الـغائـبة عـن نـفسھا)  So necessarily your self’s 1
apprehension of your self is [1] due to itself (لــــنفسھا, li-nafsihā), [2] as it is (كــــما 
 kamā hiya), [3] and you are never absent from your self or any part of ,ھــــى
your self. [Ḥ.Sh 112.1–4, ¶116] 
This is also not an unfamiliar point. In Chapter II, I have put forward an analysis of various 
degrees of Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge (2.5). I remarked that self-apprehension belongs 
to the highest level, of which the feature is that the object (O) can never escape from the 
knowledge of the subject (S), and S can never be deprived of the knowledge of O. My analysis in 
2.5 is corroborated by the text above. 
Suhrawardī’s argument is as follows. Since my self-apprehension requires no intermediary 
but my self (Sub-argument 1), and since my self is never absent from me due to their identity (I 
am nothing but my self), my self-apprehension, therefore, must be constant and continuous. In 
short, my self itself is the sole requirement of my self-apprehension, and it is never absent. 
By the last sentence [Ḥ.Sh 112.3–4, ¶116], Suhrawardī points out three essential features of 
self-apprehension. (1) My self-apprehension is because of my self itself and nothing else. (2) In 
my self-apprehension, I know my self as it is rather than as anything else, such as a form. (3) My 
self-apprehension is constant and continuous, so there is no one single moment that I am not 
apprehending my self or any part of my self. All of these three features are due to the fact that 
my self-apprehension requires nothing but my self, as established in Sub-argument 1. 
 I assume the reason Suhrawardī adds “your self which is not absent from itself” behind “your self which is manifest to itself” is 1
that “manifestation” (ظــھور, ẓuhūr) is not introduced until in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. In al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, the term used by 
Suhrawardī in self-apprehension is “non-absence” (عدم الغیبة, ʿadam al-ghayba). See 2.3.1 for detail on this point.
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5.4.3.3 Sub-argument 3: the equivalence of the self to a self-apprehender 
After establishing the constancy of self-apprehension in Sub-argument 2, Suhrawardī turns 
to the problem of the true nature of the self (e.g. my self, your self) of every self-apprehender. 
Since I apprehend my self constantly (Sub-argument 2), it follows that whatever I cannot 
apprehend constantly must not be my self. Suhrawardī goes on in ¶116: 
[Text 33] 
That from which your self is absent, such as the heart, liver, brain or any 
other organ, with all barriers, states attributed to darkness and light states, 
must not be the [self-] apprehender within you (الــــمدِرك مــــنك, al-mudrik minka). 
So the [self-] apprehender within you cannot be an organ, or anything as a 
barrier (أمــر بــرزخــي, amr barzakhī); otherwise, you would not be absent from it. 
You have a feeling of your self, which is continuous and does not disappear 
 ,shuʿūr bi-dhātika mustamirr lā yazūlu). [Ḥ.Sh 112.4–7 ,شـعور بـذاتـك مسـتمّر ال یـزول)
¶116] 
Suhrawardī first argues that my self cannot be any organ of my body, such as the heart, liver or 
brain.  This is because I cannot apprehend any organ of my body constantly (and this is a fact), 1
but I must apprehend my self constantly (Sub-argument 2), so no organ of my body can be my 
self or even a part of it. Otherwise, I would always apprehend that organ in my self-
apprehension; this is absurd. By the same reasoning, it can be proved that my self cannot be any 
barrier, state attributed to darkness or light state either, for I cannot apprehend any of these things 
constantly. 
Another candidate considered by Suhrawardī is substantiality/being-a-substance: 
[Text 34] 
[1] If substantiality/being-a-substance (الـجوھـریـة, al-jawhariyya) is the perfection 
of its quiddity (كــمال مــاھــیتھا, kamāl māhiyyatihā) or is taken as an expression of 
the negation of a subject or substrate (سـلب الـموضـوع أو المحـّل, salb al-mawḍūʿ aw 
al-maḥall), then it is not something independent (أمــــر مـســــتـقـّل, amr mustaqill), 
which your self itself could be. [2] [Alternatively,] if you take substantiality as 
an unknown intention (مــــعنى مــــجھول, maʿnan majhūl), and [it has already been 
 According to Shīrāzī, the heart, liver and brain are regarded as the most important organs in terms of a human being’s survival 1
[Shī 284.18–19], so they are the most promising candidates for being my self or your self.
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established that] you do not apprehend your self continuously by something 
added (أمــــر زائــــد, amr zāʾid). So the substantiality which is absent from you 
cannot be all of your self or even a part of it. [Ḥ.Sh 112.8–11, ¶116] 
Substantiality is (1) either an unknown intention (2) or a known one. (1) If substantiality is 
an unknown intention, then it cannot be all of my self or even a part of it, for it is absent from 
me, but my self is never absent from me (otherwise, I would not have self-apprehension at all). 
(2) If substantiality is a known intention, then it is either “the perfection of the quiddity” of my 
self or “the negation of a subject or substrate” for my self [Ḥ.Sh 112.8–9, ¶116]. In both cases, 
substantiality cannot be something independent, for it must depend on my self. So it cannot be 
my self, which must be an independent substance. Moreover, we can add another argument: if 
substantiality were all or a part of my self, I would always apprehend the intention of 
substantiality—be it “the perfection of quiddity” or “the negation of a substrate”—in my self-
apprehension. This is absurd. 
In fact, substantiality is nothing but a mental consideration. This has already been proved 
by Suhrawardī in §1.3.3.1 of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, as mentioned above (5.2.3.1). Shahrazūrī rightly 
points out in his commentary:  
You have already known that substantiality is a mental consideration or 
property that does not have any existence in the external world. [Sha 298.23–
299.1] 
Therefore, substantiality cannot be my self. 
After ruling out the possibilities above, Suhrawardī puts forward the only reasonable 
answer: I or my self, is nothing but “a thing which apprehends itself” or a self-apprehender, as he 
goes on: 
[Text 35] 
If you examine carefully, you will find that by which you are you (مــا أنــت بــھ أنــت, 
mā anta bi-hi anta) is nothing but a thing which apprehends itself (شــــيء مــــدِرك 
 .(anāʾiyyatuka ,أنــــائــــیـتـك) shayʾ mudrik li-dhātihi) and it is your I-ness ,لــــذاتــــھ
Everything that apprehends its self participates you in this. [Ḥ.Sh 112.11–13, 
¶116] 
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Suhrawardī does not show us how to “examine carefully”, so I propose to spell out this 
argument. Since my self-apprehension does not require anything other than my self (Sub-
argument 1), it follows that I must apprehend my self constantly (Sub-argument 2). So whatever 
I cannot apprehend constantly must not be my self, such as an organ, or substantiality. Therefore, 
my self must be that which I apprehend constantly. Moreover, I and my self are one and the 
same thing, so I am also that which my self apprehends constantly. In other words, my self must 
be that which apprehends me constantly, and I must be that which apprehends my self constantly. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to say: I or my self is a thing which apprehends itself constantly, that 
is, a self-apprehender. So I or my self (with its synonyms, “that by which you are you” or “your I-
ness”) must be equivalent to a self-apprehender. This argument applies to every self-apprehender. 
If this is the case, then being-an-apprehender (الـمدركـیة, al-mudrikiyya) cannot be something 
added to my self, but rather, it must be my self. Otherwise, my self, in terms of itself and without 
the added being-an-apprehender, would not be an apprehender. This contradicts what has just 
been established. Suhrawardī writes: 
[Text 36] 
Therefore, being-an-apprehender (الــمدركــیة, al-mudrikiyya) is not a property or 
something added, whatever it might be.  [Ḥ.Sh 112.13, ¶116] 1
Suhrawardī further argues that I am not only a self-apprehender but the very self-
apprehension or self-apprehending: 
[Text 37] 
If you presume that your self is a that-ness (إّنــــیـة, inniyya)  which apprehends 2
itself, then [the that-ness] itself would be prior to the apprehension, and then 
the that-ness would be unknown. This is absurd. [Ḥ.Sh 113.3–5, ¶116] 
Supposing that my self is not my very self-apprehension or self-apprehending, then it would be a 
that-ness which has apprehension; then my self would be prior to the apprehension. It follows 
that my self, in terms of itself, would be unknown, and my self is neither an apprehender nor 
something apprehended. This is absurd, for we have just established that my self is nothing but a 
 Moreover, in [Ḥ.Sh 112.14–16, ¶116], Suhrawardī argues that being-an-apprehender is not a part of my I-ness, but it is the 1
whole of it; otherwise, the rest of my I-ness would be unknown, and it would not be my self.
 Shīrāzī interprets “إنّــیة” (inniyya) as “existent reality” (حــقیقة مــوجــودة, ḥaqīqa muwjūda) [Shī 286.19]. I think “this-ness” or “that-2
ness” is an appropriate rendering.
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self-apprehender (Sub-argument 3). Therefore, my self must be not only a self-apprehender but 
also the very self-apprehension or self-apprehending. This is also not an unfamiliar point. In 
Chapter II (2.5), I introduced what Suhrawardī writes in al-Talwīḥāt about this: 
[Text 38] 
Your self is the understanding, that which understands and that which is 
understood (العقل والعاقل والمعقول, al-ʿaql wa-l-ʿāqil wa-l-maʿqūl). [LWḤ3 71.3–4] 
5.4.3.4 Sub-argument 4: the equivalence of a self-apprehender to that which is manifest to 
itself and to an immaterial light 
Suhrawardī’s next crucial step is to establish the equivalence of every self-apprehender to an 
immaterial light by resorting to the concept of “that which is manifest to itself” (ظـاھـر لـنفسھ, ẓāhir li-
nafsihi) as an intermediary: 
[Text 39] 
So it [i.e. every self-apprehender] is that which is manifest to itself by itself 
 ال) al-ẓāhir li-nafsihi bi-nafsihi).There is no characteristic with it ,الـظاھـر لـنفسھ بـنفسھ)
 al-ẓuhūr) could ,الــظھور) lā khuṣūṣa maʿahu) so that manifestation ,خــصوص مــعھ
be a status of it (حــال لــھ, ḥāl lahu). Rather, it is that which is manifest itself (نــفس 
 nafs al-ẓāhir) and nothing else. So it is a light which belongs to itself ,الــــظاھــــر
–nūr maḥḍ). [Ḥ.Sh 113.1 ,نـور مـحض) nūr li-nafsihi). So it is a pure light ,نـور لـنفسھ)
2, ¶116] 
Again, Suhrawardī’s argument needs to be spelt out. In Chapter II (2.3), it is established 
that for every instance of presential knowledge, there are three conditions: (1) the immateriality 
of the subject (S), (2) the presence (or non-absence) of the object (O), and (3) the illumination  1
of S on O. Self-apprehension, as a typical instance of presential knowledge, meets these three 
conditions. But since I and my self—S and O—are one and the same thing, the conditions are 
different in this special case: (1) the immateriality of I or my self, (2) the non-absence  of I from 2
my self and my self from me, and (3) the illumination of I on my self and my self on me.  
 I remarked in Chapter II (2.3.3) that illumination is the subject’s power to make the object manifest to itself, and illumination 1
should not be confused with manifestation. As will be shown shortly, manifestation should be taken as the combination or 
unification of presence (or non-absence) and illumination.
 We know “presence” is inappropriate in the case of self-apprehension, for I and my self are identical (2.3.1).2
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Another premise, as remarked in Chapter II (2.3.3), must be that manifestation unifies 
presence (or non-absence) and illumination. If O is present to S, it does not follow S has 
illumination on O; if S has illumination on O, it also does not follow O is present to S. But if O is 
manifest to S, then O must be present to S and at the same time S must have illumination on O. 
Otherwise, if O is not present to S, even if S has illumination, O cannot be manifest to S; if S has 
no illumination on O, even if O is present to S, O cannot be manifest to S as well. Therefore, I 
argue that manifestation unifies presence (or non-absence) and illumination. 
Based on the two premises above, the three conditions for self-apprehension can be 
reduced to two: (1) the immateriality of me or my self, and (2) the manifestation of me to my self 
and my self to me. If I am manifest to my self, and my self is also manifest to me, then 
obviously, I or my self is “that which is manifest to itself” (الظاھر لنفسھ, al-ẓāhir li-nafsihi). 
However, that which is manifest to itself may be of two kinds: (A) that which is manifest to 
itself by itself, and (B) that which is manifest to itself by another. (B) But a self-apprehender 
cannot be that which is manifest to itself by another, for it has been established that self-
apprehension requires no intermediary whatsoever (Sub-argument I). That which is manifest to 
itself by another is, in fact, nothing but a logical possibility I introduce for the sake of the 
argument, and it cannot possibly exist. This is because nothing other than my self can make my 
self manifest to me; otherwise, my self-apprehension would require an intermediary, which 
contradicts Sub-argument I. (A) Therefore, it is established that every self-apprehender must be 
“that which is manifest to itself by itself” (الظاھر لنفسھ بنفسھ, al-ẓāhir li-nafsihi bi-nafsihi).  
Moreover, it is supposed at the very beginning of light metaphysics that “that which is 
manifest in itself” is light. So every self-apprehender, as that which is manifest to itself by itself, 
must be a light. Moreover, it must be a light which belongs to itself (نـور لـنفسھ, nūr li-nafsihi), for it 
cannot be a state/accident. Therefore, every self-apprehender must be an immaterial light. 
Based on the four sub-arguments above, we know the following things are all equivalent to 
each other: 
self or I-ness = self-apprehender = self-apprehension or self-apprehending = 
that which is manifest to itself by itself = immaterial light 
5.4.3.5 Sub-argument 5: the equivalence of a self-apprehender to manifestation and to an 
immaterial light 
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Sub-argument 4 should be sufficient to establish the equivalence of every self-apprehender 
to an immaterial light, but Suhrawardī goes on to put forward another argument to prove this 
point. In Sub-argument 4, Suhrawardī uses that which is manifest to itself by itself as an 
intermediary; in this argument, the intermediary is manifestation.  
In Sub-argument 4, Suhrawardī first analyses self-apprehension; in this argument, he starts 
from light:  
[Text 2 in 5.1.1] 
If you want to have a rule (ضــابــط, ḍābiṭ) for light, then let it be that light is what 
is manifest in the reality of itself (الــظاھــر فــي حــقیقة نــفسھ, al-ẓāhir fī ḥaqīqat nafsihi) 
and what manifests others by itself (المظھـــر لـــغیره بـــذاتـــھ, al-muẓhir li-ghayrihi bi-
dhātihi). It is more manifest in itself than anything that manifestation is added 
to its reality. [Ḥ.Sh 113.5–7, ¶¶116–117] 
It has already been remarked in 5.1.1 that the reason light is considered as the most manifest 
thing is that it not only is manifest in itself but also manifests others. But the equivalence of light 
to that which is manifest in itself is not enough for Suhrawardī; moreover, he argues for the 
equivalence of light to manifestation. Suhrawardī first considers adventitious lights: 
[Text 40] 
The manifestation of adventitious lights is also not because of something 
added to them. [Otherwise,] they would be hidden (خــــفــیــة, khafiyya) in 
themselves. Rather, their manifestation is, in fact, because of the reality of 
themselves. [Ḥ.Sh 113.8–114.1, ¶117] 
Supposing that an adventitious light is not manifestation itself, but a thing to which 
manifestation is added, then the adventitious light, in terms of itself and without the added 
manifestation, would be something hidden rather than manifest. Then the adventitious light 
would fall into the two categories of darkness—a dusky substance or a state attributed to 
darkness—and would not be light; this is absurd. 
The argument above applies to immaterial lights as well, as Suhrawardī argues in general: 
[Text 41] 
It is not the case that a light occurs and then manifestation follows it (یــــلـزمــــھ 
 yalzamuhu al-ẓuhūr). [Otherwise,] light in the definition of itself would ,الــــظـھـور
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not be light, for something else manifests it. Rather, light is that which is 
manifest and its manifestation is its being-a-light (نـــوریـــتھ, nūriyyatuhu). [Ḥ.Sh 
114.1–3, ¶117] 
In brief, every light, be it an adventitious light or an immaterial light, must be manifestation 
itself. If a light is something that manifestation follows, then light would be darkness, which is 
absurd. Therefore, the following things must be equivalent: 
light = that which is manifest in itself = manifestation 
Now let us consider the relation between every self-apprehender and manifestation. 
Suhrawardī goes on: 
[Text 42] 
Another explanation (عــــبـارة, ʿibāra). It is not permissible for you to say: “my 
that-ness (إّنـــیتي, inniyyatī) is something that manifestation follows (شـــيء یـــلزمـــھ 
 shayʾ yalzamuhu al-ẓuhūr); [otherwise,] that thing would be hidden in ,الــــظـھـور
itself (خـفي فـي نـفسھ, khafī fī nafsihi).” Rather, your that-ness is manifestation itself 
and being-a-light itself. [Ḥ.Sh 114.5–6, ¶118] 
Supposing my that-ness or my self is not manifestation itself, then it must be something that 
manifestation follows; then my self would be hidden in itself. If my self is hidden, then I cannot 
apprehend my self. But it is proved in Sub-argument 3 that I or my self is nothing but a self-
apprehender; this is absurd. If one argues that I apprehend my self, which is hidden in itself, by 
the manifestation which follows my self, then my self-apprehension would require an 
intermediary; this also contradicts Sub-argument 1: self-apprehension requires no intermediary 
whatsoever. Therefore, my self must be manifestation itself. 
Since every immaterial light is manifestation and a substance (rather than an accident), and 
since every self-apprehender is manifestation and a substance as well, then every immaterial 
light must be equivalent to a self-apprehender.  
5.4.3.6 Summary: the true nature of immaterial lights 
Suhrawardī concludes:  
[Text 43] 
So everything which apprehends its self must be a pure light. Every pure light 
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must be that which is manifest to its self and which apprehends its self. [Ḥ.Sh 
114.8–9, ¶118] 
[Text 44] 
So it is certain that that which apprehends its self is a light which belongs to 
itself (لــــنـفـسـھ  nūr li-nafsihi) and vice versa. If an adventitious light is ,نــــور 
presumed to be immaterial, it would [as well] be that which is manifest in 
itself to itself.  So the reality of that whose reality is its-being-that-which-is-1
manifest-in-itself-to-itself is the reality of the light which is presumed to be 
immaterial. This is that and vice versa. [Ḥ.Sh 116.12–15, ¶120] 
Therefore, based on the texts above and the five sub-arguments, the following things must all be 
equivalent:  
self or I-ness = self-apprehender = self-apprehension or self-apprehending = 
that which is manifest to itself by itself = immaterial light or pure light = light 
which belongs to itself = that which is manifest in itself (as a substance) = 
manifestation (as a substance)  
Moreover, Suhrawardī invites us to consider the nature of life and that which is living; they 
should as well be added to the equation above: 
[Text 45] 
Life (الــــحـیـاة, al-ḥayāt) is for a thing to be manifest to itself. That which is living 
-al-darrāk al ,الــدّراك الــفّعال) al-ḥayy) is that which is actively apprehending ,الــحي)
faʿʿāl). You have known [what is] apprehension. It is obvious that the action 
 ,فــّیاض بــالــذات) al-fiʿl) also belongs to light. It is what is emanating by itself ,الــفعل)
fayyāḍ bi-l-dhāt). So every pure light is living; every living thing is a pure light. 
[Ḥ.Sh 117.7–9, ¶121] 
Therefore, based on Argument I (5.4.3.1) and Argument II, which is composed of the five 
sub-arguments as reconstructed above and another two sub-arguments which are not introduced 
in this section, I argue that the equivalence of immaterial lights to self-apprehenders is not 
 Note that an adventitious light is manifest to another, not to itself; otherwise, it would apprehend itself.1
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presupposed by Suhrawardī, but established step by step by sophisticated philosophical 
arguments.  
Now we should have a very clear idea of what Suhrawardī refers to by immaterial lights. 
Just as in the case of adventitious lights, there is nothing mysterious about immaterial lights. 
Every immaterial light is a light substance, a light which belongs to itself, that which is manifest 
in itself to itself by itself (and manifestation itself), and a self-apprehender (and self-
apprehension itself). Immaterial lights are instances of systematically ambiguous existence of the 
highest levels: God, separate intellects and souls. They are the cause of everything else in the 
other three categories of the fourfold division of real things, as proved in 5.3. 
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5.5 Summary of Chapter V 
Many significant points are introduced in this chapter, which is an example of how to 
reconstruct Suhrawardī’s light metaphysics by the Cave Story approach I propose. 
In 5.1, I first explained why Suhrawardī deems light to be an appropriate subject matter of 
metaphysics. This is because light is the most manifest thing which needs no definition 
whatsoever, so there is no need for another even higher science to prove its existence. Unlike 
existence, light is not easily confused with any mental consideration; moreover, light does not 
carry any sort of duality (like the quiddity—existence distinction). I further argued that there is 
even an advantage in taking light as the subject matter of metaphysics: it enables Suhrawardī to 
concentrate his metaphysics on investigating the nature of immaterial lights, which are instances 
of systematically ambiguous existence of the highest levels. Also, based on the analysis above, I 
remarked that light cannot be equivalent to systematically ambiguous existence; rather, light is 
the most important section of existence.  
In 5.2, I introduced Suhrawardī’s fourfold division of things in the real world: immaterial 
lights, adventitious lights, dusky substances and states attributed to darkness. This fourfold 
division serves as the key premise of all the major arguments in Book I of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. 
Suhrawardī says explicitly that his light should not be confused with any metaphorical light, a 
rule crucial to an accurate understanding of light metaphysics. Then I discussed how to render 
these key terms (the four above with “barrier”) and what they refer to respectively. With the light 
of the sun as an example, we can be sure that adventitious lights are nothing but the physical 
lights we see every day, so Kaukua’s interpretation is untenable. Pure dusky substance is a 
mental consideration, generated by the mind when we analyse philosophically barriers/bodies in 
the real world. States attributed to darkness refer to three categories of accidents—magnitude, 
quality and motion—rather than nine, so the interpretation of Shahrazūrī and Shīrāzī on this 
point is untenable. Barriers are existent dusky substances with certain states attributed to 
darkness and perhaps also with light states. 
My major argument in this chapter is that neither the existence of immaterial lights nor 
their equivalence to self-apprehenders is presupposed by Suhrawardī in light metaphysics. They 
are, rather, established respectively by a two-page argument and another eight-page argument. 
This point, as far as I know, has not yet been pointed out by any other modern scholar. So these 
two significant arguments were reconstructed in detail in 5.3 and 5.4. Both arguments take 
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Suhrawardī’s fourfold division as their key premise. In the first argument, Suhrawardī argues that 
neither adventitious lights, nor dusky substances, nor states attributed to darkness are rich or 
perfect in themselves, and they cannot cause each other, so immaterial lights must exist as their 
cause, or otherwise, nothing would exist in the first place. In the second argument, by analysing 
self-apprehension in great detail, Suhrawardī manages to establish step by step the equivalence 
of every self-apprehender to an immaterial light by that which is manifest to itself by itself and 
manifestation as two intermedia. In addition, there is another argument for this equivalence from 
the fourfold division.  
The reason Suhrawardī’s light metaphysics would not fall back to Peripatetic metaphysics 
which he criticises severely is that light metaphysics is always about particular things in the real 
world rather than any universal intention or consideration in the mind. Immaterial lights and 
adventitious lights obviously exist in the real world; so do barriers and states attributed to 
darkness. Everyone can prove their existence by direct experience, that is, by presential 
knowledge. One might object that pure dusky substance is nothing but a mental consideration. 
This is true, but dusky substance is necessary for the philosophical analysis of barriers/bodies in 
the real world. As long as pure dusky substance without any state/accident is not confused with 
anything in the real world (for example, not taken as something like the Peripatetic prime 
matter), this would not cause a problem. My claim that Suhrawardī is constructing light 
metaphysics step by step by using the Peripatetic method—investigation (بــــحــث, baḥth) or 
knowledge by forms—can be supported by his discussion of pure dusky substance and some 




In this thesis, I have put forward a historical reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist 
philosophy, focusing on the following three areas: the theory of presential knowledge (Chapter 
II), the significant discussion of mental considerations (Chapters III & IV) and light metaphysics 
(Chapter V). This thesis is intended to be an example for how to reconstruct Illuminationist 
philosophy by using the Cave Story approach I propose, which has the following essential 
features.  
(1) The indispensability of the Peripatetic works. I have argued in Chapter I (1.2), based on 
solid textual evidence, that the Peripatetic works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq must be read together to 
reconstruct Suhrawardī’s discussion on each topic; these works must form one and the same 
Illuminationist project. For example, in order to reconstruct Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental 
considerations, we must first locate all the relevant texts in the Peripatetic works and Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq: al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 19.7–26.9], al-Muqāwamāt [QWM3 162.10–176.6], al-Muṭāraḥāt 
[ṬRḤ3 340.1–371.5], and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh ¶¶56–69, 64.9–73.4]. We must treat these 
works as if they are one and the same huge book. By doing so, one can effectively avoid reading 
Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq as a mystical work or falling back into Corbin’s Oriental Theosophy approach.  
(2) The deification—investigation distinction. We should always keep in mind that the 
ultimate Illuminationist method is deification (تـألّـھ, taʾalluh, or to become God-like), although for 
a philosopher of the highest rank like Suhrawardī, investigation matters as well. The Peripatetic 
method, by contrast, is pure investigation (بــــحــث, baḥth, or discursive reasoning) without 
deification. Deification and investigation refer respectively to presential knowledge (عــلم حــضوري, 
ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) and knowledge by forms (عــلم صــوري, ʿilm ṣūrī). The fundamental difference between 
presential knowledge and knowledge by forms is that the objects of presential knowledge are 
real particular things, whereas those of knowledge by forms are forms rather than real 
particulars things themselves. 
(3) The superiority of Illuminationist philosophy. The ultimate reason Suhrawardī argues 
that Illuminationist philosophy is superior to Peripatetic philosophy is that presential knowledge 
is superior to knowledge by forms, for the objects of presential knowledge are always real 
particular things themselves rather than their forms, and moreover, presential knowledge is 
immediate, infallible, constant and comprehensive. By keeping in mind (2) the deification—
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investigation distinction and (3) the superiority of Illuminationist philosophy, one can effectively 
avoid falling back into Gutas’s Illuminationist Avicennism approach. 
(4) The absolute particularity of things in the real world. As established in Chapters III & 
IV, Suhrawardī holds that everything in the real world is particular in its own right, and 
everything which is universal (in the sense that it does not make the participation in itself 
impossible) must be a mental consideration. This is the key to many puzzles: why Suhrawardī 
formulates the theory of presential knowledge, why he decides to reconstruct Peripatetic 
metaphysics in his Peripatetic works, and why he constructs light metaphysics. 
I believe that by following the Cave Story approach, we can rediscover Suhrawardī—the 
real “Master of Illumination”—and reveal the true nature of Illuminationist philosophy. 
Hopefully, I have made it plausible that Suhrawardī is neither a mystic nor a follower of 
Avicenna but a truly creative and serious philosopher; his Illuminationist philosophy is neither 
“Oriental Theosophy” nor “Illuminationist Avicennism”, but a unique philosophy of the 
particulars (rather than of the universals). 
Suhrawardī is not a mystic. (1) As shown in Chapter I (1.3.1), Suhrawardī’s ambition is to 
become a philosopher of the highest rank; this requires him to be proficient in both deification 
and investigation. As proved in Chapter V, light metaphysics is, in fact, a perfect fusion of 
deification and investigation: Suhrawardī aims to make philosophical sense—by philosophical 
arguments—of whatever he apprehends by presential knowledge. (2) Suhrawardī explicitly 
requires his readers to study the Peripatetic works before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, for Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 
is intended only for those who are already proficient in investigation but seeking more wisdom. 
(3) Undoubtedly, Suhrawardī has distinctive philosophical positions in epistemology, the 
problem of universals and metaphysics, and his positions are all established by sophisticated 
philosophical arguments. 
As remarked in the introduction to this thesis, I never deny the mystical side of 
Suhrawardī’s thought; whoever denies this mystical side can never grasp the true nature of 
Illuminationist philosophy. Over-emphasising this mystical side, however, is not helpful at all in 
reconstructing Suhrawardī’s philosophy, for one may never be able to reveal the philosophical 
reasons underlying this mystical side, which lead Suhrawardī to mysticism in the first place. In 
short, since everything in the real world is particular in its own right, they require to be 
apprehended by presential knowledge. Suhrawardī’s ambition, therefore, is to exhaust human 
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beings’ cognitive ability to know all the real particular things as they are, including immaterial 
things beyond this world.  
Suhrawardī is obviously not a follower of Avicenna. (1) There are simply too many 
criticisms of Peripatetic doctrines in his philosophical works, especially in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. 
There is no way to interpret them as Avicennan. (2) Presential knowledge, of which the objects 
are particulars rather than universals, is in no way Avicennan. (3) God must know particulars as 
they are (rather than in a universal way); this cannot be Avicennan. (4) Suhrawardī’s light 
metaphysics, which is all about particulars, is clearly not Avicennan. Just as the fact that Plotinus 
knows Aristotle well does not make him an Aristotelian, the fact that Suhrawardī knows 
Avicenna well also does not make him a follower of Avicenna.  
If I am asked to reveal the nature of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy by only one 
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